As of late February, Palestinian deaths surpassed 30,000 and the devastation has only worsened as the war progresses. Coming from a generation that has never known a world with a weak Israel, it seems illogical and unfathomable to continue supporting Israel as the death tolls increase. Despite protests, pressure from leftist democratic colleagues and international efforts advocating for more severe policies toward Israel, President Biden has barely budged on his stance. Furthermore, all of his statements toward Israel have come in the form of a written statement, phone calls or a statement read by a member of his staff. The only exception was during his State of the Union address where he stated, “Israel also has a fundamental responsibility to protect innocent civilians in Gaza.” However, many are still pushing Biden to call for an immediate and permanent ceasefire and to stop sending military aid to Israel. In the eyes of many young democratic voters, President Biden is not doing nearly enough to stop Israel, and it’s difficult to understand why. 

While ending military aid to Israel and insisting on a permanent ceasefire may seem like a no-brainer for my generation, the reality is much more nuanced. Joe Biden’s stance toward Israel is not necessarily out of a lack of compassion or cowardice, but pure history and politics. Crediting his pro-Israel perspective to his father, Biden recalls that his father emphasized the undeniable justice of establishing Israel as a Jewish homeland in 1948 following the aftermath of World War II and the Holocaust. His historic view of Israel is as a small country fighting for democracy in a region of instability, not the powerful, right-leaning and domineering country many people my age see today. Throughout his Senate career Biden also received $5 million from pro-Israeli groups, the chamber’s biggest recipient in history. This should not be surprising nor, arguably, worrying. For most of American history since the end of WWII, support for Israel has persisted, especially for democrats. Due to the historical context surrounding Biden’s tenure in the Senate, this is not abnormal. The United States was the first country to recognize Israel as an independent state in 1949 and the country has been, and remains, America’s greatest ally in the Middle East and is praised as a symbol of democracy in the region. 

However, it is not 1949 anymore, and the gravity of the situation is becoming increasingly apparent. If Joe Biden does not reassess his pattern of nonconfrontation and passive diplomacy with Netanyahu, it may be too late to help the situation in Gaza and protect his base. President Biden won Michigan in the 2020 election but the results of the February Michigan primary, with a substantial number of undecided votes, suggest that his unwavering support for Israel could potentially be a deciding factor against him in a close general election. Key swing states like Michigan and young voters won Biden the 2020 election, but his support for Israel may jeopardize his 2024 chances, as young voters are less likely to vote in 2024 than in 2020. With such a close race, Biden cannot afford a low young voter turnout. 

That all being said, there is also the very real possibility that if President Biden takes back his support for Israel, Republicans may be quick to portray the president as anti-Israel. Republicans on the House Armed Service Committee have criticized initiatives to direct more aid into the region. Missouri Congressman Mark Alford said, “90 percent of [humanitarian]funding” ends up in the hands of Hamas. While the social media and political circles of my peers and I are skewed in favor of Palestinians, it can be easy to forget that the general public lacks a consensus on the level of support the United States should provide to Israel. Joe Biden is not the only one whose historical and personal experience with Israel deeply influences their political views. Older generations tend to view Israel as a refuge for the Jews after the painful, visceral memories of the Holocaust. One report shows that less than half (48%) of Gen Z and millennials believe the United States should publicly voice support of Israel compared with 63% of Gen Xers and 83% of baby boomers. 30 years ago, support for Israel was more associated with Democrats than Republicans. Today, many democratic Gen Z voters find it very difficult to wrap their heads around a world that sees Israel’s actions as justified and fair. Recognizing these generational divides is essential for navigating the broader discourse surrounding Israeli-Palestinian relations.

It is also valuable for my age group to understand the historical relevance of congressional and presidential support for Israel. There has never been a U.S. president to actively oppose Israel. Throughout Joe Biden’s long career, it has never been an option to withdraw support for Israel. It is also important to note that Biden’s stance is not unique nor should it be surprising: the mainstream political discourse has always skewed in Israel’s favor. As Jimmy Carter once put it, “It’s absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace.” In summary, it is unrealistic to expect Joe Biden and other politicians to completely shift their worldview that has been shaped over decades of precedent. 

This does not mean that the American people should wait around for Joe Biden to change his mind while thousands of Palestinians die every day. The world is not the same as it was 80 years ago and neither are international dynamics. While these historical precedents should not be ignored, there needs to be some acknowledgment of the Israeli government’s role in Gaza’s humanitarian crisis. In a conflict that is so rooted in history, it is imperative to keep in mind the long history that the president and the country have had with Israel if there is any hope of ending the suffering, death and destruction in Gaza.

The views expressed in opinion pieces do not represent the views of Glimpse from the Globe.

However, by 2003, North Korea had already announced that it would not be bound by the treaty’s terms and had secretly been operating a uranium-enrichment program. In October 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test to the great dismay of the UN Security Council, which quickly imposed sanctions against North Korea. To this day, the proliferation of North Korea has been contentious and seen as a major threat to U.S. security.

When U.S. President Donald Trump came into office in 2017, he was tasked with a difficult problem: How should the Trump Administration go about the North Korean nuclear problem? 

Trump had campaigned on the platform of denuclearization of North Korea. He claimed he wanted to reduce tensions with North Korea, which had reached new heights when North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un’s regime conducted its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). In response, Trump said that any North Korean nuclear attack would be “met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” 

A few months later, in September, North Korea tested what it claimed was its first hydrogen bomb. Trump responded by designating North Korea as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Trump and Kim launched their war of words, with the insult “Rocket Man” being thrown at Kim and “Dotard” at Trump. 

However, on March 5, 2018, the world woke up to the shocking news that there would be the first United States-North Korea summit. 

The summit was eventually held between Trump and Kim in Singapore in June 2018.  The two leaders signed a joint statement  in which they both agreed to pursue nuclear peace, better United States-North Korea relations, return U.S. troop remains home, and called for the complete denuclearization of North Korea, although all of the details were few and far between. 

In return, Trump agreed to suspend U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises and provide sanctions relief to the Kim regime. Although this was the first of its kind and a landmark event in history, only one agreement was partially met, which was the repatriation of some U.S. POW/MIA remains. 

After their summit, Trump and Kim appeared to be on good terms, with Trump saying he and Kim “fell in love.” Trump failed to appoint a U.S. special envoy for human rights in North Korea, and North Korea continued to grow its warhead stockpile, enrich uranium and develop missile launch sites, but did not conduct more missile tests in 2018. 

Feb. 27, 2019 marked the second Trump-Kim summit, held in Hanoi, Vietnam, which was cut short on the second day of talks. This, similarly, did not result in a joint statement from the two leaders. Negotiations failed to move forward, and Kim agreed to dismantle a nuclear facility at Yongbyon in exchange for sanctions relief.

However, Trump wanted more concessions, which resulted in both walking away without a deal, despite the leaders suggesting they would continue talks in the future. Despite the fact that North Korea was still proliferating, at least the U.S.-North Korea relationship was less strenuous. In June, Trump historically became the first sitting president to step into North Korea and boast about their “great relationship,” despite North Korea continuing to test-launch missiles. By May 2019, North Korea had conducted its first missile test launch since the first summit, launching the KN-23, a tactical ballistic missile and reigniting tensions between the two countries.

In October 2019, the world witnessed the crumbling of U.S.-North Korea relations. 

North Korea announced that the country will not do more to denuclearize or resume negotiations unless the United States relieves more sanctions and ends joint military exercises with South Korea. In December, Trump resumed calling Kim “Rocket Man” and threatened to use military force against North Korea, which Kim promised to counterattack. The North Korean regime then threatened the end of diplomacy by the beginning of 2020 if the United States  did not cease sanctions and hostile policies. 

Meanwhile, current U.S. President Joe Biden has been taking a different approach to relations with North Korea. 

