Trade wars are unequivocally bad; most experts agree that economic efficiency is lost and everyday consumers ultimately bear the brunt of the pain. Both the United States and China have trillions of dollars in export revenues at stake in a global trade war, and contrary to President Trump’s tweets, trade wars are neither “good” nor “easy to win.”

While still in its early stages, a trade confrontation between the two powers is rapidly brewing. The Trump Administration’s proposed $50 billion in tariffs against China are still only threats, but carry a very real possibility of being enacted if last-minute negotiations prove unsuccessful. The already escalating rhetoric between China and the United States has the potential to wreak havoc not only on the two countries, but also on the entire global economy. How can such a damaging foreign policy maneuver possibly be in the interests of the US?

Frankly, China is the single-biggest threat to the continuation of the liberal economic order. Dedicated to the principles of open markets and private property, the Bretton Woods system was established at the end of World War II and led to the creation of liberal institutions like the International Monetary Fund in 1945 and World Trade Organization in 1995.

This liberal system fostered investment and competition in developing countries that helped spread prosperity across the globe. Between 1990 to 2010, more than 1 billion people were lifted out of extreme poverty and the worldwide poverty rate was cut in half. These benefits clearly spilled over to China, where poverty rates fell from over 80% in 1980 to 6.5% in 2012. Mao Zedong’s Five Year Plans and a command economy were eventually replaced by Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy, which enacted greater capitalist reforms and opened China to foreign investors after decades of isolation. China’s gradual progress towards economic liberalization culminated in the accession of China to the WTO in 2001, symbolizing its full assimilation into this international order.

Valid Grievances

Fast-forward more than a decade and China’s market reforms have largely stalled and even started backsliding. A sixteen-year member of the WTO and the second largest economy in the world, China has abdicated its responsibility of encouraging open markets and competition. While its current protectionist policies today are nowhere near as severe as earlier hardline Communist laws, they clearly violate the liberal principles China committed to when it entered the WTO.

First, China imposes capital controls on foreign money transfers and has been controversially accused of currency manipulation in the past. Many believe that in the past China has kept the Yuan artificially devalued through foreign exchange operations.

Second, China has enacted significant hurdles to foreign investment. In certain industries like finance and automotives, China requires foreign investors to operate as joint-ventures with domestic Chinese firms. In many industries, foreign firms have to share technology and customer data with their Chinese partners in order to gain market access.

For example, in 2017, Apple was forced to comply with a new Chinese cybersecurity regulation by agreeing to store the data of all iCloud users registered in mainland-China with a national firm within Chinese borders. Significant backlash over privacy and human rights concerns erupted immediately as the move likely makes that user data available to Chinese authorities. Apple’s Chinese data host, Guizhou Cloud Big Data, is owned by the Guizhou provincial government and has ties to the national Communist Party government. Prior to this move, requests for user data had to be conducted under US privacy laws and courts. Instead, requests or search warrants for user data are now subject to negligible Chinese privacy rights. Other American-based firms like Amazon and Microsoft have similarly been forced to partner with Chinese firms in order to continue operations in China.

Third and most concerning is the intellectual property theft of American and European proprietary technology by Chinese enterprises–and the fact that President Xi Jinping’s government has largely turned a blind eye towards it.

In January 2018, Chinese wind turbine manufacturer Sinovel was found guilty of stealing the software code of a US company, ASMC. Sinvoel submitted an $800 million parts order with ASMC, but instead secretly downloaded software that the Chinese firm then used to build the parts themselves. The $50 billion value proposed by the Trump Administration’s tariffs is largely based on a seven-month investigation by US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer that valued US business losses due to IP theft by Chinese firms at between $225 billion and $600 billion annualized.

Robert Atkinson, President of the U.S. based technology think tank Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, remarked on the recent 15-year anniversary of China’s accession to the WTO that “trade with China has been one step forward, two steps back for 15 years. Each time China claims to move toward opening up trade, it turns around and introduces another new mercantilist trade barrier to counteract it.”

Historically, the United States and EU have enforced international trade policy through WTO dispute resolution mechanisms, but these have proved laughably ineffective in changing Chinese trade practices. China, unfazed by weak complaints or rulings in the WTO, has continued to impose various measures that have stifled competition and foreign investment in its economy. International condemnation has rarely succeeded in constraining Chinese behavior, whether in the military matters like the South China Sea or in trade disputes.

Time Is Running Out

The Western liberal order must strike back before it is too late–now may be its last chance to coerce China into changing its unacceptable behavior. Over the past decade, shifting market dynamics in international trade and in China’s domestic market have been gradually undermining the effectiveness of any US response.

Although China’s $375 billion trade deficit with the United States may lead some to believe it has more to lose on in an economic confrontation, other statistics show a different picture. For instance, China’s economic reliance on exports peaked in 2006 at 37% of GDP. As of 2016 that statistic was 19.64% and falling. As China’s economy further matures, rising domestic consumption will continue to diminish the leverage of the United States and EU.

