This dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan began almost a century ago in 1921, when Joseph Stalin gave the region of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, a Muslim-majority nation. However, almost 90% of the population identified as Armenian and Christian, and this action isolated the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, known as the Artsakh to Armenians, within a country they did not consider their own. 

Despite the circumstances, the situation remained relatively stable until the deterioration of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. In 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh announced that it wanted to join Armenia despite its location within Azerbaijan. Three years later, when the Soviet Union fell and Armenia and Azerbaijan became sovereign states, the two countries went to war to determine who would have authority over Nagorno-Karabakh.

The war was incredibly violent, lasting three years and causing the deaths of over 30,000 people. Many of the casualties were attributed to the ethnic cleansing carried out by forces on both sides, which also displaced tens of thousands of refugees. By the time a ceasefire was negotiated, Armenia had taken over Nagorno-Karabakh and much of the surrounding area. While the ceasefire, brokered by Russia, ended the war, the strained relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan persist. Since then, Nagorno-Karabakh continues to be a part of Azerbaijan but is primarily governed by a separatist republic run by ethnic Armenians and supported by the Armenian government. The Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact, the border separating the Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, remains one of the most militarized in the world.

The new resurgence of conflict hinted at the threat of an all-out war between the two countries, one that would likely involve the larger powers of Turkey and Russia. These two countries, who had previously worked together to manage the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, have also seen a deterioration of relations this year. In February, Russian airstrikes targeted and killed Turkish soldiers in Syria, and in May, Turkey sent military advisors, drones and Syrian fighters to Libya to oppose a Russian-backed political faction. Turkey and Russia are fighting each other through proxy wars in both Syria and Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh could very well have been the third.

During the war in the 1990s, Turkey fully supported Azerbaijan (with whom it shares an ethnic and cultural heritage), even closing its border with Armenia in solidarity. Turkey and Armenia have long been at odds, with the latter pushing for recognition of the Armenian genocide in 1915 and the former refusing to acknowledge it. Russia has economic ties to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, but has a closer relationship with Armenia. Currently, Armenia hosts a Russian military base and is part of several Russian-led regional alliances that include the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. 

Armenia had already claimed that Turkey is involved in this newest bout of fighting, and accused  a Turkish fighter jet of shooting down an Armenian jet in May. These claims were initially denied by Turkey, but satellite images of Azerbaijan showed parked Turkish planes. Later, Azerbaijan’s president admitted that the planes were there, but said they had not been used in combat. The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has openly declared support for Azerbaijan, and other governments monitoring the situation, including France and Russia, say that Azerbaijan has been attacking Nagorno-Karabakh with Turkish drones. These nations also allege that foreign fighters from Syria are being brought into the conflict by Turkey on behalf of Azerbaijan.

Russia, on the other hand, had called for restraint from the two countries and refrained from getting directly involved. Had Azerbaijan attacked civilian areas deeper in Armenia, a defense treaty between Russia and Armenia would have been triggered, forcing Russia to intervene militarily and counter Azerbaijan. Possibly in recognition of this, Azerbaijan mostly limited its attacks to territory claimed by the Armenian-led separatist government in Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Reactions from the rest of the international community were rather limited. The United States, France and Russia, the leaders of the OSCE Minsk Group that has been working to end the conflict since 1992, issued a joint statement condemning the escalation of violence, as did the European Union. However, no countries in either of these coalitions announced plans to get further involved in the situation. Seeing the reluctance of foreign governments, the Armenian diaspora took to the streets in protests around the world to try and generate media coverage and action. Hundreds of Armenians from all over Europe protested in front of the European Parliament building in Brussels in August. Similar action was taken by Armenians in the United States, particularly in southern California, which has the largest population of Armenians in the country. Despite their efforts, the intervention by foreign governments never came.

Two weeks after the fighting in September began, Russia negotiated a temporary ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to allow  for the return of prisoners and bodies of the deceased. This quickly fell apart following attacks in both Armenia and Azerbaijan the day after the ceasefire took effect, leading to accusations from both countries of violating the truce. This set off another week of fighting until a second ceasefire was established. Once again, it did not even last a full day.

On November 10th, a third attempt at peace was arranged by Russia, under which Armenia will return to Azerbaijan land that it had taken in during the war that followed the fall of the Soviet Union. The agreement, which is also supported by Turkey, deployed Russian peacekeepers along the Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact and required the Armenian forces to withdraw. The Russian peacekeepers are currently scheduled to remain there for five years, and will also be joined by Turkish forces. The ceasefire has held so far, hinting at a possible end to this round of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

Since the news broke, Azerbaijanis have been celebrating the news, reveling in a victorious end to a long, drawn-out conflict. However, public sentiment in Armenia has been anything but relieved. After news of the ceasefire broke, protestors in the Armenian capital of Yerevan ransacked government buildings and attacked one of the Parliament speakers. Many Armenians feel betrayed by Russia, who they considered one of their closest allies. Only time will tell if the ceasefire will last, but whether it holds or not the tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan will remain for a very long time.