He declared that he is rejecting Trump’s approach to North Korea and instead adopting a middle-ground strategy, positioning himself between strategic patience and a grand bargain, while maintaining the ultimate goal of complete denuclearization. 

Although Biden expressed willingness to negotiate, North Korea was not interested. According to the Department of State, the United States  and North Korea do not have diplomatic relations. In March 2021, Kim conducted the first missile test during the Biden Administration, launching two short-range cruise missiles. Despite this, Washington stated they remained open to talks with North Korea.

At a standstill with diplomacy, North Korea has tested 36 ballistic missiles since Biden has taken office. There have been more missile tests in 2022 than ever in North Korean history. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council has been unable to impose more sanctions on North Korea because Russia and China veto the proposals. 

Notably, North Korea’s ballistic missiles have the ability to reach the continental United States, which continues to concern U.S. security and defense experts. The most recent U.S. Department Press Meeting on Dec. 20 discussed the possibility of North Korea’s seventh nuclear test. 

In response to this possible provocation, Department Spokesperson Ned Price stated that “We would seek to impose additional measures on those responsible for its nuclear program…seek to ensure that we have sufficient defense and deterrent capabilities in the region,” adding,“We urge the DPRK to… cease with the provocations, and to engage in diplomacy.”

Given the stall in talks with North Korea, Biden could possibly have to look to new strategies to ease tensions with the DPRK.

In many ways, Biden’s pursuit of tighter relations with the Southeast Asia bloc came as no surprise. The United States wants to counterbalance China’s dominance in Asia and the South China Sea, while ASEAN countries are hoping to achieve economic growth and stability. And both sides would prefer to do it without stepping into a steaming pile of Cold War 2.0 between the United States and China.

Unlike his predecessor, President Biden recognizes the utility of maintaining amicable trade relations, even with countries that can’t afford to be staunchly anti-China. Biden entered office with a full plate of deteriorated U.S. diplomatic relations around the world, and his administration hit the ground running in Southeast Asia, sending Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken to accompany Biden to his first U.S.-ASEAN Summit of his presidency. “I want you all to hear directly from me the importance the United States places on our relationship with ASEAN,” assured President Biden.

And why shouldn’t the United States prioritize its relationship with ASEAN?

ASEAN’s mission to uphold the rules-based order in Southeast Asia, including the tumultuous South China Sea, should be reason enough for the United States to throw some of its weight behind ASEAN. But ASEAN and American objectives align even beyond maritime security issues; both parties are pursuing stronger public health safety nets in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, both are investing in digital infrastructure and technological innovation, both are committed to meeting their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) for climate action and most importantly, both parties recognize that if ASEAN doesn’t cooperate with the United States to accomplish their goals, they’ll turn to their nearer neighbor.

However, the United States “recognize[s]quite clearly that any initiative that is simply designed for competition [with China]is likely to have difficulty gaining altitude in Asia,” said Kurt Campbell, the current Indo-Pacific coordinator under Biden. The new and improved Indo-Pacific strategy is one of inclusion, a union of mutual interest in the “fundamental principles in promoting an open, inclusive, and rules-based regional architecture.”

Biden knows that China lapped the United States years ago, in terms of trade relations, financial connectivity and investment projects in Southeast Asia. The United States lacks the money and political will to go toe-to-toe with China’s Belt and Road Initiative or cheap exports, so Biden’s goal can’t feasibly be to elbow the gargantuan China market out of the ASEAN bloc.

Instead of daring to directly oppose China, Biden reframed U.S. objectives in the Indo-Pacific to focus on counterbalance and stability. Rather than waging a trade war in Southeast Asia and abruptly withdrawing from trade alliances like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Biden has pursued a strategy of further economic integration. In spring of 2022, he unveiled the Indo-Pacific economic framework (IPEF), a “non-traditional” trade agreement that encompasses a range of economic and social issues, including “fair and resilient trade, supply chain resilience, infrastructure and decarbonization, and tax and anticorruption.”

Many ASEAN countries have responded well to Biden’s new tactic, and the level of trust in the United States increased from 47.0% to 52.8% from 2020 to 2021, according to a regional survey conducted in Southeast Asia. But public approval, just like international policymaking, is moving slower than Biden might hope, and polls show a decrease in perceived U.S. engagement in the region within the past year.

Much of the focus in the polls tied back to IPEF, which has received a lukewarm reception, owing primarily to its omission of market liberalization. The four pillars laid out in advance of negotiations for the IPEF include trade provisions with high regulatory standards and an emphasis on the digital economy; coordinate action against future supply chain malfunctions; socially and environmentally sustainable investment and equitable and transparent trading practices. These goals are grand and admirable, but critics argue that without binding trade regulations and market access, the new US strategy is unlikely to hold much sway over ASEAN.

China is ASEAN’s bully and its friend. It dumps billions of dollars into BRI to fund development projects throughout the region, while also aggressing its neighbors’ EEZs and territories in the South China Sea. If the United States wants any chance at playing a meaningful role in the region, it needs to be ASEAN’s friend, its best friend.

Biden knows what it would take to make real friends in ASEAN—diplomatic consistency, trade openness and at least the potential for market access—but many onlookers in Southeast Asia see his efforts thus far as political show. The delicate dynamics between ASEAN and China should incentivize the United States to continue aiding the ASEAN economic goal, to help achieve their diplomatic goal of maintaining regional order. As political tension radiates from the dumpster fire that is Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the world teeters closer to nuclear war, promoting stability and prosperity wherever possible is in everyone’s best interest.

Counterbalancing the Chinese economic and political giant will require more than slapping a new label on the U.S.-ASEAN relationship. As Biden prepares for the 10^th U.S.-ASEAN Summit and negotiations for the IPEF this November, he should prioritize ASEAN’s interest in market access and trade if he aspires to achieve his own social goals and security missions. It’s time for Washington to put its money where its mouth is and invest in its relations with ASEAN.

The impact of Trump’s criticisms is still felt in Washington today. On the one hand, Biden has faced pressure from dozens of senators, Democrats and Republicans, who are committed to expanding upon the deal to include expanded compliance from Iran in regards to its ballistic missile program. Meanwhile, the administration has been the subject of scrutiny from diplomats from France, Japan and Germany, who manufactured a 2003 deal with Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities and have served in an intermediary role between the two countries since 2018.

Biden’s insistence that Iran must make the first move toward compromise to maintain negotiating leverage has, in the eyes of the European Union, halted potential discussions and pushed Iran to explore other avenues. The ability, or lack thereof, of Biden to orchestrate any semblance of effective diplomacy at a time when Iran may only be months away from nuclear capabilities will test his multilateral approach to the Oval Office and will potentially determine the balance of power in the Middle East for years to come.

The historically rocky relations between the two countries — characterized by the CIA-led coup of democratically elected Prime Minister Mosaddegh in 1953, the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis in 1979, and the assassination of top military commander, General Qasem Soleimani, in 2020, to name a few — were put on display when Biden ordered a series of airstrikes on Iran-backed militias in Syria in late February as his first demonstration of military force. The airstrikes were supposedly a response to rocket attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, which Iran denied involvement in. That same week, Iran rejected the European Union’s proposition to moderate informal nuclear talks between Tehran and Washington. 

While Biden’s willingness to extend a diplomatic hand through the EU and prevent the nuclearization of one of the United States’ biggest military rivals, the first such offer in four years, reflects the new administration’s intent to revive global cooperation and internationalism, Iran’s cold response has made restoring the JCPOA one of the administration’s early challenges. Evidently, it will not be as diplomatically simple as lifting sanctions and returning to the 2015 deal, though the State Department recently reported that they are ready to do so. A new round of negotiations must be conducted, whether on Pennsylvania Avenue or a neutral location, with leverage being sacrificed on both sides.

