Originally, the heart of this article centered around a nascent policy strategy by the Biden administration in regards to its lesser known allies and trade partners on the African continent. That policy, in my opinion, was likely to be continued under his chosen successor, Kamala Harris. However, due to a recent shift in the political agenda of the White House from Liberalism to Trumpism, the future relationship of the United States with the global south is now in question. Joseph Biden, despite his expansion of Trump-Era tariffs to protect domestic industry, was the furthest thing from an isolationist — in fact, it could be said that he is part of a fading generation of Democrat politicians who placed international cooperation and trade at the forefront of their political agenda, rather than focusing strictly on domestic politics. Still, both the African Union (AU) and Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have agency in regards to their trade and development strategies, and so despite a shift in U.S. interest in these projects, they may continue regardless.

On Sept. 7, 2024, Dr. Carla Bennett, chairman of the Caribbean Community, made a speech before Barbadian leaders and the press  in the capitol, Bridgetown. Dr. Bennett’s words, espousing the “vibrant pan-Africanism” and warm feelings between the Caribbean and African continent, at first seemed to be fairly standard pandering by an international leader. Amid the group of government officials and reporters, however, was an outlier — Okechukwu Ihejirika, chief operating officer of the African Export-Import Bank’s (Afreximbank) Caribbean office. 

Dr. Bennett’s words and Ihejirika’s attendance reflects a noteworthy trend of increasing political, economic, and social integration between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the African Union (AU). The year prior to Dr. Bennett’s speech, Afreximbank constructed a representative office in Barbados with the purpose of helping facilitate Africa-Caribbean trade. African and Caribbean leaders have met consistently since 2020 with the goal of Caribbean nations diversifying their export portfolio and to becoming closer with their neighbors across the Atlantic Ocean. That being said,  CARICOM is primarily an insular organization, akin to the European Union. The primary goal is to coordinate foreign and economic policies among member states, as well as economic integration and relative freedom of movement. To that end, much of CARICOM trade is with other members, and the majority of external trade still goes to larger powers such as the United States and China. Though Caribbean trade with Africa is minimal at the moment, it is clear that this is a developing relationship that may take years or decades to fully coalesce.

While the Caribbean may be best known for its idyllic beaches, rich culture and luxury crops such as nutmeg and indigo, it should start to be considered as a hotspot for a changing global economic order. Although some may overlook its assets, CARICOM has 15 votes at the UN and sits on a vital trade route between the United States, Mexico, South America and West Africa. CARICOM also rests quite comfortably within the U.S. sphere of economic and political influence, with a number of military bases and multilateral trade agreements made between the two actors. The United States wishes to keep CARICOM friendly towards it, as a trade and security partner to bolster the economy, combat the illicit drug trade from South America and project naval power into the southern oceans. How then, does this new strategy of economic development through trade diversification fit into the American agenda?

Under the Biden administration, Democratic leaders were committed to continued trade liberalization in line with neoliberal values. However,  it was abundantly clear that the United States had competition, primarily from an ascendant China who reached out to the global south through a flood of public and private investments, trade agreements and land purchases for the purpose of trade and security. 

This strategy, known as the Belt and Road initiative, sought to tie nations of the global south to China through a mix of debt trap diplomacy and circular trade relationships, blocking the United States out of the region economically. The old trade order, in which U.S. economic dominance relied on open markets, is now in danger of fracturing under the pressure of increased regional integration, potentially shutting the United States out of a Chinese-led trade order. 

Fearing this, the United States has ramped up its own investments, particularly in the African continent. Biden’s cabinet directly named Kenya as a potential trade partner and a major non-NATO ally, a country that has recently become disillusioned with the Belt and Road after a disastrous railway project halted last year. On the Southern cone of the continent, U.S. and European governments have elected to help fund a railway that connects the coast of Angola with the African interior, rich in minerals integral to electric vehicle battery manufacturing. The potential for this project is enormous: Joe Biden already wants to bolster the U.S. EV industry, and diminish Chinese influence in a hotly contested region, rich in UN votes as much as minerals and luxury items, effectively killing two birds with one stone.

The Caribbean could serve as an excellent proxy for this continued United States-Africa partnership. Already kindred in identity (with founding visions based on the ideals of pan-Africanism and decolonization), CARICOM could become the source of a linkage for U.S. foreign policy toward Africa – increased cooperation with one region could coincide with increased cooperation in the other. Rather than being directly managed by the United States, this trilateral relationship grows under tacit approval from Washington, justified as part of an existing history of trade liberalization. Given proper attention and encouragement, a pro-United States trade bloc could have formed among Caribbean and African states, trading with each other as much as they traded with the United States. However, just this last month a bomb was thrown into these plans. Newly elected 47th President Donald J. Trump, a vehement isolationist and staunch anti-China politician, is ambiguous as to his policy regarding trade and investment to either region. For starters, these developments are marginal in the minds of the American people, with domestic matters and the wars in Ukraine and Gaza being the primary foreign issues of interest. Trump’s strategy may be unshackled by commitments to his constituency and may continue under different leadership, in the same way that Trump-era tariffs toward China were maintained under Biden. However, that may also mean a U.S. withdrawal of direct involvement in the growing Caribbean-Africa relationship. The Lobito corridor may lose funding, and the HOPE and HELP acts (which give preferential textile trading rights toward Haiti) may disappear in a tide of protectionism, a policy that seeks to protect domestic industries by shutting out competition via tariffs. However, the CARICOM-AU partnership is not necessarily dead in the water. 

Ignoring the economic incentives to continue working together, there are a number of security and political benefits for the Caribbean and Africa to reap from a continued partnership. A renewed Trump presidency brings the future of trade with the United States as a whole into question – shaking a dependency on American goods and services may lessen the blow should tariffs be implemented. Similarly, African exports are primarily oriented towards advanced industrialized countries such as China, the EU and the United States, often not focusing on developing nations overseas or even other African states. Afreximbank is already focused on developing inter-African trade, and developing a more diverse portfolio only helps to achieve further independence from the northern capital. In addition to these benefits toward sovereignty, unifying policy agendas in international institutions makes a CARICOM-AU bloc a formidable force to reckon with. Leaders have already cooperated on social issues such as petitioning for a formal program to institute reparations for African slavery, a feat that could potentially be replicated on other issues, ranging from civil conflict to economic development. 

Despite a potential setback in what could have been a geopolitical boon for the United States, CARICOM and the AU have no real incentives to end their burgeoning alliance. From trade to development to security to social issues, the two blocs have more similarities than differences, and it is in their best interests to continue cooperation through bilateral agreements and negotiations. Perhaps, this new dynamic may represent a shift toward coordination among developing nations rather than clamoring toward the world hegemons, as it becomes evident that the free trade order is more threatened than ever by protectionists in both Europe and the United States. What remains to be seen is how the new Trump administration wishes to engage with the winds of change.