It was a bad idea and everyone knew it. Well, everyone except our professor. The assignment for our class was to go out into the more downtrodden neighborhoods surrounding Baku, Azerbaijan and ask people how oil wealth and government policies affected their lives. The professor would grade the questions for their inquisitiveness. Basically, the task was to get people to speak their minds about sensitive topic in public. “Better” questions were those that would provoke the average person into a diatribe about society, politics, economics or energy policies. This was something few Azeris seemed likely to do, and thus none of the students in the class were enthusiastic to conduct the experiment. We would look more like journalists than researchers, and independent journalists were suffering in Baku.

By this time, my first piece for Glimpse from the Globe had been published, which painted a decidedly negative picture of Azerbaijan’s political landscape; I had no idea if anyone in Baku was aware of it, but it was possible. Azerbaijan is known for its powerful class of political elites, floating on a geyser of Caspian oil. They are busy enough with international political and commercial affairs, so they rely on manipulated elections and a vast security apparatus to maintain stability in the domestic arena. I knew the society well, I knew the neighborhoods we were supposed to visit, and I already knew the silent opinions of many citizens. The last thing I wanted to do was ask pushy questions like “Do you think the government has managed oil wealth fairly?” in some of Baku’s poorest neighborhoods.

Further complicating the situation was the ethnic makeup of my research team: one Azeri and five foreigners, three of whom had absolutely no chance of blending in. The native student and I could speak Azerbaijani and conduct interviews, but the rest of the team would be useless. They were doomed to attract the attention of people who had never before seen foreigners roaming their neighborhoods and bazaars en masse. I knew how to blend in well enough on my own, but with two Africans and a blonde Aussie on my team, there would be no escaping the wary stares of thousands of Azeris who had probably never seen people from other continents in their neighborhoods.. Inevitably, there would be undercover police officers among them.

The inevitable approach from the local cops happened at our second of four locations. We were interviewing a man on the street – who was rather apprehensive from the outset – about how things have changed in the last decade. Instead of asking directly about energy policies, income inequality or other controversial topics, we asked about the quality of healthcare and education, job opportunities and the affordability of food, knowing that the answers would be positive. In 2004 the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline opened, wealth surged into Baku and life began to improve dramatically for many people. According to World Bank figures, Azerbaijan’s GDP per capita increased from under $2,000 to over $7,000 by 2013. Our strategy turned out to be a safe move, and we avoided triggering negative opinions. But as we interviewed the man on the sidewalk, a crowd of onlookers gathered around the unusual group of foreigners jotting notes about the conversation. They interrupted, asking what we were doing. I fended off nosy pedestrians by answering that we were students doing research, enabling the rest to keep going with the interview.

One man was particularly rude and kept asking us questions. Where were we from? Why were we asking these questions? Why did we come to this neighborhood? After explaining our project, I asked if he would be willing to do an interview himself, which he declined. Then he pulled out a government identification card, revealing himself as an undercover policeman.

We were surrounded. It was obvious that several other men around us worked with the officer questioning us. Others may have just been curious pedestrians. Uniformed policemen showed up a few minutes later, but the plainclothes officer was clearly in charge. He wanted to see identification from all of us and various government registration documents as proof we had permission to conduct our research. Naturally, we had no such documents. We spotted our professor down the street, so I broke out of the circle and got him to come explain the situation since he could speak Russian.

Upon being introduced to the professor, the officer said: “I represent Azerbaijan, I must speak Azerbaijani.” Azeris are very proud of their heritage, and tend to display serious and heartfelt nationalism. For all I know, the officer probably could have been charged with neglecting his duties if he had not shown us his robust patriotism. Our Azeri group member offered to translate, but eventually the cops acquiesced and switched to Russian. Azerbaijan’s schools used Russian throughout the Soviet period, but switched to Azeri after declaring independence in 1991. Most of the population still speaks Russian fluently. We slipped around the corner and back to the bus during our professor’s conversation with the police, who had lost interest in what was clearly a student assignment.

I could understand the officer’s position; he was doing his job. I was more disappointed with how the professor handled the class. He did not seem to think that there would be any issues with his assigned research project, and took none of the precautions that I assumed would be common sense, like sharing his cell phone number with the class. Additionally, I felt that he was on some kind of moral crusade to open the minds of Azeris to the injustices of their government. But the injustices he had in mind were related to poverty, not security or freedom of expression.

Our professor wanted us to understand that the quality of life of most Azeris had not improved as a result of the energy boom. But everyone in our class already knew the facts of life in Azerbaijan; a relatively small number of citizens are making incredible gains while the rest of the country struggles to keep up. Stability and order are strictly enforced by the government, which fears popular dissent for a variety of reasons. The government must sanction public events of any kind, no matter the size. At home, Americans can encounter musicians, reporters, pollsters and vendors on the streets virtually anywhere. In former Soviet states, this is less common since their rigorous security apparatuses can and do question “suspicious” pedestrians.

Transitioning to “democracy”, as many in the West think of it, means making societal changes that simply do not work well in some countries. It will never be easy to convince an entire police force that student activism, street reporting, impromptu performances or other “unusual” activities are nothing to fear. Many Western citizens who visit these places come to believe democracy and human rights don’t have a snowflake’s chance in hell of thriving in “oppressive” nations.