However, these two trading partners still account for almost 40% of China’s exports, providing a window of real opportunity to effect change. While a trade war will absolutely hurt both the West and China in the near-term, sometimes short-term interests need to be sacrificed for greater gains down the road. To preserve the integrity of the WTO and liberal economic order that has spread so much prosperity in the world, a starkly more forceful response of retaliatory tariffs and measures is in order–and a trade war may be the only instrument left to do so.

Although a trade war will undoubtedly hurt every participant in the near-term, there is a lot more at stake to the West than $100-odd billion in exports. The current free market principles not only form the foundation of American and European economic strength, but also lead to global development by promoting democracy through the trade of goods and ideas. Without the liberal economic system, the global innovation driving human progress would be stifled by the forces of inequality and corruption.

The Flawed Response of the Trump Administration

Alarmingly, President Trump and his administration have failed to understand that a trade war could only be truly effective against Chinese practices through multilateralism. Traditional threats of raised import tariffs and tit-for-tat escalation will never move a China that is supremely confident in its economic trajectory.

The Trump Administration’s “America First” position and recently declared steel and aluminum tariffs have already proven inadequate. China is only a minor exporter to the US of both materials, giving these extremely questionable measures no real bite. Even worse, threatening European and North American allies with these same tariffs further undermines the Trump Administration’s ability to lead a united response against China. Only with a return to the roots of liberal internationalism through cooperation among a wide coalition of countries can the West achieve real progress with China.

Many in the EU institutional framework see the urgent need to uphold the values of free trade in China. European Commission Vice-President for Jobs, Growth, Investment, and Competitiveness, Jyrki Katainen told Bloomberg in April, “we expect reciprocity from China, though we understand that it doesn’t happen overnight.” EU countries from Germany to the Netherlands have similar complaints about Chinese trade policies and would likely be willing to form an international coalition with the United States.

President Trump has a point in criticizing mercantilist Chinese practices, but his ignorance of multilateralism prevents any impactful change. Cooperation between the EU, US, and other partners like Canada and Japan has significantly higher chances of success than the Trump Administration’s foolhardy approach.

However, such retaliatory measures would not represent a final solution. The United States, European Union, and China are the three biggest trading powers in the world and must continue to trade with each other in a mutually beneficial manner. A trade war could create the leverage needed by the West prior to negotiations, but a multilateral agreement is the only permanent solution that could concretely open China’s market.

There is immense political pressure on Trump and Xi as they seek a deal that allows China to save face while making the necessary concessions. But China will not be bullied— the West would need to offer significant incentives in any deal. America and the EU would need to lower certain tariffs or sign investment deals, while in return China would have to take very significant steps towards liberalizing its domestic economy to foreign investors.

A trade war is only beneficial if a long-term pact is the legitimate goal both parties seek. The frightening question is whether Trump or Xi are even entertaining this possibility.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

The Power of ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ 

Last October, the 19th National Congress of the People’s Republic of China took place in Beijing. Over the course of the week-long congress, top Chinese leaders met to discuss reforms, elect new leadership and define national priorities. Occurring only once every five years, the event is of critical importance not only for China but for the entire international community. This year, however, the Congress made a decision that extended beyond its normal functions: in an unprecedented move, it voted unanimously to incorporate “Xi Jinping thought” into the Chinese constitution.

This decision signals much greater change than adding symbolic phrases to a document – it radically transforms the role of the President within the Chinese government, expanding his influence over the population. Although the President has always had a great degree of power over national decisions, he has also largely relied on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) approval and guidance. But now, the codification of “Xi Jinping thought” into the constitution has granted him expanded influence and control over national governance; he is now the only President aside from Mao Zedong to have his name and agenda written into the Constitution. This move is significant not only because it concretely cements Xi’s growing autonomy, but also because it elevates his symbolic status to the same level as that of Chairman Mao. From now on, any challenge to his power will be seen as a direct threat to the Communist Party.

Benevolent Father or Tyrannical Monarch?

President Xi now has expanded agency to further his initiatives, many of which are nationalistic in nature, like increasing control over Hong Kong and Taiwan, expanding government control over the army, and boosting China’s international economic power. With this agenda, Xi will most likely continue China’s trend of growing more involved in international affairs over the past several decades.

On one hand, China’s push to establish itself as a world leader has had many positive effects, including renewed efforts to improve China’s environmental policy and lessen its carbon footprint. This demonstrates that President Xi is in many ways a very forward-thinking leader seeking to cooperate with other countries. On the other hand, he still holds firmly to many communist/authoritarian ideologies that clash with liberal Western ideals–for instance, his rule has brought a dramatic increase in nationalistic propaganda and a crackdown on human rights. To promote the Belt and Road Initiative, he has issued a series of so-called “Bedtime Stories” which portray him as a kindly “Daddy Xi,” father of all Chinese men and women. Although this is not inherently malevolent, the amount of effort the government expends in shaping Xi’s image does demonstrate that it is willing to take large and costly measure to achieve Xi’s goals. This is good news for some, such as Chinese companies, but spells trouble for those the government identifies as opponents or dissidents.

