Over the past 60 years, Africa has received over $1 trillion USD in development-related aid, yet more than 50 percent of the population still lives on less than one US dollar a day. Despite continuous money flows to recipient countries and development projects, foreign aid in Africa remains a perplexing issue in the international community. Although aid appears to be the logical solution to alleviate poverty, improve education, and mitigate hunger, it may also be the reason that Africa remains overwhelmingly engulfed in corruption, plagued with ineffective institutions which further corruption, and entrenched in poverty.

This paradox between aid and development can be traced back to Africa’s colonial history as a continent divided for European gain. That extractive colonialism of the late nineteenth century has had enduring effects that can still be seen today, such as the numerous autocracies across Africa. With ill-equipped institutions and bandaid-like approaches to improving the standard of living, the continent will not emerge from its poverty without ground-up institutional reform and foreign aid accountability checks.

The Costs of Corruption and Corrupt Institutions

Corruption, a primary barrier to democratization in Africa, is a major byproduct of current foreign aid programs. Denis Sassou Nguesso, the President of the Republic of Congo (ROC), is one  infamous example of such corruption. Despite the ROC’s ravaging poverty, the Congolese president owns approximately 16 luxury properties in Paris and has 111 bank accounts under his family name in France. Although it is difficult to quantify the extent to which foreign aid is lost to corruption, existing attempts have produced jarring statistics. For instance, the Center for Global Development estimated a 5 percent loss of foreign aid to corruption in 22 aid-dependent countries, totalling to around $8 billion USD. Even these estimates, however, are likely underestimated. As corrupt leaders go to great lengths to conceal their extortion and money-laundering, the available statistics are often misreported. Poor institutions serve as a vehicle for corruption, and foreign aid in its current form merely sustains autocratic leaders who pocket the money, thus enabling those same leaders to suppress potential civilian uprisings and democratization. In fact, economist Dambisa Moyo has described aid as having a “corrosive nature” on “democracy” in Africa.

The interconnected relationship between corruption and institutions is reflected in countries’  quality of governance. There is an inverse correlation between Sub-Saharan African countries receiving the most aid and those with the lowest governance rankings. This is an unsurprising correlation — 30 percent of aid reportedly never reaches its intended destination due to corruption. For instance, in 2016, Tunisia was reportedly in the top third of countries receiving foreign aid. Despite this, Tunisia remains entrenched in debt because, according to a World Bank report, Tunisia’s “heavily regulated market access has also created opportunities for rents extraction by cronies who receive privileged access to certain lucrative activities.” Tunisia’s entrenched corruption is reflected by the policy of the current political party in power which seemed to boast anti-corruption reform. Contrary to its rhetoric, the party promoted an “economic reconciliation” law granting amnesty to all business elites who were involved with corrupt practices during the old regime.

The Donor Dilemma

Donors like the International Monetary Fund as well as country-donors also often play a dominant role in furthering the cycle of corruption. While most people agree on the principle merits of providing aid to African countries, donor countries have underlying economic and political motivations to intervene in Africa. Donor motivations may include spreading their ideology or supporting countries which are democratizing. Economically, donors may be motivated to provide aid to foster trade with the recipient country – on the belief that the recipient country may use the aid to purchase donor country exports. Clair Apodaca, an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Virginia Tech, noted that if the European Union countries were to optimize the distribution of global foreign aid for the sole motive of reducing poverty, they would need to reallocate $19 billion USD of the total $27 billion USD of EU aid to the 20 poorest countries.

The US has followed suit with its European counterparts with its selective financial support. In Egypt, the US placed restrictions on $195 million USD of its military aid in 2017 in response to Egypt’s poor human rights record and its relationship to North Korea. However, last July, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reversed this progress by lifting the restrictions despite ill-made progress on improving human rights in Egypt under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The US attempt at sanctioning human rights abuses was short-lived and motivated by a common hostility towards political Islam with Egypt.

Even for donors with more altruistic motivations, providing aid to extractive governments is not an easy task. If donors go through the government, rent-seeking leaders may pocket part of the aid and allocate the rest of the money to the in-country elites. However, if donors bypass the government and deliver aid directly to those in need, it may undermine existing country-to-country alliances, foreign relations and the recipient country’s legitimacy vis-a-vis its citizens because a country’s legitimacy is compromised when citizens see social services provided by external actors, signaling bureaucratic weakness.

Bottom-up Reform, Accountability Measures and Conditional Aid

Although aid in its current form functions as a conduit for corruption, aid is still necessary for the development of Africa, and an altered approach could catalyze positive change in the continent. Current aid programs should advocate for bottom-up reform by implementing conditional loans or aid with accountability checks. Conditional aid may include requiring governments to alleviate corruption or promote democratic ideals and should also incentivize long-term investment in the private sector, the infrastructure and manufacturing industries and most importantly, education.