The reality is that outside the West, many nations are culturally, institutionally and practically unprepared to become “Western democracies”, regardless of what their constitutions say. Azerbaijan and many other former Soviet states have little historical experiences with Western-style democracy. Their Soviet legacies are also incredibly strong, so their government institutions tend to model those first implemented by the Kremlin. Institutions born of Soviet lineage continue to shape societies in ways that reflect the Soviet period.  Therefore, incidents like my experience occur regularly. As a result, nations like Azerbaijan are condemned by moral authorities such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Human Rights Watch, the US State Department and the EU for not allowing protests, jailing journalists and other incidents. Granted, some incidents do merit international exposure and condemnation. But simply condemning regimes for human rights abuses will do nothing except document and publicize the incidents.

Am I unhappy about the status of human rights in many countries? Of course. But another problem lies in the misperceptions of those Westerners who think they have all the answers, but who don’t actually offer meaningful solutions. Despite unsuccessful Western intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last decade and a half, Americans still habitually delude themselves into thinking that we can somehow manipulate regimes into adopting a stronger rule of law. Military interventions, economic aid packages and sanctions, training programs and a host of other activities have failed to produce functioning, favorable or idealistic governments in various states.

The world can be improved, but not overnight. Transformations in states and societies take time, and we must know that from history. The US took its merry time in establishing civil rights for citizens of all races. Two centuries, in fact, and it still has problems with race relations. No nation has an innocent history. Those governments pursuing morally inspired foreign policies need to run forensics on their own souls before passing judgment on other nations. They also need to examine the practicality of a morally driven foreign policy, both for the sake of preserving amoral strategic interests and ensuring that their foreign policy goals are realistically attainable. As President Eisenhower once said, “Whatever America hopes to bring to pass in the world must first come to pass in the heart of America.” Maybe we should work on our World Press Freedom Rankings before lecturing others on media rights—the US stands at 46th worldwide.

Being briefly investigated by undercover cops was an unpleasant experience. After all, being jailed in Baku was not on my bucket list during my semester abroad. The interaction was a firsthand lesson in the everyday realities faced by independent reporters in Azerbaijan. I don’t envy their positions, and their work is laudable. But the work of a free press is meaningless when the audience of ordinary citizens is unreachable, cowed, uninspired or hopeless. Just as a population strangled by fear is unlikely to change a regime, a regime in fear will not easily change itself in any manner that would sacrifice its security.

So what does it take? What does it take for the West to understand, and for developing countries to learn? Anyone with a laptop can peruse Radio Free Europe and then write a fairly well informed blog post about the status of journalistic liberties in Azerbaijan, or an article on civil liberties in just about any nation. But understanding the causes requires experience. I had no intention of becoming a journalist of any kind when I took off for Baku last June. I had no intention of writing about my experience on the research trip until long after it had ended. But I realized that the lessons offered by that excursion and a host of other classes and experiences enabled me to realize the complexity of a seemingly straightforward situation. Just as an average American may not wholly appreciate the finer aspects of conducting journalism in a place like Azerbaijan, the average Azeri – and even the most extraordinary Azeri officials, who are quite talented – may not comprehend how a free press serves its nation by operating independently. As I learned the complexity of Azeri strategic calculus with regards to controlling the media by learning firsthand, an Azeri could learn about the workings and benefits of a free press through personal experience.

More international exchanges between the West and nations like Azerbaijan should be encouraged in order to bring the realities of Western societies to bear in developing countries. Societal changes occur one citizen at a time. Almost every Azeri I met who had travelled to the West could talk for hours about how different those countries were. I ran into dozens of students who had completed year-long student exchange programs during high school and college, and every one of them could talk for hours about how that time abroad totally changed their lives. They became fluent in English, learned the true value of education and realized that they are actually capable of starting their own businesses and becoming successful without a government job or a family connection. Unfortunately, only a small fraction of Azeris travel overseas, and foreign ideas are slow to filter into the country. American, French, Spanish and British flags can be seen on shirts and soccer jerseys throughout Baku, but the societies they represent are all but absent.

Azerbaijan is not alone in this condition. Similar political and social realities exist in countries worldwide. Nations large and small continue to dampen popular dissent for a variety of reasons. They range from more respectable goals, such as preserving national sovereignty or maintaining stable governance, to sheer abominations, like covering up war crimes. Residents of politically undeveloped countries need to experience foreign excursions in order to understand that alternatives do exist, and that they themselves are capable of implementing changes in their home nations. Encouraging citizens of politically underdeveloped countries to travel abroad might help them gain insights about what can be possible in their homelands. After all, a nation’s history is written primarily by its own people. Providing new perspectives to regular Azeris, Congolese or Venezuelans can give those citizens the tools to reshape their nations in ways the West has been dreaming about for decades. I would happily gamble a round trip ticket from Baku to New York that a certain cop would never have stopped me in the street if he had spent a week in Manhattan.

Actually, he definitely would stop me. I’ve never met a foreigner who had been to New York and didn’t have five stories to tell about it.

For all intents and purposes, Vladimir Putin killed the South Stream natural gas pipeline project on December 1st during a joint press conference with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The news made global headlines and rocked the natural gas industry. Putin blamed the European Commission’s legal restraints for making the current plans untenable. Russian state gas monopoly Gazprom would have owned both the primary gas fields and the South Stream pipeline itself, but European regulations prohibit the same corporation from owning and operating such a large amount of the supply chain. Without Gazprom’s involvement, South Stream is now as dead as the once-glorified Nabucco project. Instead, Putin described vague plans to build a new gas hub in Turkey and a new pipeline across the Black Sea. This would allow Russia to control its exports of gas to Turkey but not any further.

