The Rohingya people of Myanmar face some of the world’s most oppressive conditions, yet receive little international attention. Hundreds of thousands have fled to neighboring countries to seek asylum, with many dying en route. To prevent further human rights violations, the US must take more serious actions.

When the word “refugee” is mentioned, what’s the first thing that comes to mind? For Americans, it’s probably the Syrian Refugee Crisis, a tragedy which has resulted in over 5 million refugees and another 6 million internally displaced persons. The term “drowning at sea” may also convey similar imagery, particularly the drowning of a Syrian children in the Mediterranean Sea, or perhaps the other failed attempts of asylum seekers on dangerous boat journeys.

Unfortunately, a similarly disturbing crisis on the other side of the world has been largely underreported in American mainstream media. This is the Rohingya Refugee Crisis, which the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations has termed a “forgotten crisis.”

So where does the US come into play? In 2014, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution on persecution of the Rohingya people, urging the Burmese government to stop the persecution and discrimination of minorities within its borders and calling on the international community to put pressure on Burma (Myanmar). The US has also taken in about 13,000 refugees from Myanmar in the past 15 years. Since this resolution, however, the US has done little else, and human rights violations have persisted.

To get up to speed with the crisis, read the answers to six important questions below.

Who are the Rohingya?

The Rohingya are an ethnic minority group in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. The Rohingya are Muslim and speak the Rohingya language, whereas the Rakhine ethnic majority speak the Burmese language and are Buddhist. There are a total of 800,000 Rohingya living in the Rakhine State, making up around two-thirds of the state’s population. The Rohingya’s origins can be traced back to the 15^th century, when Muslim traders immigrated to the region.

However, Rohingya is largely a self-identified term in Myanmar, as the government does not recognize it as one of its official 135 ethnicities. Rather, the Rohingya are largely considered as Bangladeshi illegal migrants.  In fact, a 1982 Citizenship Law stripped them of their citizenship, as well as the rights associated with it; Rohingya must obtain permission to marriage or work, are restricted on the number of children they may have, and cannot vote. They are not even included in the national census. Not surprisingly, the Rohingya have been called “the most persecuted people on Earth.”

What is the Current Situation?

In recent years, persecution of the Rohingya has intensified. The Rohingya must endure institutionalized systemic discrimination due to government policies that restrict almost every aspect of their lives. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, 78% of those living in the Rakhine State live below the poverty threshold.

They lack almost any official recognition. Although a 2014 national consensus backed by the United Nations permitted the Rohingya to self-identify with that term, Buddhist nationals protested, threatening to boycott the census. The government then reneged and decided Rohingya could only identify as “Bengali.”

Violence has also broken out between the Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine people. In 2012, for example, riots broke out when several Rohingya men were accused of raping a Buddhist one. This led to riots and mass destruction, with over 2,000 homes destroyed and the displacement of over 140,000 people.

Attacks on the three guard posts on the borders between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 2016 resulted in additional ethnic conflict, as the attacks were blamed on Rohingya militants. Tens of thousands more Rohingya were displaced, and many more homes were destroyed.

Why are the Rohingya Persecuted?

The Council on Foreign Relations, a US think tank focusing on US foreign policy, provides a good explanation:

Widespread poverty, weak infrastructure, and a lack of employment opportunities exacerbate the cleavage between Buddhists and Muslim Rohingya – Council on Foreign Relations

An example that illustrates this is protests in 2014 by the Buddhist majority over concerns that humanitarian aid was only going toward the Rohingya. However, conflict here cannot only be understood in terms of economics and competition. Much of the discrimination goes back to the idea that Rohingya are not citizens of Myanmar, but rather illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. This view is strengthened by the fact that this is codified in law. As Rohingya are not included in the national census, it as if they do not even exist.

Where Are They Going?