It seems this is already underway. At a meeting in Vienna between intermediaries on April 6, representatives of the United States and Iran agreed to establish a joint commission that will work to simultaneously lift U.S. sanctions and halt Iranian nuclear development, thus officially beginning the negotiation phase, however indirectly.

However, after signing a 25-year, $400 billion dollar oil agreement with China in late March, Iran seems positioned to recuperate some of its economic losses from the devastating 2018 sanctions that Trump reimposed, thereby putting pressure on the Biden administration to concede to Iranian demands. The agreement signals that Iran is moving on from stalled negotiations with the United States and looking to the East for economic relief and potential military support down the line. 

In fact, the Iran-China deal also expanded military cooperation between the two nations, including joint research, training, intelligence and weapons development, with the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stating that, “China firmly supports Iran in safeguarding its state sovereignty and national dignity.” Yet U.S. officials seem rather unconcerned with the military aspects of the agreement, citing its lack of specificity and non-binding commitments. 

Even so, the economic leverage that the United States had over Iran as a result of Trump’s 1600 reimposed sanctions will continue to slip as Iran furthers its relations with China. With Iran entertaining other opportunities for relief and perhaps turning toward a more internationalist approach to foreign policy, the JCPOA’s salvation should not be seen as an inevitable conclusion.

Yet the most effective strategy for Biden remains the consolidation of U.S. nuclear demands. While a minority in Washington have continued to criticize the 2015 deal, most Americans opposed Trump’s diplomatic departure in 2018 and still support the JCPOA on its own, which was a landmark achievement of diplomacy and nonproliferation. And, as Iran has restated numerous times, they have no interest in renegotiating or expanding upon the JCPOA, efforts that will become increasingly slim if a new Iranian president takes office in June.

The lifting of some Trump-era sanctions will allow Biden to still maintain leverage in negotiations while also giving the diplomatic discussion some much needed momentum. Even so, such momentum might not get the JCPOA restored or a new nuclear deal established before it’s too late and Iran has already developed full-scale nuclear weapons. For the foreseeable future, Biden will continue to work in a race against time, which may require first rescinding some sanctions and returning to Obama’s Iranian approach in order to get the ball rolling faster. In fact, former weapons inspector and founder of the Institute for Science and International Security David Albright believes that “Iran could explode a test device within nine months; build a basic nuclear weapon in a year; and in two years, affix a warhead to a ballistic missile”.

Ultimately, Biden’s surprising refusal to cave into Iran’s pre-negotiation demands reflects his hard-nosed centrism and the slow U.S. return to diplomatic multilateralism following the Trump presidency. While many would have expected an immediate attempt to restore the JCPOA at all costs before the Iranian national elections, the administration seems sluggish to deliver on one of its key campaign promises. As negotiations stall and Iran approaches nuclear capabilities, expect to see a more desperate and conciliatory Oval Office to Tehran, the EU, and the American public.

These words, from Canadian philosopher and futurist Marshall McLuhan, emphasize both the necessity of a collectivist attitude and the necessity of coordinated action toward climate change. As the world rapidly approaches the disaster barrier that is 1.5 degrees celsius, it is imperative that the United States takes steps to reach critical climate targets such as net-zero global carbon emissions by 2050. 

Though these may seem like lofty goals, they are now considered essential by many climate experts, if we are to avoid major climate catastrophes that will cost millions of lives, destroy ecosystems and environments and affect trillions of dollars in global revenue. 

Given the extent to which oil and natural gas lobbyists are entrenched and hold influence in American politics, implementing large-scale renewable energy may be difficult to accomplish within the next 10 years. Alternatively, other avenues must be considered to reduce our carbon footprint. A course of action that has been seemingly overlooked is legislation to reduce methane emissions by decreasing the number of cows consumed — essentially, legislation to tackle the meat industry. If deemed politically feasible and in the interest of the administration, President Joe Biden currently faces several alternatives and options for reducing emissions from livestock in order to meet emissions targets.  

Agricultural emissions in the United States account for approximately 10% of all GHG emissions. The largest culprit within the agricultural industry is cattle which — through digestive methane production, transportation, packaging and distribution — directly contributes approximately 30% of all agricultural emissions. The most concerning of these emissions is methane (CH4) — which has a global warming potency 86 times higher than that of carbon dioxide (CO2). 

Cattle contributes to methane emissions primarily in 2 ways. The first is through a process known as enteric fermentation, which is a natural digestive process in which food is decomposed and fermented, creating a by-product of methane. The second primary contributor is cow manure, which often releases methane as it decomposes under anaerobic conditions in piles or open-pit lagoons. 

Combatting methane emissions is a nuanced issue, and agricultural organizations and scientists alike have been doing their best to tackle the challenge for the past 30 years. Many have sought to reduce emissions through intentional alterations of a cow’s rumen, the stomach chamber in which microbes ferment feed hence producing methane. Others have focused on selective breeding for cows with less methane-producing microbes, as well as experimenting with different feeds that promote better digestion. Nevertheless, emissions from agriculture have actually increased despite efforts in many developed countries to actively reduce methane production in cows.

There are several critical reasons why, even with an average reduction of methane emissions per cow, global methane emissions from cattle have still increased by 10% within the last 30 years. First is the phenomenon known as “meatification” in regions like Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Demand for meat has skyrocketed as purchasing power has increased within these regions, and, as a result, global meat production has nearly doubled since 1990. 

Second, measures adopted have been inefficient at reducing overall methane and GHG emissions. While they have made some difference in reducing emissions per cow, raising cows is still a massively inefficient process. In order to raise a cow for slaughter, you must raise it for two to three years as well as provide it with an exceptional amount of land, water, and food. Moreover, cows produce about up to 21 tons of manure per year, and ineffective manure management can lead to greater methane emissions. On top of that, many of these measures have been adopted inconsistently throughout the globe, given that wealthier nations are more equipped to fund the research and supplies needed to successfully implement these measures. 

Yet, research still continues in these areas despite the limited effectiveness of the measures being developed. Why? The larger answer lies in the fact that improvements and advancements in these areas allow the animal agriculture industry to expand. 

But these scientific advancements cannot fix an industry that is inherently destructive – not only to the planet, but to the health of citizens as well. If the United States is serious about combating the negative externalities created by animal agriculture — including methane emissions from cattle — a new agricultural landscape must be constructed rather than focusing improvements to the current one.

There are several paths the Biden administration can pursue if it wishes to significantly reduce the cattle industry’s methane emissions. The first alternative is cut from the old cloth, but worth exploring nonetheless. It involves feeding cows a specific type of seaweed. A 2018 study from the University of California, Davis suggests that feeding cows seaweed could reduce methane emissions from beef cattle by as much as 82%. Unfortunately, implementing this on a massive scale is near impossible because there is simply not enough of that type of seaweed to sustain a cow’s diet, and there are several logistical challenges with providing seaweed supplements to cows grazing on an open range. 

A second policy Biden mught consider is focusing on supporting the growth of businesses that produce plant-based protein substitutes. Plant-based meat alternatives have historically been frowned  upon, but their popularity has absolutely exploded in the past few years with the success of companies like Beyond Meat. Two out of five Americans have tried plant-based meat, with that figure stretching to over 50% for those 25 and younger. Moreover, plant-based substitutes are expected to achieve a whopping 85 billion dollars in sales in 2030, an 1,847% increase from 2018. This growth has only accelerated throughout the pandemic, as the unsafe COVID-19 conditions endured by many meat processing workers have increased calls for more meat-free alternatives.

Another promising innovation the Biden administration could support is lab-grown meat. Currently, lab-grown meat is still in its infancy in the United States, with plans to serve cultured meat still several years away. However, in the United Kingdom the process is a little further along. There are currently 15 startups focusing on lab-grown meat and they have plans to expand to mass production in the coming years. CE Delft expects that by 2030, lab-grown beef could be just as inexpensive as agricultural beef. Even better news, if lab-grown factories were funded by renewable energy it would reduce total beef emissions by 93%. Lab-grown beef may be the best potential alternative because not only does it allow us to reduce our methane emissions and assuage ethical concerns about animal farming, but it also allows consumers to keep the taste and nutrients of meat readily available in their diet.  