South Stream was Russia’s 63 billion cubic meter per year (bcm/year) competitor to the Western-backed Nabucco. The Nabucco pipeline began in 2002 as an ambitious project to bring Caspian and Central Asian natural gas across Turkey and the Balkans to Central Europe, bypassing Russia and diversifying Europe’s gas suppliers. But many potential suppliers were noncommittal, leaving Azerbaijan as the only remaining supplier. Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II gas field is projected to have enormous gas reserves, but they would not have been enough to fill Nabucco’s planned capacity. After months of deliberations and revisions to the Nabucco project, Baku shifted its support to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) in 2013. It had also completed planning for the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) project independently with Turkey in 2012, which will carry 16 bcm/year of gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II field to the Turkish border with Greece. There it will transfer gas to the TAP, which will reach the southeast shore of Italy.

The entire European energy policy discourse is rooted in Ukraine; most transport infrastructure and pipelines taking Russian gas to Europe pass through Ukrainian territory. Moscow needs a cooperative government in Kiev for strategic reasons and cannot possibly tolerate NATO or EU institutions existing on its doorstep.[1] One of Russia’s preferred methods of keeping Ukraine close is turning off its gas supplies, as it did in 2009, but that means turning off supplies to other European customers as well. Hence the South Stream and other projects have been developed to bypass Ukraine. For example, the Nord Stream and Yamal pipelines bring Russian gas to Germany. However, they are not enough to replace Ukrainian routes.

I first arrived in Azerbaijan as a language student around the time TAP was finalized. I remember meeting executives from SOCAR (State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic) and noting their excitement about finalizing the gas agreements and their eagerness to get the supplies running. Azerbaijan was always going to develop and profit from its gas reserves one way or another, preferably without sending fuel through Russia, as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan do. As long as gas made it to Europe somehow, SOCAR would be able to charge non-discounted prices and Baku would profit.

Last week, the Caspian Center for Energy and Environment (CCEE) hosted two events where the planned topics quickly shifted towards discussions about the South Stream’s cancellation. Businessmen, academics, and government representatives from Azerbaijan, Turkey, Greece, Norway, the United States and elsewhere gathered at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy (ADA) for the small but high-level events. The first event’s focus was a presentation on the economics of oil and gas price movements (both products have price elasticity of demand estimates close to zero, making prices highly sensitive to changes in supply) and the second was an in-depth review of Russian political and economic thinking regarding natural gas export strategies.

The notable aspect of the ongoing analysis in Baku is that the Russians are absent from the conversation. Russian diplomats, academics and businessmen frequently visit ADA for various programs, and several Russian students study there. Russians are sometimes present at other international energy-related events here, but no one is asking for Moscow’s opinion right now. Energy policy independence is a priority in Azerbaijan. The end of the South Stream may be bad news for Moscow, but there can be no doubt that the energy industry in Baku now has a sense of reserved excitement. Scrapping South Stream means that European consumers – whose energy demands are increasing – need to look elsewhere. For instance, Hungary is already publicly looking towards Baku as an alternative gas supplier.

At CCEE’s second event, Norwegian analyst Arild Moe brought up the issue of smaller “non-Gazprom producers” or NGPs in Russia that make up a small portion of the gas market. These gas companies have grown substantially, and even did well during the recession. Since Gazprom is a state monopoly, it is responsible for providing cheap gas within Russia. This is an enormous task, and as an inefficient monopolist, Gazprom is happy to hand off some of its domestic supply duties to smaller, efficient operations and focus on its profitable export markets. But according to Moe, these smaller gas producers have grown to the point where they are beginning to explore opportunities for exports as well. He showed graphs comparing the NGPs’ projections of their combined market share with Gazprom’s projections of the total market share held by NGPs. The difference was substantial; Gazprom anticipates NGPs controlling about 15-20% of Russian gas production by 2020, while the NGPs believe they will produce about 35% of Russia’s gas. Some of these NGPs are backed by serious investors including large oil companies like Rosneft, and have large amounts of capital available for investment in new fields and infrastructure. I asked Moe if these NGPs would consider pursuing a smaller pipeline project by themselves to export gas to Europe, such as a link running through the Caucasus or Eastern Black Sea towards TANAP in Turkey. “A few years ago, that would have been unthinkable,” he said, “but now that might not be so far-fetched.”[2] If this were to happen, it would be a sure sign that Gazprom’s monopoly on Russian gas is weakening substantially.

Although the South Stream’s cancellation may come as tentatively good news, Putin also gave some tantalizing details about future plans with Turkey: “…we are ready to not only expand the Blue Stream pipeline, as I just said, but also build another pipeline system in order to cover the growing needs of the Turkish economy.” Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said in a statement on the same day that Gazprom plans to build a new pipeline directly to Turkey. This will expand gas exports to Turkey by 63 bcm/year, with some 14 bcm/year intended for Turkey and the rest to be transported to the border of Greece. But the consensus in Baku is that a 63 bcm/year pipeline to Turkey is highly unlikely.