Christianity in Crisis

One such group that has had a rocky relationship with the government and is sometimes seen as a threat to the state is the Christian population in China. Although the Chinese Communist Party is grounded in Confucian ideology and unassociated with any religion, it looks down upon and heavily discourages certain faiths. In particular, the Christian community in China has felt the force of the CCP’s disapproval.

While the CCP has not explicitly stated its opposition to the faith, it certainly has discouraged its spread using more covert measures, such as mandating churches to install cameras. This allows for the government to monitor and “ensure that their sermons do not broach taboo topics.” However, not only does the definition of what the government considers taboo cover a wide variety of subjects, it actually asks that churches preach Communist ideology. Churches that do agree to this must compromise on their core values, making many Christians question whether this doctrine is sound or even can truly be considered the same religion.

Other than these state-sanctioned Christian churches, there are also underground churches that refuse to compromise on their values. Despite the government’s disapproval, a large underground Christian community has taken root and continues to grow. While the conditions have never been favorable for these Christians, the government has increased its crackdown in the past couple of years. This is caused by President Xi’s desire for China to replace the United States not only as an economic giant, but also as a cultural and thought leader.

Looked down on as a “Western influence,” Christianity specifically contradicts Xi’s desire for the population as a whole to fully throw off outside ideology and take pride in their Chinese heritage. Because of this, Christianity faces significant opposition from the government and missionaries face experience numerous barriers to entry.

One missionary, who wishes to remain anonymous for her own safety and that of her organization’s, said that it is much harder to bring Bibles into the country now than it was even two years ago. Based in Hong Kong, her organization works to bring Bibles into mainland China by smuggling them across the border via Shenzhen, then distributes the texts across the country. Though the organization has been largely successful in dodging government scrutiny, last November one of the workers was caught, arrested, and sentenced to two months in prison.

It’s China’s World, We’re Just Living in It

The full extent of Xi Jinping’s newfound status has yet to be revealed and its implications clearly extend beyond what has already taken place. The question now is how the president will exercise his power and how this will influence his own country and the international community. Already, people around the world are feeling the force of Xi’s increasingly powerful China on an economic level. Sipping “cheap Chinese beer” and wolfing down dumplings, Pakistani citizens illustrate the tangible benefits that increasing Chinese presence can bring for a foreign country. However, others are not quite so keen to embrace a world in which China is a great power. The US especially feels its current power is being threatened. Whether opposing new Chinese initiatives, such as the Belt and Road, or competing to control the Arctic region, or levying harsh, punitive tariffs, the US has adopted a guarded, at times antagonistic approach towards China.

Yet China is only continuing to grow, and the US should not deny or fight this change. If the US continues on this trajectory, it may risk sinking into international irrelevance even sooner. Instead of accelerating its own decline, the US should swallow its pride and realize that it has much to gain by cooperating with China. If the nation embraces China and adapts to the current situation, it actually has the potential to grow its economic and political reach both now and in the future.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Hong Kong’s chief executive election results have maintained the political status quo, much to Beijing’s liking. However, it also revealed cracks underneath this former colony’s concrete foundation that threaten the stability of this urban jungle city. On March 26^th, a small 1,194-member Election Committee casted 777 votes for Carrie Lam, the city’s newest chief executive and first female leader, defeating former financial secretary John Tsang and retired judge Woo Kwok-hing.

During the race, Lam was seen as the Mainland Chinese government’s preferred pick for chief executive. She was the former deputy to the outgoing chief Leung Chun-ying, who was infamously unpopular among Hong Kong citizens for his pro-Beijing sentiments, and Lam shares his similar ideology. In 2014, Lam pushed for electoral reform that would grant universal suffrage for Hong Kong – only after all potential candidates were hand picked by the Chinese Communist Party. This proposition spurred tens of thousands of people to protest on the streets, culminating into the famous “Umbrella Revolution” where protesters used umbrellas as physical shields from the police and as a visual symbol of universal suffrage.

Disputes on how Hong Kong elects its chief executive have been growing feverishly in the past years. Currently, the top leader is elected by a small 1,200-member Election Committee, which makes up only 0.16 percent of the Hong Kong population and is heavily comprised of pro-Beijing elites. Those who criticize this lack of representation also state that this system doesn’t follow Basic Law. According to that constitutional document accepted in 1997 when British colonial hands returned the city back to China, it promised universal suffrage.

This is why John Tsang, who supported direct elections for Hong Kong, was immensely popular among Hong Kong locals even though most locals could not vote for him. Tsang is a well-established civil servant who, despite his elite background, appealed to the public with his laid-back, non-elitist image. Unlike Lam, who seemed so well connected with Beijing, Tsang simply felt closer to the people of Hong Kong.