But one notable hurdle the United States faces with both plant-based proteins and lab-grown beef is the political strength of the U.S. agribusiness industry. According to research from New York University, major meat and dairy producers have spent millions on lobbying efforts and campaigns aimed at discrediting links between climate change and animal agriculture. Over the last two decades, ‘Big Ag’ has spent $750 million on supporting national political candidates who hold similar policy stances, with Mitch McConnell, Lindsey Graham, and Joni Ernst among their top recipients. 

Unsurprisingly, these major conglomerates have been able to get away with highly carbon-intensive methods of agriculture, as well as produce food at a very cheap rate due to large agricultural subsidies. The Barack Obama administration tried to check the advances of Big Ag, promising millions of rural farmers that they would fight back against the most powerful players in the industry, only to stop when the major agricultural conglomerates banded together with their congressional allies. 

Nevertheless, the emergence of climate change as a central political issue will facilitate Biden’s ability to check the power of Big Ag. As more and more American citizens express their concern about climate change, Congress will have to listen to its constituents or risk losing popular support. Additionally, with Democratic control over the House, and the Senate nearly equally split, climate policies will face less hurdles than they did under former President Donald Trump. Biden should take advantage of these circumstances to steadfastly push climate action.

And as such, I believe the Biden administration should consider adopting the following measures to mitigate the effect of the meat industry on climate change.

1. Increase investment in seaweed farming products;
2. Increase subsidies to plant-based protein companies in order to promote industry growth and reduce prices; 
3. Decrease or eliminate subsidies to animal agriculture, which keep the price of beef and other animal products artificially low; 
4. Have the EPA classify methane as a criteria pollutant under the Clean Air Act (CAA);
5. Fund research, infrastructure, and production capacities for lab-grown beef;

The climate crisis grows more grim every day. If substantial action is not taken by the Biden administration to fundamentally reduce American beef consumption and minimize animal agriculture in general, the United States will struggle to reach its emission targets, thereby hampering the global climate fight and bringing the world closer to environmental catastrophe. 

When President Joe Biden took office in January, the United States’ global reputation and global partnerships were falling into disarray. The Trump administration aggravated tensions with numerous countries around the world — both allies and adversaries. But, in particular, the relationship between the U.S. and China suffered greatly, with the economic, trade, and diplomatic relations turning sour and geopolitical tensions increasing.

Biden’s leadership in the White House comes at a pivotal time for the world. When COVID-19 continues to ravage the world; and the development of competing vaccines, the creation of vaccine passports and the race to distribute them to countries in need are fueling U.S.-China tensions. Foreign policy leadership under the new administration undoubtedly has a different outlook on foreign affairs than the previous administration — with engagement, global cooperation and multilateralism at the forefront of decision making. 

The relationship between China and the United States is a nuanced one; the two countries are both rivals and partners in different sectors. And the integrated and globalized economy means that the decisions of one great power undoubtedly impact the fate of the other — and vice versa. This article will provide a brief overview of what those main issue areas are, and how the Biden administration is expected to approach each area in light of U.S.-China relations. 

Navigating Trade and the Global Economy

An increasingly confrontational relationship between the United States and China continues to test global diplomacy and international trade, as the two countries struggle for economic and political power. 

In 2016, former President Donald Trump accused China of being one of the primary reasons for losses in U.S. manufacturing jobs, igniting a complex U.S.-China trade war. In 2018, the United States imposed tariffs on more than $360 billion worth of Chinese goods, causing China to retaliate by imposing tariffs on U.S. products. As tensions grew, the January 2020 $200 billion trade deal between China and the United States failed to solve economic hardship stemming from the multi-year trade war. 

But this tension is built on complex cooperation. China is the United States’ largest supplier of imported goods. Trump’s tariffs policy encouraged U.S. consumers to buy national products, making imported goods rise in prices. This strained the U.S.-China relationship, increasing tensions and making international trade more expensive. 

And currently, large disruptions in global trade resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic has provoked executive action in an attempt to reduce U.S. dependence on internationally sourced materials. On February 24, Biden signed a new Executive Order on U.S. a supply chain, requiring his administration to review supply chains and bolster American manufacturing output, beginning long-term efforts to insulate the U.S. economy from future shortages of critical manufacturing goods. The order calls for a yearlong review of six sectors and a 100-day review of four critical manufactured imports: high-capacity batteries, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and critical minerals. Early on in the pandemic, China diverted protective equipment against COVID-19 to local hospitals and proposed bans on critical minerals, leaving international buyers, including the United States, empty handed. Biden’s new executive order began an important step for creating jobs and making the U.S. economy more resilient in the face of ever growing global threats.

On March 1, the Biden administration released the 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report. The document specifies that the United States will use “all available tools” to address “China’s unfair trade practices that continue to harm U.S. workers and businesses.” The report  reinforces statements previously by the Biden administration in their strategy towards China on trade policy. 

“Addressing the China challenge will require a comprehensive strategy and more systematic approach than the piecemeal approach of the recent past,” the report read. 

Furthermore, the report outlines that it will be a top priority of the Biden administration to work with allies to ensure China fulfills its trade obligations. Although this report does not outline specific steps for trade policy moving forward, it solidifies Biden’s trade stance with China. 

Trump’s U.S.-China trade relationship left the Biden administration with several other economic complications. A December 2020 report from the Center for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) in the United Kingdom indicates that early lockdowns and stability from the COVID-19 pandemic has tipped economic recovery in China’s favor. The report predicts that after a strong economic recovery in 2021, the U.S. economy will grow about 1.9% annually from 2022-2024, and slow to 1.6% in the following years. By contrast, China’s economy is expected to grow 5.7% annually through 2025. 

Although China was the first country hit by COVID-19, aggressive action prevented the country from being affected by the same economic hardship as many others. By contrast, the U.S. economy has been hit hard by COVID-19, as the nation struggles to recover from over 30 million cumulative cases nationwide. The national economic damage has been cushioned by fiscal stimulus, but disagreements and prolonged passage of the $900 billion Consolidated Appropriations Act left millions of Americans struggling into the new year. 

On January 20, the Biden administration announced the American Rescue Plan, which intends to provide immediate economic relief to communities struggling from the effects of COVID-19, send grants and funding to struggling businesses, and assist state and local economies. Signed March 11, this plan will bolster U.S. economic growth and send much-needed relief to Americans and their families. This bill, combined with the American Jobs Plan — which aims to create millions of jobs to rebuild U.S. infrastructure and “position the United States to out-compete China” — will serve as major steps towards repairing the U.S. economy. 

As the United States recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic and begins to determine its trade policies with China moving forward, it will continue to test and enforce trade relations with China. 

The Growing Challenge of Cyber Security

In May 2020, the Trump administration attempted to block American telecommunications firms from installing foreign made equipment that could pose a threat to national security. This included an attempt to restrict the sales of Huawei computer chips within the United States and restrict Huawei from building its 5G wireless networks for fear of global spying. 

Further, hacking concerns in May 2020 caused the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to issue warnings of an imminent threat to U.S. based healthcare, pharmaceutical and research sectors working on COVID-19 response. However, this strategy failed to dissuade further cybertheft. 

In July 2020, the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice issued charges to Chinese hackers after an attempt to gain intelligence on U.S. intellectual property, including COVID-19 research. In September 2020, the Center for Strategic and International Studies revealed that Chinese hackers had been monitoring U.S. government and private networks for over a year in search of vulnerabilities. 

