On February 3, officials at Memphis Zoo in Tennessee announced the unexpected death of one of their giant pandas, Le Le (which means ‘happiness’ in Chinese). An autopsy revealed that Le Le died of heart disease. 

Le Le and his partner Ya Ya came to the United States in 2003 as part of a joint research program between the Memphis Zoo and the Chinese Association of Zoological Gardens – an initiative focused on panda protection and conservation.

Le Le was initially expected to be returned to China with his partner Ya Ya (‘cute girl’) in April of this year. Due to their scarcity, pandas are usually offered on loan by China, with the expectation of return at the end of the term. Le Le’s death brought grief and sorrow to the global community but also sparked fury among animal rights  and panda lovers, who believe that Le Le and Ya Ya were suffering from mistreatment in the zoo, a factor which they allege caused Le Le’s passing. 

Over the last two years, U.S. animal rights organizations such as In Defense of Animals (IDA) and Panda Voices have repeatedly requested that the Memphis Zoo send their pandas back to a sanctuary in China. The reason for this request stems from their claims of malnourishment, skin disease and excessive caging of the pandas. Disheartening images of Le Le and Ya Ya have circulated, showing both pandas as grubby, distressed and malnourished. This specific image of Ya Ya was tweeted by IDA in late November of 2021. In early 2022, panda activists in both the United States and China expressed similar concerns about Le Le’s and Ya Ya’s health conditions, especially when comparing them to pandas within similar age ranges living in other zoos around the world.

The Memphis Zoo responded to the criticisms and defended itself in a statement after Le Le’s death, calling out misinformation. They explained that they truly cared for Le Le and Ya Ya and had been looking after them and closely monitoring their health conditions. This did not assuage public concerns. Le Le’s death trended on Chinese social media, with Chinese panda lovers calling for the early return of Ya Ya. Some panda lovers residing in the United States have donated money for better food and treatment of Ya Ya and even flew to Memphis to ensure her safety. Meanwhile, others streamed videos about Le Le and Ya Ya’s experience on the digital screens at Times Square in New York City, hoping to bring more public attention to the issue. 

Pandas have been considered an important part of U.S.-China relations from the very start. In 1972, President Nixon’s visit to China paved the way for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. As a gesture of friendship, China gifted two giant pandas to the United States. Since then, more and more pandas have traveled to different countries around the world to promote cross-cultural communication and collaboration, as well as propel research on animal preservation. Currently, around 20 countries in the world have pandas; three U.S. zoos have currently loaned pandas from China. This long-term initiative by China has had dual benefits: not only are people interested in learning about China as a result of pandas, but the joint efforts also contributed to the removal of pandas from China’s endangered species list in 2021. 

Chinese people also refer to giant pandas as Guobao (‘national treasure’), a strong indicator that they take pride in pandas and see them as a representation of their country. According to People’s Daily, four characteristics are essential for an animal to attain status as a so-called national treasure: the animal is unique or mostly owned by a specific country; it reflects the country’s cultural characteristics; it represents the country’s image; and it is closely related to the country’s development. Pandas’ black-and-white appearance echoes China’s philosophical concept of Yin and Yang, and the species is well-built and signals humbleness, peace and harmony. These concepts constitute the national image that China wants to show the world. In fact, one of the mascots during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics was a panda; The 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics also had the panda as the only mascot.

Scholars consider pandas to be China’s soft power, which refers to a country’s values and culture that foreigners find attractive. Sharing these values and cultural aspects with international audiences will pique their curiosity and increase their favorable perception towards this specific country. This will eventually help improve bilateral relations, encourage commerce, communication and other types of exchanges between the domestic and foreign public. In a New York Times article, political science professor Andrew J. Nathan from Columbia University said that pandas constitute an image of friendship diplomacy. Even with tensions rising between the United States and China over the past decade and the American public holding a generally negative view of China, pandas remain an aspect of China that they find positive. The Smithsonian National Zoo’s panda habitat continues to be the destination spot for tourists; when a panda cub was born at the National Zoo in 2020, over 4.2 million users watched the live stream.

Politicians often see panda diplomacy as one-way diplomacy, or China’s political tool to influence the foreign public. However, they fail to understand that panda diplomacy works both ways and carries a reverse effect, as the meanings that pandas embody also make them important to Chinese people. Le Le’s death is unlikely to create further damage to inter-governmental U.S.-China relations overall, as neither the Chinese nor the U.S. government officials have commented on this. The incident also does not carry any direct political implications. Yet it will, to some extent, affect how the Chinese public views the United States, making them believe the country is disrespectful of its relations with China. This in turn may potentially discourage cross-cultural communication and exchanges between the two countries, making them less likely to cooperate in international affairs.

For the Chinese public, giving out their ‘national treasure’ to a foreign country is a gesture of goodwill. However, the death of Le Le and the controversies surrounding panda mistreatment at Memphis Zoo has only made Chinese panda lovers question the sincerity of the United States. Chinese news media commented in an editorial: “The current look of Ya Ya not only breaks the hearts of the Chinese people. We hope that its health condition can improve after returning to China. When even giant pandas are affected and implicated, it indicates the China-US relations are already quite bad. This is a strong warning signal. It shows that the hostile posture of some Washington elites toward China has already affected the normal and friendly interactions between the two peoples.”

The dispute over panda mistreatment in the United States might have also unexpectedly changed and furthered relations between the Chinese public and other countries. The death of Le Le  panda lovers examine how pandas are being treated in other countries. Chinese media as well as content creators compared and contrast how pandas are being treated in different countries. The zoo in South Korea received praise for their care of three pandas. The caretaker Kang Cherwon, who Chinese panda lovers affectionately called “Grandpa Kang,” decided to learn Chinese and teach Chinese to the South Korean-born panda cub Fu Bao, in hopes of reducing language barriers for the cub after she returns to China. In an interview with Chinese media this March, Cherwon introduced the pandas’ conditions in Chinese. Panda treatment in Russia, Qatar and Japan has also been reported more favorably.

China’s panda diplomacy, as a part of public diplomacy, can be considered successful as it promotes positive engagement between China and the foreign public. In essence, China’s panda diplomacy continues to establish cultural ties between China and other countries. Panda lovers across the world are now waiting to see if Ya Ya will recover after she returns to China this April. Her condition and behavior at home will soon provide a concrete answer to what her real experience at the Memphis Zoo was like. What follows might once again cause further reverse effects between the U.S. and Chinese public, hindering cross-cultural interactions and understanding.

This is another cog in a dangerous trend for the West. Many Pacific Rim nations are forming strategic partnerships with Chinese companies, which have drastically increased their foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region since the turn of the century. 

These moves could destabilize the smaller Pacific Rim states and significantly threaten the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategic framework that has been a core part of President Joe Biden’s foreign policy. 

The Pacific Rim nations are a quagmire in today’s world. Due to the vast amounts of ocean compared to land, these countries developed in complete isolation from the rest of the world. While many of these countries have been independent since the mid-late 20th century, they remain some of the poorest and underdeveloped economies in the world, almost wholly dependent on international aid with very few strong domestic industries. 