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In July of 2011, South Sudan became independent from Sudan and to this day, it is one of the youngest countries in Africa. The country has long been characterized by having various ethnic groups, cultures and tribes. However, the beginning formation of Democracy for South Sudan was quickly challenged internally in December 2013 due to the clash of two main ethnic groups. 

These two main ethnic groups are known as the Dinka and Nuer, which have in the past, competed against each other for land resources and water. Although they enjoyed periods of tolerance and have even intermarried at certain points in history, competition for political prowess and water resources has never ceased, as these groups are always forced to migrate for areas with better cultivation, leaving clashes and conflicts for resources inevitable.

The dispute that ignited the current civil war was an ethnic conflict between South Sudanese President Salva Kiir (a Dinka) and then-Vice President Riek Machar (a Nuer). Starting with President Kiir dismissing Vice-President Machar from his duties. This action caused a string of violence between Kiir’s Dinka guards and Machar’s Nuer guards, and Kiir accused Machar of plotting a coup d’etat. Kiir also claimed that the violence perpetrated by Machar’s guards was an unsuccessful attempt at overthrowing his rule. These accusations then set off rebel groups from both ethnic parties to take sides with their respective leaders, drastically increasing the scale of the conflict.

Now, the war is mainly between the Sudanese government’s militia comprized of mainly Dinka’s and the opposing rebel army composed of mainly Nuer’s. The government militia, largely lacking organization and professionalism, ultimately chose sides between the leaders and so set off two forces fighting for these two ethnic parties, the Dinka and Nuer. This conflict has now spiraled into one of the world’s largest displacement crises, with an estimated 4.5 million people displaced and about 400,000 dead. 

Children At War 

This is not the first time South Sudan has experienced prolonged periods of civil war and issues of independence. Previously, before South Sudan declared independence, the country was involved in decades of civil war on similar grounds regarding ethnic differences and resource usage. However, an issue that stands out in this civil war is the recruitment of children as child soldiers. As recorded by the U.S. State Department, both the government and opposing forces have recruited 19,000 child soldiers to fight in the war since the conflict began in 2013. As of 2021, this number is predicted to be on the rise in expert opinion. The government forces include the South Sudan’s People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) and the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS). Other militias that have been recruiting child soldiers include the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLM/NA). While the tactics of recruitment are unadmitted, they are nonetheless dangerously coercive. These children serve as soldiers to execute violence against other child soldiers. Some even hold ranking positions as staff, security roles and checkpoint guards. No political entity has yet to hold any of the individual forces accountable for perpetuating the recruitment and use of children in a fighting force. 

In 2018, a Sudanese ceasefire and peace agreement was made. While both forces agreed to refrain from the recruitment of child soldiers, this agreement has yet to be fully implemented. While the slowing of recruitment is unknown, many children remain in the ranks of the militias. In addition, the slow implementation and delay of the agreement has only furthered the violence, rather than ending it. 

While child recruitment continuation is largely unknown, violence in certain parts of the country continues. About 2,240 people were reported dead from such violence in 2022. Elections, which were set to occur in 2023, have now been postponed for December of 2024. Citizens, especially opposition forces, continually question the strength of the state if they cannot make due on their promise of an electoral process. Edmund Yakani is the executive director for Community Empowerment for Progress Organization, a local advocacy group in South Sudan. In an interview with AP World News, Yakani said that “the return of the country to violence is more evident than the country staying in stability.” For child soldiers, the lack of electoral implementation and total cease of violence presents uncertainty for support and resources for children to get out of the ranks of warfare. Thus, continuing the cycle of recruitment and violence. 

Response From the United Nations 

The United Nations’ Action Plan to address the child soldier issue has been largely criticized for its lack of true understanding of the situation and the ethnic disparity. Many have characterized the root of the problem as an ethnic narrative issue that many soldiers and children have been coerced into executing. The plan aimed to prevent violations against children and has allowed for the release of hundreds of child soldiers. However, due to the weak implementation, both forces have yet to fully discharge child soldiers with many also lacking awareness of such a plan to release children from fighting. 

The UN’s response to the humanitarian crisis of displacement has also been addressed by the United Nations Security Council monitoring borders and the operation of delivering humanitarian aid. Even so, about 9.3 million people need humanitarian aid, and the UN has yet to address the 67% of individuals who live below the poverty line in the country, with these numbers and figures exacerbated by the war. 

The displacement crisis and child recruitment of soldiers remains an issue with millions still without a place to seek refuge and many children still in the ranks of militia forces involved in the civil war. The violation of child rights is a crucial topic that remains at large in South Sudan. Look no further to understand the caliber of this violence that the usage of children who still face a lack of support and resource to get out of this cycle of violence. Beginning as a deep-seated ethnic clash between the Dinka and Nuer, it has now turned into a question of how to effectively transfer power within the South Sudanese government and rehabilitate these children affected by conflict.

The post Child Soldiers: The South Sudan Civil War appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

The situation has reached a critical point. Street clashes between Sudan’s warring factions have exacerbated pre-existing humanitarian needs and resulted in the forced displacement of nearly 5.1 million individuals, both within Sudan and across neighboring countries. 

“25 million people, more than half the population of Sudan, [are in]need [of]humanitarian aid and protection,” said Ramesh Rajasingham, Head and Representative of OCHA in Geneva.

The current turmoil in Sudan is a consequence of yet another governmental system breakdown in the nation and is a single crisis within the broader spectrum of political challenges that have occurred throughout Sudan’s history.

In December 2018, a wave of protests erupted in the city of Atbara, driven by grievances over Sudan’s deteriorating economic crisis, escalating food prices, widespread corruption and high unemployment rates. 

These initial protests swiftly spread across the nation, eventually reaching the capital, Khartoum. By April 2019, President Omar al-Bashir was ousted by the Sudanese army following months of demonstrations, bringing an end to his three-decade-long grip on power. The military, holding considerable influence, took steps to solidify its authority by suspending the constitution and imposing a three-month state of emergency.

Protests persisted as demonstrators called for a transition of power to civilian authorities. In an effort to dismantle the protest movement, armed individuals affiliated with the RSF militia killed 128 people in what came to be known as the Khartoum massacre. 

The escalation of violence prompted Ethiopia and the African Union to step in and act as mediators. Following negotiations, civilian leaders and the military agreed to share power and establish a governing body, called the Sovereignty Council, to rule over Sudan for a three-year transition period. 

This council faced significant challenges as military authorities and civilian counterparts refused to cooperate, which, alongside mounting political tension, led to an attempted – and failed – coup by remaining members of President Bashir’s regime. 

In October 2021, a splinter faction from the civilian protesters started a sit-in in front of the presidential palace and called for a military takeover. In response, thousands of pro-democracy supporters came out on the streets in a show of continued support for civilian rule. 