The Rohingya began migrating to Bangladesh in 1978, but their first major wave occurred in 1991-1992. Currently, there are two official UN Refugee Agency camps in Bangladesh, with a total of 33,000 people. However, between 300,000 and 500,000 Rohingya live elsewhere within the country. While those inside the camps are recognized as Rohingya, the others are not afforded any legal status, and are rather seen as “undocumented Myanmar nationals.”

The Rohingya have also fled to Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and even the Philippines, often via a treacherous boat journey. Previously, many were trafficked by land through Thailand, but after recent crackdowns on human trafficking by the Thai government (as a result of pressure by the United States), much of the trafficking has shifted to sea routes instead.

Sadly, human traffickers often take advantage of the Rohingya and have abandoned them at sea, resulting in stranded refugees. Countries in the region have not been too willing to help, only doing so after much international pressure.

According to the International Organization for Migration, more than 88,000 migrants fled by sea between January 2014 and May 2015. However, some of these migrants were actually from Bangladesh, which created political complications, as the Bangladeshi migrants were fleeing for economic reasons, whereas the Rohingya were fleeing from persecution (as well as economic hardship, largely caused by this very persecution).

What’s Being Done So Far?   

Not too much, unfortunately. Myanmar’s de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, who is seen as a champion of democracy after enduring over 15 years of house arrest and leading the National League for Democracy Party to victory in the first free election in 25 years has been largely silent on the issue, refusing to speak publicly about it. Her spokesperson has also denied allegations about human rights abuses.  However, Suu Kyi, who is a Nobel Peace Prize Winner, recently established a commission led by Kofi Annan, a former United Nations Secretary-General; the Peace and Reconciliation Commission will have a report ready in August of 2017.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is composed of 10 Southeast Asian nations including Myanmar, has not produced a unified response either. This is largely because ASEAN lacks established legal frameworks, and its human rights branch, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission Rights, lacks any real power. In addition, ASEAN is consensus-based, meaning every country must agree.

On March 17, China and Russia blocked a potential press release from the UN Security Council which would have “noted with concern renewed fighting in some parts of the country and stressed the importance of humanitarian access to all affected areas.”

The European Union also recently called on the UN to send a fact-finding mission to Myanmar to investigate allegations of human rights abuses against the Rohingya.

With Myanmar and ASEAN staying largely uninvolved, the brunt of the work has fallen on non-governmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch.

What Else Can Be Done?

A single, simple solution does not exist. Rather, the international community must work together to further expose human rights violations and pressure Myanmar to change its ways.

In terms of the US, The Council on Foreign Relations suggests that it “lead an international effort to find a humane solution.” This would involve a fact-finding mission, as called for by the EU, to assess the true amount of human rights abuses that have occurred. It would also mean a willingness to accept more refugees. While President Obama lifted sanctions against Myanmar so that the US could take in more Rohingya refugees, it’s unlikely President Trump will be very willing to take further action.

Instead, it will likely be up to ASEAN to take a stronger stance. But is this political will there? Given that three of its members, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei Darussalam are all Muslim-majority countries, the hypothetical answer is yes. But only time will tell if ASEAN will actually take any concrete action.

While action at a federal level may not be plausible in this administration, Americans can still make a difference*. By starting conversations about this issue, supporting NGOs, signing petitions, and more, we can ensure that the Rohingya Crisis does not remain “forgotten.”

*This article provides great information about specific actions we can all take.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

Alex Melnik is a junior at the University of Southern California majoring in International Relations and pursuing a Progressive Master’s in Public Administration. He spent the past year abroad in Indonesia via the Boren Award and Critical Language Scholarship. He has also interned in Taiwan in the past.

The post The Rohingya Refugees: 6 Things You Need to Know About Myanmar’s “Forgotten Crisis” appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Since Myanmar’s 2011 reforms, the country has been widely re-evaluated by the international community. The US has moved from a policy of isolation and economic sanctions to offering partnership. With diplomatic missions now re-opened, Myanmar has been allowed for the first time to chair ASEAN in 2014. Driving these re-calculations is Myanmar’s geostrategic borders with India and China. It occupies the second largest area in Southeast Asia, has a population around 60 million and offers a significant market opportunity.

