However, new dunes are forming deep within the desert, and they’re not made of sand. Immense amounts of unsold and discarded clothing have polluted the desert, creating “the great fashion garbage patch.” Mountainous piles of discarded clothing stretch as far as the eye can see, and nestled in ravines are garments with their price tag still attached mixed with other bags, bottles and garbage. Up to 39,000 tons of unwanted clothing gets dumped in the desert each year, and that number is only on the rise. 

There are two key reasons for the growing clothing landfill in Atacama. The first is the combination of fast fashion and an increase in the global population’s consumption habits. Between 2000 and 2014, clothing production doubled, and consumers began buying 60% more clothes but only wearing them for half as long as they once did. The severe increase in consumption is caused by easy access to major fast fashion retailers, low prices and an increase in social media marketing. As individuals continue to buy more and more clothes, the overall quality of clothing has also decreased with the rise of fast fashion. Second, while the fast fashion industry holds a piece of the responsibility for the garment graveyard in Chile, globalization and trade are as much to blame. 

It seems improbable that an isolated desert nearly a thousand miles from the nearest settlement would be the “dream destination” for fast fashion rejects. However, the country is also home to one of South America’s largest duty-free ports, located in the coastal city of Iquique near Atacama’s western edge. Free ports or free zones are designated areas where national laws or regulations are relaxed, such as the tax code. The activity within the area is conducted “freely,” or outside the normal activities of that nation under specifically-created rules and regulations. Duty-free ports encourage economic activity because goods are usually imported and re-exported without the usual taxes and fees. Chile’s duty-free port in Iquique was established in 1975 to generate jobs and support their debilitated local economy. Soon, Chile became one of the world’s largest second-hand clothing importers, transforming the city of Iquique. Then, the popularity surrounding fast fashion soared, and in turn, so did their imports. 

Duty-free imports can do wonders for a community, and it truly revolutionized the city of Iquique. Around 2,000 businesses of all types now operate in the duty-free zone, and within the free zone, a sorting depot for textile waste has emerged. 

The sorting process starts with one of the clothing import businesses that operates in the free zone importing clothing from developed countries, such as the United States or Europe. These clothes could come from companies with unsold inventory or thrift stores like Goodwill. Once the garments arrive in Iquique, workers focus on separating them into categories based on their ranging quality. The premium quality clothes are then re-exported to other countries like the Dominican Republic, Panama, Asia, Africa and sometimes back to the United States for resale. 

Clothing rendered not useful by importers then travels a few miles to the dump outside Alto Hospicio, where it goes through another cycle of sorting and resale among small shops and street markets. Finally, clothing that does not sell at these markets ends up in the desert; many items are made of synthetic fibers, meaning it is nearly impossible for them to biodegrade. Scavengers search for what goods they can use and take the best pieces back to markets in the hope that they will collect a few coins. 

Resale markets have been helpful in the past; however, with the mounting discards, areas like Iquique are becoming overwhelmed. Waste is continuing to pile up in the desert because sellers are unable to salvage more of the clothing that is imported due to its decreasing quality. It seems to be all linked to fast fashion, although there is one more culprit — the Chilean government. 

The World Bank predicts that 3.4 billion tons of garbage will be created annually by 2050; currently, the world produces 2.12 billion tons annually. With the influx of waste produced globally, countries have adopted policies that require manufacturers to take responsibility for their products when they are no longer useful. These extended producer responsibility policies have been adopted in countries such as India, Australia, Japan, Canada and some U.S. states. 

In 2016, Chile passed its version of the law called Extended Liability of the Producer, or LeyREP for short. This law makes producers and importers responsible for six categories of waste: lubricant oils, electronics, batteries, containers, small batteries, packaging and tires. A category not present on this list is textiles. Actions have been taken to add the textile category to the policy, but currently, it is not a category listed on LeyREP. 

Without the proper regulations for the importation of used clothing, duty-free ports like the one in Iquique will continue to import immense amounts that sellers cannot resell. The fast fashion garbage patch will threaten the desert’s unique biodiversity and will impact the health of hundreds of citizens living nearby. As the situation worsens, several of the clothes will be burned to remove the waste and populations will be at risk of inhaling the toxic fumes. Fast fashion is on the rise, the quality of clothing is decreasing and consumption is at an all-time high. As a result, a garment’s destiny to rot in the desert graveyard among the red sands in Atacama will remain. 

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Guatemala’s 36-year-long civil war ended with the singing of the 1996 Peace Accords. However, while the first two election cycles appeared like promising steps forwards, this did not mean that Guatemalan democracy would have an easy, perfect transition. The young democracy experienced several challenges, and today, corruption continues to deeply affect the Guatemalan government.