However, as shown with China’s entry in Africa via foreign aid, conditional aid is unattractive to developing nations which need resources immediately. The Chinese model starkly contrasts the US model, in that it provides conditionless aid while the US-Model hinges on conditionality. A middle ground between these two models in which donors maintain a level of accountability for and a presence in recipient countries may be the necessary antidote to foreign aid’s current inefficacies.

While aid in its current form enables corrupt leaders and sustains stagnant, broken institutions, aid which is delivered effectively and with accountability measures may make the difference between Africa remaining impoverished or transcending above its struggles. Conditional foreign aid can be effective in promoting good governance, furthering democracy, and prioritizing human rights interests. The success of foreign aid, whether it has conditions attached or not, is contingent upon donor countries’ presence and involvement. Partially conditional aid with accountability checks may bridge the gap between an aid-dependent, impoverished Africa and one without donors at all.

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Every year, numerous articles and books are written on the topic of development. These publications regularly focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region in the world, and they almost always describe development from a Western perspective, appealing to policy makers and readers in the United States and Europe. Although the authors have virtuous intentions, they often forget to acknowledge the viewpoint of the African people and are one sided in their portrayal. So, what is the African perspective, and are the needs of the African people truly being met by current programs? If there is one man that can answer this question, it is Donald Kaberuka, the former president of the African Development Bank (ADB).

In 2013, Kaberuka spoke at the African Growth Initiative in Washington DC, laying out a framework for comprehensive development. Kaberuka claimed that most African countries require investment in three areas: institutions, infrastructure and integration. These three requirements are interconnected and dependent on one another. International financial institutions are not easily accessible to many countries in Sub-Saharan African, where the amount of capital available at the domestic level is insufficient. As a result, the build up of infrastructure has fallen behind the rate of economic growth and is now limiting development. Further investment in infrastructure is needed in order to integrate Sub-Saharan Africa regionally, creating a steady flow of trade between African countries and preparing domestic firms for global competition. Kaberuka believes that this is the next step in African development.

Presently, African financial institutions lack the necessary funds to finance new infrastructure projects. The World Bank estimates that Africa needs to invest over $93 billion per year in infrastructure. African institutions currently only spend $25 billion, leaving a gap of $68 billion to be filled by foreign investors. China has proven to be a major financial asset, but only to countries that are rich in natural resources, such as Angola and Nigeria. Leaders in Beijing have invested heavily in various African nations in order to secure long-term supplies of heavy metals and fossil fuels, meeting the demands of China’s ever-expanding manufacturing industry. Moreover, international financial institutions, like the World Bank, have offered limited support due to the bureaucratic nature of their loans, which are slow to be approved and often include onerous reforms. Private investors have supplied a minimal amount of funding, and at the cost of high interest rates.

Kaberuka believes that international financial institutions are the best option for financing infrastructure projects in Africa. He argues that international organizations provide the cheapest loans to African countries and that they protect African governments from developing an unsustainable amount of debt. These organizations routinely evaluate the worthiness of projects and take into consideration the solvency of governments, using their development expertise to ensure that loans are spent strategically. However, as of right now, too many strings have been attached to international loans. These strings, which are also known as structural adjustment programs (SAPs), include policies such as trade liberalization, fiscal austerity, deregulation of financial institutions and privatization. Many researchers have concluded that SAPs are detrimental to the economies of borrowing countries, citing historical examples as proof of reforms gone wrong. For instance, during the 1980s, the IMF bailed out indebted Latin American countries on the condition that they implement SAPs. The adjustments unintentionally exposed borrowing countries to financial volatility and increased the rate of poverty by removing capital controls and eliminating the social safety net.

As the largest shareholder of the IMF and the World Bank, the US could use its voting power to lessen the restrictions that are placed on loans to governments in the Sub-Saharan region. Although the risk of default would be higher with fewer SAPs, African countries will achieve greater economic development if they are given more freedom. For example, fiscal austerity measures should be abandoned, as government spending is an essential component of stimulating an economy. There are many incentives for the US to reduce the number of economic reforms attached to loans. Mainly, advancements in infrastructure will open up new business opportunities for American multinationals, which could stand to benefit from the abundant natural resources and cheap labor. International financial institutions will be able to more effectively generate economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa if they are not required to demand as many policy reforms.   

Kaberuka’s final point is that Sub-Saharan Africa needs to be integrated as a region. This process involves two parts: improvements in infrastructure and removal of barriers to trade. Regional integration is extremely important, because it boosts overall economic growth, mitigates the risk of market fluctuations and prepares emerging firms for competition in the global economy. Kaberuka makes the case that the process of integration must begin with improvements in regional infrastructure.