While this may seem like a pro-Beijing candidate pitted against a pro-democracy one, the issue of electoral reforms belongs to a much larger, growing political fissure in Hong Kong. This complex city has nurtured its own unique Chinese narrative under a capitalist economy formerly under British rule, while the Mainland has developed its own separate personality.

Contemporary Hong Kong now faces an identity divide. The pro-Beijing benefit from economic ties to the Mainland, while others dislike a seemingly overbearing Mainland presence. A few have even called for Hong Kong independence. As the PRC exerts more influence, this identity divide and differing political sentiments will increasingly build up tensions between the opposing sides.

If she could choose, Lam would likely maintain the status quo and please her pro-Beijing supporters. However, the city faces troubling trends that she cannot ignore: low birth rates, an aging population, tremendous income inequality and unaffordable housing. As the elderly population grows older and requires more government social support, Hong Kong will need more young workers. However, the large income gap has left the younger generation dissatisfied with Hong Kong’s lack of social mobility. Meanwhile, the housing crisis needs political and economic reforms so people can have better places to live.

The Mainland government, too, will pay attention to these issues because it highly values domestic stability. Lam will do a fine job at running such an economically important city the way Beijing wants her to run it, but the CCP will exert influence on Hong Kong in other ways. For example, in 2015, five Hong Kong book publishers associated with disseminating books on the Chinese elite went missing and later appeared under Mainland Chinese custody. This is an extreme case, but it shows that Beijing will not stop its surveillance of Hong Kong anytime soon.

In the coming years, it will be Hong Kong who will shape Lam’s legacy, not the other way around. While Beijing wants to strengthen its grip on the city, Hong Kong will continue ever-so-slightly slipping away from Mainland hands because of the city’s continuing social trends and the unwavering spirit of its locals. The yellow umbrella symbol is still found in corners of this modern metropolis, tucked away yet nevertheless thriving.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Xi’s Selective Punishment
Author: Murong Xuecun
Source: The New York Times
Published Date: January 16, 2015

Chinese president Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has won him great fame in both state and international media. However, there is always a suspicion that the anti-corruption movement is selective and favors the president’s allies in the Party. In fact, the campaign is a Stalinist purge rather than a genuine attempt to clean up the government, since Xi is charging the accused with violating party regulations instead of codified laws. Also, the accused are not afforded basic legal rights. In other words, anti-corruption does not equal legal justice.

Meanwhile, those who are believed to be loyal to Xi remain untouched. For example, in Zhejiang and Fujian, two provinces where Xi spent many years as the party leader, no officials higher than the deputy provincial level have been investigated. What’s more, the so-called princelings – the second and third generation of China’s founding fathers – are seldom investigated, except Bo Xilai, who was considered a rival to Xi. Lastly, the current anti-corruption initiative does not foreshadow a corruption-free bureaucratic system in the future. It is unlikely that Xi, after holding all the power in his hands, will allow China to adopt a truly democratic government.

Corruption Cannot be Cured with Higher Wages Alone
Author: Editorial
Source: The Paper
Published Date: January 20, 2015
Originally in Chinese

It is a known theory that when civil servants’ wages lie significantly below market average, they either pick up a second job or turn corrupt. This logic explains why managers of China’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and officials related to city planning and building are prone to corruption—they feel as though their salary does not match the contribution they have made towards the state’s economic development. Treatment received by higher-level officials and lower-level officials varies significantly, which encourages the latter to do everything possible in order to climb the bureaucratic ladder. This phenomenon brings immeasurable damage to the building of a corruption-free system.

Recognizing the abovementioned problems, the state recently increased the wages of civil servants; however, there are still several fundamental problems to be solved. First, the adjustment of officials’ salaries should be standardized. The status quo is that the government inconsistently decides how much officials’ salaries should increase, which makes it harder to narrow the gap between the incomes of different levels of officials. Secondly, it is hard to convince the general public that the corruption will recede as salaries rise. Therefore, it is necessary to further limit the power of the government in addition to raising salaries.

The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Committing Suicide for Chinese Officials
Source: Financial Times – Chinese
Author: Nie Huihua
Published Date: January 22, 2015
Originally in Chinese

According to state data, 112 Chinese officials committed suicide between August 2003 and April 2014; at least one third of the deaths were related to corruption. While the number of officials committing suicide has increased, the number of officials sentenced to death for corruption has decreased, thus raising the question of why these corrupt officials chose to commit suicide even though they would not have been sentenced to death.

From an economic perspective, the major cost to officials who commit suicide is the loss of life and the trauma inflicted on relatives and friends. Also, the privileges and benefits enjoyed by the official’s family would end with their death. On the other hand, there are three major benefits. First, the death would eliminate any evidence of corruption and protect potentially guilty colleagues; usually the death of a lower level official can break the chain of evidence and protect those who are above her/him. Second, the suicide can help their relatives retain privileges and benefits because the suicide of an official can win public sympathy. Third, under the current legal system, there is almost no possibility of being acquitted once the official is under investigation. Therefore, committing suicide beforehand can avoid public humiliation.