The most famous corruption scandal in Guatemala is known as “La Línea” or “the line.” The scandal involved the disgraceful resignation of President Otto Fernandez Perez Molina, a retired Army General who was elected in 2012 on a platform of fighting drug-related crime. La Línea was the name given to this scandal, which accused former President Molina of defrauding the state of millions of dollars and led to his eventual resignation in September 2015. The uncovered scheme allowed companies to evade import taxes entirely or at a reduced cost through bribes. The term “La Linea” was coined in reference to the telephone number that businesses could call in order to bribe the former President. Molina actively denied these charges, claiming them to be lies. He said “Nobody has ever said I gave an illegal order, and I never gave any. They never said I was given money.” However, despite his denials, in December 2022, Molina was found guilty of crimes associated with “La Linea” and was sentenced to 16 years in prison along with his Vice President Roxana Baldetti. 

Unfortunately, corruption has not only plagued the executive branch of Guatemala’s government, but the judicial branch as well. The Humans Rights Watch 2020 World Report states that Guatemala’s judiciary system “suffers from high levels of impunity,” along with long delays taken advantage of by defendants to escape justice.  A clear example of the effects of corruption on the judiciary system involved Judge Erika Aifan. Aifan served on Guatemala’s high risk court, which deals with high profile cases of corruption and criminal cases, sometimes involving politicians. Aifan was known as an anti-corruption judge, with The U.S. Department of State recognizing “Judge Aifan as a 2021 International Woman of Courage (IWOC) for her efforts to strengthen the rule of law in Guatemala.” Yet, after harassment and threats to judicial independence persisted, Judge Aifan felt threatened that she would be arrested by corrupt government officials trying to escape her convictions. This rising threat eventually led to her resigning and fleeing the country, citing “particular pressure from Guatemalan Attorney General Consuelo Porras.”. 

Fortunately for Guatemalan citizens, there have recently been calls for progress in ending widespread corruption. In 2017, Guatemala’s Attorney General, Thelma Aldana, and Ivan Velasquez, a human rights lawyer, made accusations against President Morales of stealing up to $800,000 of campaign funds. In response, Morales called for Velasquez’s resignation and gave a police memo stating that all previously approved leave for the country’s elite special forces had been canceled, essentially putting these special forces on high alert if push comes to shove, ready to use for his own protection from the law. Outraged, thousands of Guatemalan citizens rose up in protest against corruption in the government and the lack of action to combat this issue. From these protests, the Semilla or “seed” political party was born. The party’s name references seeds of change and anti-corruption. In its young history, the Semilla party has been very successful. In its first election in 2019, the party won seven seats in the Congress of the Republic, Guatemala’s unicameral legislative structure. In the most recent, 2023 presidential election, Bernardo Arévalo of the Semilla Party, campaigning on anti-corruption, won in a landslide victory receiving 58% of the votes. This trumped the 36 percent former first lady and establishment politician Sandra Torres received. Arévalo’s victory illustrates a clear call from Guatemalan voters for change as Arévalo campaigned on a strong anti-corruption platform. However, establishment politicians did not take this loss lying down. 

Guatemala’s Attorney General, Consuelo Porras, launched a campaign against Arévalo. This concentrated effort led by Porras, dubbed a ‘coup in slow motion’ by Arévalo, aimed to undermine the legitimacy of his election victory in order to prevent him from taking office. Porras first tried to call the election victory illegitimate, citing “ballot falsification [and]computer manipulation.” Following the court’s upholding of the election outcome, Porras had the Semilla party suspended due to unproven claims that the signatures necessary to the legality of the party were falsified at its conception. Prosecutors even went so far as to illegally seize documents from Semilla headquarters. Porras’s efforts to prevent an anti-corruption candidate from taking office led to widespread protests from Guatemalan citizens calling for his resignation. 
Due to his perseverance, public support and lack of base for claims against his party, Arévalo was formally sworn into office on the morning of Jan. 15, 2024. This marked a triumph for Arévalo and the Semilla party, but even more so for the citizens of Guatemala as their unity in support of Arévalo has persevered through multiple attempts of stopping his assumption of office. Arévalo, standing for anti-corruption, promising to strengthen democratic institutions and being another of few examples of a peaceful transition of power, all represent a glimpse of hope for the democracy of Central America’s largest country.