The pandemic exacerbated this: Pacific Rim nations were hit hardest by COVID-19 due to travel bans and stringent government-imposed quarantines. These factors make the Pacific Rim vulnerable to China’s often predatory FDI practices through its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other strategic partnerships. 

Chinese investment in Pacific Rim countries is a relatively new phenomenon. The majority of countries in the region previously established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. That number has significantly decreased as Chinese willingness to invest has increased and Taiwan has become more polarized from its neighbors. Countries like Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Tonga and Samoa have all switched allegiances in the past few years. Through various investments,  from building naval bases in the Solomon Islands to constructing telecommunications networks in Vanuatu to an extensive package of loans to Samoa, China’s footprint has significantly increased in the region. A large part of that can be explained by the differences in the structure and goals of the IMF and the World Bank vs. how China and its state-owned enterprises operate.

The growing presence of Chinese investment in Oceania is primarily due to fewer conditions for accessing loans from China than the IMF and the OECD. Meanwhile, China provides loans so long as they can afford to ensnare countries in what is known as “debt-trap diplomacy.” This is where economically fragile companies who can not afford to pay China back are forced to give up government or strategic assets, such as ports. This is already the case in certain countries in Oceania, like Samoa, where nearly ⅔ of their debt ($160 million ) was owed to China, and for a country that holds just an $800 million GDP, that is a massive amount of economic leverage to China. If this trend continues, Samoa likely will become the norm rather than the exception.

The most dangerous example of Chinese influence can be seen in the parliament of the Solomon Islands. Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, in his fourth non-consecutive term, was up for a vote of no-confidence, having been removed from his previous terms in the same fashion. However, Sogavare has strong pro-Chinese tendencies and having spearheaded the beginning of the relationship, the Chinese government did not want him to be replaced. The Chinese government paid off every person who voted against the vote of no confidence, and Sogavare remained in power. 

This demonstrates how China has been taking advantage of countries with weak democratic institutions, like the Solomon Islands and forming strategic partnerships with the promise of a brighter future. Aid could indeed be beneficial for these countries. However, most of the benefits of FDI, especially investment from China’s SOEs, are concentrated in two places: Chinese elites and the South Pacific government elites, with little trickling down. Moreover, China’s soft power allows it to impose its political will on these nations. In Oceania, many nations have already renounced Taiwan as an independent state and instead have chosen to recognize the legitimacy of the People’s Republic of China’s claim to the throne. 

Many argue that whether these nations hold allegiance to China or the West does not matter. However, the intentions of the Chinese government, coupled with the actions and strategic partnerships of Oceania nations, spell significant trouble for future U.S. interests. The United States is taking this seriously after recently committing to send representatives to the Solomon Islands to straighten things out. 

Now let’s make it clear — China is not pursuing monetary policy in Oceania for technology transfer like they may in the United States or the EU. Instead, Chinese SOEs and Chinese money is flowing into these countries to increase Chinese soft power in the region and protect against the expansion of the U.S. Indo-Pacific alliance. There are also serious concerns that strong Chinese partnerships with Oceania could lead to the establishment of military barriers, countering the West’s traditional military dominance in the region. 

The United States, under President Biden’s administration, has been focused on the expansion and strengthening of ties with major players in Southeast Asia and Oceania. While China has been busy cultivating interests through an inflow of capital in smaller Oceanic countries, including the Solomon Islands, the United States seems to be solely focused on the larger, wealthier economic powers. While some relationships have been strengthened (Japan and South Korea), others, such as India, are still somewhat tenuous due to a lack of strong stance taken during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. 

Another recent development in the Pacific Rim region is the growing worry of polarization between the Pacific Rim nations. Many are now strongly siding with China or Taiwan and the rest of the West, including Micronesia and Tuvalu. For now, many in these countries welcome competition between the two because they see it as beneficial for getting the best deal, but it could come back to bite them if the United States and China engage in a proxy war. 

Despite Australia being their primary economic supporter, many Pacific Rim countries have increasingly prioritized their relationship with China, despite announcing their intentions to divert almost bilateral aid to the South Pacific away from Southeast Asia and Chinese investment decreasing year-over-year in the region since 2018. 

Why is that the case? This primarily lies in Australia’s historically poor climate policy and seeming inaction to take responsibility for climate change. While many in the developed world say they care about climate change, many South Pacific Islanders are at the frontline experiencing the worst of the effects. For them, climate change is personal, and Australia has done little to rectify the situation. They have an extremely poor climate policy and are one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of coal. At the recent COP26 climate negotiations, Australia had a bad performance committing to zero binding climate targets and receiving a colossal fossil award for the worst overall performance by a country. 

All of these issues have culminated in a shift in power in Oceania. Once thought untouchable, China has slowly chipped away and now maintains a strong presence in the region. Until Australia, New Zealand and the United States commit to a strong climate change policy, expect many countries to keep their allegiances open and even swing towards China. 

According to journalist George Yang in Wired Magazine, Techno-Orientalism, which creates an ideology of the Asian “Other,” rests on Western logic of the East as a technological threat to the world. With Beijing’s technological rise in an increasingly globalized world, Techno-Orientalist frameworks have now become fundamental to specifically describing China.

Plan A Magazine’s Lily Luo writes that the term “Techno-Orientalism” was originally coined by Asian scholars like David Roh, Greta Niu and Betsy Huang. These scholars perceived Techno-Orientalism as the projection of historical Orientalism, or what Khan Academy’s Nancy Demerdash describes as the “conception of an ‘Orient’ that was rooted in incivility.” 

Under the futuristic gaze of Techno-Orientalism, East Asians are not only conceived of as a racialized source of fear, but also a source of technological fear. In other words, the technological advancements of East Asian countries were perceived as a threat to the global order. 

Today, Techno-Orientalism is most evident in the Western media’s coverage of China, which often reflects what Yang describes as “Western anxieties about the East.” 

“China’s dystopian tech could be contagious,” reads a 2018 headline from The Atlantic. The word “contagious” implicitly projects the notion that China’s technology is somehow diseased, evoking imagery of illness and a plague — racialized elements that Yang states were formerly attributed to Chinese immigrants building the United States’s Transcontinental Railroad back in the 19th century. 

The article goes on to describe China’s “social credit” system and its effects as a method of “social control” with “teeth.” The element of “teeth” provokes a more physical understanding of China’s technological capabilities. Instead of directly analyzing the mechanics of the system, the article employs metaphors that conjure up negative connotations of fear and violence.  

Another headline for a 2019 article in The American Conservative demonstrates a similar concept: “George Orwell’s Dystopian Nightmare in China.” The featured image displays a large cartoon of Chinese President Xi Jinping looming over ordinary citizens and handing them numbers intended to dictate their identities. The article cites the Orwellian vision of the world — particularly Social Psychologist Erich Fromm’s afternote about the dangers of men becoming machines — implying that this is what China has become. 