General Burhan and General Daglo, responding to the protests, jointly orchestrated a military coup in 2021 which led to the dissolution of Sudan’s power-sharing government and council, as well as disruption of its transition to democracy. Burhan justified his actions by claiming it was meant to prevent a potential civil war in Sudan, citing the incitement by politicians against the military as a threat. He portrayed his actions as a transitional measure rather than a coup, aiming to maintain stability until the upcoming elections.

More than a year after the military coup, an agreement was signed by the Sudanese military and a coalition of civilian actors that forged a path to a more civilian-centered government. Under the new framework deal, the military would step back and would only be represented on a security and defense council. While the agreement was a major accomplishment and a show of compromise, its success was uncertain as it excluded formal rebel groups and others who had the capacity and power to undermine the transitional government. 

The fear of the agreement’s potential collapse materialized when conflict emerged between the military leaders concerning the integration of the RSF into the national military. Implementing military reforms to establish a competent and standardized national army was seen as one of the first steps to adhering to the internationally recognized agreement for the transfer of power. 

General Burhan advocated for the planned integration of the RSF to take place within a two-year timeframe, while Dagalo insisted on stretching it out over a decade. As a result, disagreement resulted in a struggle for power, with neither displaying any signs of relenting. 

Central Khartoum became a war zone as the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) conducted airstrikes aimed at RSF forces who in response, retaliated using artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry. 

The international community denounced the escalation of violence in Khartoum. Volker Türk, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed strong condemnation for the indiscriminate violence, emphasizing that both sides had disregarded international humanitarian law. 

In an effort to hold all those undermining peace in the country, the United States and UK imposed sanctions on five businesses that have been linked with bankrolling and providing support to the Sudanese army and RSF. 

“At least 5,000 people have been killed and over 12,000 wounded” said Volker Perthes, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan. 

6.3 million people – 13% of Sudan’s population – are experiencing emergency levels of hunger – just one step from famine, with the conflict continuing to disrupt access to humanitarian aid, water, food and medicine. 

In an effort to put an end to fighting, Saudi Arabia and the United States facilitated a seven-day ceasefire on May 22 between Sudan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This temporary cessation of hostilities provided some respite and allowed limited humanitarian access. 

However, the ceasefire has since lapsed, and the subsequent ceasefires were primarily implemented to facilitate unrestricted movement and the delivery of humanitarian aid across the nation. Additionally, efforts made in July by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to mediate a peace agreement were rejected by the Sudanese army. 

So what happens now?

It’s unclear. The political landscape of Sudan has historically been unstable with a pattern of short-lived agreements. However, continued violence of this nature in Africa’s third largest country poses a real risk to destabilize the wider region and contributes to the mass exodus of the civilian population that bears the brunt of the suffering. 

With current peace talks in Jeddah stagnating, the fate of Sudan hangs in the balance. It is essential that the two military forces, with the well-being of the Sudanese people in mind, accept and adhere to a long-term ceasefire and bring an end to the hostilities.

The post What’s Happening in Sudan? appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Nestled between Senegal and Guinea and ruled by the Portuguese for centuries, Guinea-Bissau is a small state with a rich history and culture. Moreover, it was only in the 1960s that Guinea-Bissau underwent its (violent) independence movement, and despite pleas of regional U.S. diplomats, the United States refused to officially recognize its sovereignty for years.

It was not until 1974, after Portugal formally declared Guinea-Bissau independent, that the United States also acknowledged its legitimacy, and immediately following this recognition, the U.S. constructed an embassy in the nation’s capital, Bissau.

Competing with the USSR for regional influence at the time, the embassy symbolized American interest in West Africa, and its opening was followed by a $1 million grant to UNHCR to help resettle displaced citizens from its previous civil conflict. American diplomats went to extremes to woo the government in Bissau, even borrowing the Defense Attache’s C-12 plane to help the then-president locate his former rebel camp in the bush. Yet, when civil war broke out in 1998, the United States abandoned its in-country embassy.

Since the embassy’s physical closure, the American embassy in Dakar has offered its services to Guinea-Bissau virtually; however, during the period of these virtual services, Guinea-Bissau saw three coup d’états, one leader killed in office, and became what the UN classified as “Africa’s first ‘narco-state.’” These developments were not a direct result of the American withdrawal, but U.S. foreign policy has incidentally shaped the situation.

American policies in Latin America during the war on drugs reshaped local politics and forced cartels to look for new markets outside of the region, and as a result of its close geographical proximity to Europe, Guinea-Bissau became the ideal new target for operations. Fueled by its rampant corruption, cocaine flooded the borders at unprecedented rates following a 2012 coup. With fears of losing regional stability, American authorities quickly supported numerous efforts to combat the trafficking. Their aid in addition to the assistance of the international community, particularly the UN, has largely thwarted the presence of drug trafficking in the country, but it has not eliminated it entirely.

Following this anti-trafficking campaign, little American presence has been seen in Guinea-Bissau, but nonetheless in 2020, over twenty years after the United States’ departure, Guinea-Bissau saw its first civilian-to-civilian transfer of power. After the election of the new president Umaro Sissoco Embaló, the U.S. Embassy in Senegal published a statement positioning the United States as “a friend and partner of Guinea-Bissau” with hopes of advancing “peace and security, strengthen[ing]democratic governance, and spur[ring]economic growth and development.”

Yet, it is nearly three years later and the actions of the United States remain inconsistent with these claims as beyond aiding with Covid-19 vaccine distribution, American efforts at building relations have been largely absent.

U.S. President Joe Biden has repeatedly noted a desire to increase United States territorial influence, and the recently published “U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa” reiterates this urge. The report suggests that the United States will “Revamp Public Diplomacy Efforts” by ensuring “sufficient human and financial resources to plan, organize, and execute these critical programs,” but without a physical presence in countries like Guinea-Bissau, the United States’ actions do not align with its claims.

While U.S. leaders debate the next steps for policies in Guinea-Bissau, the question of the construction of a new embassy has repeatedly come up. Throughout the world, embassies both assist citizens who live or travel to a host country and “carry out duties related to advancing U.S. interests abroad.” Moreover, the United States has around 168 embassies with sites in all but four sub-Saharan countries. They have strong presences in Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Mauritania and Gabon, even though countries like Guinea-Bissau host far more American tourists. This distribution coupled with continued claims from the United States expressing augmented regional interest makes the absence of an embassy in Bissau extremely glaring.

Furthermore, as a multi-ethnic state with nearly 20% of its territory preserved for environmental conservation, Guinea-Bissau is an ideal location to measure the pulse of West Africa according to politicians, such as Paulo Gomes. Furthermore, with ever-growing mutual interests in democracy between Bissau and Washington, many policy analysts look at the continued absence of an embassy in Guinea Bissau as a “U.S. foreign policy failure.”