Following incidents of intellectual theft from U.S.-based companies and despite U.S. efforts to prevent major companies such as Huawei from dominating the field of telecommunications, China continues to grow as a limitless threat in the cybersphere. The United States’ vulnerability to China’s international cyber reach leaves the Biden administration with several immediate online threats to combat and weaknesses to secure. 

The Trump administration challenged China’s technology industry through sanctions and executive orders. Early actions from the Biden administration indicate Biden will maintain a similar approach. 

In the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference, Biden said that “we must shape the rules that will govern the advance of technology and the norms of behavior in cyberspace, artificial intelligence, biotechnology so that they are used to lift people up, not used to pin them down.” Statements like this display the administration’s tough stance on proliferating technology concerns. 

Biden may potentially continue the Trump administration’s efforts to exclude Chinese companies from next-generation 5G mobile networks. Trump’s executive order gives the U.S. government the power to block technology transactions that pose “an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States.” 

Only time will tell what the Biden administration will do to tackle cyber security on a global scale. However, one thing is certain: the conversation of technology, global security, and cyber dominance will continue under the Biden administration. 

Emerging Technology and Media Concerns

The technology standoff between the U.S. and Chinese administrations was one item in the laundry list of tensions between the two countries that dominated headlines over the past year. As a staunch proponent of American superiority, Trump seemed determined to undercut any sort of relationship with China that was perceived as a security threat. In February 2020, officials discussed placing restrictions on export licenses of goods from American companies in order to restrict sales to China and reduce their technological advantage. 

American technology companies voiced strong concerns and opposition to any sort of embargo. They insisted that these restrictions would actually undercut American business abroad, as many foreign and American companies were locked into symbiotic business relationships. While these specific restrictions were never enacted, the threat of implementation was enough for some foreign companies to begin cutting ties with American tech corporations. In particular, the semiconductor industry was among one of the most affected industries as the Trump administration placed strict limitations on sales of sensitive microchip technologies to China in January 2020. 

The U.S.-China technology war goes beyond the trade of technological raw materials. In September 2020, as the Chinese app TikTok gained massive global traction, Trump signed an executive order that demanded Bytedance, the app’s parent company, to sell TikTok’s American operations to a U.S.-based company. Trump also banned WeChat, the popular Chinese messaging and communications app, from app stores on Android and iOS platforms. These restrictions were the culmination of U.S. suspicions regarding how these apps utilized personal user information; many in the administration believed the apps were delivering sensitive information directly to Chinese intelligence. As the Trump administration exited the White House, the New York Stock Exchange was ordered to delist the stocks of three Chinese telecommunications companies.

Many believe that the strict hardline stance against Chinese technologies will continue under the Biden administration. The U.S. continues to state that Chinese technologies pose an economic and national security threat to American interests. While many American companies attempted to block such acts from being implemented, the Biden administration is reportedly allowing a Trump-era sanction against Chinese technologies to come into effect later this year. This rule would allow the U.S. Department of Commerce to unilaterally ban any Chinese technologies that it perceives as a threat to national security, paving the way for a great deal of uncertainty among CEOs of American technology giants. However, the Biden administration has taken a step back from Trump’s bans on WeChat and TikTok, allowing the Commerce Department to review these sanctions and determine whether they are necessary. 

Looking Forward

China poses one of the largest long-term threats to U.S. national security. As a growing global influence, China will continue to shape the international sphere through free speech and censorship methods, economic trade policies, and cyber domination.

Tensions regarding trade tariffs and economic recovery will continue as the globe recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic. As China and the United States recover from economic hardship, both countries may aim to improve trade relations. However, this seems increasingly unlikely, as recently passed U.S. legislation aims to outcompete Chinese manufacturing and economic prosperity. 

Cyber security and growing concerns over censorship will continue throughout 2021. Following cases of lapses in cyber security, the U.S. will need to bolster its stability in the cybersphere. The U.S.-China technology war will likely continue under the Biden administration — as the U.S. looks to secure its position as a global hegemonic power. Over the course of the trade war with China, the U.S. administration seeks to also become less reliant on Chinese manufacturing and more self-sufficient. 

Another point of contention that gained international traction last year is the treatment of the Muslim Uighur population in China. The issue attracted massive media coverage when reports of camps filled with Uighurs in the north-western Xinjiang region of China were leaked to international media. While the Chinese government was openly criticized for its actions, President Trump supposedly voiced approval of the treatment — news that became public following the release of former National Security Advisor John Bolton’s memoir. President Trump also delayed sanctions against China’s treatment of the Uighurs in order to facilitate a trade deal. Shortly before leaving the White House, the Trump administration changed course and publicly denounced the treatment of the Uighurs. The Biden campaign was vehemently opposed to the issue but it remains to be seen whether the administration will pursue a more hardline stance against this particular humanitarian issue.

The U.S.-China relationship will continue to evolve over the next four years under the Biden administration. As tensions continue to rise, only time will tell if the United States and China will be able to resolve hegemonic conflicts and improve diplomatic relations. 

NEW YORK — The Biden administration has expressed an interest in reinvigorating U.S.-Canada relations following a virtual meeting between President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau early February. The meeting, which was the first between the then newly-inaugurated president and a foreign head of state, focused on each country’s response to COVID-19, economic cooperation during the pandemic and moving forward, as well as other shared interests among the two close allies. As the White House begins forming its foreign policy objectives and global leadership, it is essential to consider the current state of U.S.-Canada relations and where the two countries may be headed moving forward.

“Generally in world politics, there are no permanent friends, but permanent interests. But, there is supposed to be a special exception for some countries,” said Brian Bow, director at the Center for the Study of Security and Development at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, in an exclusive interview with Glimpse from the Globe. “It is not unique to the U.S.-Canada relationship, but Canada has a special relationship with the U.S. and Canadians were happy with that in the first half of the Cold War.”

When former President Richard Nixon reformed the United States’ economic policy in 1971, which is often referred to as the “Nixon Shock,” along with leaving the Gold Standard, Nixon began putting tariffs on products leaving the United States.

“Most countries reacted with hostility, but no one was more surprised than the Canadians,” Bow said. “They assumed it was a mistake that they weren’t on the list of countries that wouldn’t need to pay these surcharges.”

Following the change invoked by Nixon in U.S. international economic foreign policy, Canada had to do some “soul-searching,” as Bow said. Canada began realizing that they needed to have other partners rather than just entirely relying on the United States. Canada tried to diversify its economic partners, but ultimately failed, as penetrating new markets, especially in Asia, can be pricey and full of uncertainty. As a result, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1989, signaling that economic relations would return to normal. This agreement; which eliminated all tariffs on trade, was a precursor to NAFTA, which was then enacted in 1994. 

“Even since then, there have been these recurring periods where Canada hasn’t liked the direction the U.S. has been going in,” Bow said. “The controversy with the Bush administration over the war in Iraq in 2003 was a big one, and the election of the Trump administration in 2016 was another one.”

Bow believes that the current administration in Ottawa is better aligned with President Biden than it was with Trump. That said, he believes there is a possibility of Trump-like rhetoric making its way into Canadian politics in the future. 

“When I was a teenager in Canada, stylish clothing would make its way about five years after it appeared in America,” Bow said. “The same thing can happen with policies and parties in Canada trying on Trump-style rhetoric.” 

The possibility of conservative politicians in Canada imitating the populist and often provocative language of Trump will certainly impact relations between the two neighbors. While this style of rhetoric is not prominent in Canada yet, Canadians, including Bow, are worried this could occur in the future. The next federal election in Canada could see a tight race between liberals and conservatives. Current polls show Prime Minister Trudeau with a narrow five-point lead, but Biden’s win may have an effect on Canadian elections. Many politically engaged Canadians are happy that the Biden administration will be holding office for the next four years; a recent poll showed that four in five Canadians hoped for a Biden win. 