The issue is not endemic to a few articles or a handful of media organizations and publications. In a 2018 op-ed in Bloomberg, Cathy O’Neil argues that the United States must take an active stand against the surveillance state with the headline: “Want to See Your Dystopian Future? Look at China.” For The New York Post, a headline reads: “China’s ‘social credit’ system is a dystopian nightmare.”

This angled coverage of China, unintentional or not, falls prey to a certain dehumanizing rhetoric in which the Chinese people are viewed as constant victims of a dystopian, futuristic state. In the process of shedding light on how China’s technological advancements may strip humanity away from Chinese citizens, an important topic that deserves coverage and criticism, Western media coverage paradoxically falls victim to the same trope: implying that Chinese people are mindless robots at the mercy of a technological villain. 

It is necessary, though, to acknowledge that criticism of Techno-Orientalist sentiments pervasive in Western media is not based on the assumption that such articles are not credible. In fact, it is because these articles are so well-written and well-researched on a topic that merits global attention that it becomes even more essential to understand how racialized ideals manifest in complex ways within contemporary media discourse — even in the small ways, like headlines, images and adjectives. 

This problem becomes cyclical, especially because so many articles cite the ideas mentioned by others. This may explain how the media tends to exacerbate Sinophobia. Often, Western media’s hegemonic mindset regarding Beijing prizes competition over collaboration. This undermines a positive diplomatic relationship between the United States and China and, more critically, a nuanced American understanding of Chinese people, culture and values.

When evaluating how Techno-Orientalism has shaped internalized conceptions of China, it is critical to be rhetorically careful and to distinguish between hard evidence and Western interpretations of that evidence. These interpretations appear to be motivated by hegemonic fears of Asian countries achieving unprecedented progress and subverting colonialist paradigms. 

Alternatively, these interpretations may be real fear rooted in the use of technology to oppress certain liberties — a genuine concern. However, journalists must be careful in examining their assumptions and biases. When writing about China, they should consider how certain language may benefit discourse on the country or proliferate harmful stereotypes.

It may even be worth thinking about how the media can provide a counternarrative to Techno-Orientalist ideologies. Instead of characterizing China’s technological rise as dangerous and fear-mongering, journalists and media experts could explain the original reasoning behind such technological policy measures. 

The Qiao Collective, for example, is an organization that is a staunch defender of China against “Western aggression.” While not without its controversies and criticism, the volunteer-run media site features articles intended to provide a more nuanced, humanizing perspective on China. Articles on the website strategically deconstruct stereotypes and misconceptions about China from raising awareness of China’s internationalist solidarity during the coronavirus pandemic to more personal reflections on the connections between China’s political thought and anti-racist thinking. 

Ultimately, addressing biases in media coverage can enhance not only the quality of reporting, but also address the ways in which reporting contributes to political misconceptions of entire nationalities, cultures and values.

Cross-cultural diplomacy is amplified by programs like the Yenching Academy of Peking University and Schwarzman Scholars of Tsinghua University. Each are master’s programs funded by the Chinese government for scholars to learn about China from an interdisciplinary and international perspective. Much like the Fulbright U.S. Student program, these two programs are intended to equip students with the tools to pursue future careers with a globally-minded perspective, and are critical examples of the importance of public tools in the 21st century.

As for differences between the two programs, the Yenching Academy offers a more theoretical humanities-oriented curriculum. Selected Yenching Scholars have the opportunity to choose which area of research they would like to focus their studies in, including subjects from History and Archaeology to Literature and Culture. Schwarzman Scholars take a more professional business-oriented approach. Required courses for Schwarzman Scholars include courses such as “Leadership in Business” and “Leadership in Diplomacy and Security.” 

On an educational level, programs such as Yenching and Schwarzman inform their students about Chinese perspectives — perspectives that are often missing or ignored in Western media coverage of China. They provide the opportunity to refine an understanding of China not only in relation to the United States or Western hegemony but to also humanize its distinct identity and consider the challenges it faces as a nation. 

On the other hand, such programs also disseminate what Western students may believe is Chinese propaganda, above all else. 

Bethany Allen Ebrahimian of The Atlantic writes that because such programs are so closely aligned with the CCP, which has enabled their existence, this often leads to contradictory practices and a moral dilemma. How do these programs reconcile their professed educational purpose with political obstacles? To what extent can students reaping the benefits of these programs be considered “complicit” in the CCP’s political agenda? These are the questions that Ebrahimian believes define the controversy surrounding Sino-American exchange. 

This conflict begins in the very selection process. In the process of investigating the politics of such programs, Ebrahimimian was told by a Schwarzman Scholars spokesperson that CCP officials have firsthand involvement in selecting the students that will participate in the program. 

This aspect of admissions most likely means that the program is geared towards a particular kind of student: one who ideologically conforms to Party beliefs and avoids any dialogue that could be perceived as politically inflammatory. Ebrahimian believes that for a program that advertises itself as a forum for open educational exchange, Schwarzman Scholars appears to still place political interests at the forefront. 

Andrew Jacobs, a former New York Times foreign correspondent based in Beijing, states that a program like Yenching is intended to “raise the global profile of Chinese universities” and increase positive sentiments about China and Chinese education. While this may be an admirable purpose from a nationalistic perspective, it also means that this education is politically-minded and will thus likely entertain a certain vision of national history and culture. 

In those instances, Western students must serve as critical consumers of information. They must consider information presented more widely as less of an educational classroom discussion but as the experience of a Chinese reality. 

In light of these elements, the challenge that programs like Yenching and Schwarzman face is overcoming the political divide that shaped their formation in the first place. Despite the fact that Peking University and Tsinghua University are widely known for their prestige as the two top universities in China, Western responses to these programs have centered on undermining their educational credibility in favor of projecting their own political suspicions onto their institutional caliber.  

According to an article from NPR, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) questioned graduates of the Yenching Scholars program, asking whether or not their time in China had allowed them to participate in Chinese espionage efforts. From the perspective of these graduates, it seems like studying abroad in China has become linked to threatening national security. In looking at the United States’ response, it is paradoxical that the mission to bridge the gap between the United States and China has only widened it. 

Moreover, on a pedagogical level, there is also concern as to whether or not students participating in these educational programs will be able to effectively study in China and from all points of view, especially given the concern of censorship. Topics like the Uyghur crisis in Xinjiang, the Hong Kong protests and Taiwanese independence are fraught with controversy. Potential students may wonder to what extent they are able to freely discuss these topics and how much “debate,” a core component of Western education, is exactly allowed.  

In an article for SupChina, an alumnus (whose name was kept confidential) of the Yenching Scholars program defends the program against such concerns. The student criticizes the NPR article for framing the issue as a problem inherent in the government-funded Yenching Scholars program. They specifically target the article’s assumption that the goal of Yenching is to indoctrinate students into pursuing the Chinese Communist Party’s political agenda. 