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Brazil, a pioneer for the Global South and Latin America’s self-proclaimed regional leader, has long been recognized as a potential power in the international system. Initiating its regional-leader trajectory in the 1930s after its adoption of the “national-developmentalist” paradigm, one based on the foundations of industry, Brazil endorsed the promotion of domestic markets through the employment of import substitution tactics, and centre-periphery. Yet the nation’s failed attempts to live up to its full potential in influencing global events have proven insufficient, time and time again. Regional treaties with futuristic, promising proposals such as the Treaty of Asuncion (1991) operated well in their primary years, yet performance from all member countries stagnated as commitment from partner states became less important in their individual agendas — the Treaty of Asuncion dispersing in the late 1990s due to Brazil’s economic crisis whose effect rippled all throughout the region, including in the Argentinian economy’s collapse in 2001. 

In attempts to attain such a goal of regional influence, two diverging approaches were employed: under liberal leadership, Brazil’s attempt at recognition came from avant-garde peacekeeping and notable humanitarian proposals from 1995-2016, whereas under conservative administration, the attempt was directed towards Brazil’s potential economic power in commodity trading. Regardless of whichever approach was taken, success rates have proven inconsistent, with policies not being carried out, agreements being dismantled and audacious claims being contested. Under Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency from 2018 through 2022, the country’s agenda stayed away from regional power and dove deeper into domestic stability given the COVID-19 pandemic and its substantial effects on economies worldwide. With the drastic leadership change from the radical conservative president Jair Bolsonaro, back to extreme liberal leadership under current president Luis Ignacio “Lula” da Silva in Jan 2023, nonetheless, Brazil’s policy agenda returned to the importance of growing regional and international power. 

Amongst many, one of President Lula’s first proposals was the establishment of a joint currency with Brazil’s neighbor and trading partner, Argentina. The currency that would be titled “The Sur” would not be used as a widespread currency. Instead, it would “be a common denominator of trade exchanges,” as understood by Fabio Terra, professor of Economics at the Federal University of ABC. 

Analyzing the currency implementation through different lenses highlights the conflicting outcomes for Argentina and Brazil, with a clear winner and loser in sight. 

 For Argentina, who has been suffering from seemingly-limitless levels of annual inflation approaching 100%, while also owing a $40 billion debt to the IMF for a bailout in 2018, the joint currency approach seems like an efficient bandage on the gaping wound of international debt. For Brazil, nonetheless, binding its monetary flows to such an unstable neighbor would be tying an anchor to a rapidly sinking boat. 

On the other hand, the countries’ bilateral trade is expanding, even “reaching $26.4bn in the first 11 months of last year, up nearly 21 percent on the same period in 2021,” according to the Financial Times. This may motivate the joint currency as a supporting booster between both economies. Yet, it only accounts for 6.5% of their combined gross domestic product. With trade being a crucial primary source of income for Brazil, the establishment of the Sur motivated by facilitated trade with Argentina is no trade-off given its detriments.  In addition, the sectors that pioneer trade in the two countries diverge immensely, from industrial commodities to agricultural goods for Brazil and Argentina, respectively. Such a difference in traded goods results in different responses to trade alterations in global headwinds that might spur from the new currency proposal. 

Furthermore, Brazil’s inflation levels have been thriving on a stable currency regulated by a “vigilant independent central bank,” remaining under double digits throughout the last decade, a staggering 61 percentage points below Argentina’s inflation levels. As highlighted in a recent article by the Atlantic, “Brazil’s monetary policy has credibility in international money markets; Argentina has had to impose capital controls to keep people from buying dollars.” The divergences in the nation’s economic performance economically through the past years can be attributed to significant divergences in policy approaches, which could be yet another issue factor when considering the establishment of the Sur. 

With the launch of the idea to the public eye, significant figures in the realm of international economics have spoken out about their opinions on the proposal. Olivier Blanchard, former chief economist of the IMF, mercilessly characterized the operation as “insane” and “a terrible idea.” For Brazil, doubtlessly, the insanity is clear. Why, then, is the country so headstrong about the merger? Surprisingly, a similar proposal was made in the late 1980s, following the neoliberal influence of chile, to replace the Brazilian Cruzeiro and Argentine Austral as a trade currency, but the idea fell short due to economic turmoil in 1988 sprouted from rampant inflation encountered by Brazil and an arduous debt crisis occurring in Argentina. 

The reintroduction of a joint currency for Brazil can be attributed to the country’s continued attempts to dominate the Latin American region through forms of soft and hard power. Economically, Brazil’s avant-garde approach to lifting Argentina from the ashes of financial turmoil, on paper, would allow it to reinforce its regional dominance as a liberal state providing support to one of its neighbors. Simultaneously, the Brazilian government sees the Sur as an opportunity to challenge the current economic system’s reliance on the US Dollar in trade. From the Brazilian perspective, the support of this idea provides the country with a “reputational boost from being seen to revive regional cooperation,” while also “[clawing]back trade with Argentina it has lost to China in recent years.”