During Dr. Ed Hirs’ presentation on oil and gas price fluctuations, the question of such an ambitious project to bring 63 bcm/year to Turkey was brought up. Hirs, an economist who chairs an annual energy conference at Yale, agreed with others that such a project would be commercially and economically unviable for Gazprom since it would be immensely costly.[3] The Turkish economy is strong, but Hirs and others agreed that it would not grow enough to require an additional 14 bcm/year anytime soon. A BP spokesperson said that any new Russian-Turkish pipeline would not affect the TANAP, in which BP holds a large stake. Azerbaijani participants dismissed the Russian claims, projecting that a smaller project with a capacity for 30-35 bcm/year would be more likely. Participants in the event with Dr. Moe also reached this conclusion.

More importantly, there is a business opportunity here for those operating in Baku. Russian gas still needs to go somewhere. It may come from Gazprom or from NGPs in Russia. The Azerbaijani participants in the CCEE conferences often commented that TANAP and TAP could be readily expanded to accommodate 32 bcm/year or more. SOCAR is a major stakeholder in both these projects. If Russian gas companies, seeking profits from Western customers who pay full prices, decide to avoid major capital-intensive projects like South Stream while still avoiding Ukrainian routes, then TANAP and TAP could become the routes of choice.

The idea of Russian gas transiting non-Russian pipelines probably does not sound appealing to the Kremlin right now. But according to some experts such as Dr. Moe, Gazprom’s major gas fields are Soviet legacy fields, which are becoming less productive over time. They will need to make massive investments in developing new fields sooner or later, and with the decreasing prices of energy, the Russian budget is being squeezed. There is also a major capital flight out of Russia due to the Ukrainian crisis. Perhaps building a small link through the Caucasus and paying transit fees to use TANAP and TAP will be more appealing in Moscow than pursuing major pipeline projects, in order to save up for the inevitable exploration and development of new fields. Since TANAP and TAP will be coming online in a few years, SOCAR has time to think and play its cards.

There is also a strategic opportunity here for the West. If Russian gas was reached Europe via an expanded TANAP and TAP, then the life of Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II field could be extended significantly; the pipeline could be filled without Shah Deniz II being consistently operated at 100% of its output capacity. If Russia ever found itself in a scenario desiring to shut off exports via TANAP, gas supplies from Azerbaijan could be increased to satisfy some of that demand. A variety of gas suppliers using TANAP and TAP routes would increase European energy security while adding substantially to fees collected by Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Expanding TAP and TANAP could be a windfall: more energy security for Europe, more cash coming into Baku, and another non-Ukrainian route for getting gas from Russian producers to their best European customers. Russia would not have direct control of this pipeline, but that would allow it to focus its investments elsewhere.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Other Works Cited

[1] “Ukraine and the Little Cold War” by George Friedman, published on Stratfor March 4th, 2014, is composed of excerpts of two chapters on Eurasia from Friedman’s 2009 book The Next 100 Years, published by Anchor Books.

[2] Personal interview with Dr. Arild Moe during CCEE’s event “Round-Table Discussion on Russian Gas: New Internal and External Challenges with Dr. Arild Moe.” December 3rd 2014.

[3] Discussions during Dr. Ed Hirs’ presentation “Oil and Gas Prices: Analysis of Current Situations and Trends” sponsored by CCEE. December 2, 2014.

“Do you feel free, living here?”

It was the question I had seen in countless people’s eyes, but never heard aloud. They were too afraid to say the words. To be honest, I had hoped no one would ever ask me. Over here, America is synonymous with freedom, and revered to an extent I never anticipated. The people here are told that they are free, and that their state constitutes a democracy, but most people quietly disagree. As an American citizen, I am the de facto local expert on freedom, and this lady called me to the stand right outside my apartment door, the last place I felt like speaking my mind.

“I do feel free,” I said, noting her skeptical expression. “For me, I guess it’s a different kind of free. I’m free from everything else in my life, because that’s back in America. I love this city. It feels like a second home already. I love the culture even though it’s so different. I certainly feel safer walking around at night here than I do in some parts of New York.”

She smiled, begrudgingly accepted the answer, and turned to descend the crumbling stairwell. I had been reciting that response in my head for a long time, feigning youthful enthusiasm for living abroad in order to avoid political conversations.

Welcome to Azerbaijan, where oil and natural gas oozes from the ground and nothing else matters, for one simple reason: life is pretty good here thanks to massive economic growth fueled by the energy sector. Last October, the Central Election Commission released the results of the presidential election a day early on its mobile phone app, showing incumbent Ilham Aliyev winning 72.76% of the votes. No one expected the election to be fair; voting irregularities were documented by OSCE observers in Azerbaijan. But the early release signaled a new low in domestic politics. The government blamed the early release on a technical glitch encountered while testing the app before the election. The next day, President Aliyev accumulated 84.54% of the votes, securing another term. Despite the opposition’s accusations of falsified results and appeals for a repeat election, there was no Azeri Spring. Less than a year later, the event is largely forgotten.

Many wonder how the Azerbaijani government can get away with blatant maneuvers to rig elections and suppress political dissent without triggering popular unrest. For all its faults, from the litany of human rights violations to the significant wealth inequality gap (Azerbaijan had a Gini coefficient of 33.7 in 2008), Azerbaijan has actually been one of the most successful post-Soviet nations. And the current leadership knows that is has exceeded expectations. The population knows it too: the bread lines of the war-torn 1990’s are nonexistent, and a modest lifestyle is a realistic expectation for many citizens. GDP per capita has risen from $763.10 in 2002 to $7,190.00 in 2011. But life here is not all about money. Survival is what really matters.