Canadians are excited and hopeful about the Biden administration’s position on various issues, namely climate change. Undoubtedly, the Biden administration is taking the threat of climate change more seriously than the previous administration. Already, Biden has appointed former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry as the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, a new position within the cabinet. Additionally, the U.S., as of February 19, has rejoined the Paris Agreement with the international goal of keeping global warming below two degrees celsius, needed to avoid the most catastrophic impacts of climate change. Canada is also a signatory of this agreement and has fiercely advocated for its importance. Most recently, on February 25th, Biden and Treadau announced that they would be coming together to reach their goal of net zero emissions by 2050 with their “U.S.-Canada Partnership Roadmap.” 

The Partnership works to align the goals and climate policies of each country so that they can cooperate more efficiently. In addition to aligning policies, the plan hopes to create more policies and projects that will promote job growth, address inequality and combat the effects of climate change. Advocating for the creation of clean-energy infrastructure and ensuring that cross-border energy is renewable is at the core of this partnership. Biden and Trudeau also committed to having polluters take responsibility for their damages.

In addition to the announcement of the plan, Trudeau said that “U.S. leadership has been sorely missed over the past years… [it is]nice when the Americans are not pulling out all references to climate change and instead adding them.” 

While both countries must implement long-term goals for climate change to protect our planet, the issue of COVID-19 has taken precedent this past year as over 500,000 people have died of COVID-19 in the U.S. alone as of February 2021. 

During the initial meeting between Biden and Trudeau, COVID-19 was the primary focus. Both leaders agreed that cooperation in combating the virus was essential. Canada has struggled to vaccinate its population due to supplies being bought up by larger economies like the United States and United Kingdom. As part of his statement, Trudeau raised the idea of buying vaccines produced in the United States. Canada is currently receiving vaccines from Pfizer and Moderna plants in Europe and Biden’s team reportedly said that it was the administration’s priority to “ensure every American is vaccinated.” 

It is unlikely, however, that the United States would sell vaccines produced domestically to Canada until late summer at the earliest. As of February 20th, 2021, only 2.43% of Canadians had received at least one dose of the vaccine compared to about 14% of the U.S. population. 

Despite the challenges associated with vaccine distribution, the United States and Canada have committed to keeping trade as open as possible. The Prime Minister’s office emphasized “the importance of avoiding measures that may constrain the critical trade and supply-chain security between our countries” in a public statement. Economically, it is in the best interest of both nations to keep borders open and encourage trade to avoid unemployment and increase GDP.   

Although Canadian and U.S. interests are more aligned than in previous years, on his first day in office, Biden signed an executive order to end the expansion of the Keystone XL pipeline, a project supported by the Government of Alberta, a provincial government of Canada. The Keystone XL pipeline, which began planning and construction in 2008, travels from Canada through Texas. The pipeline, which began operating in 2010, was scheduled for an expansion to be able to carry even more oil. Despite the pipeline providing economic benefits to both countries, Biden canceled the project in order to protect the environment and indigenous communities. A January statement from the White House said that “the President acknowledged Prime Minister Trudeau’s disappointment regarding the decision to rescind the permit for the Keystone XL pipeline.” 

Bow said that the pipeline will hurt domestic relations between the local governments and the federal government in Canada, rather than hurting diplomatic relations between Ottawa and Washington. Given that Trudeau is substantially worried about political support in his country, this may be why he showed disdain for the cancellation of the project. 

“The prairie provinces who are the major oil exporters in Canada are the ones who really desperately wanted Keystone to go through, and people in other parts of Canada don’t really care that much about it,” Bow said. “There are real differences between Canadians on those issues.” 

While the Trudeau administration did not express as much distress about the cancellation of the project, in a statement released by the Government of Alberta, Premier Jason Kenney expressed his disturbance with Biden’s actions to cancel the Presidential permit for the Keystone XL pipeline. He highlighted the 2,000 jobs that would be lost due to the cancellation of the project. The statement also said, “That’s not how you treat a friend and ally.”

Even though some of the provincial governments may not support President Biden, there is no reason to believe that the Trudeau administration, which will be in office for at least the majority of Biden’s stay in the White House, will become hostile with the U.S. over this issue, especially as, since the cancellation of the project, Trudeau and Biden have already begun working on several projects together. 

The future of U.S.-Canada relations looks hopeful as the two countries are already working together to tackle global issues such as climate change and COVID-19. However, the  relationship between the two countries can change depending on the issues at hand and the administration holding office. 

With the popularity of Trumpism in the United States and growing support of populism in Canada, both countries could experience major political shifts once the two leaders are up for re-election. However, until then, the neighbors will most likely continue to work cooperatively together and advance the two countries’ unique historical, cultural and geographical relationship.

LOS ANGELES — The Cuban Missile Crisis. The Bay of Pigs. Guantanamo Bay. All of these infamous events seem to encapsulate a common sentiment around the topic of U.S.- Cuba relations over the years, one marked by tense relations and cautious diplomacy. 

In 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama overcame decades of tension and became the first president to visit Cuba since Calvin Coolidge in 1928. In Obama’s second term, he made it a priority to change the contentious relationship between the two countries. While Obama understood the human rights differences, he believed that the best way to deal with the dispute and promote freedom was through dialogue and positive actions. 

He then set out a plan to develop trade, humanitarian and scientific opportunities. The Obama administration promoted joint medical research, the selling of Cuban medicine in the U.S. and banking for Americans in Cuba. They also wanted to create scholarships for research and build more infrastructure in Cuba. 

The administration hoped that easing restrictions and creating new programs would help facilitate a better economic and diplomatic relationship. Though Obama’s actions were not widely applauded by Cuban Americans like Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ), his arrival in Havana marked a historic beginning to a detente period and the first step to normalizing relations between the two countries. 

That, too, however, quickly deteriorated. The past four years under Trump saw rollbacks in Obama’s policy. Former British Ambassador to Cuba Paul Hare told Glimpse from the Globe in an exclusive interview that, “Trump for largely electoral reasons, thought it would be advantageous, so he could win Florida, to say he would reverse Obama’s policies, which he did pretty quickly, despite the main one of keeping full diplomatic relations.” 

Notably, Trump also re-designated Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” continuing to choke Cuba’s economy with economic sanctions. Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reported the new classifcation of Cuba, and justified the decision by saying that Cuba continually, “[provided]support for the acts of international terrorism in granting state harbor to terrorists.” When this decision was made, the United States only had listed Syria, Iran and North Korea under this categorization. Being classfied as a “state sponsor of terrorism” allows the United States to apply more sanctions, deny foreign aid and restrict the exports of defense materials to the country. 

In a tweet, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez condemned the act, and said that “the political opportunism of this action is recognized by anyone with an honest regard for the scourage of terrorism and its victims.” Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy expressed his frustrations with the decision and recognized in a statement that this action will make the relationship between the United States and Cuba even more strained for the Biden administration. As Biden now takes office, there has been talk of continuing Obama’s legacy to normalize relations between the two countries. 

U.S. President Joe Biden, who served as Obama’s vice president, heavily endorsed previous efforts to seek improved relations with Cuba. Biden’s presidential campaign vowed to reverse Trump’s policy that has “inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights.” Already, eighty Democrats in the U.S. House of Representative have encouraged Biden to roll back sanctions on Cuba and allow travel between the two countries to create “a constructive, productive and civil approach toward Cuba and its people,” according to Peter Kornbluh, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive.  

Calls for lifting U.S. sanctions on Cuba mainly stem from concern for the Cuban economy. Many describe Cuba as a country lost in time, with its infrastructure and economy unmoving from decades ago. The struggling economy saw its first awakening in 2014 after U.S.-Cuba relations were restored and travel restarted to enliven the tourism market. However, these changes were quickly undermined by rollbacks of the Trump presidency and the COVID-19 pandemic. 