The Gulf States have been increasingly looking to their east in search of new markets, labor sources and diplomatic support. Their expanded relationship with Southeast Asian countries, and increasingly Myanmar, is evident through increased trade, foreign aid, investment and tourism. A shared religious culture with the Muslim population in the region has further characterized the relationship.

Interaction between the two regional multilateral organizations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has increased; they have a two-year action plan and there are ongoing ASEAN-GCC meetings regarding opportunities to expand and build on their relationships for security and economic gain.

Despite being geographically close, with some common cultural and religious threads, and generations of intermarriage stemming from migration and trade interactions, Southeast Asian countries and the Gulf States used to feel more strongly connected to the West than to each other. However, Myanmar’s earliest Muslims were traders, mercenaries and court servants of Persian, Indian and Arab ethnicity who settled in the country in the 13^th and 14^th centuries and married Burmese women. Another strand of shared history is that Myanmar was a British colony for more than 60 years, and the UAE, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar, although not colonies, were British protectorates for decades.

Yet, many stark differences between Myanmar and the Gulf States can be observed. For example, while Myanmar is predominantly a Burman society, only an estimated 60-70% of the people being ethnic Burmans. In contrast, the Gulf States’ native populations are very homogeneous. Myanmar claims to have 135 different ethnic groups, while migrant workers supply most of the diversity in the Gulf States, thus creating different issues for these countries to manage. Myanmar’s aspiring democratic government will have to learn how to respond to public opinion, while the authoritarian Gulf States largely ignore public opinion.

With respect to religion, the Gulf States have majority Muslim populations; in contrast only about 4% of Myanmar’s population is Muslim. The majority of Myanmar’s Muslims are Sunni, aligning them with the Muslims in the Gulf and worldwide, 90% of whom are Sunni. Due to recent Buddhist-Muslim conflicts within Myanmar and the humanitarian crisis with the Rohingya population in Myanmar’s western Rakhine State, a small but very visible percent of the population receives international media attention. Increasingly the Gulf States feel compelled to stand by fellow their fellow Muslims and respond to Myanmar’s dismal treatment of the Rohingya and its Buddhist-Muslim clashes. At an August 2012 extraordinary meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference the Gulf States supported a statement condemning Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya. The Saudi cabinet also spoke out against the violence asking for action from the international community to protect Myanmar’s Muslims. Saudi Arabia provided US$50 million in aid for Rohingya refugees and has also accepted groups of Rohingya as migrant laborers.

Yet, one development regarding this issue concerns the thousands of Rohingyas now held in Saudi prisons after an earlier asylum offer by King Faisal was reversed with the change in monarch. This shows that the Saudis are speaking out of both sides of their mouth on the issue, which may weaken their leverage with the international community when they urge action. Another complicating factor is that the Myanmar government’s failure to adequately respond to the poor treatment of the Rohingya could incite extremist Muslim groups. The religion factor will continue to complicate the relationship because Gulf countries must balance investment in Myanmar, yet admit they are working with a government that mistreats Muslims. In Myanmar the famous opposition party leader and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, has also failed to speak out strongly on the issue, to the disappointment of the international community (a reticence on her part because it would probably be domestically unpopular).

While the diplomatic relationships between the Gulf States and Myanmar are complicated by religious ties, at the same time the Gulf States have great motivation to build a strong relationship with Myanmar. For example, Saudi Arabia has prioritized economic gains rather than religion in foreign policy, especially in its drive to become a major economic and political power by 2020. The emergence of Iran as an adversary and the collapse of Mubarak’s regime in Egypt also increased the Gulf States’ need for new friends and wider circles of influence. Thus they have invited Myanmar to open embassies in their countries. To make this a feasible reality for such a poor country, some of the Gulf States, such as Kuwait, pay half the salary of the new Burmese embassy diplomats.