In fact, the student says, while subjects are always taught first and foremost from the Chinese government’s point of view, there is also room to nuance those ideas. This is an especially important element given the international bent of the Yenching Scholars program as a cross-cultural collaboration above all else. 

“On several occasions, I personally raised the issue of the Chinese government’s concentration-camp-like policies in Xinjiang, including to a former prominent diplomatic official with deep ties to the Party,” the student writes. “Not once did I feel targeted, harassed or sanctioned for those comments, and often my classmates readily participated in the discussion.”

In contrast, Noah Lachs, a former Schwarzman Scholar, argues the exact opposite: that the very weakness of such educational programs lies in the polarization of the political contexts that contributed to their creation. He expresses that there exists a pressing disparity in Western and Chinese perspectives when it comes to viewing China as more than a one-dimensional concept. This has to do with the dominant narratives cultivated by each country for their citizens, which in turn informs the very nature of how subjects are taught.

“On three occasions when I broached [the subject of Xinjiang](twice with Chinese students outside the Schwarzman program), I was told that Uyghurs were responsible for a ‘genocide against Han Chinese people,’” Lachs writes. “This is not an arguable principle but a falsification. It is not possible to begin a dialogue on human rights or counter-extremism when such assumptions persist.”

To Lachs, there is no possibility of building ideological bridges because of the ways that overarching political differences are fundamentally rooted in individual viewpoints. In other words, there cannot be a dialogue because what the West believes are facts are presented as opinions in Chinese classrooms rather than truth. 

Visually represented, the disparity that Lachs presents is akin to a Venn diagram. The distinct positionality of Western and Chinese points of view implies that there is no commonality, no overlap by which the two can meet.

The contradictions inherent in these two different experiences is emblematic of the political ideologies that surround contemporary discourse about China. Students of Yenching and Schwarzman, along with other educational programs, must be cognizant of their unique roles in cultivating the broader diplomatic relationship between the United States and China. Likewise, there also needs to be a greater understanding of the underlying factors that may undermine this mission.

It is clear that more than the issues discussed, the very programs themselves are rooted in political controversy. As such, it is essential to negotiate sociocultural understandings of such programs within the greater political divide. 

Yet, when it comes to the role of education in the US-China relationship, education cannot be separated from its context. As Lachs writes, perhaps building bridges is not the right term. Perhaps it is evaluating whether or not there are the resources on both sides, particularly on the West’s part, necessary to even begin a discussion in the first place. 

BEIJING AND HONG KONG — On April 13, Japan announced that it would release around 1.25 million tons of nuclear wastewater into the Pacific Ocean within two years, a process that is expected to last for 40 years. Although the Japanese government claimed that the wastewater has been treated and will have minimal risk for human health, the plan has sparked outcry both at home and abroad. 

Japan has been dealing with the effects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident for the last decade. On March 11, 2011, an earthquake and the following tsunami hit the prefecture of Fukushima, located on the eastern coast of Japan. The disaster led to the meltdown of three of the six reactors at the largest nuclear power plant in the region, causing explosions and the leak of radioactive substances into the atmosphere and the ocean. 

Japan started decommissioning the nuclear plant after the disaster, and an average of 170 tons of water are pumped into the broken reactors daily to prevent the melted cores from overheating. During the process, the water has been contaminated by harmful radioactive substances from the core and then stored within the vessels near the power plant. Although more than 1,000 vessels are being used to contain the wastewater at this point, it is estimated that there will be no extra room for storage by 2022. 

Feeling the imminent challenge, the Japanese cabinet had started a discussion on releasing the wastewater into the ocean five years ago. Some of the proposed solutions include evaporating the wastewater and releasing them into the ocean. The government eventually adopted the latter solution as it is believed to be the more reliable option.

Responding to the decision, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, claimed that the government would “take every measure to absolutely guarantee the safety of the treated water and address misinformation.” 

The operator of the Fukushima nuclear power plant, Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc. (TEPCO), uses an advanced liquid processing system (ALPS) to treat the radioactive wastewater and minimize the radioactivity. TEPCO plans to dilute tritium, a harmful radioactive isotope in the wastewater, to fewer than 1,500 becquerels in every liter of water. The figure is well below the national standard of 60,000 becquerels of tritium per liter.

Yet, many in Japan have objected. A nationwide survey conducted by The Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese national newspaper, reported that 55% of respondents opposed the plan, compared to 32% that supported it. On April 13, protestors gathered around governmental buildings in Tokyo and Fukushima to show their disapproval of the government’s decision to release treated wastewater into the ocean. 

Several environmental groups also voiced their concerns about whether the discharged wastewater is safe enough. Friends of the Earth Japan pointed out that the government has not been candid with the details of how to treat radioactive elements other than tritium. Meanwhile, United Nations experts noted that the ALPS is not sufficient enough to remove all radioactive elements in most nuclear wastewater. The experts claimed that “[a]first application ALPS failed to clean the water below regulatory levels and there are no guarantees that a second treatment will succeed.”

The pushback is particularly strong in the fishing industry, where members are afraid that the release of treated, radioactive wastewater will still turn customers away from the Japanese seafood manufactured in the area. Their worries are not unsubstantiated, as 15 countries and regions have been restricting the import of Japanese fishery and agricultural products ever since the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011. 

In February, Japan held back on shipments of black rockfish from the Fukushima Prefecture because the amount of radioactive cesium detected was five times the national standard. Even though the release of nuclear wastewater equates to a certain amount of economic losses and environmental concerns, the impacts only pertain to certain areas and limited groups of people. 

Japan’s plan hasn’t gone unnoticed by its neighbors either. China has condemned Japan for being “highly irresponsible” by endangering public health, noting that “the oceans are mankind’s shared property.” South Korea called the plan “utterly intolerable” and “one-sided”, and threatened to file a case with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Russia, North Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines have expressed similar concerns.

On the contrary, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States have backed the plan and called it safe. 

“In this unique and challenging situation, Japan has weighed the options and effects, has been transparent about its decision, and appears to have adopted an approach in accordance with globally-accepted nuclear safety standards,” a statement from the U.S. Department of State read. 

The support came a few days before Suga was scheduled to meet with President Biden to strengthen the partnership between the two nations. However, the United States has not lifted its ban on Fukushima food imports, which has been in place since 2011. 

Still, the Japanese government insists that the plan is safe and scientifically sound. They also pointed out their neighbors’ hypocrisy: South Korea’s Wolseong Nuclear Power Plant and China’s Daya Nuclear Power Plant both have a history of releasing tritium into the ocean. Despite this, both China and South Korea — along with neighboring countries —  likely feel domestic pressure to take a strong stance against Japan’s plan, partly because the Fukushima disaster is so etched into regional memory.

Whether their worries are rational or not, many people in the region “are going to be very, very anxious about what would happen if this radioactive material came into our near seas and contaminated our resources,” Eunjung Lim, an associate professor of international relations at Kongju National University in South Korea, told The New York Times.