I first came to Azerbaijan in 2013, and spent several months living in Baku. SOCAR, the national energy firm, signed the final agreement to construct the TAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline) soon after my arrival. The SOCAR employees I met were on cloud nine, having finally cemented Azerbaijan’s status as a major supplier of energy to Europe. TAP will only reach into southern European countries upon completion, but extending the pipeline network northwards could be a viable option in the future. Such an extension would put Azerbaijan in direct competition with Russia as an energy supplier in Central and Eastern Europe. They knew this at the time, and dreamed of Azeri prosperity. Then Ukraine happened.

Azerbaijan is a strategically dangerous land, occupying the eastern side of the South Caucasus. The capital, Baku, is only a short drive from Iran and Russia, both of which have ruled Baku at various points in history. Russia has acted aggressively towards its least favored neighbors in recent years, invading northern Georgia and Crimea. Armenia and Azerbaijan are still technically at war, not unlike the Koreas, and Russia keeps several thousand troops stationed in Armenia. So Azerbaijan is surrounded by Russia, a hostile Russian puppet, a resurging Iran and Georgia. Should the status quo in international relations hold, Putin’s army could walk into Tbilisi unopposed by any major powers (read: the United States). Azerbaijan would then be forced to make a deal with Moscow to preserve its ability to export energy. Exporting via Iran would be unlikely due to Azerbaijan’s close relationship with Israel, from whom it purchases military hardware. In reality, taking Tbilisi would give Russia the ability to cut off even more of Europe’s energy supplies at will, and instantly sink Azerbaijan’s economy in the process.

The Azeris have a lot to lose. The CIA World Factbook estimates that Azerbaijan’s GDP (purchasing power parity) reached an all-time high at $102.7 billion in 2013, with an annual growth rate of 5.3%. Their economic growth is still fueled by exporting oil and natural gas via pipelines through Georgia and Turkey to destinations worldwide. Despite a severe inequality gap, Azerbaijan does have something of a middle class. Anything from political demonstrations to inflation could upset the prosperity they have worked so hard to attain.

The price of Azerbaijan’s secure independence is individual political freedom. The government knows that political unrest could trigger Russian intervention. The math is simple: pursuing NATO membership cost Georgia two of its provinces, and Ukraine lost Crimea and control over its eastern provinces after pursuing EU partnership. Any political opposition that leans west must be sidelined, as would any political party that leans decidedly north towards Moscow. The Azerbaijanis have struck a near-perfect balance between the West and Russia. They do not export energy so ambitiously as to threaten Russia’s monopoly on European energy markets, nor are they are so authoritarian that they are shunned and sanctioned by the rest of the world. Upon this balanced foreign policy, they have made tremendous accomplishments in the last 20 years. Overall, quality of life has never been better and enough arrests are made to keep any discontented people wary of being publicly critical towards the government.  Most Azerbaijanis are unwilling to trade their relative prosperity and national independence for political rights.

Would you risk trying to overturn your government if your economy could crash and Russian tanks could come rolling into town as a result? Or would you be content to live a quiet, peaceful life without real elections? Americans are fortunate to not face questions like these. But they are also unfortunately ignorant of why people in many nations are reluctant to embrace real democratization: it is often not worth dying for.

The views expressed by this author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Since the late 19th century, skyscrapers have been built out of necessity; growing populations and rising real estate values have coerced engineers to build up rather than out. The inception of steel framed buildings allowed for just that as the first skyscrapers formed in agglomeration in US cities like New York and Chicago. In the 21st century, current technological innovations and renewed economic pressures have led to an international surge in skyscraper construction.

According to the Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat (CTBUH), there are currently 3,206 skyscrapers (defined as buildings over 150 m in height). Most of these are located in countries including China, the United States, Japan, the UAE, Australia and Canada. Of these, 2,103 have been built since 2000 and 2,595 have been built since 1990. That is to say that 80% of all skyscrapers in the 130-year history of tall buildings have been built in the last 25 years.

So where are these new buildings being built? We should first compare the year 1990 to the present. That year, the world leader in tall buildings was the United States, which had 438 of the world’s 611 skyscrapers. Next was China, with 37 (most of which were located in British-controlled Hong Kong), followed by Canada and Australia, which each had 20, and Japan with 19.

Today, the data is incontrovertibly different. China has taken the lead with 1,111 skyscrapers to the US’s 676. Australia, Canada and Japan have all more than quadrupled their skyscraper output while South Korea and the UAE, which barely made the map in 1990, are now major players. The UAE has 187, including the world’s tallest, while South Korea has erected 175. India, Indonesia and other emerging economies have followed similar, though less dramatic, trends. In the midst of these developments, European countries, which have long avoided heights, are also now constructing skyscrapers. For instance, the UK has gone from a single skyscraper in 1990 to 15 in 2014. France, Germany, Spain, Turkey and Russia have followed suit.

