Announced as a “special military operation,” Russia officially invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022. Since then, the West, led by the United States and the EU, has donated billions of dollars worth of equipment, humanitarian aid and more to Ukraine in an effort to stall and hopefully fully repel Russia’s invasion. This support had been widely covered by international media, with Ukraine frequently encouraging allies to send more aid. However, many people may not know that the United States actually began donating to Ukraine following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2017, Trump’s administration continued sending weapons to Ukraine, primarily sending Javelin antitank missiles. This practice continued and increased following the Russian invasion in February of 2022, when the United States Congress passed a $13.6 billion aid package to be sent to Ukraine. 

By Feb. 27, 2022 the European Union responded swiftly and similarly with a 500 million euro, roughly $577 million,  military package composed of 90% “military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force…”  By the end of May 2022, Ukraine had received two billion euros ($2.3 billion) from the European Union, $55 billion from the United States, and over 1.3 billion pounds ($1.7 billion) from the United Kingdom. The start of this war shook the geopolitical landscape of the world. Countries were shaken, frightened at what more could come and were staunchly motivated to resist Russia’s encroachment into Ukraine’s territory. With over $59 billion in aid, Ukraine was able to launch its 2022 Kherson counteroffensive, taking back Kherson, the only regional capital that Russia was able to occupy since its initial invasion. 

This huge financial package and commitment from the West signaled the West’s support for Ukraine and its opposition to Russia’s actions. However, the war has now lasted over three years and sees no clear end in sight. Therefore, it begs the question of how long can this commitment last? 

The last U.S. aid packages sent to Ukraine came in the form of $3.4 billion in “direct budget support” on Dec. 30, 2024 and $500 million worth of military aid on Jan. 9, 2025. These packages were approved by the Biden administration, presumably to preempt changes before the Trump administration took over. 

Since the start of the second Trump administration, the United States has suspended all aid to Ukraine. In doing this, Trump seems to be applying pressure on Ukrainian President Zelensky to sue for peace, stating that Zelensky is “gambling with World War three.” The EU on the other hand, has not slowed down its aid. From January to Aug. 31, 2025, the EU has already given roughly $50 billion worth of aid to Ukraine, ranging from direct financial support and loans to military equipment.

From these donation patterns, conclusions about the United States and European Union’s differing attitudes towards Ukraine appear. Evidently, the European Union has not been experiencing Ukrainian fatigue as they continue to donate billions of dollars worth of equipment to Ukraine in an effort to fight Russia. The EU likely feels a larger threat from Russia than the United States does. If Russia were to take over part or all of Ukraine, Russia would be closer to the EU than to the U.S., essentially knocking on the EU’s doorstep. If a war were to occur, it would likely be on Russia’s Western front making it significantly closer to the EU than to the U.S. This difference suggests differing threat perceptions between the U.S. and EU with the second Trump administration stalling funding. 

Furthermore, this does not seem likely to change any time soon as the relationship between Trump and Zelensky has been shaky at best following their clash in the Oval Office. However, a “Supporting Ukraine Act of 2025” bill has been introduced to Congress on July 31, 2025, though has not been voted on by the Senate or the House of Representatives. While U.S. aid has stalled at the federal governmental level, public support echoes this attitude as well. While 46% of polled Americans say U.S. assistance to Ukraine is not enough, the other 53% of Americans polled state that American assistance to Ukraine is either the right amount or too much. 

However, it is worth noting that the sentiment of sending American support to Ukraine is on the rise. In December 2024, only 30% of Americans said not enough aid was being sent, and by March, 46% said it was not enough. The contrast between EU and U.S. relations with Ukraine highlights a shift in Western engagement: while Europe views the conflict as a more immediate security threat, the U.S. political landscape reflects growing wariness over long-term involvement.

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While the world focused on the clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces in May 2025, it is important to remember that the Kashmir conflict has not only been shaped by the two states, but also by various armed non-state actors with conflicting goals, ideologies and allegiances. This article seeks to explore the various armed non-state actors that have shaped the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, focusing on their histories, ideologies and relations to the Indian and Pakistani states and intelligence services.

Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) – Pro-Independence

The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front was founded in the late 1970s, with considerable support from the British-Pakistani diaspora, most of whom trace their origins to Mirpur in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. After carrying out attacks on Indian military personnel, diplomats and Kashmiri Hindus, JKLF shot to prominence with the execution of key leadership and the conclusion of the 1987 elections in Jammu and Kashmir, widely regarded as rigged in favor of a pro-India Kashmiri party. This prompted many Kashmiri youth to pick up arms to fight Indian rule, starting the armed Kashmir conflict. 

JKLF initially received support from the Pakistani intelligence agencies with the common goal of separating from Indian rule, but the group adopted a relatively secular, Kashmiri-nationalist ideology that sought to unite Indian-administered Kashmir and Pakistani-administered Kashmir as an independent country. 

In the mid-1990s, a diversion of funding from Pakistani intelligence services to pro-Pakistan militant groups combined with crackdowns from India and Pakistan saw JKLF renounce violent struggle in 1994. They continue to operate politically on both sides of the ceasefire line dividing the region, advocating for independence, but face restrictions from both countries. 

Currently, Pakistan restricts political activity by JKLF and other pro-independence groups in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, and India has banned JKLF since revoking Indian-administered Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status in 2019.

Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM) – Pro-Pakistan

Another non-state armed group, Hizbul-Mujahideen, emerged in 1989 after the 1987 elections. HM, like the JKLF, was predominantly composed of Kashmiri Muslims seeking to separate from Indian rule. However, unlike the JKLF, they sought to merge all of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan, and justified their struggle as a jihad against India in contrast to secular nationalism. By the early 1990s, they overtook JKLF as the foremost separatist militant organization in the Indian-administered Kashmir with Pakistani support. 