China and South Korea have been the most vocal against Japan’s plans. This is not surprising given the countries’ proximity to the island; but the distrust is underscored by historical and political conflicts. 

TEPCO’s history of scandals has long caused it to lose trust both domestically and abroad. South Korea and China further take issue with the Japanese government behind TEPCO, whether it’s due to ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea, or historical grievances that date back to World War II. 

Lately, South Korea has dialed down their complaints and struck a more conciliatory tone, saying that they won’t oppose the plan if Japan abides by IAEA standards. This may be due to an unwillingness to sacrifice bilateral ties, as Japan is a valuable trading partner and market. Chinese officials, on the other hand, have kept up an aggressive stance, maintaining its years-long ban on certain imports from Fukushima and even daring Japanese officials to drink the treated wastewater. Unless they impose further economic sanctions, Japan is not likely to change its course.

Nevertheless, in the face of such intense domestic and regional pushback, Japan would not only have to navigate the scientific and technological challenges of releasing its nuclear wastewater, but ensure transparency, reestablish trust and manage good public relations regarding the plan both at home and abroad. 

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak in December, China has taken a huge hit to its international reputation. Harshly criticized by foreign journalists for its initial coverup and delayed containment response, China now faces a remarkable challenge: repairing its image and restoring its position as a global leader. With a significant slowdown of new cases within its borders and the spotlight on the United States as the new epicenter of the outbreak, China has begun taking advantage of the fragile situation abroad to change the narrative surrounding the virus. 

Origin Theories

One of the CCP’s primary objectives is reframing the coronavirus as a non-Chinese disease. At a February press conference in Guangzhou, Zhong Nanshan, a Chinese respiratory specialist who has been leading the government response, stated: “Though the COVID-19 was first discovered in China, it does not mean that it originated from China.” Furthermore, Lijian Zhao, an official spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, posted a tweet in early March stating, “it might be [the]US army who brought the epidemic to Wuhan … US owe us an explanation!” 

Zhao also shared a link to an essay which blames the US for the outbreak, published by Global Research, a Canadian organization known for anti-Western conspiracy theories. As American officials like President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have repeatedly called out China for its role in the spread of the virus, referring to COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus” and the “Wuhan virus,” it is clear the CCP has intentions to retaliate by shifting the blame to the US.

CCP Twitter Campaigns

Zhao’s tweet is only one example of a recent increase of Twitter use by Chinese authorities to exert influence; in the last year, tens of thousands of accounts posting pro-CCP propaganda have popped up across the platform, tweeting primarily in Chinese but also sharing content in English. 

These accounts are easily identifiable — they all have stock photo profile images or no profile photo at all, zero followers, and only like and share others’ misinformation content so that it will trend. While previously these Twitter accounts were used to denounce democratic protests in Hong Kong, since the beginning of the coronavirus outbreak, there has been a sharp increase in tweets that spread misleading propaganda which seeks to reframe the CCP as a hero for its response to the pandemic. 

Not only is China creating fake accounts on Twitter, a platform blocked for those within its borders, it is also hacking and taking over existing accounts owned by users around the world. One example is the case of Kalen Keegan, a college student at the University of Nebraska who found herself unable to login to her account last year. According to an investigation by ProPublica, her profile photo and biography was changed, and the account regularly began posting tweets condemning the Hong Kong protests. 

Like Keegan, other users are seeing their accounts overtaken and used to spread propaganda which applauds Chinese efforts to reduce impacts of the coronavirus or assigns unsubstantiated blame to the US. Moreover, Chinese operatives are soliciting assistance from real Twitter users, directly offering funds to influential Chinese-speaking Twitter users to create coronavirus propaganda posts. 

China as a Global Health Provider

Although the US previously led the world in responding to global health crises, China is currently dominating in COVID-19 aid while the US addresses the outbreak domestically. While China itself slowly continues to recover, the CCP has already launched a global aid offensive to regain trust abroad, providing masks, hazmat suits, and test kits to countries severely hit by the virus. Additionally, it has sent teams of doctors experienced in treating the virus to help effectively treat foreign patients. Such moves highlight China’s desire to restore its image and strengthen relations with its allies.

However these efforts are not entirely fueled by generosity. China is not only donating supplies; it is also greatly profiting from selling its surplus of medical equipment to other nations. The CCP has been praised for shipping about as many medical supplies to Europe as it previously received in donation, but is not all free. 

As international demand spreads, Chinese companies are increasing production of medical supplies to gain global market share. In the first two months of the year, 8,950 new manufacturers started creating masks in China. Companies that previously produced items ranging from iPhones to electric cars are now abandoning production of these goods in favor of selling masks. While the global economy falters, China seeks to restore its own footing and turn a profit by dominating distribution of the supplies urgently needed by those struggling abroad. 

As the US remains occupied by the rapidly developing health crisis, China is taking advantage of the opportunity to step up as a global leader and shift focus away from its role in the spread of COVID-19. It remains unclear how the coronavirus will affect the international order long-term, but for now, China is doing all that it can to ensure it is not permanently knocked from power.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

In October of 2019, The United States Senate passed the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act unanimously. The act is an addition to a series of US measures intended to ameliorate Taiwan’s worsening foreign relations. The act also symbolizes a change in attitude towards China, as the US makes a clear effort to assist Taiwan — a historically delicate issue in US-China relations. Although Trump seeks to counter China’s impact in Taiwan, US effort in elevating Taiwan’s diplomatic status could be counterproductive as China responds with harsher policies. 

The US has traditionally preferred a conservative stance on Taiwan to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait. Former US President Barack Obama prioritized cooperation with China on common security issues – primarily global warming – over provocative actions that could strain bilateral relations. The US’ long-standing inclination to prevent tensions with China was most evidently signified by previous declination to sell military vehicles to Taiwan. On the other hand, Trump, a stubborn disbeliever of environmental changes and a strong advocate for the “America First” strategy, has taken an adversarial position in his China policy. Trump launched investigations on China’s economic aggression and expansion almost immediately after he was inaugurated into office. 

Tensions escalated between the US and China as the Sino-US Trade War intensified.  While the economic growth of China plummeted amid the Trade War, Taiwan emerged as a beneficiary of the War’s impact as the value of its currency rose and Taiwanese companies returned home to produce goods. Taiwan’s greatest gain from the US-China feud, however, is an ideological one. Under Trump and his team of China-hawks, China was re-examined and officially recognized as a “revisionist power” that posed a threat to the national security of the US. Such a narrative aligns with that of Taiwan, a de facto independent country that has struggled to deal with invasion threats and isolation from the international community as a result of Chinese pressure.

Trump’s attempt to improve Taiwan’s official status became apparent as US-China antagonism heightened. In 2018, the Senate unanimously passed the Taiwan Travel Act, which would “allow high-level officials of Taiwan to enter the United States;”. The US would later go on to approve various sales of arms to Taiwan, the most recent of which was valued at $2.2 billion. Furthermore, Taiwan’s strategic role was considered with new significance as US officials continuously cited Taiwan in its vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. This streak of US support has emboldened President Tsai Ing-wen to make more assertive statements on the national security of Taiwan and even visit New York to deliver a speech at Columbia University, all of which triggered strong reactions from China.