Because Israel interestingly has had close ties with Myanmar in the past, the Gulf States could also be improving their relationship with Myanmar in order to have as much influence in the country as Israel. China, too, has been very invested in Myanmar and was taken by surprise by the country’s dramatic opening in 2011. Saudi Arabia’s relationship with China has been drastically improving over the past 10 years. As Saudi Arabia seeks to increase its influence with Myanmar, it will want to carefully consider Chinese perceptions of the Saudi involvement in Myanmar, as China is now one of Saudi’s largest clients, importing 19% of it’s crude oil from Saudi.

The Gulf States view the growing market in SE Asia as an opportunity for Gulf business, and they are interested in using land in Myanmar for food security. For example, they foresee that if there is a war between Iran and one or many Gulf States, then the Strait of Hormuz could be cut off making it hard to get food into the region; food concerns are also due to growing Gulf populations and rising food prices. The Arab Spring vividly showed the potential firestorm the region could erupt in if regimes do not keep their populations happy. In contrast Myanmar’s population is mostly rural, working in agriculture. As a result, Myanmar would be a great market for Saudi Arabia’s agricultural chemicals and fertilizers industry.

On another front, Saudi Arabia is extremely interested in possibly using the newly built pipelines in Myanmar to get their oil to China. This would avoid using the Malacca straits, a passageway that could be blockaded in the event of a conflict in the South China Sea or if anyone was trying to cut off China’s energy supply. The realization of this possibility depends on whether Saudi Aramco is the sole and exclusive partner with China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) in the move of oil to the southwest Chinese state Yunnan. Saudi Aramco and CNPC have a contractual agreement, but the details of the contract, and if/when government action kicks in is hard to obtain. CNPC owns and operates the pipelines and so it is most likely it would be required to pay transit fees to Myanmar’s government. Saudi Arabia has decided not to export natural gas, but rather to use that energy for domestic development. It will be interesting to see if this decision is reversed over time because the dual pipelines consist of one for natural gas and one for crude oil. Qatar, the world’s largest producer of natural gas, may also try to utilize the pipelines to export liquid natural gas to China.

A Qatari company, Ooredoo, is one of the two granted a telecoms license in a recent high profile bid in Myanmar. The license is good for 15 years and allows the largest foreign investment to date. Ooredoo said it would invest up to $15 billion in two years to bring all but 10% of the population on a 3G network, a quicker time scale than the government requested. Estimates as to when the company can expect to turn a profit on its investment are not clear.  Vodafone and China Telecom withdrew their bids saying the project did not offer sufficient returns. If this is the case, it may be that Ooredoo, which is partly a state owned company and a subsidiary of Qatar Telecom, has been told by the Qatari government that it will be compensated for the low returns; it may signal that the project is more important for its diplomatic and profile building investment rather than profit.

With respect to migrant workers from Myanmar, there are many in the Gulf States. As of 2004 it was estimated that there are 1.5 million Burmese migrant laborers in the UAE, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. There is a general concern with the treatment of foreign laborers in the Gulf countries and Burmese workers have been subject to the same dismal conditions that have been reported about other groups: for instance, reports have stated they are not paid the amount originally promised, work in different functions than what they signed up for, and have extremely long hours. However, the Myanmar employment agencies may be unfairly providing misinformation to the laborers being sent to the Gulf States.

There is no information about increased Gulf tourism in Myanmar, though growing numbers of Gulf citizens have been documented visiting Indonesia and Malaysia. Myanmar has a growing sense of nationalism and if Myanmar citizens feel that the Gulf States are expanding the relationship only to extract resources, obtain agricultural products or use the pipelines to get oil to China, the Burmese could resent the Gulf States for not taking the time to invest in the surrounding community. Tourism could be an opportunity for growth in the relationship, especially since Qatar Airways is one of the main airlines providing service to Yangon.