There is a very large deficiency of infrastructure in the Sub-Saharan region. The World Bank reports that major ports are regularly overwhelmed due to a lack of capacity and that “road freight moves no faster than a horse-drawn cart.” Additionally, regular power outages, which are caused by a lack of updated equipment and poor maintenance, have hurt the economies of African countries and limited their growth. The costs of transportation and electricity have harmed domestic firms and discouraged foreign ones from investing. Financial support targeting roads, railways and ports would help to improve the African business environment and encourage integration.

China Road and Bridge Corporation is in the process of constructing a railroad network in Kenya, the economic hub of East Africa. The railway will connect major cities in Sub-Saharan Africa to Mombasa, the only large port on the Coast of East Africa. It is expected to have a huge payoff, significantly reducing the costs and hazards of shipping. Chinese investors, both public and private, have largely subsidized the project, providing the Kenyan government with cheap loans. And this project is only a scratch on the surface; the Chinese government recently developed an ambitious plan with the African Union to build a high-speed railway to connect every country on the continent within the century.

However, Kaberuka points out that China has directed its investment towards resource rich countries, ignoring a vast majority of the 48 countries that make up Sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, China’s demand for commodities has decreased significantly in the last year and will likely continue to do so for the foreseeable future. It is questionable whether China will continue to invest in the region as its economic growth slows.    

The US has also launched infrastructure projects in the region, but has been plagued by a lack of financial support. President Obama united the private and public sector in an initiative known as Power Africa, which plans to bring electricity to millions of people in the region. Nonetheless, the program is off to a bad start, failing to raise enough money to reach its initial target. Given these examples, its is clear that foreign investment from the US and China is not sufficient, and that multilateral development banks (MDBs) need to play a larger role in infrastructure development. An increase in funding from the World Bank would make a tremendous difference.

Kaberuka’s second step in the process of regional integration is trade liberalization, which is entirely dependent on African leaders. Presently, the 48 economies of the Sub-Saharan region have particularly high barriers to trade and operate almost entirely independent of one another. There are eight official African Union Regional Economic Communities, which were established over two decades ago by the Abuja Treaty. However, these Communities have barely increased the amount of commerce, with regional trade currently only accounting for between 12 and 16 percent of Sub Saharan imports and exports. Kaberuka proposes several steps to increase regional trade: 1) the eight Economic Communities should cooperate and work to increase the amount of transactions between their member countries and 2) domestic laws pertaining to commerce should be harmonized across the region. For instance, Kenya and Zambia should have similar environmental standards, so that one country cannot discriminate against the other country’s exports.

Although a lot of progress has been made in the development of African economies, Kaberuka accentuates that there is still a lot of room for improvement. International financial institutions need to step up and play a more significant role in funding infrastructure projects in the region, and African leaders need to further liberalize trade, removing tariffs and harmonizing regulations. Kaberuka has spoken on behalf of the African people. The real question is: will the rest of the world listen?

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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In a move that shook the world for more than a few diplomats, Reuters recently published an exclusive investigative report claiming that on at least two occasions in 2013 and 2014, Turkey supplied lethal aid to Syrian rebels, including Islamist groups, and that at least some of that aid later ended up in the hands of the Islamic State (IS) and other jihadist units operating over the border in Syria. The May 21 report cited a Turkish prosecutor and court testimony from Turkish gendarmerie officers who searched trucks escorted by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (called Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı, or MIT). The Reuters investigation appears to have taken several months, if not over a year. The local police and gendarmerie alleged that the MIT was caught covertly supplying weaponry to areas of Syria controlled by Islamist rebels on two occasions, in November 2013 and January 2014. Since then, the prosecutors and over 30 officers who searched the MIT trucks have been charged by the Turkish federal government with crimes ranging from carrying out an illegal search to revealing state secrets, military espionage and attempting to overthrow the government of Turkey.

Exactly whose hands these weapons ended up in remains uncertain. At the time, the Syrian territory closest to where the shipments were discovered was under the control of Ahrar al-Sham. This hardline Salafist group was then led by Abu Omair al-Ahamy, who was a known associate of al Qaeda leaders including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Shamy was killed in Aleppo in February 2014.

Ibrahim Kalin, the official spokesperson for Turkish President Erdogan, recited to Reuters the oft-repeated official statement that “Turkey has never sent weapons to any group in Syria.” But as the Reuters report suggests, there is ample evidence to the contrary. Additionally, the MIT has the support of President Erdogan. When questioned on the incident last August during a television interview, he commented that “You can’t search an MIT truck, you have no authority.” He further claimed the trucks were carrying humanitarian aid to Turkmen communities.

But according to Reuters, Turkey was supplying lethal aid to rebels in Syria, which begs the question: Whose side is Turkey on?