Though a strengthened partnership with the US opens doors to diplomatic opportunities for Taiwan, it simultaneously catalyzes pressure from China. Beijing has begun to express resolute opposition against Taiwan’s interactions with the US through its actions. Just this summer, Beijing issued a tourism ban that restricts Chinese residents from traveling to Taiwan as solo visitors. The ban could potentially result in lost revenue of $900.5 million in the Taiwanese tourism industry, which still heavily relies on Chinese tourists. A few months later, two of Taiwan’s remaining seventeen formal allies cut ties with the island and switched recognition to Beijing. In denouncing US arms sales to the island, China went as far as declaring that “China’s military will be ready to go to war” if “there are people who dare to try to split Taiwan from the country.” Beijing’s message is clear: the US would be playing with fire if it meddles with Taiwan.

In fact, Beijing cannot afford to compromise much on Taiwan. Sandwiched by a declining economic performance and a lack of progress on the trade deal, China’s President Xi Jinping needs to secure China’s national interest in Taiwan to justify his lifelong rule. Crippled by ceaseless anti-government protests in Hong Kong, Beijing desperately needs to prove its leadership capability by tacking a  firmer position on domestic affairs, of which Taiwan is considered a part. Trump administration would underestimate the significance of Taiwan should it continue to regard Taiwan as a card to pull out in trade negotiations. To China, Taiwan’s political value is beyond a chess piece in the game against the US; it relates to the legitimacy of the governance of the current Chinese government.

To maximize the interests of both the US and Taiwan, Trump needs to strike a careful balance between confronting Beijing and bolstering the self-ruled island. All things aside, an intensified cross-Strait tension, which could be fostered by greater US support, could harm Taiwan’s economy, consequently undermining the island’s ability to conduct defensive actions against China. Instead of taking ambitious steps to solidify Taiwan’s international status or urging the top hub of semiconductor manufacturing to restrict chip exports to China, Washington should work on increasing the financial independence of Taiwan by strengthening commercial ties with it. Establishing bilateral agreements on investments, for instance, could be immensely helpful as Taiwan strives to create a more favorable environment for foreign investments. A more economically independent Taiwan is important for a free and open Indo-Pacific that many US administrations have envisioned. On Taiwan’s side, President Tsai should avoid excessive reliance on the US’ support which, under Trump, is unlikely to be permanent given Trump’s unconventional diplomatic behavior and his America-first policy. Most importantly, Washington and Taipei should be aware of the new challenges ahead as uncertainty of the 2020 presidential elections approaches. 

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

In 1979, Deng Xiaoping, former leader of the People’s Republic of China, implemented a one-child policy in China which ordained that each family could have only one offspring. Fear of overpopulation and another famine occurring soon after the devastating Great Chinese Famine of 1962 were the primary drivers behind the enactment of this law. Deng believed that by limiting the number of children born in China, the population as a whole would gain greater access to basic necessities and better opportunities for economic success. China enforced this policy by requiring intrauterine devices after the birth of a child and imposing punishments such as forced abortions and sterilization for a second pregancy. China abolished its one-child policy in 2015.

Use of Propaganda

The Chinese government inundated its people with slogans touting the benefits of having one child. These messages were found everywhere, from billboards to murals to images printed on decks of cards. The Chinese shibboleth “If you want to become rich quickly, have fewer children” was ubiquitous. 

Those raised during the era of China’s one child policy still bear psychological scars. The victims include more than the mothers who underwent forced abortions or the doctors who performed them. In her September 2019 TED Talk, Nanfu Wang spoke with great emotion about her experience growing up in the time period, saying “I remember feeling a sense of shame because I had a younger brother.” The government propaganda filled the Chinese with such a sense of national duty that many were left with overwhelming guilt if they did not abide.

Abandoned Children

Perhaps the worst consequence of China’s strict one-child policy is that violators sometimes abandoned their children. Some of these abandoned children were left at shelters, while others were tragically abandoned in dumpsters or sewage pipes. The children deserted were most frequently female and sick or disabled because these children were considered less desirable in Chinese society.

Recognizing the abandonment crisis, in 2011, China began building “baby hatches,” or safe places for parents to drop off unwanted children. Many opposed the safety drops because they believed it encouraged abandonment, but experts argued that parents were going to abandon their children under any circumstance. 2016 estimates place the number of orphans in China at 460,000. Tragically, most of these children may never find a home, since children over the age of fourteen are ineligible for international adoption.

China’s Missing Women

The government creates one sole exception to the one-child policy. If a couple had a daughter, they could try again for a son who was more likely to work and bring economic success to the family. However, complications arose when the second pregnancy was also female. These pregnancies often either went unreported or were terminated in sex-selective abortions. This strong preference towards male children led to a significant gender imbalance in China’s population, which has created what is known as China’s “missing women” issue. As a result of this imbalance, studies indicate that by 2020 nearly 24 million Chinese men will experience great difficulty finding wives due to a lack of suitably aged women. Sociologists predict the imbalance will lead to intergenerational marriages, where younger men marry older women. However, such marriages pose further complications for couples as the older women may be beyond child bearing age. Additionally, there is an unknown number of women (“missing women”) who are excluded from receiving state welfare benefits and lack many rights afforded to Chinese citizens because their families failed to document their births by registering them with the government.

The 4-2-1 Problem

Most recently China’s growing concern is the “4-2-1” problem. This 4-2-1 dilemma is the generational burden borne by an aging population of men who are “only children.” It is called the 4-2-1 problem because it explains the dynamic of an adult male who is an “only child”, and who bears the obligation of caring for not only his two aging parents, but also his four aging grandparents. The problem is compounded if these men marry, as they become responsible for their spouse’s parents and grandparents. This financial and social burden only serves to further dissuade couples from having large families themselves. 

Was it effective?

At first glance, it may seem that way. China’s birth rate declined while the policy was in effect between the years of 1979 and 2015. However, this decrease cannot be solely attributed to Deng’s law, as the initial decline in birth rates began even before the one-child policy was implemented. One significant factor that contributed to this  decline was China’s rapid economic expansion during this time period. Researchers, using data from sources such as the United Nations Population Division and Eurostat, have established a pattern of inverse correlation between fertility and income. As a country develops and experiences an increase in income, its fertility rates decline significantly. This calls into question whether the one-child policy was necessary or whether fertility rates would have continued to independently decline as a natural consequence of  China’s growing prosperity.

Will China’s population grow now that there is a two-child limit?

It is very unlikely. Now that families have become accustomed to only having one child, many parents believe that having multiple children would strain their resources. While China previously faced an overpopulation issue, now it faces the opposite: the birth rate is increasingly low. Twenty million children were predicted to be born in 2018, however there were only 15.23 million births that year, two million fewer than the year before. 