The group has historically enjoyed close ties with Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir, an Islamist political party in Kashmir. HM has engaged in attacks against Indian armed forces, Jammu and Kashmir police officers, pro-Indian politicians in Jammu and Kashmir and Kashmiri Hindus, leading to the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits in 1989-1990. They are accused of committing the 1998 massacre of Hindus in Prankote. They are also held responsible for the Wandhama massacre of Kashmiri Hindus in 1998. Furthermore, a popular HM commander was killed by Indian security forces in 2016, prompting massive protests in Kashmir. Indian forces were widely criticized for the usage of pellet guns to quell the protests which caused severe injuries, including blindness, to hundreds of Kashmiris. 

HM is designated as a terrorist organization by India, the U.S., Canada and the European Union. It is a legally operating organization in Pakistan. It remains active, but severely weakened due to Indian crackdowns and infighting.

Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen – Pro-India

The Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen was formed around 1993-1994, backed by the Indian intelligence services. Pakistan’s intelligence services initially supported multiple armed groups in the JKLF umbrella, but later concentrated support on the pro-Pakistan HM. This led many other militant organizations to lose their weapons, training, funding and bases, pressuring members to defect to HM. Many militants became disillusioned, and instead sought revenge on HM and other pro-Pakistani organizations. Indian intelligence services and their collaborators organized these groups together to form the Ikhwan. They recruited Kashmiri Muslims with pro-India leanings, those seeking revenge against HM due to loss of resources or friends and family members to militant attacks and suspected, surrendered and imprisoned militants who sought freedom and protection from both India and HM. 

While considered effective by India for counterinsurgency operations, they were widely criticized in Kashmir for egregious human rights violations, including torture, extortion and extrajudicial killings. Lack of popularity in Kashmir pressured Indian forces to disband and remove security from the organization, leading to the killing of many Ikhwanis by rivals. Others were absorbed into the Jammu and Kashmir police force (JKP) or Indian army. Many joined the Special Operations Group (SOG), a specialized counterinsurgent unit of the JKP. While the SOG is officially affiliated with the state, recruiting police officers from the various ethnic groups of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, it is also widely accused of serious human rights abuses, with particular concern that cash incentives from the Indian military for killing militants has encouraged SOG members to kill civilians and label them as militants for financial rewards.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) / The Resistance Front (TRF) – Pro-Pakistan

The LeT was established in 1990 in Afghanistan, as one of the various Mujahideen organizations, after the merger of two Islamist missionary organizations. After the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan, it shifted its focus in the mid-1990s on fighting India with the objective of merging Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan. Unlike Hizbul-Mujahideen, who were mostly made up of Kashmiris, most LeT fighters were Pakistani Punjabis. The group expanded from suicide bombings and shootings in Kashmir to attacks in major Indian cities, becoming notorious for both the 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks, where 10 LeT fighters sieged the Taj Hotel and killed more than 160 people. The group is also accused of collaborating with Indian Muslim extremist groups in coordinating attacks, and enjoys ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It is designated as a terrorist organization by the UN, European Union, U.S., India and Pakistan.

 In spite of its official ban, Pakistan’s intelligence services are widely accused of continued support to the organization, particularly through allowing its charity front, Jamaat ud-Dawa (JuD), to continue its activities within Pakistan, as well as taking limited action against LeT leadership. While Pakistan has cracked down on LeT and JuD since 2018 to comply with FATF regulations, seizing assets and jailing leaders, criticism remains that the organization continues to receive covert support from military and intelligence circles. Top leadership have historically lived openly in Lahore, holding political rallies and appearing on television interviews, in spite of UN sanctions and American bounties.

The Resistance Front (TRF) has emerged in resistance to the 2019 revocation of Article 370 in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. The group has become known for its attacks on Indian military personnel, Jammu and Kashmir police, migrant laborers and minorities. The group shot to prominence with the April 2025 massacre of Indian tourists in Pahalgam, prompting the military standoff between India and Pakistan. The group appears to have deliberately targeted Hindus during the attack, sparing those who could recite Islamic verses. Both India and the U.S. allege the group is a local proxy of the LeT, with considerable overlap between its leadership. Unlike the LeT, it has framed its struggle against India in more secular terms in an attempt to distance itself from the LeT’s religious rhetoric, seen as a strategic shift to win more tolerance for their cause.

Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) – Pro-Pakistan

Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM) is a newer group, founded in 2000 in Pakistan by militants released from an Indian prison in exchange for Indian hostages from a plane hijacking. The group, like LeT, seeks Jammu and Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan, and largely draws membership from Pakistani Punjabis who had experience in the Afghan Mujahideen. The group became notorious for its suicide attacks, including on both the Indian Parliament and the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly in 2001, Indian consulates in Afghanistan and the Pulwama attack on Indian paramilitary forces in 2019. They also launched attacks on Indian military personnel in 2016. It is designated as a terrorist organization by the UN, most western countries, India and Pakistan. However, Pakistan remains accused of allowing the organization to effectively function, with no serious legal action or arrests against the organization. Pakistani intelligence is suspected of supporting the group in attacks against India and shielding its leadership, as well as utilizing it as a counter to the Pakistani Taliban which wages war against the state. Both JeM and the Taliban share ideological links from the Deobandi school, leading to competition for cadre. The group remains active.

Village Defence Guards (VDG) – Pro-India

The Village Defence Guards, formerly known as Village Defence Committees, were organized in the mid-1990s as a civilian militia against militants in Jammu. Villagers were predominantly recruited from pro-India ethnic and religious groups in Jammu, such as the Hindu Dogras, Hindu and Muslim Paharis, Sikhs and Muslim Gujjar-Bakarwals. The VDG system has been criticized for arming civilians, enabling them to settle personal scores. With most VDG members being Hindu, the program has also been accused of enabling majoritarian violence against Muslim Gujjar villagers. While inactive for most of the 21st century, the VDGs were resurrected after the abrogation of Article 370, particularly as more militant attacks are shifting to Jammu from the Kashmir Valley. The VDGs are armed, trained and paid by the Indian army.

Conclusion

Armed non-state actors have played a significant role in Kashmir for decades, complicating the conflict beyond the formal militaries of India and Pakistan. For the Kashmir conflict to reach a resolution, and for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences, the complications arising from these various organizations are an important factor to account for and keep in mind.