In 2020, Cuba’s economy shrank by 11%, setting a three-decade record of decline. Broadly speaking, the Cuban economy last peaked in 1984 and plummeted in the 1990s, erasing almost a third of its entire economy. After that, there were meager economic improvements in 2000 when Venezuela supplied oil at discounted prices, but since the 2008 financial crisis, Cuba never truly recovered. 

Now, the dire state of its economy is taking a toll on the entire demographic, with its population of 11.2 million shrinking and quickly aging. With Biden’s arrival, many are optimistic about Cuba’s recovery with U.S. aid — but it may still be too early for that. At this stage, Cubans are looking towards strides in opening up travel.

“They will be hoping now that Biden does open travel, which will bring a lot of money into Cuba,” said Paul Hare, former ambassador to Cuba. “It will bring tourism, but also Cuban American travel, which is being reduced from the new restrictions.”

As seen by Cuba’s recent governmental action, better relations seem to be desired by Cuba. Cuba’s inner workings have seen significant changes over the years. After decades of isolationist authoritarian policy under Fidel Castro, in 2009, Fidel’s successor, Raul Castro completely reformed his cabinet. He removed several of Cuba’s highest-ranking officials from their posts and dismounted many loyalists of his brother. The political significance of the removal signaled a notable pivoting point for Cuba, signifying an internal political power and Cuba’s divergence from a long period of isolationist policy. 

For the first time in decades, Raul expressed openness to improving relations with the United States. Cuba’s reform has not only been limited to its government but has also been making economic changes to accommodate for the pandemic. The spread of the Coronavirus in Cuba has caused over 65,000 infections and resulted in 387 deaths. While the country was able to keep the mortality rate considerably low, it struggled to keep its economy going and protect its citizens. And the already dwindling economy became even more damaged by a food crisis. 

Since 2010, Cubans have only been allowed to work in businesses in 127 private sector categories specified by the government, mostly encapsulating service jobs in the restaurant or transportation industry. In February, the former policy was abolished, legalizing all private sector businesses except for a list of 124 specifically prohibited jobs. 

This is a fundamental, historic change that we’ve been asking for for a long time,” said Oniel Diaz Castellnos, an owner of a business Cuban consultancy agency. “There are a lot of businesses that were illegal and now can be legalized, and there’s going to be a lot of innovative ideas that will be unleashed. It’s an economic opportunity not just for entrepreneurs but for the country.”

Biden’s entry into office has increased optimism on the U.S.-Cuba relationship. He has openly voiced intentions to roll back President Trump’s harsh foreign policy and continue engagement with Cuba. “Yes, I would. In large part, I would go back,” Biden said. “I’d still insist they keep the commitments they said they would make when we, in fact, set the policy in place.” The Biden administration’s first priority in Cuba would be to support democracy and human rights in the country. White House Spokeswoman Jen Psaki said at a press briefing “[we are committed]to making human rights a core pillar of our U.S. policy,” and “to carefully [review]policy decisions made in the prior administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.”

However, this is not necessarily a guarantee of close diplomacy. Biden’s arrival may mean improved relations between the United States and Cuba, but as the United States battles with COVID-19, diplomacy with Cuba may not be of the utmost importance. The Biden administration is not in a rush to change Cuba policy, which is currently under review, the White House said. 

“The Biden administration clearly has to decide what it’s for and what its policy priorities are,” Hare said. “They’ve got many more pressing issues, and perhaps Venezuela, which is linked with Cuba, is more pressing than actually reformulating a new policy towards Cuba.”

This is old news. The report merely revealed information that was leaked and well-known years beforehand: the brutal murder of Khashoggi would not have been possible without the approval of the crown prince. The declassification of the report was largely a symbolic move, much like the general nature of American response to Saudi Arabia and other allies who consistently violate human rights. 

Saudi Arabia has long been a country marred by questionable actions, most notably the decade-long war in Yemen. The Yemen Civil War began after the Shiite Houthi rebels overtook the Sunni government’s capital in late 2014. Fearing Houthi links to Iran, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition with other Sunni Gulf states with hopes of restoring power to Yemen’s incumbent government. As the Saudi-led coalition intervened with airstrikes and economic isolation, a full-blown humanitarian crisis emerged. Yemeni civilians faced famine and an endless downpour of strikes, leading to tens of thousands of casualties, thousands of deaths (including those of children), and millions of people displaced. Despite the global concern, during the first five years of the Yemen War, Saudi Arabia was the largest arms importer in the world — and 73% came from the United States. By supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia and other states in the coalition, the United States ultimately fueled a devastating human rights catastrophe. 

During his campaign, Biden promised to end support for the Saudi-backed war. So far, his administration has temporarily suspended arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states and has revoked Trump’s designation of the Houthi rebels as a foreign terrorist organization. It’s worth noting that these actions do exceed those of previous administrations. However – especially if the arms sales ban is not made permanent – these are mainly emblematic in nature. They signify a reluctance to take hard action and a desire to subdue calls for accountability. 

Shortly after these actions were announced, the backtracking ensued. Biden clarified that the crown prince himself would not be penalized, claiming that the diplomatic cost would be too high. Instead, Biden’s aides described a series of travel restrictions on lower-level Saudi officials among other actions, denying giving Saudi Arabia a pass. According to White House officials, instead of reaching out to the crown prince directly, Biden opted for a call to his father, King Salman. During the brief phone call, Biden reportedly raised the idea of recalibrating the U.S.-Saudi relationship. However, approaching the aging king, rather than the prince who appears to be calling the shots, is likely another mechanism to avoid direct accountability.

The United States is not likely to take harsh action against Saudi Arabia, especially against the crown prince himself. Albeit, Biden was correct in highlighting the diplomatic cost of doing so, as Saudi is a critical ally in ensuring Middle East stability and in confronting Iran. Biden faces the unfortunately difficult task of balancing security interests and basic human values. However, it does illuminate America’s double standards when it comes to human rights. 

Directly punishing world leaders is not unheard of for the United States. It has imposed sanctions on a handful of world leaders: President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, Kim Jong-un of North Korea, President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and Robert Mugabe, the former prime minister of Zimbabwe. Many of these punishments came after various human rights violations among other sources of conflict. However, none of these nations were American allies. In fact, they were the opposite. The unwillingness of the United States to punish M.B.S after a brutal and clear violation of human rights — against a U.S.-based journalist nonetheless — reflects its stance on human rights violators: pursue when convenient. 

It’s not as if Saudi violations have not been up to par with other perpetrators. Migrant workers, religious minorities, women, and other vulnerable groups have all faced questionable treatment in Saudi Arabia. Families affected by 9/11 have taken to the courts, seeking accountability from the Saudi kingdom for providing material support to Al-Qaeda after some Saudi officials had been linked to the horrific attacks. Thus, the Khashoggi murder report could not have been the final straw for the U.S. government to finally reconsider relations with Saudi Arabia. It was an opportunistic maneuver to appease human rights activists and fulfill a back-burner campaign promise, which likely would not have even occurred if the United States was still heavily dependent on the Gulf for oil. 

The United States has consistently shown that it is a champion of human rights — when convenient. If an American ally commits a crime, whether that be Saudi Arabia or even Israel, the United States usually will not pursue accountability. This is not the era of American isolationism; the United States is not shy in actively involving itself in conflicts around the world. 

However, the conflicts it chooses to insert itself in reveal a clear double standard where adversaries are punished and allies go unchecked, even if they have thousands of deaths on their hands. 

In exchange, nuclear-related sanctions would be lifted once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified that Iran had taken the steps to roll back their nuclear program. The controversial agreement was designed to repair the relationship between the United States and Iran after numerous tumultuous decades. 