According to our analysis, in order to reduce the suicides committed by officials, the Party needs to either raise the cost or lower the benefit of committing suicide. The former requires investigators to persuade the officials’ relatives to cooperate when they have found clues of corruption, and the latter goal relies on a transparent and just legal system. In addition, the anti-corruption task force needs to make it clear that the investigation will continue and the stolen money will be tracked down regardless of whether the officials are alive.

China launched an anti-corruption campaign last year. So why is its reputation getting worse?
Source: The Washington Post
Author: Simon Denyer
Published Date: December 2, 2014

China’s ranking at Transparency International, a non-governmental organization that tracks global corruption, has dropped 20 places in 2014 – 100 out of 175 countries – even though President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has affected different aspects of the Chinese government. For one thing, officials have stopped lavishly spending public funds. Meanwhile, there’s a decline in the number of people applying for civil service jobs; many attribute such a decline to the decreasing attractiveness of jobs in the public sector as a result of Xi’s anti-corruption movement.

One possible explanation for why China is still dropping on the index is that China’s anti-corruption movement has focused more on the punishment of corrupt officials than the introduction of fundamental changes to the Party. Experts from Transparency International also think that the campaign should rely heavily on civil society, but instead, the government represses grassroots activists who have demanded that officials disclose their assets. It might be too early to summarize the anti-corruption campaign – and it is certainly likely that China’s Transparency International rating will improve – but the effect of this campaign is surely not as profound as what the Chinese Communist Party claims it to be.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

The investments in the real estate market, particularly in luxury high-rise apartments and even the cities developed around the complexes, made sense for the Chinese on a number of levels. Homes, including the apartment complexes and the surrounding shopping malls, were investments for the next generation, spaces where grandchildren would flourish in a future, resurgent China. Home ownership in China is a sign of stability much as it is in the US, but with higher implications of familial honor and duty. Buying a home implies responsibility not only for oneself, but also for the entire family. Thus, the housing market was not just a source of economic strength, but of social prestige as well. Investors also perceived a demand for new luxury apartment complexes because of the growing economy—after all, industry in China was booming, always demanding more workers, and cities were growing as millions migrated from the countryside to the cities. These people needed places to live, so developers began construction on hundreds of thousands of high-rise apartments, sometimes planning brand new cities around these units. The investors bought and bought and bought, because they believed that the developments were solid investments. But as developers continued building, and people continued investing, China developed its own housing bubble.

Housing Bubble. A housing bubble occurs when housing prices become dangerously high due to increased demand and a belief that prices will never fall. The term might raise any American’s blood pressure, yet in China, the fear of a bursting bubble does not bother many. Most investors do not see an economic meltdown anywhere in the near future. Additionally, the Chinese government is on guard in the wake of the American housing bubble burst. When the government observed the development of the bubble, it rushed to do damage control by first limiting households to purchasing only one or two apartments to control the inflating prices of real estate. However, within three years, prices were dropping too low and the CCP lifted the restrictions to balance the market again. Now, most economists agree that the Chinese housing bubble is not nearly as dangerous as that in the US, nor would a Chinese real estate market crash wreak as much havoc as the American crash. So, rather than bursting, the housing bubble seems to be deflating. Economic crisis (hopefully) averted, the Chinese people can move on, right?

Wrong. The massive complexes built during the surge in real estate investment still stand completely empty, and sometimes there are so many vacant apartments that the area is literally a ghost town. No one moves into the apartments because they are simply too expensive. While some might be advertised as “affordable,” almost no lower or low-middle class citizens can pay to live there. And with housing prices in Beijing, Hong Kong and Shanghai at an all-time high, ranging from $4,000-$5,000 per square foot (for reference, luxury apartments in New York City go for $2,100-$2,500 per square foot), migrants from the countryside cannot afford any of the new housing options.

People who once lived in the newly developed areas have been displaced during and after construction. They must leave the cities to find affordable housing, undermining the Party’s plans to maximize urbanization for the next several decades. There is also environmental damage, as wildlife habitat is often destroyed and significant amounts of resources and energy are used to build homes that remain vacant. It is easy to pass off the bizarre ghost towns as “dystopian movie sets,” but they present a very real problem for China. For the health and prosperity of its cities and people, China must approach the housing problem immediately, especially with other economic problems, such as a shrinking labor force and decaying GDP growth rate, looming in the future. Rather than continually building luxury apartments, there should be a push for affordable housing for blue-collar workers. If unaffordable housing continues to dominate the market, then China’s labor force will be forced out of the very cities they are building (in some cases, they already have). China’s urbanization plans are also in jeopardy as people slowly move out of, rather than into, cities. If China wants to truly urbanize its population, then it must provide housing options for all income levels so that its cities can grow in a sustainable manner and its real estate market does not disappoint its investors.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Today, the US enjoys quite a high degree of soft power globally, particularly in Asia. The infiltration of American values and culture into the East is evident in the success of American pop music icons and Hollywood films, as well as the appeal of elite American universities. Interestingly, the US government invests virtually no resources in soft power in Asia, excluding humanitarian aid—it almost never funds the cultural items exported to Asia.