 While on paper, the idea seems plausible and the potential accomplishments of the plan seem beneficial to Brazil as a growing regional and global power, the detriments coming from the implementation of the Sur would provide a drastic counter effect to such benefits, leaving the country in a worse state than in the outset of the plan. “Hitching Latin America’s biggest economy to that of its perennially volatile neighbor” would not work as smoothly as the neighboring states in question envision it. Not only would the Sur tether instability to Brazil’s economy, diverting investments and furthering trade relations, but it would also prove inefficient for the complications of the free flow of capital and labor across borders — a crucial aspect of currency shock balancing. The Sur simply lacks the mechanism that working currency unions bear: where European farmers transit seamlessly between jobs and member states, “South America’s poor infrastructure makes travel a hassle, and Argentina’s capital controls make getting paid across borders nearly impossible.”

Brazil should not be fooled by the enchanting tale of valiantly rescuing itself, Latin America and eventually the Global South, from dollar dominance marching across the international arena in a white stallion; certainly less so when said stallion, Argentina, has no legs. As a result, the growth potential that has been historically attributed to Brazil’s powerful economy remains — under the plan of the Sur — presently unattainable. 

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However, the political marvel of Bukele’s success does not come without its drawbacks. Not only has his government committed a number of human rights violations under the consistently extended state of emergency/exception that has now lasted for a year and a half, but his recent push within the Salvadoran judicial system to allow his unconstitutional bid for reelection threatens the already weakened democracy in the country. 

So, who is Nayib Bukele? Why has he been able to systematically rid El Salvador’s democracy of checks and balances, and even go against the constitution with the support of his people? How does his casual dress and social media usage contribute to his success? 

Born in San Salvador in 1981, Bukele is amongst the oldest of the millennial generation, making him 42 years old as of 2023. He originally pursued a career in business but soon transitioned into politics, becoming the mayor of a small principality outside San Salvador called Nuevo Cuscatlán in 2012 on the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) ballot, the country’s main leftist party. However, during his time in this office, Bukele clashed with party leadership over policy disagreements. Despite their displeasure with his policy and conduct, the FMLN could not pass up on his popularity and put him up as their candidate for mayor of San Salvador, the country’s capital. Bukele was elected in 2015, but this position marked the end of his association with the FMLN. The party expelled him, citing their assertion that he sowed division within the party and, at some point, physically attacked another member of the party. 

This marked a change in the trajectory of his political career. Bukele soon began his campaign for president, running under the Grand Alliance of National Unity (GANA) because his new party, Nuevas Ideas, did not register in time to put up a candidate. 

His win in 2019 was historic. It was the first time in the near thirty years since the end of El Salvador’s brutal civil war that the country’s two main parties, the FMLN and Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), were not in control of the presidency. Salvadorans saw this as a much-needed relief from the stifling two-party system that failed to address issues of corruption and violence.

In his first year in office, Bukele quickly began implementing his tough-on-crime policies. His “Territorial Control Plan” lacked support in the legislature, as the GANA party controlled only 10 of the 84 National Assembly seats, the rest of which were held primarily by the FMLN and ARENA. Bukele wasted no time in using his power as president to get his way, entering the National Assembly’s chamber surrounded by armed forces members, then sitting in the chair reserved for the president of the assembly and demanding they support his policy. This stunt was immediately criticized for intimidating the legislature, and El Salvador’s highest court told President Bukele to refrain from similar actions in the future. 

While the first few years of his presidency were hindered by an opposition-controlled legislature, El Salvador’s 2021 midterm legislative elections could not have gone better for Bukele and his Nuevas Ideas party. The party won 56 out of 84 seats in the National Assembly, giving Bukele an important majority. 

Bukele immediately began to dismantle important democratic checks and balances upon gaining legislative control. His party quickly replaced all judges of the country’s Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court and replaced the Attorney General, then unconstitutionally appointed 5 new judges to the supreme court, giving Nuevas Ideas control of 10 of the 15 seats. Other laws which undermined judicial power throughout the government followed suit, and the new legislature also shelved many progressive bills related to issues such as abortion and gender affirmative care. 

Nuevas Ideas posits that its ideology is neither right or left wing, and instead challenges the entire system developed after the 1992 peace accords. However, Bukele has failed to align himself with or agree with the narratives of leftist presidents in the region, such as Brazilian President Lula or Nicaraguan President Ortega. He has instead spoken and agreed with right wing world leaders including Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and, as mentioned, pursued conservative social policies. 