There is nevertheless a danger – if the religious conflicts in Myanmar spiral out of control, which is not an unlikely possibility given the violence in Rakhine State – that the Burmese will attack anything they view as a connection to Muslim Rohingya, such as companies from the Gulf States. Sensationalist press, in a country where free press is less than a year old and the media and population are still figuring out how to handle responsible journalism, could start rumors about the connections of these companies to Rohingya and encourage people to boycott the businesses.

Among the opportunities also lying in the Gulf States and Myanmar relationship, Myanmar could learn lessons from the Arab Spring as it works to build democratic institutions. Although the majority of the Gulf States survived the crisis without radical change, Myanmar could, for example, learn from Kuwait and Bahrain, which seem to be working towards a constitutional monarchy, a strategy to involve a new class of ruling elites and political participants, while at the same time keeping the old guard engaged and not threatened from an overthrow of the government.

Conversely, the Gulf States can observe Myanmar’s challenges as the country transitions from an authoritarian to a democratic government, assuming their governments could easily find themselves in a similar position. Because Myanmar’s military has long been the most influential force in the country, one challenge as the country transforms is to avoid spooking the military into clamping down for fear there will be retributive action against them or that they will be dramatically disenfranchised.

Many Gulf States and Myanmar also have comparative circumstances with both being well endowed with natural resources. The Gulf States have generally been able to use their natural resources profits to develop the state and to benefit the population. Myanmar could learn from the distributive states. It is hard to imagine what Myanmar could have been like today if natural resources profits coming from, for instance, energy sold to China and Thailand, had been invested in education and healthcare (allocated less than 5% of total budget), rather than the military (currently allocated at over 20% of the budget).

The Gulf States could further increase their influence in Myanmar by providing scholarships for Burmese students at Gulf universities. Graduates of strong engineering programs would produce qualified candidates for Myanmar’s energy sector, infrastructure, agriculture and service industries that in turn would benefit Gulf companies investing in Myanmar. Myanmar would benefit greatly in a technology transfer from Gulf States companies, and that could attract more investment by Gulf state owned enterprises, especially those supported by deep pockets and capable of taking on large scale projects with risky returns.

Lastly, although unlikely to happen, the Gulf States could play a constructive role in the Rohingya conflict. They could offer asylum or agree to resettle portions of the Rohingya population, initiate a mass guest worker program (adhering to international labor standards), or instead of providing aid money to the Rohingya, which makes the Burmese government suspicious, invest in Myanmar’s peace process.

The relationship between the Gulf States and Myanmar is one of contradictions, but also one with possibly immense growth. A mutually beneficial, although highly complicated and potentially politically difficult partnership between Myanmar and the Gulf States currently is in the making in the ongoing expansion of their relationship, a process that should be most interesting to follow into the future.

Anne Gillman recently graduated from The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and is currently a Presidential Management Fellow in the International Trade Administration in the Department of Commerce.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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Today, the US enjoys quite a high degree of soft power globally, particularly in Asia. The infiltration of American values and culture into the East is evident in the success of American pop music icons and Hollywood films, as well as the appeal of elite American universities. Interestingly, the US government invests virtually no resources in soft power in Asia, excluding humanitarian aid—it almost never funds the cultural items exported to Asia.

The idea and implementation of soft power has become extremely important to the small nation of South Korea. In the last decade, Korean pop culture has experienced an international boom through Korean dramas and “K-Pop.” Koreans are so invested in this new soft power that it has its own word in Korean, hallyu, which literally translates to “Korean wave.” PSY of his “Gangnam Style” fame is the epitome of this phenomenon. Under the current president Park Geun Hye, the Korean government has more than doubled its financial endorsement of Korean pop culture abroad and has expressed hopes that hallyu will lead to strengthened cultural friendliness and economic partnerships. The long-term effects of hallyu are yet to be seen, but the growth of K-Pop fandom on virtually all continents has the Korean government excited.