The idea and implementation of soft power has become extremely important to the small nation of South Korea. In the last decade, Korean pop culture has experienced an international boom through Korean dramas and “K-Pop.” Koreans are so invested in this new soft power that it has its own word in Korean, hallyu, which literally translates to “Korean wave.” PSY of his “Gangnam Style” fame is the epitome of this phenomenon. Under the current president Park Geun Hye, the Korean government has more than doubled its financial endorsement of Korean pop culture abroad and has expressed hopes that hallyu will lead to strengthened cultural friendliness and economic partnerships. The long-term effects of hallyu are yet to be seen, but the growth of K-Pop fandom on virtually all continents has the Korean government excited.

In comparison to South Korea, China has invested even more resources in its soft power, but with disappointing results. Xi Jinping, the president of China, launched the campaign for the “Chinese Dream,” a rebuilding of the nation’s culture and reputation. Through this campaign, Xi is striving to counteract American cultural influences. The Netflix drama House of Cards proved to be quite popular among Chinese viewers, but the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was quick to paint it as a demonstration of Western corruption and greed. However, the show maintained its strong following. Another product of Hollywood, Transformers: Age of Extinction, became the highest grossing film in China ever, surpassing the previous record holder, James Cameron’s Avatar. In comparison, Chinese artists and films see marginal success in the US. One such artist is Jia Ruhan, a classically trained Chinese singer akin to Celine Dion. The CCP scouted, trained, recorded and promoted Jia with the expectation that she would reach stardom in the States. Yet, you have probably never heard her name or purchased her album, which is unsurprisingly “in line with the image of the Chinese government.” Starlets like Jia are consistently drowned out by news of China’s dodgy actions, like the backlash from the Beijing Olympics, and the political nature of Confucius Institutes, academies established to promote ancient Chinese values. Oftentimes, because of the CCP’s obvious interest in popular entertainment, other Asian nations see Chinese soft power as propaganda or thinly veiled political hard power. Rather than improving China’s image and accelerating the Chinese Dream, Xi Jinping’s brainchild has soured the impression of China in a number of Eastern nations.

Which country, then, has an effective soft power policy in Asia? It seems that India is the nation that best understands the intricacies of soft power. In order to harness, but not control, India’s soft power worldwide, the government funds Bollywood film festivals, art exhibitions and Hindi conferences around the world. These are designed to simply spread awareness of Indian culture, not to promote its policies or generate content as the CCP desires in China.

While the cultural soft power of India has certainly increased in strength and visibility, the government has also utilized humanitarian aid and economic relief to add another dimension to soft power. In Afghanistan, India rose in popularity when it sent economic, rather than military, aid to stabilize the Afghan government. Major financial donations to the UN Democracy Fund (among other funds) also promote a modern and generous image of India. In fact, polls show that many Southeast and Central Asian nations think India is a better partner than China because it is less aggressive.

This financial facet of soft power, unlike Bollywood and Hollywood cultures, is indeed state-run. Despite its political nature, it is critical to the success of a country’s soft power. In the case of the US, South Korea and India (among others), the state does not have influence over pop culture, but, because it recognizes the benefits and necessity of soft power, it uses money to boost its image abroad. For instance, the US gives billions of dollars every year to natural disaster relief and foreign aid. While those numbers might compose a mere 1-2% of the federal budget, the international perception of the US is still improved as images of American officials providing vital aid hit the press. India and South Korea also embrace their roles as donors to the international community. India has one of the world’s fastest-growing foreign aid budgets, while South Korea recently joined the Development Assistance Committee, a prestigious subset of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. All of these nations have effectively used their economic strength in conjunction with cultural soft power to improve the global image of both the people and their government.

Soft power, then, is ultimately a balancing act between the government and the culture of a nation. China’s approach is generally too overbearing, if not threatening. The CCP’s mission to control cultural soft power actually damages its international image, especially when combined with its reluctance to give foreign aid. The United States, on the other hand, allows its cultural soft power to independently run its course in addition to supplying humanitarian aid. As other states look to grow their own soft power, they should follow the leads of India, the US and South Korea. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, is looking to promote Southeast Asian culture around the world. They would be wise to foster a soft power policy that gently blends economic aid with culture free of an overt political agenda. With social clout and generous economic assistance, governments can then pursue hard power foreign policy goals with less resistance.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