So why are these buildings being built? The answer is a mirror image of what occurred in the United States through the 19th and 20th centuries. China has seen its GDP rise from $3.6 billion in 1990 to over $10 trillion in 2014 with parallel increases in property values and urban population. The resultant economic pressure in urban areas coupled with the same ambition that built the Empire State Building has driven engineers in less developed countries upwards.

Meanwhile, in European cities such as London and Paris, places long subject to height restrictions for safety or aesthetic purposes, regulators are changing their attitudes. Development in London’s Square Mile and Canary Wharf districts has been fueled by record property values and population growth. France’s La Défense, located on the fringe of Paris’s city limits, has propped up ten new skyscrapers since the 1980s in an attempt to be business friendly. Moscow’s International Business Center, which hosts nearly a dozen new skyscrapers as well, was conceived for similar reasons. Throughout Europe, the construction of skyscrapers seems increasingly seen as a useful economic tool.

In the Middle East however, skyscrapers serve as elaborate displays of wealth. Grandiose hotels and office buildings, such as the Abraj Al Bait in Mecca or the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, serve to exemplify this point. Saudi Arabia is now moving forward with what will become the world’s new tallest building, the kilometer-high Kingdom Tower in Jeddah. These major projects, typically designed by western architecture and engineering firms such as Adrian Smith, SOM, or Thornton Tomasetti, not only serve their symbolic purposes, but are also intended to transform oil dependent economies into centers of finance and tourism. These efforts, however, can reach the point where they defy economic principle. In Dubai, vacancy rates loom over many of the cities newest skyscrapers.

It’s easy to wonder why the United States, which leads the world in skyscraper construction through the 1990s, hasn’t been keeping up with many of its international counterparts. But in the US, the demand for new skyscrapers simply isn’t there. Countless cities throughout the United States already posses sufficient quantities of office space for their employment levels and many companies have turned to more efficient space usage as an alternative to new construction projects. Another factor lies in the location of US companies, which are relatively rural or suburban. About a third of the US’s largest companies are found in suburban or rural areas and an international comparison (see headquarter locations here) would surely reveal that US companies are less urban than firms abroad. 70% of current construction projects in the United States are underway in technology hubs such as the New York, San Francisco and Dallas metropolitan areas and in only New York is there really a skyscraper construction boom. Aside from these areas, you can expect little change in the skylines of most American cities.

While the construction of supertall structures may be limited domestically, by 2020 over 900 new skyscrapers will be built internationally. Though more than half of these will be found in China, countless other nations will see dramatic changes in their own urban heights. Countries like Russia will witness their skylines double in size while formerly docile countries like Azerbaijan plan their own megatall buildings and European cities adapt their historic reputations. These factors are all indicative of the globalization-fueled trend of building upwards, which will certainly continue for at least the next two decades.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Over the past few years, the largest obstacle to Iran’s power projection and influence in the greater Middle East has been sanctions levied against Tehran by the United States, Europe and the United Nations. Tehran’s nuclear program is the main cause, but festering wounds caused by Iran’s own vehement anti-Americanism and the 1979 Hostage Crisis endure, with Iran’s support of Hezbollah against Israel causing even more strain.

Optimism in the West for rapprochement with Iran surged with the swearing-in of the relatively moderate President Rouhani. After President Rouhani visited New York City, held a phone conversation with President Obama – the highest level talk between the two countries since 1979 – and then offered to sit down and talk about proliferation and the possible ending of sanctions, the West was ready to listen. With a possible rapprochement on the line, it is a prime time for the US to analyze Iran’s geostrategic objectives in the context of American involvement in the Middle East and the ongoing Iraqi crisis.

Iran’s Current Geopolitical Position

Iran geopolitical position is unenviable. A look at it’s neighborhood reveals that, contrary to hardliners’ fears of a post-sanctions Iran ruling the Middle East, Iran finds itself in a tar pit of dangers.

Iran is only one of four majority Shi’a countries, the others being Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan. Despite Iran viewing itself as the leader of the Shi’a world, relations with each of these Shi’a countries are strained. Iraq is deteriorating by the day. Bahrain mistrusts Iran due to Iranian sentiments expressing the desire to annex Bahrain, igniting Bahraini Arab nationalism. Azerbaijan and Iran, despite sharing strong cultural, religious and historical ties, mistrust each other. Iran remains suspicious of possible Azeri irredentist ambitions (four of Iran’s provinces are considered part of “Greater Azerbaijan”), while Azerbaijan also remains suspicious of Iran’s maneuvers, particularly after Iran’s support for Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Due to its size, its ability to project significant power and its historical and cultural influences, Iran is a contender for establishing regional hegemony in the Middle East. It faces two rivals, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, one a parallel Sunni theocracy and the other a secular republic. Despite Turkey’s recent political instability, their friendship with the Iraqi Kurds and existing image as an effective partner for the West in Middle Eastern affairs renders it a significant regional power. Saudi Arabia is determined to oppose Iran at every turn. Leveraging its status as a strategic American ally, Saudi Arabia has liberally asserted itself in the greater Middle East, endeavoring to isolate Iran and funding Sunni movements against Iran and its allies. Wikileaks documents reveal that despite warming relations, Saudi Arabia encouraged the Americans to attack Iran in the heyday of the Israel-Iran standoff.