As he nears the end of his five year term, Bukele is once again making the news due to his decision to run for reelection. Although the Salvadoran constitution outlaws reelection, the Bukele-controlled Supreme Court ruled that the President is allowed to run for reelection once. Soon after, Bukele announced his intent to run, and officially registered for the election in October. The decision has seen widespread disapproval amongst human rights groups, but Bukele maintains high domestic support for the decision. 

Aside from his authoritarian behavior regarding democratic institutions, the main critiques of Bukele and his government center on the anti-gang policies. As of September, over 72,000 Salvadorans have been arrested under the state of emergency, and the government continually failed to ensure protection of both civil and human rights for those arrested. Cases of foreign nationals being wrongfully arrested and the legislature’s decision to permit mass trials are concerning to human rights and pro-democracy groups. 

President Bukele has dramatically changed not only El Salvador, but the state of politics throughout Latin America. As other politicians aim to recreate Bukele’s security “success,” the entire region faces threats of democratic backsliding and humanitarian crises. Some leaders in the region have even begun to mimic Bukele’s style of dress and social media strategy, attempting to rile up the same levels of support.

All eyes are on El Salvador as it approaches the 2024 election. What the future is for Salvadorans if they cross this unconstitutional line is yet to be determined, and its ripple effect on the region as a whole may determine the future of democracy in the region.

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Chile and Colombia joined Bolivia in condemning what they called a disproportionate military offensive on the part of Israel, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Palestinian citizens, and recalled their ambassadors. Other countries, including Mexico and Brazil, have called for a ceasefire in the region. Most recently, Belize suspended relations with Israel.

Israel has critiqued these decisions, with Lior Haiat, Israel’s Foreign Minister, asking countries such as Chile and Colombia to “support the right of a democratic country to protect its citizens, and to call for the immediate release of all the abductees, and not align themselves with Venezuela and Iran in support of Hamas terrorism.” 

The prevalence of Latin American policies taking a stand against Israel’s actions in Gaza is counter to the positions of many western countries, including the United States. It is also a stark change in regional policy. Prior to the current humanitarian crisis, Latin America, and the Western Hemisphere as a whole, had close ties to Israel, spanning from economic agreements to technological cooperation.

Why is Israel’s war so unpopular in Latin America? Why have Latin American leaders swarmed to support Palestinians? 

The answer is complicated, but some understanding can be garnered by looking back to historical experiences with imperialism throughout the region and addressing the so-called “pink tide” of leftist leaders rising to power in countries such as Brazil and Columbia. 

Latin America, as a region, has time and again experienced imperialist and colonialist powers meddling in domestic affairs and infringing on their sovereignty. Sensitivity to these issues dates back to Spanish colonization in the region and has continued due to U.S. imperialistic and paternalistic behavior toward Latin America during the 20th century, especially throughout the Cold War. In many cases, these historical experiences led to institutional deficiencies and instabilities in these countries, allowing authoritarian rule to propagate. From colonization to independence to U.S. intervention, Latin American countries were often left with systems that benefited the wealthy elite, concentrating power and increasing inequality. 

Colonization left Latin America scarred, as Latin America expert and prior Literary Director of the Library of Congress Marie Arana says, “Absolute power still beguiled. New republics became as oppressive, insular, and isolated as Spain had encouraged its colonies to be. Latin America’s culture of violence . . . seemed to morph, almost overnight, into a culture of intimidation, with the landed gentry acquiring an ever sharper aptitude for cruelty, and a pumped-up military that never seemed to stand down.” Latin Americans have been fighting to change these inheritances ever since. Still, U.S. imperialism efforts often took advantage of systemic weaknesses, pursuing regime changes that removed leftist, non-capitalist leaders, often replacing them with right-wing extremists. Both colonization and U.S. imperialism left Latin America with an intimate familiarity with the perils associated with the rule of political radicals, from Augusto Pinochet to Porfirio Díaz. 

It is likely that these historical wounds are part of the explanation for Latin America’s sympathy for the Palestinian cause and anger towards human rights violations conducted by Israel. Violent revolutions freed many Latin American countries first from colonialism, and then from dictatorships. As a result, it follows that this region would be sensitive to a potentially imperialistic relationship between Israel and Palestine, especially once the situation turned to state-sanctioned violence against civilians.

The other potential explanation is the new rise of leftism within Latin America. The region is currently seeing a swell in the election of leftist leaders, who often lean towards supporting Palestine rather than Israel. The newly developed leftist bloc in Latin America includes Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, Peru and Chile, with some autocratic leftists in Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba.