International implications?

As China’s population ages and fewer young people work to support its economy, China’s position as a global economic leader may weaken. The combination of a shrinking and aging population will lead to less domestic consumption and economic growth, which could have profound consequences for the global market. Currently, people aged over 60 constitute 17.9% of China’s population, a figure which grows yearly. As the number of China’s eligible workers declines, the country will likely suffer, affecting both its position as an economic world power and the global economy as a whole.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

In a recent Amnesty International report, it was found that 13-year-old Dinara Yergali was just one of many Uighur Muslims in China who have suffered from humanitarian abuses. In March 2018, upon returning back to her hometown in Zhaosu County, Xinjiang with her mother from Kazakhstan, she was detained by the Chinese government. Her whereabouts are still unknown. Yergali’s case highlights one of many in which Uighur Muslims have been wrongfully detained. China’s human rights abuses have been touched upon in recent news, but the media has not adequately covered the severity of these abuses and the overarching consequences of its actions.

Who are the Uighurs and what is their current situation?

The Uighurs are a Turkish ethnic minority in Xinjiang, an autonomous provincial region in Northwest China, where approximately 11 million Uighurs currently reside. Most Uighurs are Muslim and follow a moderate version of Sunni Islam. However, most Uighurs do not view themselves as Chinese but instead feel culturally and ethnically closer to Central Asian countries. Many Uighurs even speak a language close to Turkish, with some refusing to learn Chinese Mandarin.

In August 2018, reports from human rights organizations and the U.S. Department of State confirmed that the Chinese government had detained close to 1 million Uighur Muslims. The U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China wrote that it is “the largest mass incarceration of a minority population in the world today.” The Chinese government is also detaining other ethnic minorities and targeting Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other Muslim citizens who have family members in places which the Chinese government has deemed to be a “sensitive country” such as Indonesia, Kazakhstan and Turkey. Additionally, the Chinese government has published an official list of 26 countries which it has labeled as “sensitive.” Most or all of the nations are Muslim nations.

Since then, Uighurs have been forced to live under an immensely restrictive surveillance state. They have been arrested, detained and relocated to “re-education camps.”  Those that manage to avoid the re-education camps are regularly visited by government workers and are sometimes forced to assigned homestays of government workers.

Orchestrated and widespread government discrimination against Uighurs began in 2014 when 200,000 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members were a part of – according to the Chinese government –  an effort to “visit the people, benefit the people and bring together the hearts of the people.” In this time CCP workers were dispatched to villages in Xinjiang to watch and report on Uighur citizens. In 2016, the “United As One Family” campaign was instituted by the Chinese government. Around 100,000 party workers were placed in the homes of Uighurs whose family members were detained or disappeared as a result of the previous policy. By 2017, there were more than 1 million party members assigned to homestays in Uighurs residences.

What happens in homestays and “re-education camps?”

Homestays are a method for the Chinese government to regulate the religious and cultural practices of Uighurs and other minority groups in order to ensure their allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party. During homestays, party members are told to take note of and change a number of practices such as speaking Mandarin instead of Turkish in the household. The family’s level of religiosity is tested by offering them pork, cigarettes or alcohol (substances prohibited by Islam), or offering a handshake to greet a female member of the family. Their loyalty to the CCP is measured by whether they have Qurans and other religious items in their home or Chinese flags and posters of President Xi Jinping. Furthermore, party members threaten Uighurs to not hide personal opinions or belongings, telling them that their internet and communication activity is being monitored. These measures of loyalty and secularism are used to determine whether family members should be sent to re-education camps or not.

Those sent to camps are brainwashed and nationalized. They are forced to learn Mandarin Chinese, swear their loyalty to Xi Jinping and renounce Islam. The detained have to listen to “ideological lectures, sing hymns in praise of the Chinese government and even write self-criticism essays.” In internment camps, they also live under an extensive surveillance state. China has employed the use of facial recognition cameras and QR codes to track Uighurs and confiscate cell phones and other materials deemed to be threatening to the Chinese regime. There have also been many reports of physical and mental torture. Survivors have said they are subjected to military-style discipline, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement and beatings.

Why are they being persecuted?

China has claimed that its actions are in response to violent Islamist and ethnic separatist groups in the Xinjiang region. It is true that in the past decade there have been conflicts between Han Chinese (China’s ethnic majority) and Uighurs. Similar to Tibetan independence activists, Uighurs have organized to call for their autonomy. Uighurs have felt that their culture and livelihoods are under attack and in response, there have been outbreaks of political violence. For instance, in 2014 a Uighur separatist group was responsible for the stabbing of 33 civilians at a railway station. However, the Chinese government has also indiscriminately blamed attacks on Uighurs from the region. After a knifing attack in February 2017, Xinjiang’s Communist Party boss, Chen Quanguo, urged government forces to “bury the corpses of terrorists in the vast sea of a people’s war.”

 China has also abjectly denied the reports of Uighurs being kept in re-education camps in front of the UN. They later stated that the re-education camps were vocational training facilities, set up in an effort to alleviate poverty and quelling terrorism in the region. Chinese government spokespeople have claimed that the Uighurs were voluntarily given courses on Chinese history, language and culture. Another narrative that the Chinese government has adopted is that religious ideology is a disease. Consequently, the Chinese Communist Party has distributed official messaging describing Uighurs that have been put in re-education camps as being “infected with religious and extremist ideology.”

It is interesting to note that China does not treat all of its Muslim population in the same way as the Uighurs. There are 10.5 million Hui Muslims living in China, making them the largest of China’s recognized ethnic minorities. Unlike the Uighurs, China lets the Hui practice their religion without restriction. For example, Hui Muslims wear traditional Islamic clothing and are even allowed to pray in school, while Uighurs have been forced to cut their beards and remove their veils. CCP workers have gone so far as to prohibit Muslim names for new babies. What is the difference between these two Muslim groups in the eyes of the Chinese government? Simply, the Chinese government does not view the Hui Muslims as a domestic security threat. Hui Muslims are more integrated into the Chinese mainstream with the Han majority and have not pushed for autonomy.

There is also an economic element intertwined in the systematic oppression of Uighurs. China’s new Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious plan to expand China’s sphere of influence to the Middle East and Central Asia through infrastructure and trade, relies on controlling Xinjiang. Xinjiang is home to China’s largest natural gas reserve, 50 percent of the country’s coal reserves and 20 percent of its oil. Two of the Belt and Road Initiative planned economic corridors will pass through Xinjiang. Thus, the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) relies, in part, on the stability of Xinjiang. The Chinese government wants to ensure separatist voices are quelled in order to ensure it can hold onto the region’s resources and move forward with BRI development.

What is being done about this crisis?

As with most human rights crises, the most vocal voices condemning China have been international human rights NGOs. However, their reach has been minimal because of the Chinese government’s tight grip on media and press in the Xinjiang region.