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Since the breakdown of inter-Korean ties and the failed Trump-era talks in 2019, North Korea has doubled down on nuclear weaponization. In 2022 alone, the regime tested over 70 ballistic and cruise missiles. It also reportedly continues to produce advanced fissile material, which experts say can fuel up to 90 nuclear warheads.

Pyongyang’s growing alignment with Moscow and Beijing has deepened the crisis. In exchange for supplying Russia with artillery shells, ballistic missiles and even troops for its war on Ukraine, North Korea has gained valuable political cover—and likely technological support—from the Kremlin. China, meanwhile, has provided an economic lifeline for the isolated nation and brushed off Western countries’ requests to pressure the regime. This emerging axis has emboldened Pyongyang, enhancing its missile and nuclear capabilities while forming a united front that threatens U.S. influence and the security of Japan, South Korea and the U.S. mainland.

Taken together, these developments cast doubt on the sincerity of Kim’s statement and the notion that talks could alter the North’s strategic calculus. Nonetheless, Washington seems intent on restoring diplomacy with Pyongyang in the hopes of resetting relations. 

Even if such a summit were to occur, it would likely yield little progress. For decades, the United States has insisted on denuclearization as the foundation for improving ties, oscillating between diplomacy and military threats as a way of bringing about the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear program. Successive administrations have tried different approaches—including the 1994 Agreed Framework, which temporarily froze the North’s plutonium production, and the 2012 Leap Day Deal, which briefly halted nuclear and missile testing—but each of these efforts ultimately unraveled as Pyongyang reneged on its commitments and pressed ahead with weaponization. Kim’s position on denuclearization continues this pattern, pouring cold water on the prospect of a negotiated settlement.

What, then, motivated Kim to make such a statement? Given Pyongyang’s upgraded weapons arsenal, he lacks the same incentive to extract concessions from Washington as during Trump’s first term. Back then, North Korea displayed a markedly different attitude toward negotiations; the historic Panmunjom Declaration with the South in April 2018 affirmed their shared goal of achieving “a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula,” and the Singapore Summit with Trump later that year fueled hope that U.S.-North Korea relations were entering a new chapter.

The talks ultimately collapsed in October 2019 due to disagreement between both sides over sanctions relief and the terms of complete denuclearization. This was because, despite the economic incentives, Kim was fundamentally unwilling to abandon the regime’s most important source of security and status—an arsenal his family had spent nearly half a century developing. Knowing that nuclear weapons were his regime’s primary source of leverage and domestic legitimacy, he concluded that maintaining this arsenal was worth the economic cost.

Nearly seven years later, Pyongyang’s upgraded nuclear and conventional weapons capabilities have strengthened Kim’s leverage. However, his demands have fundamentally changed: rather than seeking comprehensive sanctions relief or warmer ties with Washington and Seoul, he is solely focused on persuading the White House to recognize North Korea’s nuclear status.

This would confer several benefits to his regime on the domestic and international stage. Shaped by the trauma of the Korean War (1950-53) and President Harry Truman’s nuclear threats, North Korea has long viewed its nuclear arsenal as the sole means to guarantee its survival. For years, Kim has cited the examples of Libya and Iraq as cautionary tales against denuclearization. In this vein, recognition by the United States would not only strengthen his regime’s legitimacy, but also the narrative that North Korea’s nuclear status is irreversible and a key pillar of its national identity—boosting Kim’s leverage at home and abroad.

Nuclear recognition would also give North Korea more room to maneuver between Moscow and Beijing. China remains wary about Pyongyang’s rapprochement with the Kremlin, fearing it will undermine both its economic leverage and its ability to balance between the United States and its allies in the region. It has thus adopted a more cautious stance toward the nuclear issue, officially supporting denuclearization yet refusing to meaningfully pressure the regime; such caution would evaporate if Washington were to recognize Pyongyang as a nuclear power. Although this would not eliminate all sources of friction within the Russia-China-North Korea axis, it would enable Kim to effectively balance ties between Moscow and Beijing, strengthening the regime’s regional and global influence.

Given Kim’s hardened stance on the nuclear issue, the United States must develop a clear, comprehensive strategy to constrain Pyongyang. Instead of yielding to Kim’s demands, Washington should reaffirm its commitment to denuclearization as a way to blunt the axis’s destabilizing influence and avoid nuclear brinkmanship in East Asia. This includes tightening enforcement of existing sanctions on North Korea and imposing secondary sanctions on Russian and Chinese firms that enable Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Washington should also continue to deepen trilateral security cooperation with South Korea and Japan, expanding joint military exercises, facilitating allied weapons transfers and increasing high-level coordination among top security officials as a strong signal to the regime of the alliance’s continued resolve. President Trump’s Asia trip last October was a positive step in that direction, but the administration must continue to build on this momentum and pursue additional measures to counter the regime.

Additionally, Washington should craft a long-term strategy to deter the regime militarily. That includes reaffirming its extended deterrence commitments to Tokyo and Seoul, and, if necessary, maintaining the option of targeted strikes against North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities. Such action would be both unlikely and unwise, but it must remain viable to cast a shadow of power across the negotiating table.

The North Korean nuclear threat has grown dire in recent years. The regime’s rapidly advancing weapons arsenal and strategic alignment with Moscow and Beijing present an increasingly complex challenge for the United States and its allies. Although Kim’s offer to resume talks may seem like a tempting diplomatic offramp, Washington should stand firm and marshal all available resources to achieve the goal of peaceful denuclearization. This would not only bring stability to the Korean Peninsula but also strengthen Washington’s credibility among its allies in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, an outcome that would reaffirm U.S. leadership at a moment when it is being tested on multiple fronts.

The views expressed in opinion pieces do not represent the views of Glimpse from the Globe.

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At the same time, the eastward expansion of NATO, which the West viewed as integral to safeguarding peace and establishing a buffer zone, is perceived by Russia as “an existential threat to national security.” Particularly, Russia is most concerned recently with NATO expansion as more and more countries are joining the organization. At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, both Georgia and Ukraine were promised to eventually join the Western defense alliance. Four months later, Georgia attacked Russia, killing at least ten Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, to which Russia responded with a full-scale offensive — marking the beginning of the Russo-Georgian war. Although the nature of this conflict is multifaceted, its predominant causes can still be analyzed. These causes can be broken down to the personal interests of Russian President Valdimir Putin, the desires of the Kremlin and NATO’s involvement. 