Regardless of what the trucks in question were carrying or where they were sending their supplies, there can be no doubts that President Erdogan is juggling conflicting foreign policy interests while preparing for the upcoming general election on June 7. Turkey straddles the Bosporus Strait, and is geographically part of both Europe and the Middle East. Many of NATO’s European members are heavily focused on the Ukrainian crisis, their energy security and the financial state of the EU. All of these things are problematic for Turkey, NATO’s southeastern anchor. But lately, Turkey’s focus has been largely on the Syrian civil war that continually ravages Syrian and Iraqi lands south of Turkey’s long Anatolian border. The primary objective for the Turks in this conflict so far has been to maintain their own territorial sovereignty. Given the strength of the Turkish military and stability of the government in Ankara, this has not been much of an issue. The core of Turkey lies in the northwest, in the area surrounding Istanbul and Ankara. The rugged Anatolian landscape serves as a significant buffer between Turkey’s population centers and the chaos swirling in the Arab lands to the south.

The only recent threat to Turkish sovereignty involved the tomb of Suleyman Shah, grandfather of Ottoman Empire founder Osman I, which was located on the bank of the Euphrates River in Syria, about 30 kilometers south of the Turkish border. Shah’s tomb has long been guarded by a platoon-sized element of Turkish soldiers, and Shah’s burial site is considered Turkish sovereign soil. As IS approached the area in February, the decision was made to exhume the remains of Suleyman Shah and move them to a new location in order to avoid a large-scale confrontation between IS fighters and the Turkish guards. On February 22, the Turkish military conducted the operation, bringing home the contingent of guards in a rapidly executed rescue mission. Suleyman Shah now resides in a new, temporary tomb. It is still in Syria, but now less than 200 meters from the Turkish border. The Assad regime naturally condemned the operation as a violation of Syria’s territorial sovereignty.  But the Assad regime has no interest in fighting Turkey over such a relatively trivial matter, and Turkey is not willing to join the melee just to take down Assad. What’s more important is that the Suleyman Shah incident highlights a continuation of the Turkish government’s non-confrontational policy towards the Islamic State.

Back in October of last year, the city of Kobani came under siege from IS forces. The city lies on the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border and is (or was) inhabited predominantly by Kurds, who also populate a large swath of eastern Turkey. Much to the chagrin of Kurds in the area, the Turkish government stationed tanks on the border in a firm stance against any violent spillover, but did nothing to assist the besieged Kurds militarily. Given the uneasy and often violent history between Ankara and the Kurdish people, this was not much of a surprise. While Erdogan could have scored major points with the Kurdish minority in Turkey by intervening, he was unwilling to make Turks the target of the Islamic State’s brutality or Assad’s barrel bombs. As a result, Turkey stood back and watched while keeping Anatolia secure.

For its part, the Islamic State has not conducted any major operations in Turkey. IS has been expanding in two ways. First, it has been expanding its influence by supporting small cells located throughout the Middle East. Second, it has been gaining the loyalties of more distant, well-known terrorist groups in Asia and Africa, most notably Nigeria’s Boko Haram, which pledged allegiance to IS in March. But IS activity in Turkey has been largely limited to recruiting, since many jihadists enter the Syrian battlefields from across the lengthy Turkish border. An uneasy truce between the Islamic State and Turkey can be observed; both want the Assad regime to fall. Since IS has no air force, a Turkish no-fly zone is no threat to them—they would actually gain mobility from the absence of Syrian aerial attacks.

Meanwhile, the Turks have not actively participated in anti-IS coalition airstrikes led by the US and its Western and Gulf allies, launched in September 2014. Turkey is, however, home to a US air base. When the airstrikes began, Erdogan voiced support for the operations, which targeted the al-Qaeda aligned Khorasan group and IS targets in both Syria and Iraq. He stated that Turkey could provide “military or logistical” support for the operation, leaving the door open to future involvement.

Turkey doesn’t have a favorite in the Syrian conflict so much as it has a least favorite  – the Assad regime – whose actions are responsible for the countless Syrian refugees who have fled to Turkey. For Ankara, anyone who wants to depose Assad is welcome to do so. The Islamic State is the most powerful actor besides the regime in Syria, so Turkey won’t impede any IS activities. But Ankara also knows from the Islamic State’s rhetoric and operations throughout the Middle East that its ultimate goal is to create an all-encompassing caliphate. That too would be unacceptable for Turkey, but the prospect of a pan-Islamic caliphate is a long way off. So far, IS has only posed a significant threat to the sovereignty of weak and failing states, and doesn’t have the operational prowess to make territorial gains in more stable countries like Turkey or Saudi Arabia.