Indigenous Latin Americans, who are often supportive of leftist governments, understandably empathize with the plight of displacement facing the Palestinians, having been continually displaced themselves. This has led to progressive movements in the region seeing Israel and Palestine as an issue of decolonization. 

Leftists in Latin America also have little reason to support U.S. policy in any regard. During the first pink tide in the 1970s, the CIA was undeniably responsible for removing leftist governments that did not fall in line with U.S. Cold War goals. In some cases, this led to the installation of right-wing authoritarians who agreed to stifle the spread of communism and subscribe to U.S. capitalist beliefs. Overall, this left a number of Latin American countries facing “significant declines in freedom of expression, civil liberty, and rule of law.”

Despite these experiences, there are some countries in Latin America that support Israel. Specifically, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Costa Rica and Peru, all countries with right-wing governments, immediately expressed their strong support for Israel. President Nayib Bukele of El Salvador, infamous for his extreme crackdown on gangs and gang violence which has drawn wide criticism for humanitarian violations, likened Israel’s fight against Hamas to El Salvador’s fight against gangs. 

Latin America is not a monolith, and differing domestic contexts have clearly affected the overall perspective held by each nation. It is also pertinent to note that some of these policies may be affected by international contexts, as those who rely on countries such as the United States economically or otherwise may be less likely to come out against Israel, meaning countries with larger, more independent economies have more freedom in policy. 

While a divide exists within the region on this issue, the high levels of support for Palestine are altogether unsurprising when one considers the historical scars of colonialism and imperialism that continue to mar Latin American communities, institutions and governments.

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Although private “orphanages” have existed for years prior, the three years following Haiti’s major earthquake in 2010 saw more than a doubling of child institutions in the country, increasing from 300 orphanages to 752 in 2013 alone.

This pervasive poverty and homelessness crisis has led to a total of at least 30,000 Haitain children living in orphanages. About 80% percent of those children, contrary to the meaning of “orphan,” have at least one living parent. Unable to sustain their children’s wellbeing, these parents are persuaded to relinquish them to privately-run orphanages that promise the children will receive shelter, food and education. 

This is often not the outcome. Instead, the children living in Haiti’s orphanages face exploitation and trafficking unintentionally funded by foreign donors. 

“This orphanage business – where orphanages are established and recruit children to raise donations from foreigners – is becoming increasingly recognised globally as a form of trafficking,” says Jamie Vernaelde of Lumos, an NGO advocating for the end of institutionalization of children.

The orphanage directors pay individuals called “child finders” to single out struggling families and recruit the children into orphanages, convincing the parents of a better life and occasionally providing $75 as compensation.  

Lumos reports speaking with children living in orphanages who said they were often beaten, denied adequate food and prevented from learning English so they could not interact with foreign volunteers, missionaries and tourists. One girl said she had to pay her school fees through prostitution. Others reported being forced to cook and clean and never attending school.

The Guardian spoke with another victim who said, “She [the orphanage director]would beat us at night, always. She would take us to her room, put us on our knees with our arms outstretched holding rocks. Or sometimes she left us out in the sun until she remembered about us.” 

President of the National Human Trafficking Committee, Fils-Lien Ely Thelot, attributes the problem in part to the ignorance of the traffickers. “You can find people that practice human trafficking, and they are not conscious that what they are doing is human trafficking,” said Thelot.

The US Department of State categorizes Haiti on its “Tier 2 Watch List” for human trafficking, indicating its prevalence in the country and that although Haiti had made efforts to combat it, more needs to be done. 

Prosecution is the only way to set the standard that human trafficking is not acceptable, but the Haitain government is not providing the proper resources. Despite the creation of a national committee on human trafficking in 2015, it has received no funding, has no employees and has no connections with official authorities that are supposed to assist them in the field. 

The government has an abundance of other social problems that the administration prioritizes over the issue of child trafficking. 

Aside from trafficking and exploitation, the children in orphanages face potential physical, social and psychological issues. A Lumos report found that orphans are 10 times more likely to be involved in prostitution as adults, 40 times more likely to have a criminal record and have a 500 times higher rate of suicide. 

Babies and infants in particular suffer from a lack of one-on-one affection that the orphanages either cannot or are unwilling to provide.

Moreover, traffickers recognize that such negligent conditions only encourage more pity money from foreign donors.

Approximately $100 million a year in donations is sent to the more than 750 for-profit orphanages, primarily from church groups and non-profit organizations based in the United States. Specifically, Lumos found that 90 percent of these donors were faith-based. Most of this money never reaches its intended recipient.