In the context of the Russo-Georgian war, an individual to analyze is Putin, who (despite not officially being president) still had full control over the country as Dmitry Medvedev, the leader at the time, was Putin’s protégé and aligned his policies through regular consultations with Putin. This effectively made him Putin’s proxy. For Putin, his interest was to ensure the survival of the Russian state and, within that, to maintain his own power. 

The color revolutions, particularly the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in the subsequent year, collapsed pro-Kremlin leaders in neighboring countries, which increased Western influence by Russia’s borders. Preservation of the Kremlin became Putin’s priority during that period, which might have been a contributing factor to the war. Indeed, Putin sought constitutional changes as a means to reclaim power and pursue a more aggressive role in the region which could explain the asymmetrical escalation in 2008 — launching a full scale invasion after just a few casualties. This revisionist sentiment remains even today, where Putin continues to abide by incrementalism in his foreign policy rather than drastic actions — resorting to cyberattacks to undermine NATO solidarity, exploiting international institutions (i.e. UNSC, IMF, APEC) to stifle liberal internationalism, and propagating misinformation to disrupt free elections. All of these efforts are to destabilize Western institutions and democratic systems around the world. 

For the short-term leading up to the invasion, Putin was faced with a triple-challenge: low oil prices from the Great Recession, a stalled constitutional process and socio-economic hardships. The war in Georgia was a diversionary tactic employed to distract from these domestic failures. By ‘rallying around the flag’ against NATO, which over 88% of Russians held unfavourable views towards, Putin increased his approval rating by eight percentage points directly after the intervention and re-consolidated his regime’s legitimacy. This parallels the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, where Putin’s approval rating jumped by 22 percentage points from a historic low post-invasion. 

More broadly, the Kremlin sought to revise the status quo and bring back Soviet glory. The disintegration of the USSR was seen as a humiliating defeat because Russia/USSR lost a third of its territory and half of its population and GDP. The Kremlin has long desired to rebuild the once-great Soviet Union (also known as revisionism) and feels it has the right to “take something back” such as reuniting the ethnic Russians in South Ossetia and Abkhazia with their motherland. Yet, revisionism also can only be a secondary component because it does not explain why Russia chose Georgia to go to war with instead of other ex-Soviet states, which all possess ethnic Russians in varying quantities. Specifically, Kazakhstan and Moldova both have comparatively larger populations of ethnic Russians compared to Georgia. This means that while revision can be a contributing factor to the war, it is not a leading factor because there is no justification for Georgia specifically compared to every other ex-Soviet state. The only difference is Western involvement in the country, which suggests that to be a decisive factor. 

NATO’s involvement in Georgia impacted both Russia’s and Georgia’s decision-making calculus when it promised that Georgia would one day join the alliance. Instead of disbanding after the collapse of the USSR, NATO extended membership to 15 additional countries in Eastern Europe as a means to ‘deter Russian aggression’ through the creation of a buffer zone. Russia on the other hand, has vehemently opposed NATO expansion, perceiving its only goal to be villainizing and containing Russia. 

Furthermore, “NATO expansion broke a promise that various American officials [including Bush and Clinton]had given to various Russian and Soviet officials [such as Gorbachev and Yeltsinthat]that NATO would not expand.” NATO’s hubristic expansion tipped the balance of power in Eastern Europe and was considered an existential threat by the Kremlin, which compelled it to retaliate to seek survival. In this case, Russia felt forced to destabilize the region in an effort to block NATO membership for Georgia, which was promised at the Bucharest summit. Indeed, the war effectively vetoed membership for Georgia because NATO would not accept new members with open territorial disputes. Overall, it’s arguable that Putin has been “protecting legitimate security interests” by destabilizing the region to veto NATO membership. 

By contrast, NATO involvement also emboldened Georgia to become overconfident through moral hazard  — the concept that Georgia engaged in risky behavior (behavior which they wouldn’t otherwise engage in) because they believed they had the full support of NATO. NATO’s open-door policy emboldened Georgia to act arrogantly after verbally pledging membership in 2008. Soon after, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili launched an offensive against pro-Russian separatists and Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia as he believed the “West had his back, but he miscalculated and overreached,” confirming that the pledge made by NATO was misinterpreted by Georgia as a blank cheque. In Georgia, sporadic fighting against separatists has been ongoing for years, but it was not until after the Bucharest summit that President Saakashvili decided to strike. In this paradigmatic plight of moral hazard, NATO involvement encouraged Georgia to provoke Russia, confident that NATO would save them in the end. Critically, this was not the case with the invasion of Ukraine, as there were no indications that Ukraine would be part of NATO anytime soon. 

Today, Russo-Georgian relations are in shambles despite the war only lasting five days. After Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, Georgia completely severed all diplomatic relations with Russia. Russia eventually withdrew their troops from Georgia after a month. In its entirety, the war displaced nearly 200,000 people, many of whom were unable to return even today. 

Importantly, many of the issues and patterns in the Russo-Georgian war can still be seen today: the unresolved ethnic tensions in the Donbas and Luhansk regions, the revisionist sentiments of the Kremlin and the antagonistic stance of NATO. Moving forward, it is vital to consider pre-existing conditions within regions, the intention of each state and the impact of the involvement of international institutions.

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At its core, this meeting was about searching for a mutually beneficial trade. North Korea reportedly went in the interest of obtaining satellite technology, economic aid and food supplies. In return, Russia is desperate to refuel its dwindling ammunition in order to sustain its war on Ukraine. 

North Korea likely seeks satellite technology for a number of reasons. One is truly for satellites — the country has already failed twice this year to put a spy satellite in orbit and says they will try again in October. They seek more advanced technology to aid this endeavor. 

The other, unspoken reasoning is for nuclear missiles. Both satellites and missiles rely on rocket technology, and the United States and its allies argue that North Korea uses its space programs as a cover for weapons tests. 