In comparison to South Korea, China has invested even more resources in its soft power, but with disappointing results. Xi Jinping, the president of China, launched the campaign for the “Chinese Dream,” a rebuilding of the nation’s culture and reputation. Through this campaign, Xi is striving to counteract American cultural influences. The Netflix drama House of Cards proved to be quite popular among Chinese viewers, but the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was quick to paint it as a demonstration of Western corruption and greed. However, the show maintained its strong following. Another product of Hollywood, Transformers: Age of Extinction, became the highest grossing film in China ever, surpassing the previous record holder, James Cameron’s Avatar. In comparison, Chinese artists and films see marginal success in the US. One such artist is Jia Ruhan, a classically trained Chinese singer akin to Celine Dion. The CCP scouted, trained, recorded and promoted Jia with the expectation that she would reach stardom in the States. Yet, you have probably never heard her name or purchased her album, which is unsurprisingly “in line with the image of the Chinese government.” Starlets like Jia are consistently drowned out by news of China’s dodgy actions, like the backlash from the Beijing Olympics, and the political nature of Confucius Institutes, academies established to promote ancient Chinese values. Oftentimes, because of the CCP’s obvious interest in popular entertainment, other Asian nations see Chinese soft power as propaganda or thinly veiled political hard power. Rather than improving China’s image and accelerating the Chinese Dream, Xi Jinping’s brainchild has soured the impression of China in a number of Eastern nations.

Which country, then, has an effective soft power policy in Asia? It seems that India is the nation that best understands the intricacies of soft power. In order to harness, but not control, India’s soft power worldwide, the government funds Bollywood film festivals, art exhibitions and Hindi conferences around the world. These are designed to simply spread awareness of Indian culture, not to promote its policies or generate content as the CCP desires in China.

While the cultural soft power of India has certainly increased in strength and visibility, the government has also utilized humanitarian aid and economic relief to add another dimension to soft power. In Afghanistan, India rose in popularity when it sent economic, rather than military, aid to stabilize the Afghan government. Major financial donations to the UN Democracy Fund (among other funds) also promote a modern and generous image of India. In fact, polls show that many Southeast and Central Asian nations think India is a better partner than China because it is less aggressive.

This financial facet of soft power, unlike Bollywood and Hollywood cultures, is indeed state-run. Despite its political nature, it is critical to the success of a country’s soft power. In the case of the US, South Korea and India (among others), the state does not have influence over pop culture, but, because it recognizes the benefits and necessity of soft power, it uses money to boost its image abroad. For instance, the US gives billions of dollars every year to natural disaster relief and foreign aid. While those numbers might compose a mere 1-2% of the federal budget, the international perception of the US is still improved as images of American officials providing vital aid hit the press. India and South Korea also embrace their roles as donors to the international community. India has one of the world’s fastest-growing foreign aid budgets, while South Korea recently joined the Development Assistance Committee, a prestigious subset of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. All of these nations have effectively used their economic strength in conjunction with cultural soft power to improve the global image of both the people and their government.

Soft power, then, is ultimately a balancing act between the government and the culture of a nation. China’s approach is generally too overbearing, if not threatening. The CCP’s mission to control cultural soft power actually damages its international image, especially when combined with its reluctance to give foreign aid. The United States, on the other hand, allows its cultural soft power to independently run its course in addition to supplying humanitarian aid. As other states look to grow their own soft power, they should follow the leads of India, the US and South Korea. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, is looking to promote Southeast Asian culture around the world. They would be wise to foster a soft power policy that gently blends economic aid with culture free of an overt political agenda. With social clout and generous economic assistance, governments can then pursue hard power foreign policy goals with less resistance.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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Putin has been pushing for an energy deal with China for nearly ten years, and rightfully so. China, and Asia more broadly, has a vast market for oil and natural gas with its megacities and booming economy. The deal between Gazprom and CNPC gives Russia a foot in the door of this profitable energy market. Providing up to 20% of China’s natural gas needs, the deal finally solidifies the Sino-Russian alliance that Putin has been advertising. What’s more, the two countries will be paying with their own currencies, the ruble and yuan, completely bypassing the American dollar, which is traditionally used in energy transactions. Although the dollar has long been the international reserve currency of choice, Russia’s VTB and the Bank of China’s decision to trade in domestic currencies stresses the exclusivity of the Eurasian trade deal; the US is not welcome. Although this alone does not significantly destabilize the petrodollar, it certainly undermines American relevance in the deal and indicates Putin’s increasing focus on relations with Asia.