Thus, Iran is relatively isolated in the world. While Iran does have powerful friends in China and Russia, the former does not wish to be heavily involved in the politics of the region and Iran cannot consistently rely on their help. Syria is the only reliable regional ally, but unfortunately for Iran, Assad has been severely weakened in his fight with the rebels, leaving Iran, in terms of immediate surroundings, with few options.

Therefore, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities for its own power projection is understandable. Furthermore, Iran’s overall regional strategy relies on soft power. Facing a Sunni Saudi Arabia backed by the Americans, Iran has opted for pan-Islamic leadership by taking foremost action against its arch-nemesis Israel, thereby not only attempting to rally Muslims to the Palestinian cause, but also attempting to encourage the people of the Middle East to expunge American influence from the region.

ISIS Crisis

The origins of the ISIS Crisis are studded with irony. Before ISIS established a Caliphate, the underground group was funded largely by wealthy patrons in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, secretly wishing to ignite an anti-Shi’a jihad. Although Saudi Arabia has since reduced donations to ISIS, it is clear that America’s traditional allies in the region indirectly contributed to the disintegration of the Iraqi state. This is not to say that Maliki’s own sectarian policies, and by extension Iran’s own meddling in Iraq, share no part of the blame. It is only to say that in this current climate, the US finds itself in an awkward, and oddly opportune, position of needing new allies to help stabilize Iraq.

As painful as it may be for us to work with a member of the “Axis of Evil,” and as upsetting as it is to continue supporting al-Maliki as he violates principles of democratic governance, regional stability in the Middle East is the highest priority for America. The most preferable short-term stable state of affairs would be one in which al-Maliki reigns as a reliable client in Baghdad, a state we are increasingly unable to maintain.

Iran, having carved a sphere of influence through Iraq to Syria, cannot allow a fundamentally anti-Iranian Sunni insurrection to disrupt Iranian designs, much less allow a disruption so close to Iran’s own homeland. Iran also recognizes that in the current situation with a weakened Assad, an increasingly assertive Turkish-backed Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region and a reluctant America, it cannot combat ISIS alone. The Syrian Civil War drained Iran of much political capital as it sought to keep Assad in power. Indeed, it seems increasingly likely that Iran will have to choose which ally to save: Syria or Iraq. Needing stable borders and to prevent spillover conflicts, Iran will likely choose Iraq and seek American partnership.

Rushing into the limelight during ongoing talks between the West and Iran concerning proliferation and the ending of sanctions, ISIS seems to provide an incentive for the Americans and Iranians to recognize their common interests and pursue greater cooperation. For now, the Eagle’s priorities align with the Lion’s.

Future Trajectory

While neat parallels do not exist between 2014 Iran and 1972 China, Nixon and Kissinger’s bold move reminds us today that daring statecraft will always be necessary. America would gain much needed Iranian support in stabilizing Iraq. Additionally, less pressure on Tehran would allow Iran to further entertain the possibility of an Iraq without al-Maliki. While al-Maliki is a reliable ally of Tehran, even the Iranians realize that al-Maliki’s divisive politics are not a suitable long-term strategy for the Iranian sphere of influence, a realization made all the more apparent by ISIS’ insurrection.

Another possible boon is that Iran can play a role in ensuring the survival of the Afghan state. Iranian covert support of the Taliban may run counter to American interests, but in the short term Iran also wishes for a stable Afghanistan, which cannot be guaranteed should American support and manpower in the region dwindle.

Security and politics aside, Iran also brings a largely untapped market to the table. Sanctions have prevented Western businesses from pursuing opportunities in Iran. With Iranian overdependence on oil exports, cueing the need for diversification and a rich resource base that includes large reserves of hydrocarbon, investment and partnership opportunities for American businesses abound. For instance, California-based World Eco Energy has reportedly signed a conditional $1.175b deal in Iran to turn waste into energy.

Iran, for its part, will perhaps have even more to gain from a partnership with the Americans. Booming economies, solutions to macroeconomic woes brought about by sanctions and liberalized oil exports aside, Iran would simply have more space to maneuver. No longer drawing the ire of a powerful ally of Saudi Arabia, Iran can set out to expand its economic and political influence.

For instance, recognizing the apprehension of surrounding Gulf States to the possibility of a resurgent Iran, Tehran sent a delegation to Kuwait, the UAE and Oman. This move is beneficial on many fronts since it allows Tehran to look past sectarian differences and work towards solutions for the ISIS crisis, perhaps even paving the way for future talks on Gulf cooperation and energy policy.

On the flip side of the coin, increased room for Iranian maneuvers might also mean greater Hezbollah activities against Israel. However, this can be checked by greater American security commitments to Israel, agreements with the Iranians themselves, or by the simple fact that solving the ISIS crisis will require even more political capital and resources from Iran, already partially depleted from the Syria Civil War.

Of course, any partnership does not make Iran our friend. Iranian support of Hezbollah and Taliban cannot go unheeded. The values and interests of Iran still clash with the American’s. Iranian ambitions must still be curbed through continued support and reassurances of key allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. It is a fine game the Americans must play: to engage in offshore balancing without too often lending a hand to any one party. Nevertheless, cooperation with Iran can expedite Middle Eastern stability, giving the United States much needed breathing room to address domestic problems and reevaluate its foreign policy strategy in the Middle East.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.