Besides the Islamic State, every other rebel faction is out to get rid of Assad as well. These groups range in ideology, practices and strength from the secular, US-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) to jihadist groups to ethnic Kurdish militias. Many of these groups find themselves in conflict over incompatible ideologies and long-standing feuds. These smaller groups also tend to find themselves pinched between regime forces in the east and IS strongholds in the west of Syria. The medley of smaller militant groups are Turkey’s best options to use as proxy forces in Syria, and many are in dire need of military assistance.

In deciding whom to support, Turkey must turn west and juggle the concerns of its European and American partners, whose attention is divided between the Middle East, Ukraine and tensions in the South China Sea. While Turkey may see the Islamic State as a lesser evil than the Assad regime, its NATO partners disagree. The US, its Gulf partners and Israel do not want to see the Islamic State supplant Assad and rule all of Syria. For the US, it is better to have a Syria divided among evildoers and to focus instead on keeping the Baghdad regime intact. There are no good options right now in Syria for the US or its European partners. The West’s preferred politically moderate, secular rebel forces have been holding a weak hand for a long time now in Syria, and providing them with lethal aid means undertaking the risk that those supplies could fall into terrorist hands. Publicly taking sides with the Assad regime to oppose terrorism is still morally and politically untenable among NATO members. Letting the civil war continue unabated is actually the best of all these bad strategic options.

Western powers find themselves doing four things under US leadership: 1) giving parcels of aid to refugee camps in Jordan, Syria and elsewhere, 2) bombing the least desirable jihadist elements in an effort to maintain the current balance of chaos in Syria, 3) preventing terrorist attacks outside the region, and 4) attempting to preserve a semblance of a government in Iraq by reluctantly accepting Iranian help in the region. Turkey has only been an active partner in the humanitarian aid mission and contributing to counterterrorism efforts outside the conflict zone. It is unlikely to join the airstrike coalition or to assist the government in Baghdad. But Turkey’s opinion about the utility of assisting certain groups does not align with the thinking of its NATO partners, as evidenced by the smuggling activities uncovered by Reuters.

So whose side is Ankara on? For now it stands alone. Technically, Turkey is a NATO treaty ally, but given its reluctance to participate in NATO operations in Iraq, anyone can see that the NATO-Turkey relationship has been fraying slowly over time. NATO offers Turkey a hedge against aggression from Assad, but Turkey remains reluctant to take part in US-led NATO missions. Additionally, Turkey depends on the United States to keep Iraq from imploding. Like the Arabs, Turkey is uncomfortable with expanding Iranian influence in the region. But Turkey is unlikely to openly challenge Iranian power, unlike the Saudis, who have been actively fighting Iranian supported Houthi militants in Yemen. Turkey also has the unique problem of dealing with a quite large Kurdish population with territorial ambitions. Keeping the Kurds in check is a national security priority for Ankara, and the Turkish government would undoubtedly diverge from its allies’ policies to keep Kurdish militants under control if necessary. Turkey also does not want to arm Kurdish forces fighting in Syria or Iraq for fear that those weapons could be used against Turkey in the future.

Like the US, Turkey is unlikely to fight outside of a supportive coalition. But its interests no longer align with those of its NATO allies, and so it finds itself isolated in many areas. Perhaps the upcoming elections will result in a change for Turkish policies, but for now its foreign agenda will remain intact. Turkey will have to come up with solutions for its foreign policy challenges on its own, lest they be resolved in favor of its foes. Maybe letting the Islamic State achieve its short-term goals in Syria wouldn’t be so bad for Turkey, if Ankara could figure out a foolproof and bloodless way to prevent IS from achieving its larger ambitions in the future.

Good luck with that, Erdogan.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Since Myanmar’s 2011 reforms, the country has been widely re-evaluated by the international community. The US has moved from a policy of isolation and economic sanctions to offering partnership. With diplomatic missions now re-opened, Myanmar has been allowed for the first time to chair ASEAN in 2014. Driving these re-calculations is Myanmar’s geostrategic borders with India and China. It occupies the second largest area in Southeast Asia, has a population around 60 million and offers a significant market opportunity.

The Gulf States have been increasingly looking to their east in search of new markets, labor sources and diplomatic support. Their expanded relationship with Southeast Asian countries, and increasingly Myanmar, is evident through increased trade, foreign aid, investment and tourism. A shared religious culture with the Muslim population in the region has further characterized the relationship.

Interaction between the two regional multilateral organizations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has increased; they have a two-year action plan and there are ongoing ASEAN-GCC meetings regarding opportunities to expand and build on their relationships for security and economic gain.

Despite being geographically close, with some common cultural and religious threads, and generations of intermarriage stemming from migration and trade interactions, Southeast Asian countries and the Gulf States used to feel more strongly connected to the West than to each other. However, Myanmar’s earliest Muslims were traders, mercenaries and court servants of Persian, Indian and Arab ethnicity who settled in the country in the 13^th and 14^th centuries and married Burmese women. Another strand of shared history is that Myanmar was a British colony for more than 60 years, and the UAE, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar, although not colonies, were British protectorates for decades.