Today, Guinea Bissau remains greatly impacted by U.S. foreign policy, even without strong diplomatic ties. Despite this current absence, the Biden administration and future administrations have the chance to enact tangible change and redefine the American image abroad.

Moreover, it is a pivotal point in the development of African politics, and the United States has a unique opportunity to facilitate economic, political and social development, as well as strengthen diplomatic ties if its actions begin to better align with its rhetoric.

The post Action Speaks Louder than Words: The United States’ Diplomatic Absence in Guinea-Bissau appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

In the aftermath of the country’s 10-year long civil war ending in 2002, women’s place in society deteriorated. Before the war, women held varying positions of power in the country and were active in politics. During the war, however, women were brushed to the side as second-rate citizens and maintained this same perceived ranking even after its end. 

Many of the barriers and inequalities women face are due to the country’s laws. For instance, property rights used to only be able to be inherited by men, so women were not able to inherit property and widows could be kicked out of their own homes. Consent is also not required on the woman’s part for marriage, and many girls are forced into early marriages by their families, which not only inhibits their free will, but often prevents them from continuing their education: less than 2% of girls aged 15-19 are both in school and married. 

In addition to young marriage, early pregnancies are common. In Sierra Leone, 3 in 10 girls under 18 are pregnant, whether by their husband or not. This, coupled with the 10-year ban from 2010-2020 that prohibited pregnant girls and teenage mothers from attending school, had a major impact on the number of girls completing their secondary education. 

The ban ended because of COVID: during the Ebola outbreak in 2014, over 18,000 young girls fell pregnant, with the majority of them dropping out of school. The President wanted to avoid a repeat with COVID, and outlawed the ban. Even after the ban ended, though, stigma, discrimination and physical factors often prevent young pregnant women from continuing their education, despite how much they may want to. 

Changing laws is the first step toward progress, but changing attitudes must be the second. Culture has comparable sway to the law when it comes to such issues. Improvements must be put into practice socially before any real change can be seen. 

For example, there have been local acts in the past that aim to empower women in Sierra Leone, but there have been complaints of lack of follow through on the laws to affect visible change. For instance, there have been local policies that set an 18 year minimum age for marriage, require the consent of both parties and ensure women are able to remain on their property if their husbands die. In cases such as these, implementation and awareness are crucial in the next steps: just because women might be able to inherit land doesn’t mean they will. 

Violence and non consensual marriage still persist and go unreported. Additionally, these laws still only exist on the local policy level, with bigger changes to the country’s national laws or constitution yet to be seen. 

In terms of education, there have been successful programs for female education which show promise. The Transforming Girls’ Education program targets pre-teen and teenage girls specifically in an effort to keep them in school just when the enrollment gap between them and their male counterparts is widening. It has reached 80,000 girls so far and involves over 1,000 teachers. 

For another recent project, the government set up community learning centers which operate with the purpose of reintegrating young mothers back to school to continue their education. They involved both program staff and local government to go home to home and bring young women back to school. 

The effort was successful: in 2015, 14,500 girls were enrolled in the centers. The centers also worked with NGOs to address male mindsets and to educate communities on the importance of female education, an example of mindful follow-through to address root attitudes in society. 

Increasing the number of women in schools is important, but it’s equally important to foster professional spaces for women to work after they graduate. As adults in Sierra Leone, women struggle to find significant roles in the country’s labor market and industry. While their presence percentage is fairly comparable, making up about half of Sierra Leone’s workforce, their participation is rarely equal. They have limited access to salaried positions and generally work for lower wages with weak job security. 

Men are more likely to be salaried, which has the advantage of job security and a regular wage. They also tend to earn 30% more than women, and are more likely to hold managerial and professional positions. So, despite making up 50% of the workforce, women only occupy 27% of formal jobs. Typically women engage instead in informal labor like hairdressing, childcare and soap making, or they sell food and clothes, all of which pay very little.

The new Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Act aims to lay the groundwork to change that, implementing policies to help boost women’s positions professionally. For one, the act grants and ensures women the right to take out bank loans, which could make a large impact on the prevalence and success of women-led businesses, and women’s maternity leave also increased from 12 to 14 weeks. 

Perhaps the most notable stipulation, though, is the requirement that both public and private entities must employ at least 30% women. This includes government positions, meaning at least 30% of parliamentarians must also be women. This is a huge step, as before just 13% of the Parliament and Cabinet and 19% of local governments were made up of women. 

This act is making strides in the right direction for women’s rights in Sierra Leone. However, as previously stated, implementation is an extremely crucial and often overlooked step. Laws have been made in the past, but without anyone to enforce and see through the on the ground impact, often the new policies have less of an impact than intended. 

This can be due to a variety of factors. One explanation is that some laws address the symptoms of a deeper-rooted issue. For instance, surface level causes of sexual violence might look like rape or forced prostitution, while more intrinsic issues of poverty and women’s role in society are less obvious and less targeted.

Another example of lack of follow through is in lifting the ban on pregnant women attending school, where just because the law no longer prohibits it, community mentality may. In the opposite vein, an example of successful implementation was the initiative to get young mothers back to school that involved community-based centers and local leaders. In terms of this new law, implementation and awareness include things like company and societal culture. 

Until companies value and respect female employees and what they can contribute, women cannot truly be equal in the workplace. The government should create programs that integrate women into the workplaces that the law has just welcomed them into, creating a transition for the incoming women and pre-existing male workers. Continuing an emphasis on girls’ education is also essential. If companies hire underqualified women simply to fulfill the quota, it could cause negative sentiment and unfavorable results to the new law. 

Such changes come with time, but it’s important for policymakers to keep their ear to the ground and foot to the pedal in encouraging them along. Part of this change comes with the increased presence of women in higher positions to inspire the next generation of young girls and show them what is possible.

The post Women’s Rights in Sierra Leone and Their New Gender Equity Law appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Oct. 24: delegations from Ethiopia’s central government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) arrive in South Africa to begin peace talks. Nov. 2: the parties publicly announce a truce. Two years after the start of Ethiopia’s brutal civil war, it appears the country is ready to stop fighting. 

The negotiations are just the beginning of a long and tenuous recovery process for Ethiopia, economically, socially and politically. In the short term, the peace agreement has outlined a series of transitional measures for the region. Until the next election cycle in Tigray, both parties will negotiate the appointment of an Interim Regional Administration and have agreed to create a hotline for continued political dialogue within 24 hours of the agreement. 

However, inflation in Ethiopia is the highest it’s been since the 2000s, and working to rebuild and mend two years of social disarray and humanitarian crisis will demand significant and sustained recovery efforts. The Tigray war has left over 2.6 million people internally displaced, and the United Nations Human Rights Council has publicly denounced both parties as guilty of war crimes. Understanding the significance and implications of the truce means looking into the reality of the conflict and its harrowing aftermath in the northern regions. 