Last year, the U.S. Congressional Executive Commission on China urged the Trump administration to place sanctions on officials and companies involved in the “ongoing human rights crisis” in Xinjiang. The committee wrote, “Muslim ethnic minorities are being subjected to arbitrary detention, torture, egregious restrictions on religious practice and culture and a digitized surveillance system so pervasive that every aspect of daily life is monitored.”

The new UN Human Rights Chief, Michelle Bachelet, has also demanded that monitors be allowed access to Xinjiang, a request that drew an angry response from Beijing. The situation is unlikely to change without greater action from powerful nation-states and Muslim countries. Despite the persecution of the Muslim minority in China, many Muslim nations have been silent on the issue. Perhaps their silence can be attributed to Shia-Muslim governments being unwilling to defend the rights of the Sunni Uighur minority or because many of these governments themselves are familiar with the use of oppressive and repressive tactics against their own citizens.

The international community should be proactive about accepting refugees and refuse to deport Uighur refugees, like Germany and Sweden have done. They should also urge neighboring Central Asian nations to not view their economic interests with China as mutually exclusive with helping refugees. It is unlikely that China would retract their plans for the BRI with countries such as Kazakhstan. However, many Central Asian countries are apprehensive of risking their economic relationship. It is paramount that the international community begin paying attention to the ethnic cleansing of Uighurs.  

According to a report published by C40, a network of the world’s megacities committed to addressing climate change, over 800 million people will live in cities where sea levels could rise by more than half a meter, or approximately five feet, by the year 2050. Despite President Donald Trump’s contrary claims, climate change is real, and the global challenges we collectively face are daunting.

In Southeast Asia, the intense challenges of climate change have disproportionately affected its major urban centers. As a result, citizens in Southeast Asia’s megalopolises are finding themselves on the front lines of a changing planet. Home to approximately over 650 million people, the region houses major financial centers, such as Singapore, major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, such as Indonesia, and places of immense ecological diversity across Borneo, Cambodia, and Burma just to name a few. Southeast Asia is also home to one of the world’s fastest growing populations, making climate change a very real and urgent threat. Three cities in particular, Singapore, Jakarta and Metro Manila have experienced the effects of and are coming up with new innovative solutions to best tackle climate change.

Singapore – Making Green to Become Green

As both a city and a nation-state, Singapore has been more aggressive in addressing climate change than most other cities and countries in the region. Part of its push may lie in the immediate concerns for the city-state, with most of its land mass lying only 15 meters above sea level. Additionally, the infrastructure that the city’s intense urbanization requires has decimated the mangroves and forests around the city, which has lead to major challenges for future planning.

With the mounting challenges, Singapore is poised to take massive strides in addressing climate change through direct government initiatives. Since its establishment in 2010, the National Climate Change Secretariat (NCCS) has been instrumental in shaping policies that will allow Singapore to adapt to the effects of climate change and develop new economic and green growth opportunities that arise. From a carbon tax to investments in natural gas and renewable energy, Singapore has implemented a wide variety of policy initiatives and is continuing to update its infrastructure to reach its target greenhouse gas emissions. According to the Government of Singapore’s projections, the city aims to save 15 percent of its 2013 electricity consumption in 2020. As a result, Singapore will have saved $44 Million USD.  

Singapore is also uniquely situated to use its financial strength to develop new fields in finance. For instance, the city has an ambition plan to be a hub for green finance. Green finance, according to the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), is the use of financial flows from public, private, and non-profit sectors for sustainable development priorities. In June 2017, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) kick-started its plan to develop a green bond market with the “Green Bond Grant” that will be reimbursable of additional costs of up to $100,000 USD obtained through external reviews of a green bond. While this will be a useful tool to help spur green investment in the region, it is clear that there is still a lot of work to do; DBS Bank estimates that ASEAN countries require around 3 trillion USD of green investment until 2030.

Jakarta – That Sinking Feeling

North Jakarta, part of the sprawling megalopolis of metro Jakarta and home to 1.7 million people, could be 90 percent underwater by 2050. Indonesia is a major contributor to climate change and could see major consequences from its actions. Similar to Singapore, Jakarta faces infrastructural problems related to climate change. However, Jakarta’s main issue comes not from sea level rise, but rather from land level sinking. Sinking at an average rate of 1-15 centimeters a year, some of Jakarta’s neighborhoods and buildings have disappeared underground, and dirty brown, sewage-laden rivers have suddenly appeared, flooding major business and financial areas.

Jakarta’s precarious situation comes from a variety of factors related to location, rapid urban growth and, most importantly, an overuse of groundwater. According to a report produced by the Urban Climate Change Research Network, close to 90 precent of the Jakarta Metropolitan area lies below sea level, with around 50 percent of the population living in informal settlements known as Kampungs that are vulnerable to flooding. In fact, since its historical roots of haphazard land reclamation projects initiated by Dutch colonial authorities, the city has grown faster than infrastructure has been able to catch up or be maintained. Additionally, currently around 65 percent of Jakarta residents rely on groundwater. Due to demand, the groundwater is becoming more scarce, and wells have to be dug deeper and deeper, leading to a very unstable situation.

In order to alleviate these issues, Jakarta’s main project has been the “Giant Sea Wall,” or “Great Garuda,” which is a USD $40 billion undertaking that both strengthens existing onshore barriers and constructs a 15-mile outer sea wall with artificial islands to reclaim land from the ocean. However, there are major concerns from experts who argue that the project doesn’t address land subsidence or groundwater use and cuts access to the oceans that many Jakartans depend on. Local community efforts and community organizations may offer alternatives to better address climate change, but the verdict is still unknown.

Quezon City and Metro Manila – On the Front Lines and Paving the Way

Quezon City, the largest city both in the Philippines and in the Metro Manila area, has embraced a leadership role in spearheading climate change initiatives in the country. Like in Singapore and Jakarta, rising sea levels, along with its frequent typhoons, have caused major concerns in the Metro Manila area.

As the biggest city in the Philippines, Quezon has made it a point of civic pride to become a leader in sustainability. Led by its current mayor Herbert M. Bautista, Quezon City has placed sustainability at the forefront of civic policy by reducing Quezon City’s carbon footprint, altering  the city’s infrastructure to become more sustainable and restricting the use of non-biodegradable materials such as plastic bags. Mayor Bautista and the Quezon City Council have been aggressive in addressing climate change policy as part of its  “Quezon City Local Climate Change Action Plan,” a systematic blueprint for the city to follow as it embarks on climate change policy.

Following Quezon’s lead, Manila and the Philippines as a whole have become aggressive in addressing climate change. During the 2015 Paris Climate talks, Manila issued a call to action on climate change, requesting cooperation, justice, and solidarity when facing this issue. Even the populist President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, who found a common kinship with the climate-denying US President Donald Trump, has stated that climate change is real and is a top priority for his administration.

While the planet continues to warm and global political leadership continues to flounder around on how to best address it, cities across the globe and especially in Southeast Asia refuse to wait for policy solutions from above to direct change. They are taking the initiative to survive and even thrive in this new terrible normal.