Yet, many stark differences between Myanmar and the Gulf States can be observed. For example, while Myanmar is predominantly a Burman society, only an estimated 60-70% of the people being ethnic Burmans. In contrast, the Gulf States’ native populations are very homogeneous. Myanmar claims to have 135 different ethnic groups, while migrant workers supply most of the diversity in the Gulf States, thus creating different issues for these countries to manage. Myanmar’s aspiring democratic government will have to learn how to respond to public opinion, while the authoritarian Gulf States largely ignore public opinion.

With respect to religion, the Gulf States have majority Muslim populations; in contrast only about 4% of Myanmar’s population is Muslim. The majority of Myanmar’s Muslims are Sunni, aligning them with the Muslims in the Gulf and worldwide, 90% of whom are Sunni. Due to recent Buddhist-Muslim conflicts within Myanmar and the humanitarian crisis with the Rohingya population in Myanmar’s western Rakhine State, a small but very visible percent of the population receives international media attention. Increasingly the Gulf States feel compelled to stand by fellow their fellow Muslims and respond to Myanmar’s dismal treatment of the Rohingya and its Buddhist-Muslim clashes. At an August 2012 extraordinary meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference the Gulf States supported a statement condemning Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya. The Saudi cabinet also spoke out against the violence asking for action from the international community to protect Myanmar’s Muslims. Saudi Arabia provided US$50 million in aid for Rohingya refugees and has also accepted groups of Rohingya as migrant laborers.

Yet, one development regarding this issue concerns the thousands of Rohingyas now held in Saudi prisons after an earlier asylum offer by King Faisal was reversed with the change in monarch. This shows that the Saudis are speaking out of both sides of their mouth on the issue, which may weaken their leverage with the international community when they urge action. Another complicating factor is that the Myanmar government’s failure to adequately respond to the poor treatment of the Rohingya could incite extremist Muslim groups. The religion factor will continue to complicate the relationship because Gulf countries must balance investment in Myanmar, yet admit they are working with a government that mistreats Muslims. In Myanmar the famous opposition party leader and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, has also failed to speak out strongly on the issue, to the disappointment of the international community (a reticence on her part because it would probably be domestically unpopular).

While the diplomatic relationships between the Gulf States and Myanmar are complicated by religious ties, at the same time the Gulf States have great motivation to build a strong relationship with Myanmar. For example, Saudi Arabia has prioritized economic gains rather than religion in foreign policy, especially in its drive to become a major economic and political power by 2020. The emergence of Iran as an adversary and the collapse of Mubarak’s regime in Egypt also increased the Gulf States’ need for new friends and wider circles of influence. Thus they have invited Myanmar to open embassies in their countries. To make this a feasible reality for such a poor country, some of the Gulf States, such as Kuwait, pay half the salary of the new Burmese embassy diplomats.

Because Israel interestingly has had close ties with Myanmar in the past, the Gulf States could also be improving their relationship with Myanmar in order to have as much influence in the country as Israel. China, too, has been very invested in Myanmar and was taken by surprise by the country’s dramatic opening in 2011. Saudi Arabia’s relationship with China has been drastically improving over the past 10 years. As Saudi Arabia seeks to increase its influence with Myanmar, it will want to carefully consider Chinese perceptions of the Saudi involvement in Myanmar, as China is now one of Saudi’s largest clients, importing 19% of it’s crude oil from Saudi.

The Gulf States view the growing market in SE Asia as an opportunity for Gulf business, and they are interested in using land in Myanmar for food security. For example, they foresee that if there is a war between Iran and one or many Gulf States, then the Strait of Hormuz could be cut off making it hard to get food into the region; food concerns are also due to growing Gulf populations and rising food prices. The Arab Spring vividly showed the potential firestorm the region could erupt in if regimes do not keep their populations happy. In contrast Myanmar’s population is mostly rural, working in agriculture. As a result, Myanmar would be a great market for Saudi Arabia’s agricultural chemicals and fertilizers industry.

On another front, Saudi Arabia is extremely interested in possibly using the newly built pipelines in Myanmar to get their oil to China. This would avoid using the Malacca straits, a passageway that could be blockaded in the event of a conflict in the South China Sea or if anyone was trying to cut off China’s energy supply. The realization of this possibility depends on whether Saudi Aramco is the sole and exclusive partner with China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) in the move of oil to the southwest Chinese state Yunnan. Saudi Aramco and CNPC have a contractual agreement, but the details of the contract, and if/when government action kicks in is hard to obtain. CNPC owns and operates the pipelines and so it is most likely it would be required to pay transit fees to Myanmar’s government. Saudi Arabia has decided not to export natural gas, but rather to use that energy for domestic development. It will be interesting to see if this decision is reversed over time because the dual pipelines consist of one for natural gas and one for crude oil. Qatar, the world’s largest producer of natural gas, may also try to utilize the pipelines to export liquid natural gas to China.