This deal could thus be doubly threatening to the West, as it would both aid Russia in its war against Ukraine and support North Korea’s nuclear and weapon proliferation.

Other than posing a threat to the United States and its allies, North Korea’s nuclear proliferation is a violation of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution, which was at the time supported by Russia. A decree also forbids any financial aid or education training that may help North Korea’s nuclear program. Moscow has in the past been hesitant to share such technology with North Korea, over its own concerns about the country’s nuclear arsenal. However, experts now believe that Russia’s priority for its war in Ukraine (and its desire to form strong relationships with enemies of the West) outweighs any previous inhibitions toward North Korea. 

What does Russia seek in return for this nuclear technology? Putin may be interested in the possible tens of millions of old Soviet artillery shells and rockets in North Korea’s possession. Russia has run through its own arsenal in its war on Ukraine faster than it perhaps expected to, and is now desperate for weapons and artillery. 

An obstacle to this deal, though, is another UNSC decree (which Russia also endorsed) that bans North Korea from exporting or importing any arms. It prohibits the transition of weapons in or out of the country. This resolution effectively bans Kim Jung-Un from making this trade and giving Russia their weapons. As such, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has stated that any military cooperation between North Korea and Russia is illegal as it breaks the United Nations Security Council resolutions and other international sanctions.

In this same vein, in August of last year, according to American Intelligence, North Korea volunteered 100,000 of its own troops to help Donbas and in September they sold Russia millions of artillery shells and rockets for use in Ukraine. However, both parties heavily deny this claim, though these denials could be truth or just cover for deals that break UNSC treaties. 

There is history to this kind of covert weapons aid between Russia and North Korea. After World War II, the Allies took Korea from under Japanese occupation and divided it between the Soviet Union and the United States. Then, on June 25, 1950, the Communist North, overseen by the Soviet Union, invaded the U.S. backed South. During the war that ensued, the Soviet Union secretly funneled North Korea pilots, aircrafts, machine guns, tanks, materials and medical services. They couldn’t get directly involved due to their tenuous relationship with the United States, who were actively involved on the South Korean side. Any sort of blow up between the two countries could result in a nuclear war. As a result, the pilots had to fly in other uniforms, speak other languages, and pretend to be tourists when on the ground. Armistice was reached in 1953, but since no peace treaty was ever signed, the two countries are still technically at war. 

Following the war, the relationship between the Soviet Union (Russia) and North Korea has fluctuated, but they now find themselves in a very similar, if reversed, position to 70 years ago. Putin even brought up this piece of history during their meeting. He said it was “our” country who first recognized the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a state and “our” country who supported their “war of independence” in the 1950s. Similarly, North Korea was the third country to recognize the independence of breakaway states of Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics in Eastern Ukraine, in reaction to which Ukraine terminated diplomatic ties with North Korea. Perhaps by bringing to mind the times “his” country supplied weapons to their invasion, Putin hopes to endear Kim Jung-Un to contributing to his own invasion. 

It still remains to be seen what the products of this meeting will be, on Russia’s war on Ukraine, on North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, and on our current political landscape. Regardless, this was a meeting ripe with historical and modern implications that will have heavy influence on both the outcome of this particular meeting and on international politics in the years to come.

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Fisher writes for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, where he challenges the U.S. President’s expedient access to the briefcase that contains the nuclear launch codes. In the United States and other countries, the power to start a nuclear war lies in the hands of the prime leader. 

In the United States, the Commander and Chief of the army, the president, has sole authority to launch nuclear weapons. This absolute power had been delegated to the military during the Cold War. In 1945, former U.S. President Harry S. Truman took office and argued that nuclear weapons were a strategic political tool, changing nuclear launch power to be under the president’s control.

Today, a “nuclear football” also known as the nuclear briefcase containing the nuclear launch code is near the president at all times. “Mutually assured destruction – ‘MAD’” is all the president has to say and a nuclear launch can be achieved in minutes where both enemy and defender are obliterated. Fisher suggests a hypothetical: what if, “instead of a briefcase containing the nuclear launch codes, the means to launch a bomb should instead be carried in a capsule embedded near the heart of a volunteer”? The President would have to carry a blade and kill the volunteer on-site in order to receive the launch codes. 

Although gruesome and strictly hypothetical, such a suggestion highlights the implications of nuclear war up close. Having to take the life of one person would draw attention to the thousands of lives potentially at stake with this responsibility. Fisher proposed this at the Pentagon and stated, “Before killing thousands, the leader must first look at someone and realize what death is — what an innocent death is. Blood on the White House carpet.”

The danger behind a country’s nuclear arsenal is that its immense power also has immense potential for error. The immediate nature and sole authority associated with the launching of nuclear weapons could contribute to a grave miscalculation. 

However, nuclear bombs are not conducive to “learning from mistakes.” Many scholars theorize that an impending nuclear war may take place due to an accidental launch. 

There have been countless near-misses that are known to the public, and many more that are concealed. According to Zaria Gorvett, an award-winning Senior Journalist at BBC Future, there have been at least “22 alarmingly narrow misses”. Moreover, the Future of Life Institute states that “the most devastating military threat arguably comes from a nuclear war started not intentionally but by accident or miscalculation.” 

Today, there are thousands of nuclear weapons on high alert with the readiness to launch at any moment. Unbeknownst to many, nuclear war has almost started because of mere misunderstandings or mistakes — from misfired nuclear tests to the moon rising, computer simulation malfunctions, rockets, and training exercises, the near-misses have been too many to overlook. 

Furthermore, William Perry, who served as the U.S. Secretary of Defense under Bill Clinton and Undersecretary of Defense for Jimmy Carter, described a narrow miss event in the 1980s that could have led to an accidental nuclear disaster.  

Military surveillance computers alerted the United States that 200 missiles were making a descent from the Soviet Union. Perry comments that “they actually had called the White House before they called me – they called the president. The call went through to his national security advisor”. The security advisor had waited before waking up President Carter to make a decision on whether or not to retaliate. Within minutes, he received another call informing him that there was an error with the computer systems and it had been a false alarm. Had he not waited and woken President Carter up immediately, the outcome could have been very different. 