Putin’s meeting with Xi Jinping also comes on the heels of Obama’s four-country Asia tour in April. After a canceled trip to Asia during the October government shutdown, Obama’s tour demonstrates the president’s desire to make good on his foreign policy goal to “pivot to Asia.” In his visit to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines, Obama focused on strengthening economic and military relationships. The trip resulted in increased numbers of American military personnel and equipment stationed in the region; yet, thus far, Obama’s plans for future economic partnerships have not been realized.

Neither the Malaysian nor Japanese leadership approved Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to increase connectivity between the Asian and American economies. Despite domestic backlash from Democratic Senators and Congressmen, Obama has continually pushed for more economic cooperation across the Pacific. Obama, like Putin, hopes to benefit from the expanding Asian markets; the TPP would eliminate tariffs between the US and several Latin American and Asian states. According to Don Emmerson, a political scientist at Stanford, “Americans cannot afford to deny themselves…the opportunities for trade and investment” present in Asia, but Asian leaders, however, seem less enthusiastic. In Japan, Abe refused to join the partnership due to the protected five sacred areas of Japanese agriculture. In Malaysia, political “sensitivities” and economic concerns also halted progress. The TPP has major implications for American and Asian economies (Japan is America’s biggest trading partner in Asia aside from China). Thus, although no agreement was reached during the tour, the American, Japanese and Malaysian leaders promised to continue negotiations. These promises give President Obama a glimmer of hope that soon the Asian governments will be more receptive to the partnership. It should be Obama’s mission, then, to adjust the TPP to be more beneficial for all states involved, especially those with heavily protected domestic industries.

TPP negotiations were also designed to reestablish American’s military presence in East Asia. The US military will continue to maintain operational control of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea. This agreement gives the US command of South Korean troops in the event of war with North Korea. In Japan, Obama reassured Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that the Senkaku Islands (or the Diaoyu Islands, as they are known in China) would fall under American protection in the case of a threat. These uninhabited islands have long been disputed by Japan and China, who both claim ownership of them. Obama’s declaration of support for Japan’s sovereignty in the maritime dispute is a signal of disapproval to China, whose military actions in the East and South China Seas concern many Asian states. As expected, China was not pleased by Obama’s remarks.

These figures make China impossible to ignore. Combine the country’s military expansion with its rapidly growing GNP and it becomes one of the greatest forces in the world today. China’s enormity and consequent impact on its neighbors, from Japan to the Philippines to Russia, have forced other world powers to readjust. Putin and Obama have played their hands, each trying to get ahead in the Asia-Pacific. Putin’s natural gas deal has created a buffer for conflicts in Europe and Obama’s efforts to increase economic cooperation and American military presence in Asia also indicate increased interest in Asia. It remains to be seen how other world leaders will react to the growing relevance of East Asia in global issues.

In early May, European Union (EU) leaders met with Shinzo Abe to reaffirm their positive relationship. At the meeting, the leaders discussed further economic and political ties, although no specific agreements were signed. The leaders of the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will also hold a summit in October. Will Europe, like Russia, turn to China, Asia’s largest power, or invest in ties with other East Asian nations alongside President Obama? Regardless, it is clear that the “turn to Asia” is a legitimate and global phenomenon.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff and editorial board.

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