For moderate Iranians, the JCPOA ignited a sense of unprecedented optimism for a new beginning — one that could integrate Iran into the international community, allowing for economic prosperity and policy reform within the nation. These sentiments were echoed by the Obama administration, as their top Deputy National Advisor Ben Rhodes said that the agreement would produce an “evolution in Iranian behavior,” while simultaneously implying a reduction in the systemic human rights abuses within the nation.

While the JCPOA was primarily viewed as a nuclear and economic agreement, there was hope that the deal would inspire a shift in the sociopolitical governing of the Iranian regime. Prior to the deal, Iran had a long-lasting history of alleged American hostage-taking, including the mysterious disappearance of Bob Levinson, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent, and Siamak Namazi, an Iranian-American businessman. In the days preceding the JCPOA’s implementation, former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif worked to release ten U.S. Navy personnel who were taken into Iranian custody after straying into the nation’s territorial waters. 

On January 16, 2016, the day the JCPOA went into effect, Iran agreed to release all remaining jailed dual nationals, implying renewed diplomatic intentions. However, the same year, Iran further imprisoned several other dual nationals, making it abundantly clear that Iran’s true motives in regard to diplomatic and human rights relations had not reformed. Instead, Iran’s support for Houthi rebels in Yemen, a U.S. declared foreign terrorist organization, increased, initiating a concatenation of consequent violations. 

The largest human rights violations following the JCPOA’s implementation were the inhumane conditions within Iranian penitentiaries faced by free speech proponents which were carried out without basic due process. Prisoners continued to be executed, their deaths symbolizing the consequences of rebellion. Human rights activists and citizen journalists have carried the majority of the burden, as they uphold the reputation of being the regime’s most formidable threat. A majority of political activists’ executions are justified by the Iranian government through false convictions that require barbarous punishments or the clandestine selection of a scapegoat to pin government officials’ crimes on. 

According to an informed source, Hossein Jozi, a protest organizer during the 2019 riots, was kidnapped and murdered by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC). Farhad Vosoughi, a 27-year old husband and father, was accused of killing Jozi and unlawfully subjected to solitary confinement — without ever having received legal assistance. During his sentence, his brother cited the fierce torture Farhad Vosoughi’s endured that led to his eventual death. Following his demise, prison judiciary officials further threatened Vosoughi’s family to equivocate the truth to the press.

Sina Ghanbari, another political activist, was incarcerated and rumored to have committed suicide in May of 2018. However, when Ghanbari was lowered into his grave, family members unveiled his head and found signs of a broken skull and smashed left eye. 

Aside from mysterious homicides, there were also direct accounts of inhumane treatment through the refusal of medical services within penitentiaries. Behnam Mahjoubi, a prisoner of conscience, was arrested for his involvement in anti-government protests in February of 2018. Despite requiring daily medication for a diagnosed panic disorder, Mahjoubi was intentionally denied proper medical care. According to Mahjoubi’s wife, the correctional physician substituted his prescribed medication with 14 to 17 sleeping pills, a night, which led to his paralysis and untimely death. Their deaths and cruel treatment represent a minuscule fraction of the overwhelming number of political prisoners who bear the burden of seeking free speech. 

It has become increasingly difficult to hear the muffled screams of Iranian citizens, as human rights abuses continue to be meticulously buried via government censorship. As there has been little information revealed on the subject, the situation on the ground is best understood through local activists. Shiela, an Iranian local advocate who has extensively studied the sociopolitical climate of the region, spoke to Glimpse from the Globe on the status of human rights post-JCPOA implementation.

“There has been an extensive amount of misinformation spread regarding the satisfaction of Iranian citizens, especially after the signing of the JCPOA,” said Sheila, who requested that her identity be kept anonymous. “Rouhani repeatedly expressed that Iranian citizens were overjoyed at the lifting of sanctions, when the reality is that Iranian families have received no economic assistance and are victims to inhumane living conditions… the painted narrative put forward omits the realities of our hardships. It becomes increasingly frustrating when there is no way to illustrate how human rights abuses have worsened.”

Government mandated censorship does not end at journalist inoculation; the concealment of human rights violations is equally crucial for the Iranian government. During the November 2019 protests, over 300 protesters died and over 7,000 were arrested. An Amnesty International report revealed accounts of relentless torture throughout their prison sentences, including beatings, electrocution, amputation, waterboarding and sexual violence. On the deadliest day of the protests, Iranian authorities purposely blocked all internet access within the nation to conceal the true extent of police misconduct. Till this day, there have been no official criminal investigations or accountability measures taken against the government for the blanket internet shutdown. During the shutdown, many American-Iranians residing in the U.S. turned to non-partisan organizations to shed light on the severity of the protests. While various organizations within Iran claim to be for the people, Sheila said this is not always the case.

“Non-partisan organizations such as the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) claim that they amplify the voices of the Iranian-American community, yet they continuously formulate false testimonies about our experiences and have been repeatedly linked to the Iranian government,” she said.

While the international community may not understand the depth of human rights violations, they have witnessed the multitude of protests that overtook the streets of Tehran in the past decade. Since January 2018, over 5,000 individuals have been imprisoned for engaging in protests surrounding inflation, unemployment and inequality. In May 2018, former President Trump declared that he was withdrawing from the nuclear deal and imposing severe economic sanctions and penalties on Iran. Consequently, Iran has been unable to access its tens of billions of dollars in assets held in foreign entities, mostly in the form of oil and gas exports. 

Despite these sanctions causing an increased cost of living, many Iranian citizens had hoped that the increased pressure on the regime could promote accountability, decrease human rights violations and even lead to an eventual government collapse. However, the imposed sanctions produced no change in governmental accountability, causing an eruption of mass dissent. The protests were multifaceted in their aim; while a portion of citizens were protesting the worsening human rights violations, others were opposing the rise of fuel prices and their crippling socioeconomic conditions.

Thus, citizens face a Catch-22 with no axiomatic resolution. During the JCPOA era, the Iranian government was able to access over 50 billion dollars in usable liquid assets to further strengthen their regime and perpetrate severe human rights offenses. However, even during the post-JCPOA era, increased economic sanctions led to civil uprisings, further provoking the government’s police forces to escalate state-sanctioned imprisonment and death rates amongst Iranian citizens. 

The entrance of the Biden administration onto the world stage could mark a new era in Middle Eastern affairs. However, reentering a revised deal will not be accomplished as easily as the United States may hope. Since the Trump administration previously withdrew from the deal, Iran has enriched their uranium from 102 kilograms to approximately 2,440 kilograms — more than 12 times the limit set by the JCPOA. They have also halted international inspections of nuclear sites, allowing for the accelerated development of atomic weapons. 

Iran has become more powerful, granting them greater leverage at the negotiating table. Although Iran’s economy is in shambles, Iranian hardliners are hesitant to negotiate a new deal following the killing of Qasem Soleimani, an Iranian general who commanded a wing of Iranian military forces. With the upcoming 2021 Iranian Presidential election, a tough fight between hardliners and moderates will indicate the future of U.S.-Iran relations, and more importantly, the future of human rights within the country. 

The most feasible and immediate solution for Biden’s administration may be an interim agreement to halt nuclear buildup in exchange for sanction relief and access to oil revenues, allowing an economic boost. Following a potential period of economic relief, popular support for a more moderate presidential candidate could allow the revisiting of a new deal that can further develop diplomatic ties between Iran and the international community. 

While economic benefits may be the key to reentering negotiations, the global community cannot continue to turn a blind eye to the number of Iranian lives at stake following the introduction of a new deal. In September of 2020, then-presidential candidate Biden promised to “call out the [Iranian] regime for its ongoing violation of human rights”, citing the execution of Iranian wrestler Navid Afkari as a “travesty” in a September 12th tweet. 

Iranians now, more than ever, are urging Biden to impose stringent economic sanctions until Iran is willing to accept accountability for their human rights violations. Only then can the global community and Iran negotiate a feasible nuclear and economic deal that sets human rights at the forefront.