The Tigray war began on Nov. 3, 2020 after the political group of the country’s northern region, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), performed strikes against a national military base. However, the causes and complexities of the civil war begin much earlier in the nation’s geopolitical history. Ethiopia has over 90 ethnic groups, exacerbating tensions and complicating power dynamics within the regional and national governments. 

Background

The TPLF emerged as the political force representing Tigrayans, Ethiopia’s fourth largest ethnic population, after the fall of Ethiopia’s military regime in 1991. The group was at the forefront of the four-party coalition that dominated Ethiopian politics until 2018. The coalition faced heavy criticism for suppressing dissent and, coupled with a series of anti-government protests in 2016, led to calls for leadership changes. 

This led to the appointment of Abiy Ahmed, the first ethnic Oromo prime minister. 

A member of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Force, Ahmed dismantled the coalition and created the Prosperity Party. He pursued a series of reform policies and received great international attention for helping negotiate a peace settlement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, winning the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. 

However, tensions between the TPLF and the central government grew when Tigray declined to join the Prosperity Party. The new government under the Prosperity Party signified a significant reduction in TPLF’s political influence. 

Then, in 2020, Ahmed announced the country would be delaying the 2020 election cycle due to COVID-19 concerns. Tigray refused to cooperate, running their regularly programmed elections in August. Response from the government came swiftly, refusing to acknowledge the results and passing legislation cutting funding to the northern region.  

In November, the TPLF striked national military bases, and Ahmed announced military intervention and airstrikes into Tigray. Fighting began between the TPLF and Ethiopian military, and continuously shifted between the two parties. Although a five-month truce briefly emerged in early 2021, the conflict continued to instill tensions in the region, with the central government appearing to have more resources and the upper hand. Conflict continued even days before the November truce, with reported airstrikes on Tigray.

Human rights violations

Beyond the ongoing civil conflict in Ethiopia, international debate spotlights claims of human rights abuses and accessibility to aid. 

In September, the United Nations announced evidence of crimes against humanity in Tigray, including claims of starvation, rape and ethnic cleansing in the northern region. Although Ahmed’s government has strongly refuted claims of hindering humanitarian aid, the World Food Program has estimated over 5.2 million people are at risk of starvation. Not only are food shortages apparent, but the conflict has destroyed many medical centers and infrastructure in Tigray. Doctors without Borders released a statement in March 2021, citing accounts of wide-spread attacks on healthcare. 

Because fighting began in the middle of the pandemic, Ethiopia has seen little to no COVID-19 recovery and support, and the lack of medical supplies has induced  countless deaths from routine medical procedures and infections. According to the World Health Organization, it’s been two months since humanitarian assistance reached the region. 

Furthermore, the war led to massive telecommunication blackouts and services—making it difficult for journalists and international groups to get first-hand accounts of the conflict—and challenging claims grew even more apparent after questions of Eritrean military intervention. 

Ethiopia and Eritrea have a complicated history. Eritrea first declared independence from Ethiopia in 1961, and the two nations have been in conflict several times since. Most recently, the Badme war lasted from 1998 until 2000, and the two countries maintained limited  diplomatic relations until Ahmed rose to power in 2018. Then, in 2021, accounts started streaming in of Eritrean forces actively involved in the Tigray conflict and supporting the Ethiopian military. Despite initial government rebuttal, the Human Rights Watch reported claims of civilian massacres by the forces in the Axum region. There was no mention of Eritrean forces in the peace-talks’ public statements. 

Peace Talks and Moving Forward 

The Ethiopia Peace Agreement struck many in the international community by surprise. After two years of continued fighting leading up to the African Union Peace talks there was uncertainty that the two groups would meaningfully engage. Yet, prolonged fighting and worsening humanitarian crisis seemed to have pushed the parties to the negotiating table. 

According to the Agence France Presse, the head of the TPLF delegation released a statement explaining the group was willing to make concessions in order to stop and address the prolonged suffering in the northern region. 

“In order to address the pains of our people, we have made concessions because we have to build trust,” Getachew Reda said. 

One of the agreement’s main objectives was the protections of civilians and humanitarian access. The Ethiopian government agreed to expedite the access to humanitarian aid in the region. 

The Ethiopian government also agreed to support the TPLF’s removal from Ethiopia’s terrorist organization list. 

The agreement however was a big win for the Ethiopian government, with the TPLF agreeing to complete disarmament of the Tigray Defence Force within the next thirty days. Additionally, Ethiopia troops presence is set to occur in Tigray’s capital of Mekelle. 

However, there are concerns regarding no mention of Eritrean forces from the peace agreement and a lack of implementary details. The African Union will be monitoring the situation, and both parties have agreed to set up a Transitional Justice Policy framework to restore order in the region. 

More remains to be seen as additional information and accounts arise over the conflict, but Ethiopia will have decades of work to acknowledge the suffering the conflict has imposed over Tigray and the nation as a whole. Rebuilding trust and ensuring access to aid will continue to regenerate debate, but the party leaders appear committed to ensuring an end to the conflict. Just Nov. 12, both parties officially signed an agreement outlying the implementation of peace talks. The Declaration of the Senior Commanders Meeting on the Implementation of the Ethiopia Permanent in Nairobi released a statement disarmament will begin Nov. 15. Soon after, the Department of State reported the parties have committed to the distribution of humanitarian aid and essential services.

The post The Politics of Famine: Ethiopia’s Truce Will Have to Mend Two Years of Humanitarian Crisis appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Where less water is available, this also means less available for livestock production. Livestock is a key driver of the Somalian economy and is many Somalians’ only source of income. In 2021, the exportation of livestock accounted for more than one-fourth of Somalia’s exports. 

When families see less food, water, and income, they eventually have to choose who gets to eat and drink. In Somalia, males are given priority access to the food supply. In many circumstances, young girls are either taken out of school to work or are forced into marriage so families have one less mouth to feed. 

Forced marriage is a subsection of gender-based violence that has continued to rise in most parts of Somalia. A recent UN report reported that female genital mutilation/cutting between the ages of 15 and 49 is 99.2%. Gender inequality is not a recent development in Somalia.

Consequences of the changing climate in Somalia have only exacerbated gender disparities. In 2019, the International Labor Organization estimated that 73.6% of Somalian men between the ages of 15 and 64 participated in the workforce, while 23.1% of Somalian women in the same age range participated in the workforce.

In the same way, Somalia is also one of the worst countries for obstetric care. According to Our World in Data: 5.08% of women are expected to die from pregnancy-related causes (3rd highest in the world), there are 829 deaths per 100,000 live births (5th highest in the world) and Somalia has a 3.87% neonatal mortality rate (5th highest in the world). The United Nations has stated that Somalia is the 4th worst country for gender equality in the world. 