“Had the president got the call himself, he would have had about five minutes to decide whether to launch or not. This is the middle of the night, no chance to consult anybody,” said Perry. Moreover, he added that mistaken launches are an “alarmingly realistic possibility,” as this incident was too close of a call. 

In 1980, the Soviet Union launched four submarine-based nuclear missiles as part of a training exercise. The U.S. early warning system alerted military officials that the launch seemed to be aimed at the United States. The president had to decide whether to launch a counterattack. Fortunately, the warning sensor was incorrect, and the counterattack was halted. 

This shows how alarming nuclear tests can be when accompanied by errors from missile detection systems. A similar situation occurred in 2010 when the U.S. Air Force “temporarily lost the ability to communicate with 50 nuclear missiles.” Without any communication, there was no possible avenue to stop an automatic launch or to detect it. In this instance, the United States could have started an accidental nuclear war. This reveals that “our present safeguards are not necessarily more robust than those from 50 years ago.”

Nuclear tests and military training exercises have not only pushed countries to the brink of starting a nuclear war, but have also prompted peculiar miscalculated situations. For instance, when computers at North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) showed a massive Soviet attack on the United States, within seconds, “U.S intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) crews were put on the highest alert [and]nuclear bombs prepared for takeoff.” However after a couple of minutes, there was no data to confirm the attack and the ICBM crew withdrew the actions taken. They later found out that a technician had accidentally played a training tape broadcasting a realistic nuclear attack scenario. 

Marshall Shulman, a senior U.S. State Department advisor, comments that “false alerts of this kind are not a rare occurrence. There is complacency about handling them that disturbs me.”  Another near-miss incident happened when a radar misinterpreted a moonrise over Norway as a Soviet missile launch heading toward the United States. NORAD responded immediately with a high alert, until they realized something was off. 

Other disturbing mistakes include an incident of a bear triggering a nuclear alarm in 1962. Meia Chita-Tegmark, Future of Life Institute member, commented that she finds this very cynical, “We humans are so hubristic when comparing ourselves to the rest of the animal kingdom, yet we’ve inadvertently created a system through which a single bear could endanger our civilization.” 

Nuclear tests have become a strategic scare tactic in politics. Kim Jong-Un is the current Supreme Leader of North Korea. His use of nuclear missile tests is a notorious example of displaying military aggression to assert military dominance. The theory that nuclear war will likely happen accidentally also follows the ideology that one day, these acts of exhibitionism will be taken seriously. A nuclear test intended to threaten another country may one day be misinterpreted as an invitation to engage in a nuclear war. 

Moreover, early warning systems from the Cold War are still used today. The systems do not wait for nuclear missiles to strike but rather detect them before they reach their target. The only true confirmation that missile threats are real is once they have already landed, which would leave the target country without the ability to retaliate. Perry and Tom Collina co-authored, The Button: The New Nuclear Arms Race and Presidential Power from Truman to Trump.   According to Tom Collina, “Experts agree that by far the biggest threat comes from the very launch systems that are supposed to be protecting us,” because any false reading has the power to accidentally start a nuclear war.

There are some steps toward combating the possibility of accidental nuclear war. For instance, in China, they have a “no first use policy.” 

Tom Collina, the director of policy at the nuclear non-proliferation charity Ploughshares Fund, states that China has “announced that they will not use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, and there’s some credibility in that policy because China separates its warheads [which contain the nuclear material]from its missiles [the delivery system].” China’s “no first use policy” is a favorable solution, when considering the instantaneous capacity for destruction when launching nuclear weapons. On the other hand, neither the United States nor Russia has such a policy, “they reserve the right to launch their nuclear weapons, even in response to conventional warfare methods.” 

Moreover, today, the likelihood of false alarms remains high because of the increasingly sophisticated technology used in cyber-attacks. This should prompt countries to re-evaluate the “safety” they perceive from their nuclear arsenals.

Ultimately, nuclear weapons in a political setting are argued to be a deterrence for war. However, with the high risk of accidental nuclear war, it is difficult to maintain a viable argument for their necessity when it comes to global protection. Unless there is a zero chance of errors and accidents, how can we ever be truly protected when the stakes are so high? 

Should the power to launch nuclear weapons be in a single person’s hands? There have been many leaders that take strong medications, drink heavily, have irrational personalities, and are diagnosed as clinically depressed through the ages. They are, after all, human. 

Can world leaders ever be solely trusted to make a decision to launch nuclear weapons? The currently recorded incidents of narrow misses for nuclear war have taught us that both technological and human error remains a factor. 

However, the essential problem lies in how vulnerable the human race and all living beings are left, in the hands of a select few leaders who can easily activate such catastrophe with a press of a button.

The post The Next Nuclear War: An Accidental Launch? appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

It’s a classic case of history being written by the victor. 

Powerful nations feel threatened that their power might be vulnerable. Therefore, they need to obtain as much power as they can. One such measure is the possession of nuclear weapons. 

But is it fair for nuclear powers to demand nuclear non-proliferation from all countries, nuclear and none? Depends on who you ask. 

In 1970, a total of 189 countries signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), leaving major powers that already had nuclear weapons at a standstill and preventing weaker countries from building such an  arsenal. 

The overarching goal of the treaty was to contain nuclear weapons and technology, promote nonviolent uses of nuclear energy and support nuclear disarmament. However, the execution of such initiatives is questionable, at best.

The NPT has no requirements explicitly stating that major powers must reduce their arsenals or halt the development of nuclear weapons. There is also no incentive to prevent countries from backing out of this agreement, if they feel provoked. 

Given these circumstances, it is evident that the premise of disarmament only makes sense if both countries are of equal standing. This would prevent a security dilemma, since neither country is threatened. However, when forcing smaller countries to halt their development of nuclear weapons, they will inevitably still feel threatened by more advanced nuclear powers.

For instance, despite its misleading title, the Cold War was arguably a time of peace in which the U.S and the Soviet Union restrained from using nuclear force while simultaneously increasing their arsenals. Although the case is an obvious success story of nuclear deterrence, it is important to remember that in the historical context, both Russia and the United States were major rising hegemonies after World War II, with similar access to nuclear intelligence.