Additionally, international interest in Haiti through volunteering, tourism and mission trips to these orphanages has created a market to keep them financially sustained and to continue filling them with children. Instead, Lumos recommends that volunteering be done through ethical agencies that focus on community development and family preservation.

With family preservation as a key focus in helping combat Haiti’s orphanage crisis, Lumos encourages phasing out orphanages and replacing them with foster care and small group homes, as countries like the United States have done. The NGO finds that they are less expensive and provide children with stronger futures. This would also help account for children who are actually orphans by definition and have no family to be returned to. Since beginning its Haiti operations in 2015, it’s already shut down 13 institutions and returned 242 children to their families. 

Non-profit organizations like The Potter’s Family provide family preservation and community assistance too, in its case by providing formula and assistance to babies whose mothers have died.

“It’s about strengthening families first, and not all children are going to be safe in families – we know that in any developed country – so there is a possibility of developing foster care in Haiti. It’s about investing in support services for all communities,” Vernaelde said.

There has been modest media attention given to this issue, including a 2014 documentary called “Poverty, Inc.” that examines the rise of charity as a multibillion dollar poverty industry in developing countries. Its segment on the Haitain orphanage crisis points to providing job opportunities for the parents of poverty orphans as key in helping families sustain themselves and limiting the use of private orphanages. 

Considering how lucrative and complex the poverty industry is for charities and other participating organizations, change to the orphanage system is likely to be slow. 

Institutional efforts to support family stability and self-sufficiency are also being threatened by ongoing violent protests against government corruption and economic decline. These demonstrate the unrest and anger felt by Haitian citizens about their current living conditions. Gang violence has suspended food and fuel shipments and warehouses run by charities and aid organizations that serve vulnerable populations have been looted, resulting in limited availability of food and drinking water.

Unless Haiti is able to stamp out these pervasive issues at the source by achieving systemic change, the private orphanage business will continue to perpetuate poverty orphans.

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Latin America’s complex and polarizing political history with dictatorships, neoliberalism, American intervention and economic inequality favors the ultra-wealthy and neglects the poor, especially in rural areas. The right- and left-leaning sides of the political spectrum relate to the tendency that these countries have in terms of centralization. While individuals who live in metropolitan areas are more likely to have access to resources and economic prosperity, those who live in rural areas tend to be ignored, pushing toward an imbalance in the countries’ development which results in contrasting political ideals among those who live in these opposite environments. However, a surge in left-wing politicians across Latin America is winning presidential elections against their right-wing incumbents signifying the resurgence of the “pink tide.” The pink tide represents the shift in Latin American countries, leaving their neo-liberal ways for leftist ideology during the early 21st century. Political analysts believe its revival is reoccurring, especially with the victories in Chile, Colombia, and Peru. 

Recently elected Chilean president Gabriel Boric is the country’s youngest president at 36 years old and who raised the temperature of the leftist wave in Latin America. The country’s history of leftism died when the right-wing military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet overthrew the socialist Salvador Allende government in 1973, which ruled Chile for almost twenty years. Pinochet’s legacy left Chile in a neoliberal state championing free-market fundamentalism. Boric vows to work with his cabinet members and political organizations to end Pinochet’s neoliberal model and constitution by raising taxes on the rich while expanding social services. 

More recently, Chilean feminists and Indigenous organizations fought and wrote the new constitution which expands Chileans’ rights and provides an environmental agenda. The updated text would guarantee individuals’ rights to health, housing and abortion, and establishes universal public services while granting nature rights by protecting Chile’s glaciers, parks, and waters from mining. The constitution’s passage would revolutionize the standard for Chilean democracy compared to Pinochet’s suppressive past of overthrowing the previous socialist government of Salvador Allende in 1973. While the vote for a new constitution overwhelmingly passed with a 78% vote, its progressive policies and leftist values stirred misinformation perpetuated by conservative politicians and media outlets like Fox News claiming that the new constitution bans private property, allows private companies to count votes and grants prisoners and migrants voting rights in the upcoming constitutional referendum. This misinformation spread across social media platforms in Chile dropped support and contributed to its failure. However, Boric’s determination for its passage plans to stage a revote to continue his promises of deconstructing Pinochet’s past. 