Another way to see how women are valued in Somalian society is to look at their representation in government and law. In the 2020 elections for the seats of the 11th parliament, Somalian citizens appointed a record proportion of upper house seats to go to women. However, the amount was only 26%. Out of the 295 judicial positions, only two belong to women. 

Later in the same year, the Somalian parliament drew international scorn for the passing of a bill that superseded laws protecting women and children and permitted forced child marriages. Pramila Patten, the United Nations Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, called it “a major setback for victims of sexual violence in Somalia.” Somalia cannot address gender inequality without giving its female citizens the platform to effect change. 

Another problem that plagues Somalia and draws attention away from its social deficits is war. Al Shabaab, a militant group associated with the Islamic Courts Union, was founded in 2004 to help bring order after the collapse of the government under Mohamed Siad Barre. Al Shabaab quickly became viewed as an extremist group and began to draw international attention. 

In 2012, Al Shabaab announced its allegiance to al Qaeda. Al Shabaab is responsible for attacks such as the attack at the Westgate Shopping Mall in Kenya, where they killed 68 civilians, and a bombing of a viewing of a World Cup soccer match which killed 75. 

Al Shabaab continues to maintain a strong presence in Somalia and Kenya and continues to be a main focus of the Somalian government. The prevalence of al Shabaab in Somalia and the surrounding region has left the government’s attention divided and added to the barriers surrounding an appropriate reaction to the changing climate.

Al Shabaab’s presence in Somalia has made it difficult for foreign representatives, diplomats, and reporters to visit the country. Recently, Matt Gutman, a reporter for ABC news, visited Somalia to see the effects of the climate crisis firsthand. In his time there, he was not able to move freely without a police escort because of al Shabaab’s presence in the country.

During his visit, Gutman witnessed a camp provided by Save the Children International. He spoke with Ebrima Saidy, the Chief Impact Officer for Save the Children International, and asked Saidy about the Somalian government’s response to the widespread famine. 

Saidy was very critical of the government still not declaring a national famine exclaiming, “for me, the declaration of famine is irrelevant… look around you, what is this if this is not famine?” 

During Gutman’s visit, he also interacted with several children afflicted by the famine. One, he remarked, was three years old but only as big as a one-year-old. Gutman observed another child was “too sick to eat, too weak to cry.”

With the Somalian government spread thin between Al Shabaab and the newly emerging famine, the aid given by international organizations will be a vital factor in the ability to mitigate the famine’s effects. On Wednesday, September 21st, the United States Agency for International Development pledged 151 million U.S. dollars to assist the citizens of Somalia. On the same day, the United Kingdom’s Development Minister stated that the United Kingdom would pledge 22.8 million pounds toward assistance in the Horn of Africa. Specifically, humanitarian organizations have pledged much of their Somalian monetary aid to local organizations which are working to address the gender disparity and create opportunities for Somalian women.

As the effects of climate change continue to be seen in devastating ways across the world, governments are tasked with finding different ways of adaptation. Olufunke Cofie, principal researcher and country representative for West Africa at the International Water Management Institute, claims that many of the countries experiencing drought in Africa experience enough rainfall throughout the year to provide for their citizens. 

Cofie states that the problem is a combination of a lack of infrastructure, a lack of maintenance on existing infrastructure and a lack of education on how to efficiently use existing infrastructure. The questions remain for Somalia of how to prepare for another drought and how to tackle its gender imbalance.

The contributions from international organizations and other governments are crucial to Somalia’s response to the changing climate and the gender disparity, but there must be Somalia-driven action to turn the corner on these problems. The inclusion of women should be a nationwide priority and the consequences of the climate crisis need to be equally felt and prioritized across the country. 

A successful response from Somalia’s government would involve establishment of institutions and infrastructure. The institutions will protect the rights of women and children, and the implementation of infrastructure will increase freshwater resources and decrease the effects of future droughts in Somalia. For Somalia, international aid has been beneficial, but it only provides short-term solutions. Only when the Somalian government begins to view these issues as preeminent priorities can long-term change be established.

The post How Somalia’s Climate Crisis is Fueling Gender Inequality appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Internet Research Agency, and the Wagner Group

At the center of Russia’s disinformation machine sits Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch, financier and member of Putin’s inner circle. Prigozhin (known as “Putin’s chef” because of his extensive catering contracts with Vladimir Putin) is well known for financing the Internet Research Agency (IRA) — a troll farm that was key in spreading disinformation in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. Prigozhin also manages and finances the Wagner Group, which is interchangeably described as a private military company, a network of mercenaries or Putin’s de facto private army (though officially, this group does not exist). 

The Wagner Group has overseen Russia’s strategic push in Africa, with media reports of their presence in the Central African Republic (CAR), Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mozambique, Sudan and Zimbabwe. These reports detail how the group allies with military commanders in conflict zones and receive payment for their services via cash or lucrative mining concessions for precious minerals like gold, diamonds, and uranium. They have been implicated in human rights violations in CAR and Mali. The latter recently welcomed Wagner Group mercenaries onto their borders following the pullout of French troops, and a coordinated network of Russian-linked social media accounts promoted Russian intervention prior to their arrival. 

Common Themes

In addition to pushing for pro-Russian intervention sentiments, the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns promote false narratives about vaccines, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the West and the food insecurity crisis. Russia also seeks to present itself as a viable economic alternative to the West.

Vaccine Narratives: As vaccines were being developed during the height of the coronavirus pandemic, U.S. analytics company Novetta found that the Russian Sputnik V vaccine received disproportionate coverage on African social media – with a combined 6.4% of quotes in all vaccine stories published by traditional African sources. Once information on Pfizer, Moderna and Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccines overshadowed these narratives, Novetta found that WhatsApp messages from Nigerian phone numbers were sent to devices in the DRC with links to fake news stories promoting Russian vaccines and discrediting American-made vaccines.

Anti-democracy and Anti-West Narratives: A State Department report has highlighted the ways in which Russian networks have promoted Russian policies in CAR and convinced journalists to write positively about Russia in Central and Western African states. In a report published by the Digital Forensic Research (DFR) Lab at the Atlantic Council, Russian networks promoted the Front du Refus aux Elections Imposees (FREI), an organization mobilizing anti-democracy protests in Mali.

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: In an effort to encourage support for its war of aggression in Ukraine, Russia has sowed misinformation into the African continent. Using whataboutism to divert attention, Russian media emphasized the treatment of African exchange students fleeing Ukraine and other global crises like in Yemen, Syria and Ethiopia, claiming that they are being overshadowed by coverage of Ukraine. State-affiliated media outlet Russia Today, the Russian Embassy of South Africa and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs are among the most retweeted platforms spreading whataboutism. These platforms have also pushed anti-West and anti-NATO narratives, with hashtags like #abolishnato, #istandwithputin, #istandwithrussia, and #racistineu. These narratives pick up traction by inflaming existing tensions and grievances across the continent.