Currently, the United States only allows its allies (Great Britain and France) to have nuclear weapons, further ostracizing other countries and maintaining this polarizing international atmosphere. When Russia attempted to do the same by supplying Cuba with missiles in 1962, all hell broke loose — resulting in the awkward period of nuclear non-proliferation known as the Cold War.

Nuclear non-proliferation doesn’t account for small countries feeling threatened, therefore prompting them to obtain weapons through illegal means. For instance, in the case of  North Korea, it is evident that the United States has done its best to prevent its progress in developing nuclear weapons. Despite this, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and has made significant progress in producing fuel for nuclear bombs. 

Even current members of the treaty still tread a fine line by producing enriched uranium (commonly used to fuel nuclear weapons). After all, it is inevitable that sitting ducks will become restless and start to quack.

Although some argue it is inconsequential to consider what-if scenarios, this situation does call into question what would happen if Ukraine had not given up its nuclear arsenal to Russia as a condition of the NPT? Could Ukraine have deterred Russia from invading? 

Similarly, in modern situations of conflict such as Taiwan and Afghanistan, the control that their occupiers had over the region could have been, in a sense, avoided. Hypothetically, if both sides were equally defended, these conflicts might have been left at a standstill, like in the Cold War. 

Such scenarios display a significant downside of non-nuclear proliferation, in that it is highly dependent on one’s intentions. It does not directly prohibit the development of nuclear energy, but rather its potential uses. 

Regardless of intent, nuclear non-proliferation is forcing the international community to follow a rigged system in which major powers have the upper hand. 

The NPT needs to be seriously restructured in order to fulfill its original purpose — to avoid another Hiroshima and Nagasaki — and successfully promote nuclear deterrence. However, given that it currently benefits those that have a chokehold over the international community (namely, the United States and Russia), it is unlikely that it will be reexamined anytime soon.

For now, we are nothing more than sitting ducks.

The post Sitting Ducks: The Conundrum for Non-Nuclear Powers and Urgency for NPT Revision appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Under the international treaty, South Korea and other member states are prohibited from creating nuclear weapons, in order to promote cooperation in nuclear energy and further the goal of total disarmament.

South Korea also signed another joint declaration with North Korea, a denuclearization and unification effort of the Korean Peninsula that agreed to not “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons” that went into effect in 1992. Further clauses mandate nuclear energy use solely for peaceful purposes, and regular inspections to ensure compliance with the declaration.

Unfortunately, North Korea has repeatedly violated this declaration by launching six separate nuclear tests since 2006, not including the over 70 ballistic and cruise missile tests the country launched in 2022 alone. The most recent concerning behavior from North Korea came at the end of last year, when five North Korean drones crossed into South Korea, one of which breached the presidential office’s no-fly zone. 

The election of South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol in May , whose conservative policies take a harsher stance on North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un’s regime than his deescalation-seeking predecessor, has contributed to this increase in tensions. 

In a meeting of Kim’s Workers’ Party at the end of last year, he cited Yoon’s government as a valid reason to center its nuclear policy on “a mass production of tactical nuclear weapons” and “an exponential increase of the country’s nuclear arsenal,” specifically as a defense mechanism against South Korea. 

All this comes in conjunction with Kim’s need to maintain his credibility after international sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic and recent floods that devastated the economy. Peace talks on the Korean Peninsula now look less than promising.

While the country’s current policy under Yoon is to defend itself from North Korea by strengthening its alliance with the United States, the president stated during a recent policy briefing that South Korea would consider building its own arsenal should the North continue its escalations. 

Washington’s official policy maintains its goal of entirely clearing the Korean Peninsula of nuclear weapons, fearful of triggering an arms race should South Korea decide to do so.

The threat of nuclear war has garnered support among South Korean citizens for their government to build an independent arsenal. A joint survey published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Lester Crown Center on US Foreign Policy found that 71% were in favor of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons, and 56 percent would support a deployment of U..S nuclear weapons into the country.

However, an independent arsenal is greatly preferred, as trust that the United States will defend South Korea against the North remains at only 61% despite repeated assurances from Washington and the 28,500 American troops still stationed in the country.

Opinions of analysts and policy makers are split. Some hold faith in the umbrella of protection that the United States provides, while others not so much. 

According to Sejong Institute senior analyst Cheong Seong-Chang, the United StatesU.S. would be safer if South Korea had nuclear independence. Washington would not have to sacrifice its own nuclear weapons to defend South Korea, and, as an added bonus, a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula might encourage China to crack down on Kim, he says.

However, deciding to build its own arsenal would require South Korea to withdraw from the NPT, in which case it would be the only country to do so after North Korea did in 2003.

Article X of the NPT does allow for a member state to withdraw, provided it gives the UN Security Council three months’ notice and sufficient reasons. The reasons cited for withdrawal must be in the case that “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this [t]reaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” The increasing threats of nuclear attacks from North Korea could be a potential justification for South Korea to withdraw. 

Leaving the NPT remains a last resort for now. In the meantime, Yoon and his Defense Ministry plan to hold tabletop exercises with their allies to strategize and determine how well-equipped they are in the event of an attack. 

South Korea’s Defense Ministry has other deterrence strategies, as well. In 2017, after North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, South Korea established a “decapitation unit” under the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation initiative, which would conduct cross-border helicopter and plane raids into North Korea under the cover of night. The unit’s imposing name aims to strike fear of assassination into Kim Jong-Un.

Other South Korean arms build-up programs include Kill Chain, which would detect incoming missile attacks and launch preemptive strikes, and the Korea Air and Missile Defense program, which aims to intercept incoming missiles. 

The debate on nuclear policy comes at a time when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised global concerns of nuclear war, and self-defense capabilities seem not only appealing but also necessary. 

South Korea must first confront several problems: How heavily can it rely on the United States for protection in the event of a Northern attack? Would an independent arsenal of nuclear weapons trigger an arms race? And, what is the best decision the government can make to ensure the prosperity and peace of its people? 