A Qatari company, Ooredoo, is one of the two granted a telecoms license in a recent high profile bid in Myanmar. The license is good for 15 years and allows the largest foreign investment to date. Ooredoo said it would invest up to $15 billion in two years to bring all but 10% of the population on a 3G network, a quicker time scale than the government requested. Estimates as to when the company can expect to turn a profit on its investment are not clear.  Vodafone and China Telecom withdrew their bids saying the project did not offer sufficient returns. If this is the case, it may be that Ooredoo, which is partly a state owned company and a subsidiary of Qatar Telecom, has been told by the Qatari government that it will be compensated for the low returns; it may signal that the project is more important for its diplomatic and profile building investment rather than profit.

With respect to migrant workers from Myanmar, there are many in the Gulf States. As of 2004 it was estimated that there are 1.5 million Burmese migrant laborers in the UAE, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. There is a general concern with the treatment of foreign laborers in the Gulf countries and Burmese workers have been subject to the same dismal conditions that have been reported about other groups: for instance, reports have stated they are not paid the amount originally promised, work in different functions than what they signed up for, and have extremely long hours. However, the Myanmar employment agencies may be unfairly providing misinformation to the laborers being sent to the Gulf States.

There is no information about increased Gulf tourism in Myanmar, though growing numbers of Gulf citizens have been documented visiting Indonesia and Malaysia. Myanmar has a growing sense of nationalism and if Myanmar citizens feel that the Gulf States are expanding the relationship only to extract resources, obtain agricultural products or use the pipelines to get oil to China, the Burmese could resent the Gulf States for not taking the time to invest in the surrounding community. Tourism could be an opportunity for growth in the relationship, especially since Qatar Airways is one of the main airlines providing service to Yangon.

There is nevertheless a danger – if the religious conflicts in Myanmar spiral out of control, which is not an unlikely possibility given the violence in Rakhine State – that the Burmese will attack anything they view as a connection to Muslim Rohingya, such as companies from the Gulf States. Sensationalist press, in a country where free press is less than a year old and the media and population are still figuring out how to handle responsible journalism, could start rumors about the connections of these companies to Rohingya and encourage people to boycott the businesses.

Among the opportunities also lying in the Gulf States and Myanmar relationship, Myanmar could learn lessons from the Arab Spring as it works to build democratic institutions. Although the majority of the Gulf States survived the crisis without radical change, Myanmar could, for example, learn from Kuwait and Bahrain, which seem to be working towards a constitutional monarchy, a strategy to involve a new class of ruling elites and political participants, while at the same time keeping the old guard engaged and not threatened from an overthrow of the government.

Conversely, the Gulf States can observe Myanmar’s challenges as the country transitions from an authoritarian to a democratic government, assuming their governments could easily find themselves in a similar position. Because Myanmar’s military has long been the most influential force in the country, one challenge as the country transforms is to avoid spooking the military into clamping down for fear there will be retributive action against them or that they will be dramatically disenfranchised.

Many Gulf States and Myanmar also have comparative circumstances with both being well endowed with natural resources. The Gulf States have generally been able to use their natural resources profits to develop the state and to benefit the population. Myanmar could learn from the distributive states. It is hard to imagine what Myanmar could have been like today if natural resources profits coming from, for instance, energy sold to China and Thailand, had been invested in education and healthcare (allocated less than 5% of total budget), rather than the military (currently allocated at over 20% of the budget).

The Gulf States could further increase their influence in Myanmar by providing scholarships for Burmese students at Gulf universities. Graduates of strong engineering programs would produce qualified candidates for Myanmar’s energy sector, infrastructure, agriculture and service industries that in turn would benefit Gulf companies investing in Myanmar. Myanmar would benefit greatly in a technology transfer from Gulf States companies, and that could attract more investment by Gulf state owned enterprises, especially those supported by deep pockets and capable of taking on large scale projects with risky returns.

Lastly, although unlikely to happen, the Gulf States could play a constructive role in the Rohingya conflict. They could offer asylum or agree to resettle portions of the Rohingya population, initiate a mass guest worker program (adhering to international labor standards), or instead of providing aid money to the Rohingya, which makes the Burmese government suspicious, invest in Myanmar’s peace process.

The relationship between the Gulf States and Myanmar is one of contradictions, but also one with possibly immense growth. A mutually beneficial, although highly complicated and potentially politically difficult partnership between Myanmar and the Gulf States currently is in the making in the ongoing expansion of their relationship, a process that should be most interesting to follow into the future.