The Food Insecurity Crisis: One of the biggest repercussions of Russia’s invasion has been the global disruption of food security. Because of Ukraine’s role as the “breadbasket of Europe” (it is one of the world’s leading exporters in grain, particularly wheat and sunflower products) the war — and subsequent destruction of Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure – has devastated millions. While food prices were rising before the war, Putin’s invasion has led to prices of food, fuel and fertilizer skyrocketing. To deflect blame from these economic shocks, Russian government officials, state-funded media and Kremlin-aligned proxy disinformation actors have taken coordinated efforts to falsely blame Western sanctions for worsening food insecurity. These campaigns specifically target Africa and the Middle East, the regions hurt most by the food insecurity crisis and are amplified by Kremlin-controlled state outlets such as RT Arabic and RT en Francais. Recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov used a trip to the African continent to spin the crisis in favor of Russia.

Big Tech’s Lack of Action

While there has been a bigger investment in content moderation, Facebook has shown little ability to curb harmful disinformation campaigns despite its rapid expansion across Africa. 

Even posts that are clear evidence of a coordinated political agenda are sometimes not removed because they don’t meet Facebook’s definition of “inauthentic.” Disinformation experts have also warned that social media companies’ content moderators will inherently do an inadequate job policing extremist content due to their lack of proficiency in local dialects. Facebook is not the only popular platform where Russian disinformation spreads — apps like WhatsApp, Twitter and Telegram also facilitate outsourced disinformation campaigns.

Assessing the Impact

Though sometimes difficult, identifying disinformation is significantly easier than assessing its impact. Facebook has removed tens of thousands of posts across several different regions and countries, but it is often too early to assess the campaign’s success. In some instances, the campaigns appear to gain little traction in their environment. In Kenya, Russian campaigns that mischaracterize the Ukrainian invasion have had little impact on the population. 

Other campaigns, however, experience more success. In Mali, for example, Russian-aligned social media campaigns building support for Wagner mercenaries have received notable traction. Facebook pages pushing pro-Russian views and support of Malian armed forces post frequently in coordination with identical accounts, with the largest page in this network having more than 90,000 followers. 

Similarly, pro-Russia sentiments have become more visible during recent anti-France protests in Mali and in neighboring Senegal. In Burkina Faso, Moscow-friendly disinformation has permeated Burkinabe social media and increased Russian popularity in the country. Investigative analysis has shown a network of 175 Facebook pages that advance pro-Russian, anti-Western narratives, with several pages having tens of thousands of followers. 

This engagement isn’t static, as local analysts have warned about its success. As Jordan Meda of FasoCheck said to the Washington Post, “We’re seeing a lot more fake news. More and more pro-Russia messages, and little by little, more calls for military collaboration with Russia from ordinary people.”

The uptick in pro-Russian media on the African continent has mirrored a rise in pro-Russian sentiments across several West African countries. 

Pro-Russian or anti-French demonstrations jumped in Burkina Faso, with 8 demonstrations just this year. Similarly, in Mali, demonstrations increased from 6 in 2021 to 9 so far in 2022. As the DFR Lab reported, local support for Russia increased before the military coup in Burkina Faso. Pro-Wagner demonstrations grew in Mali before the mercenaries arrived. The spike in pro-Russian Facebook posts in the broader Sahel region has been met with growing, visible pro-Russian sentiments by the public. 

While it is unclear if these sentiments are directly linked to persistent digital disinformation efforts, the permeation of Russian influence in fragile African states creates fertile ground for violent extremism, anti-democratic tendencies and human rights abuses.

The post Russia is Using Disinformation to Increase Favorable Views of Putin in Africa appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

The international community has portrayed Rwanda as an inspirational and teachable example for war-torn countries. In 2020, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres applauded Rwanda for its recovery. 

“Since the genocide, Rwanda has demonstrated that it’s possible to rise from the ashes, to heal and rebuild a stronger, more sustainable society,” Guterres wrote in a press release. While the economic success of Rwanda is monumental, this growth has come at the expense of democracy. 

In Rwanda, expression of identity is limited, and discussions about the genocide are illegal. The government believes that limiting speech that carries a diversity of opinions is necessary to create a single Rwandan identity, and therefore, a unified Rwandan identity is needed to achieve economic success. 

Jean-Paul Kimonyo, a policy advisor to Kagame, said in an interview with PBS, “Now we are trying to get back to a strong state of a strong nation. Without social cohesion and national unity, there’s not much you can do. And certainly not mobilize the population to go ahead and transform things and be efficient.”

Kagame has brought this sentiment a step further in recent years by committing serious human rights violations — including election corruption, repressed freedoms, torture, and targeted killings abroad — in hopes of consolidating power to maximize efficiency. Kimonyo believes that a strong leader is essential to achieving a strong Rwanda.

“It’s not the time of a journalist, it’s not the time of the researcher or observers. It’s our time. And our time is to change things profoundly,” said Kimonyo in 2019. As of 2020, Rwanda scores 3.35 out of 10 on the Democracy Index conducted by the Economist. Although Kimonyo and other Rwandan officials view Kagame’s tight grip on power as beneficial, this perspective overlooks the fact that Rwandans are actively stripped of their human rights.

Kagame has corrupted elections in order to keep his power. The Rwandan constitution promises citizens that everyone is able to freely and fairly pick their leaders; however, irregularities conducted by the Kagame administration have violated this promise. In 2017, Kagame was elected to a third seven-year term. 

It was reported that Kagame won 99% of the vote. Additionally, Kagame was only able to run for a third term because a 2015 referendum on a constitutional amendment granted him this ability. The referendum was approved by 98% of voters, but the text of the amendment was not provided to them. Opposition groups were not allowed to hold meetings or rallies to discuss the amendment. Kagame has also killed and silenced opposition leaders to keep his role as president.

Kagame’s administration has limited expression, association and assembly in Rwanda in order to consolidate power. In 2019, three members of the opposition party, Forces Démocratiques Unifiées (FDU), were either found dead or reported missing. 

Moreover, in March of 2020, Anselme Mutuyimana, an assistant to the FDU leader, Victoire Ingabire, was found dead, with signs that Mutuyimana was strangled to death. In September of 2020, Syldio Dusabumuremyi, FDU’s national coordinator, was stabbed to death.

The most recent and famous instance of silencing the opposition is with the arbitrary arrest of Paul Rusesabagina. Rusesabagina, the man honored in the movie Hotel Rwanda (2004) and given the US Presidential Medal of Freedom for his efforts in protecting many Tutsis during the genocide, has been critical of the Kagame regime. Rusesabagina left Rwanda in 1996 to seek asylum in Belgium. 

In exile, Rusesabagina became the leader of the opposition group Rwandan Movement for Democratic Change (MRCD). In 2020, however, Rusesabagina was kidnapped and is currently being held hostage in Rwanda. Rusesabagina is charged with terrorism by the Rwandan government and was sentenced 25 years in prision. The U.S. has called this a wrongful detainment.