There may not be one right answer, but safety cannot be guaranteed while nuclear weapons are in the hands of any nation with malintent. 

The post The Future of Nuclear Weapons in South Korea appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

This threat of nuclear escalation is neither new nor surprising. Putin has made similar statements in the past, namely stating that “the world is nothing without Russia,” and therefore, using nuclear resources to defend Russia is necessary. However, with the massive costs of this conflict and increasing Russia-West tensions, such threats are beginning to bear more impact than ever.

Moreover, Russia recently took over a Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant following strenuous attacks. Zaporizhzhia, currently Europe’s largest power plant, now sits under Russian control. 

As Russian attacks move further into Ukrainian territory, the shelling and the sensitivity of the nuclear force in the plant may pose a threat. Many in the West and around the world are watching intently as Russia inches closer and closer to risking the lives of millions with its continuous pressure on the plant. 

With many of Putin’s threats materializing into consistent attacks on this region, nuclear threats like these become more worrisome. With such a large nuclear arsenal at its disposal and Russia’s repeatedly-expressed interest in using them to win the war it started at any cost, many Western powers are looking intently at the course of action by Putin’s government.

U.S. President Joe Biden has not stayed unresponsive to Putin’s attempts at nuclear provocation. Biden is warning Russia that there might be a “wider danger” in the threats by the Russians, and something that the West should not turn a blind eye to. In an interview with CNN, Biden stated, “It would be irresponsible for me to talk about what we would or wouldn’t do” if Russia follows through with any nuclear threat.

If Russia was to actually exert its force on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and continue to move forward with a “strike first” mentality, it would risk challenging the United States and its allies to a nuclear match-off. Approximately 90 percent of all nuclear warheads are owned by Russia and the United States, and their excessive — yet accessible — supply has kept them at a stalemate for the past 80 years. 

If Putin chose to make good on his threats, he would have to recognize that the United States is well-equipped to retaliate at any second. However threatening Putin’s words might be, they seem insufficient to realistically push him to take nuclear action. 

To better understand Putin’s ideas and the threat’s validity, one must also look at his long-term history of empty promises and unfulfilled threats of nuclear usage. 

Even with the strain of the ongoing conflict, Putin is considered by many to be acting erratically and irrationally. However, the threat of retaliation when it comes to nuclear force is something even Putin cannot pretend to show defiance to. 

But this issue is not simply a matter of rationality for Putin or Russia. While the use of nuclear weaponry to further this particular war is not likely, the wielding of such a threat would have dire consequences if it materialized, and should not be taken lightly. 

It would be in the best interests of both Russia and Putin to back away from nuclear use. But, that simply may not be enough to hold him back. 

With the world’s gaze on him and increased doubt on whether Russia can actually win this fight and maintain its position of power, Putin might be willing to take any measures necessary to win back control.

The post How Real is Russia’s Nuclear Threat? appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Accordingly, the United States has long maintained a strategic position in favor of nuclear first-use in its international policies. However, members of the international community have criticized the first-use position for heightening global tensions, creating pressure for the United States to reevaluate their stance.

In 2019, U.S. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass) proposed a No-First-Use (NFU) bill in response to this sentiment. If passed, the bill would have restricted the United States from deploying nuclear attacks against any actor, if the target had not first launched one against the United States or its allies. 

Although it did not pass, Warren reintroduced the policy two years later. Despite international and domestic pressures for change, another two years have passed since the bill’s reintroduction, and no policy on NFU has yet been officially adopted by the United States.

Considering how major U.S. rivals like Russia and China have made declarations of commitment to NFU, the United States’ struggle to follow suit leaves some with the impression that it is falling behind on efforts towards global peace in terms of nuclear weapons. 

However, what stands in the way of the United States denouncing nuclear first-use is perhaps best described by Stanford University Professor Scott Sagan, who suggests that the threat of asymmetric nuclear attack may be an “unfortunate necessity.”

Although grotesque, the devastating physical capacity of nuclear weapons and the unquestionable terror surrounding their deployment has served as a pivotal point of strategic deterrence against major attacks since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

Today, the United States relies on nuclear first-use to maintain even wider international security interests on multiple geographic dimensions. Most prominently, the United States’ credible ability to strike first has held together decades of global alliances and agreements of nuclear non-proliferation such as that of NATO and its members.

Less powerful, non-nuclear members of NATO rely on the nuclear first-use of their allies to deter and counter threats of conventional warfare. In turn, non-nuclear NATO members agree to abstain from developing nukes of their own. In the event that the United States fails to provide such an assurance — such as by declaring a position of NFU — non-nuclear allies will likely abandon nuclear abstention and attempt to procure their own arsenal to satisfy the national security needs left void. 

Hence, without any established substitute measures to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, adopting an NFU policy could, in fact, lead to widespread nuclear proliferation.

Proponents of NFU often argue that the international agreements already in place, such as the UN-sponsored Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), would prevent such an outcome. However, previous defections from the NPT have proven otherwise. One notorious example is North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. Furthermore, three member-states of the UN (i.e. India, Israel and Pakistan) have remained non-signatories to the NPT and actively pursued nuclear weapons development.

The capacity for nuclear first-use has also served as a critical deterrent in defending the United States against other forms of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), creating an additional disincentive to adopting NFU. 

For instance, the “calculated ambiguity” doctrine is a U.S. policy which maintains the potential for nuclear first-use in response to a chemical or biological attack against the United States. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen once stated that “the ambiguity involved in the issue of nuclear weapons contributes to [the United States’]own security, keeping any potential adversary who might use either chemical or biological [weapons]unsure of what our response would be.” 

Hence, an NFU policy would nullify this critical element of ambiguity in U.S. security measures against non-nuclear WMDs.

Because American international security arrangements have been so closely entwined with the ability to conduct a nuclear first-strike, an immediate declaration of NFU would prove detrimental to both U.S. national interests and international stability. 

Therefore, in order for the United States to be ready to adopt NFU, measures must be taken to alleviate the foreign and domestic dependence on nuclear weapons as a mechanism for security.

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