Anne Gillman recently graduated from The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and is currently a Presidential Management Fellow in the International Trade Administration in the Department of Commerce.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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When scholars talk about political revolutions happening overnight, they usually speak figuratively. And yet, at 3am on May 22^nd, Thailand suddenly became a military dictatorship.

Yingluck Shinawatra, who was elected Prime Minister of Thailand in 2011, had been removed days earlier by court order. The Thai military, led by Gen. Prayuth Chan-Ocha, took over on May 22^nd and created a junta, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), to rule the country. Thai citizens awoke to tanks on street corners.

The most recent takeover is the 18^th successful coup since 1932, when Thailand became a Constitutional Monarchy. This is largely a result of the military’s large role in the political sphere combined with the constant failure of democracy to flourish in a meaningful capacity.

The United States should maintain aggressive responses to dictatorships like the NCPO in Thailand. The dictatorship in Thailand might not be incredibly violent or pose a large threat to the United States, but as a matter of principle and establishing credibility to deal with actors that are violent and threatening, the dictatorship in Thailand should be opposed with equal force.

One of the first things Congress should do upon their return is to revoke all military aid unless things change for the better. Each year, Thailand receives $10.5 million in “security-based” foreign aid, an umbrella term that includes military and direct economic aid. Thus far, the strongest signal the US has sent the new dictatorship is cutting only $3.5 million in “Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds.” Cutting health, counterterrorism and nonproliferation aid, which the country also receives, is less important. North Korea, for example, receives food aid from the United States for fear that its people will starve otherwise. But strong reasons remain for the continued suspension of military exercises and aid: it is ethical, required by law and proven to be effective at deposing the military dictatorship.

The ruling military government has shown a complete disregard for democratic freedoms. They engaged in a full-scale censorship campaign that includes removing former leaders’ names from new editions of history books. Additionally, The official in charge says the removal is an unexplained mistake. The country now joins China and North Korea in the circle of Asian countries who have vied to erase past leaders from the historical record.

Additionally, the NCPO upheld a prohibition on all forms of government criticism. In the months since, organizations like Human Rights Watch have detailed the detention of over 300 opposition party leaders and activists and the massive censorship over the media. Those detained included Kritsuda Khunasen, an opposition leader who described being beaten until she lost consciousness during her one-month detention at a military camp. Actions punishable under lèse-majesté (a French term that refers to violating the dignity of the sovereign) law by a two-year prison term include playing the French national anthem, covering one’s mouth with duct tape and reading 1984 in public.

How can the United States consistently and credibly oppose human rights violations at the hands of actors such as IS, North Korea and Syria (none of which receive security-based aid), if we continue to prop up Thailand? Not only will the countries we do decide to forcefully oppose take our actions and threats less seriously, but we will also be unable to convince allies and international partners to join us in that opposition if we selectively ignore the actions of small nations like Thailand. Though small, the effectiveness of United States diplomacy and soft power will be particularly reduced in the ASEAN region, a critical area for US geostrategy.

Irrespective of the treatment of Thai citizens and ethical questions, the Congressional 1961 Foreign Assistance Act requires the suspension of aid. In section 508, in no uncertain terms, the law mandates that the US cut aid to any nation where a “duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup,” pending the return of civilian rule. This policy was strengthened to include countries that commit human rights violations by the Leahy Amendments, which were passed in 2008. In the past, the US has evaded the law’s mandate by refusing to dub certain overthrows as “coups,” most recently in the case of Egypt. But even Egypt eventually saw its entire security aid budget disappear as the nation descended further into chaos, and so too should it be in the case of Thailand.

Proponents of maintaining some aid cite diplomacy as a more credible approach than sanctions, especially with a nation like Thailand, which remains a military partner in Asia for huge naval exercises like Cobra Gold, which plays a large role in East Asian readiness. However, this is a feckless strategy that ignores recent history: the total suspension ($29 million worth, compared to the $3 million that’s been suspended since May) of development and military aid in 2006 (health and counterterrorism aid were some of the few projects that were understandably maintained) led to the end of military rule in just 18 months, and even some scholars say that action wasn’t harsh enough.

The central tension at home seems to be between think tanks and the State Department on one side – who, today as in 2006, favor further aid restrictions and the cessation of military exercises – and the military, which has historically been vulnerable to threats from the Thai military to move closer to China in the event of an aid cutoff, and thus more willing to support continued military engagement. Those defense officials, and, to some extent, high-level government officials like Secretary of State John Kerry, fear China will exert more influence over Thailand in the event of a suspension of ties. But the US can’t have its cake and eat it too. As long as the historical record shows that the suspension of aid has been successful in restoring civilian rule in Thailand, that is the policy that should be maintained: supporting a military dictatorship and clinging to an outdated, Cold War-era military posturing strategy should not.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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