In the spring of 763 CE, eight years of rebellion came to an unceremonious end. The An Lushan Rebellion, started by its namesake, a Chinese general of Turkic descent, sought to carve a new dynasty centered in the Chinese capital of Luoyang to replace the corrupt and decadent Tang Dynasty. Although An Lushan was motivated by personal ambition and not by what we would now classify as ethno-nationalism, the immediate consequences of the rebellion were clear: the Tang turned their backs on the Silk Road-based cosmopolitanism that once defined their glorious empire in favor of homogeneity. The days of rich Persian merchants parading the streets of Guangzhou, of Turkic generals patrolling the northern deserts and of Chinese citizens exploring new cultures in art and expression were long gone. In its place was a new era of mistrust, where Uyghurs (the exact relationship between Tang Dynasty’s Uyghurs and today’s Uyghurs is disputed) were forbidden from wearing their ethnic dress and anti-miscegenation laws were promulgated. The weakened dynasty never regained its glory, leading to a long decline as corruption and rebellions weakened its ranks before ultimately falling in 907.

Recent attacks in Xinjiang, China’s western-most province and home to a prominent Uyghur community, and elsewhere threaten to force a similar pivot to intolerance in contemporary China. The knife attack in Kunming that left 33 dead and the recent market bombing in Urumqi have been met with predictably harsh government reactions. In a spectacular display of political theatrics, the Chinese convicted 55 people of terrorism charges in a mass trial, sentencing three to death and the others to incarceration in front of an audience of 7000.

Though many in the West may label the trial as a typically oppressive action by an authoritarian government, these measures are understandable. The Han majority’s faith in the central government’s ability to protect its own turf from domestic terrorism is waning. The Kunming attack is especially disconcerting, as it took place in a multicultural province where Islam is not the majority religion. To the average Han, the subsequent bombing in volatile Han-majority Urumqi would leave little doubt in the eyes of many Han Chinese that a new era of separatist action was upon them: a new War on Terror must be waged to protect China.

But the mass trial is already a serious blunder on the part of the government. The Uyghurs see the trials as nothing more than the latest in a string of alienating and marginalizing policies. A Han Party Secretary, who takes precedence over a largely symbolic Uyghur governor, rules in the supposedly autonomous Uyghur Province. In everyday life, Uyghurs experience economic marginalization, denial of opportunity and the destruction of homes and old districts in the name of economic progress. And now, the Uyghur community is being blamed for attacks that many had nothing to do with, harassed by security and facing the ire of their neighbors.

[su_quote]The Uyghurs see the trials as nothing more than the latest in a string of alienating and marginalizing policies.[/su_quote]

Americans of Middle Eastern descent faced similar experiences in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Faced with paranoia and a blind hate towards all things Islamic, many Americans faced levels of discrimination from stares at airports to having their fundamental rights blatantly violated. The collapse of trust between citizens took years to recover. However, mistrust and intolerance continue to this day, exacerbated by America’s interventions throughout the Muslim world.

If intolerance spurred by acts of terrorism caused American progress to stumble, then it is sure to threaten geopolitical stability for China, a country with relatively little experience in maintaining a society that is just to citizens of all ethnicities. Ethnic tensions boiled over in 2009 with the Urumqi Riots and relations now between the Han and the Uyghurs can only sour after these attacks and show trials. In the interest of maintaining stability and of ultimately expanding the role Xinjiang can play in China’s domestic and international politics, the Chinese government must resist giving in to short-term interests and sentiments and adopt a longer-term vision for Xinjiang.

Traditionally, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has relied on top-down control to preserve stability. During the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the CCP re-emphasized the fact that national reforms must proceed at the hands and whims of the government. The autonomous ethnic provinces of Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi are, contradictory to their name, tightly controlled by the Central state.

However, this approach is no longer viable in Xinjiang. As the world decentralizes and new forces are unleashed on the stage of global politics, non-state movements and actors become better organized and more powerful. East Turkestan is once again in the spotlight because many Turkic minorities do not feel “Chinese,” thanks to cultural, political and economic isolation. “Ethnic harmony,” as promoted by the top-down government, hardly soothes a people without a home.

The government must be prepared to accept that unless some bottom-up policies are allowed to flourish, minorities’ animosity towards the CCP will grow. This mistrust is the basis of the violence and independence movements that fuel those seeking East Turkestan today. The government must take extra care that in curbing terrorism they do not foster the next generation of anti-Han minorities.

In order to achieve a truly stable Xinjiang, China must allow the local population to represent their own localities. Although people’s elections for their own mayors are largely symbolic, since real power resides with the Party Secretary of a region, the Party can still exercise more sensitivity by cultivating talented Uyghurs and allowing them political leeway. Too often, the frontier is seen as a stepping-stone for power-hungry Han officials eager for promotion to the capital. They quickly set to work bulldozing buildings, displacing people and building apartments that no local person can afford, calling it economic progress.