Intimidation of journalists is another tactic Kagame uses to silence the opposition. Kagame’s intimidation has stopped journalists from reporting on politically sensitive matters. As a result, much of the media is pro-state. 

In April of 2021, the police arrested two reporters after they asked the government to distribute food and other resources in underprivileged communities as an altruistic pursuit. The government claimed that the reporters organized an illegal distribution of food. In the previous month, journalists were arrested for exposing alleged rape by security forces and similar instances of corruption from authorities.

Human Rights Watch (HRW), a non-governmental organization (NGO) focused on the advocacy of human rights, reported in 2019 that “prison guards used threats, beatings, and intimidation against detainees [to]extract confessions.” The US State Department reported in 2018 that torture included the use of asphyxiation, electric shocks, severe beatings, and mock executions. 

Despite Rwanda instituting an updated penal code that cracked down on torture and carries a sentence of  20 to 25 years for those convicted, no one has been charged yet. The government had not even conducted an investigation into the 104 alleged cases of torture that took place in unofficial military detention centers from 2010 to 2016, which the HRW reported. The judicial system has condoned these actions as judges willingly accept information that has been obtained through torture. 

Jean Bosco Ngarana, a human rights activist that was critical of the government, was a victim of extrreme torture in Rwanda. “I was brought into a small room, which I considered like a slaughterhouse. I saw machetes, I saw axes, I saw electric cables,” Ngarana said in an interview with PBS. “They hit me with electric cables. When I screamed, they took plastic bottles and shoved it in my mouth. Blood was pouring out of my mouth.” 

Ngarana was held for eight months and was charged with conspiracy; however, he was never sentenced. Kagame’s administration has officially denied all of these claims.

In addition to this denial, Kagame has publicly made general threats to the Rwandan people in regards to threatening his power. “Betrayal has consequences,” Kagame stated at a press conference, “Anyone who betrays our cause or wishes to harm our people will fall a victim.” 

Rather than accepting and even applauding Rwanda’s growth, global governments and institutions must re-evaluate the future of Rwanda’s path.

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For the producers of vanilla, however, it’s more than something that belongs in an ice cream cone or in a coffee mug. Vanilla production and extraction compromise their livelihoods as they work day through night on the fields. Both processes are a threat to farmers’ survival.

A large number of developing countries’ economies depend on trade with developed nations of commodities such as vanilla beans, minerals, copper, and oil. However, this has created a heavy burden on both the producers of these goods and the country’s economy; resource extraction has become resource exploitation, subsequently creating economic instability across the globe.

Consequently, due to price inflation, lack of infrastructure and poor economic scores, trade-dependent export economies can suffer from instability, which could instigate human and labor rights issues. This then would lead to poor quality of life, faltering economies and political unrest. 

For a country like Madagascar that is an agricultural-based economy and where 80% of the world’s vanilla comes from, economic and political stability depends on the demand of booming countries. In other words, when countries like the United States, France, Germany, etc. feel like they prefer real vanilla, prices will go up; however, when they prefer artificial flavoring, prices and demand decrease. 

Hence, this presents the explanation for the rising or plummeting prices of vanilla by over 20% in just a few weeks. While there is an explanation for the price volatility, it does not make the lives of farmers any easier. 

Vanilla farmers like Beni Odon report that life quality is improved when the prices of goods, such as vanilla, are high. In contrast, conditions are poor when the price of vanilla is low. The fact that Madagascar’s economy is so dependent on other countries’ desires creates uncertainty for the political, civil and economic state of a country. In  Madagascar, farmers would have to sleep with their crops, even going so far as to bear some type of defense weapon in order to protect the source of their profit. 

Given the dire circumstances, what is the primary motivation behind such actions? Demand is so high that farmers are afraid to lose out on any possibility of making money and supporting themselves.This translates to farmers quite literally fighting for their livelihoods and jobs. In addition to this, problems like violence, vigilante justice and even poor harvest (because of premature harvest due to fear of scarcity or violence) become prevalent. 

As exemplified by Madagascar, the problem goes beyond price fluctuations, lack of infrastructure and the finite availability of resources. The overarching issue is that the economies of these countries depend on other nations. As demand increases in these affluent import countries, developing countries seek to match it with increased supply. This comes at the expense of producers and workers who experience human and labor rights violations, oppression from governments and the constant fear of an otherwise crippling economy. 

The rapid increase from $80.00 per kilogram in 2014 to $600.00 per kilogram in 2017 and around $425 in 2022 is a quantitative indicator of the farmers’ quality of life. When Madagascar seems to be booming, one can presume that vanilla is a popular crop. When a decrease in the economy is seen, vanilla has lost its appeal. 

This economic fluctuation is correlated with governments having a poor relationship with the agriculture industry. Consequently, this relationship negatively impacts its people. 

This, however, isn’t unique to Madagascar. Chile, now one of Latin America’s most economically flourishing countries, once experienced civil unrest (in the 90s and again in 2019) due to the economic instability rooted in the subsidence of copper — its most important trade good.

The issue of resource exploitation extends far beyond just Madagascar and Chile. It appears in nearly every continent of the world. From avocados in Mexico to tobacco in Moldova, to timber in Cambodia and crude oil in Syria, the examples are vast. 

Developing nations are often barred from achieving economic prosperity due to their limited and inequitable trade practices with powerful countries that take much and give too little in return. In turn, these nations are lured by global superpowers, like the United States, into trade that is only attractive for short-term growth.

However, solving this problem is not impossible. The solution lies in switching from a largely resource-centered and trade-based economy to a more diversified economy. 

While the civil unrest in Chile might be due to the subsidence of copper, Chile’s case exemplifies how moving away from mass extraction can immensely improve the limited prosperity of developing countries. The explanation lies behind the fact that resource extraction is fickle, which then creates unrest. 

However, Chile, now operating with an open economy, is able to limit the detrimental impacts of relying on one trade resource and one wealthy trading partner. Such flexibility has propelled Chile’s GDP per capita to 40%, which makes Chile’s GDP  the highest in Latin America. 

Central to Chile’s success has been its bold and strategic investment in different industries — such as renewable energy and technology — helping promote entrepreneurship and small business ventures to further support the average citizen. The Chilean path to success can be imitated by nations across the world. Countries can slowly reduce their dependence on trade of popular resources, and instead diversify industries, trading partners and goods.

While developing nations have to ensure that they are making smart decisions, the role that companies and consumers play in developed nations is also crucial. This is not to suggest that it is necessary to boycott commodity imports from countries like Madagascar or Chile — this action will only hurt these producers and nations. Rather, multinational corporations and consumers have a responsibility to combat human and civil rights violations by demanding increased transparency of the production process behind the goods they sell. 

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