In a broader perspective, as China seeks to reconstruct the Silk Road and once again extend its influence over the steppes, it cannot fully strengthen continental relations without a strong Xinjiang. A strong Xinjiang requires a strong citizenry of Uyghurs, Han, Kazakhs and other ethnicities free to express themselves and honor their heritages while also feeling included in the Chinese state and its destiny. A strong Uyghur citizenry will be eager to serve and represent the country and, since four out of the five Central Asian countries share Turkic cultural and linguistic backgrounds, can find themselves uniquely positioned to build strong ties between their home country and Central Asia. It only makes sense that the Chinese government should actively cultivate and develop the region and its people, to truly make Urumqi into a gateway to Central Asia rather than a slogan claiming it as such.

To truly bring Xinjiang into China’s fold and give the Uyghurs a home in a Chinese nation, “ethnic harmony” is not enough. Acceptance of heterogeneity is the ultimate solution. As radical an idea as it might sound considering the tense environment of contemporary China, it is an idea present even in the annals of Chinese history. Taizong (ruled 626 – 649 CE), the second Tang emperor, is still considered one of the greatest emperors in Chinese history. Taizong himself was not fully Chinese, having been born a quarter Turkic and his wife, the Empress Zhangsun, fully Turkic. He understood the importance of a diverse China, and actively encouraged foreign trade and interaction, even going so far as to promote any man of talent, regardless of whether he was ethnically Chinese or not, thus ushering in an era in which Chinese ships and porcelain could be found as far west as the Horn of Africa and where the influence of the realm could be felt all across the vast steppes into Central Asia and the golden city of Samarkand.

Both the Uyghurs and Han yearn for a stable Xinjiang. For China to truly achieve a prosperous and flourishing society, Xinjiang and the Uyghur community must also be empowered. Reactions to terrorism mustn’t repeat the same mistake of the Tang after the An Lushan Rebellion. Diversity and openness, as in the Taizong years, must be favored over intolerance and marginalization.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff and editorial board.

To be fair, identifying necessary reforms in a country plagued by environmental issues, social and economic inequality, and political malfeasance is no easy feat. If Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and their band of merry men released a statement with too many calls for reform and policy changes, the bar would be set unreasonably high. At the same time, if in the Third Plenum they called for insufficient changes there would be tremendous public outrage that might precipitate political activism.

In this case, being vague is the best approach. If China’s leaders prescribed legitimate reforms for their economy and political systems, just think of the instability it might prompt. The millions of migrant workers who are denied health insurance, educational opportunities, and economic freedom would get overexcited. Calls to curtail environmental pollution would give the millions of Chinese who live in cities with toxic PM 2.5 levels such a sense of relief that they might pass out on the streets during rush hour, dying of asphyxiation from exhaust fumes. Discussing democratization or even more transparency in government might distract Foxconn workers from assembling iPads. It is clear that rushing into reforms without proper thought and consideration is a bad decision for a country still in the early phases of development.

Engaging In Premature Reform is Dangerous

For now the safest way to engage in reform is by avoiding said reform at all costs. They say the longer you wait for policy changes the better they feel. The right time for reform implementation, however, remains unclear. One can’t simply engage in pre-hegemonic reform. At the moment, the party is simply waiting for that special generation to come along. The wait of course will be worth it.
China’s 18th Party Congress can’t be upfront about the fact that reforms may be only attainable in the far-away future. China’s 1.3 billion people are bursting with all kinds of desires to experiment politically, economically and socially. If China was too upfront about its intention to postpone reform, there might be a nasty schism and nationwide protests. And it isn’t that the Communist Party doesn’t want to reform with its people. It just doesn’t feel ready.

How to Lead on Your Population in the Most Effective Way

Sure you can’t engage in it, but you definitely can talk about it. Even just saying the word over and over can excite your countrymen enough without succumbing to their desires. It’s for this reason that in the Plenum Communiqué there was a lot of mention of reform and other words that are sure to excite its disgruntled, frustrated citizens. According to a press release by the Beijing News, no prior Third Plenum report had as many uses of the word ‘reform’.

The Plenum stressed that to comprehensively deepen reform, we must hold high the magnificent banner of Socialism with Chinese characteristics, take Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important ‘Three Represents’ thought and the scientific development view as guidance, persist in beliefs, concentrate a consensus, comprehensively plan matters, move forward in a coordinated manner, persist in the reform orientation of the Socialism market economy, make stimulating social fairness and justice, and enhancing the people’s welfare into starting points and stopover points, further liberate thoughts, liberate and develop social productive forces, liberate and strengthen social vitality, firmly do away with systemic and mechanistic abuses in all areas, and strive to open up an even broader prospect for the undertaking of Socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Chinese readers must have gotten excited just reading this. “Persist…”, “concentrate…”, “stimulate…” This proactive language would leave any reform-deprived person brimming with optimism, if only for a while. One Chinese blogger wrote, “In the end it’s not important whether the document is consistent from beginning to end, because everyone can find what they need in it.” So long as Chinese citizens are satisfied with their government toying with reform, the Communist Party may be able to kick the can down the road and refrain from true policy changes for some time. Sure, citizens’ reform frustrations will continue, but at least everyone can be assured that no one is rushing into any big decisions.