In Colombia, Gustavo Petro was sworn in as the country’s new president in August of 2022, and he is the first leftist candidate to hold office. Petro participated in the M-19, a military group formed by university students and activists created as a response to alleged fraud in the 1970 presidential election. His left-wing past resonated with voters which helped him defeat right-wing businessman Rodolfo Hernandez, joining a wave of leftist politicians and political outsiders winning elections in Latin America since the Covid-19 pandemic left incumbents struggling to fix their country’s economic problems like about half of the population living under the poverty line and lessen the economic reliance on fossil fuel. Petro promises to shift Colombia in a new direction away from its capitalist and American reliance. He wants to combat social and economic inequalities by increasing spending on anti-poverty programs, raising taxes on the wealthy and eliminating corporate tax breaks. His environmental agenda addresses climate change by stopping granting new licenses for oil exploration, banning fracking projects, delaying deforestation, and reducing the country’s reliance on fossil fuels. In terms of Colombia’s U.S. relations, Petro plans to end the U.S.’s war on drugs in Colombia by redirecting billions of dollars in funding toward social resources. 

The case study of Peru’s current president, Pedro Castillo, is unique and shocking given the way in which he rose to power. The former school teacher and union leader had little experience in politics yet managed to win the election in the second round while not even being in the top ten candidates, according to a poll conducted by El Comercio. Castillo went from being predicted to win 6% of the vote to obtaining almost 19% of the vote in the first round. This percentage of support is significant considering that there were 18 different candidates running in the 2021 elections.  

During the campaign season, little was known about him but his ability to win the support of the majority of Peruvian voters by centering his campaign in the more rural areas of the country. Being originally from Cajamarca, a city in Peru’s northern highlands, 

Peru is a very centralized country within Lima, the capital city. According to the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics, 29.5% of Peru’s population is concentrated in this province where over 124 million soles of the GDP is generated. The fact that those in the capital did not consider him a prominent candidate before his victory shows the deep divide between those living in Lima and the rest of the country. Fujimori won with over 50% of the votes in all 43 districts of Lima, and the disparity increased in the central Lima districts which are the most wealthy areas in the entire country. For example, in San Isidro Keiko, the rival candidate won with over 80% of the votes. 

His success as a candidate is also linked to his opponent, Keiko Fujimori. Keiko is a prominent political figure in the country as she inherited her role from her father Alberto Fujimori, who was among the most polarizing presidents in Peru’s history and faced a tremendous divide between the capital and the rest of the country. Alberto Fujimori’s goal was to eradicate terrorism which was a pressing security issue that the country faced in the 1980s and early 2000s, however, to achieve this goal, he became dictator and the president with the most amount of human rights violations in the country’s history. From massacres to forced sterilizations, Fujimori’s means were violent and were mainly targeted at Peru’s most vulnerable populations. While his time in power is characterized by his fight against terrorism and the ability to capture Abimael Guzman, the leader of Sendero Luminoso, the most prominent terrorist group at the time. This presents the dilemma of whether the end justifies the means. In the end, Keiko was not able to beat Castillo despite being the most experienced in conventional politics as well as being a well-known public figure. Fujimori’s failure at the polls says a lot about how much Peruvians desired to move on from the politicians of the past. This discontentment of so many Peruvians with previous governments leads to the question of how many people truly supported Castillo and his campaign versus how many people did not want a second Fujimori government.

In the past decade, Peru has had mainly right-leaning presidents, from Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian regime to the more recent Pedro Pablo Kuchisky; the one thing that all these leaders have in common is their involvement in major corruption cases. All of Peru’s leaders in the last two decades have ended up either being impeached, in jail, or fleeing the country. The changes in the political ideology of Peru’s leaders can be described as a reaction to the failure of Peru’s previous right-leaning leaders and the county’s need for a radical change in the political system deeply rooted in corruption and inefficiency. 

As the pink tide continues more recently with far-right Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro losing to leftist Luiz Inacío Lula in the 2022 presidential election, the pink tide power grows to eight Latin American countries and as the time comes, there may be more.

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As the region prepares for the upcoming COP27 conference in Egypt this November, they have a long list of initiatives and demands, including investments in sustainable development, disaster prevention and relief and transition to clean energy. Many regional leaders have grown frustrated with previous international climate deliberations and have resolved to take a more aggressive stance on climate negotiations, one that mirrors their concerns about environmental collapse.

“The time to see ourselves as climate victims is over. Although we are, the time to take the helm of the ship has begun,” said Max Puig, executive vice president of the country’s National Council for Climate Change and Clean Development Mechanism (CNCCMDL). Puig’s was one of many rallying cries at this year’s Latin American and Caribbean Climate Week (LACCW), held in July in Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic. Climate Week hosted approximately 1,700 government representatives, international organizations, private sector stakeholders and civil society experts. The week-long summit featured more than 160 sessions regarding “climate risks and the transition to carbon neutrality economies, among other climate issues.”

LACCW allowed regional leaders to discuss their national climate policies and develop strategies for the upcoming COP27 negotiations. Cities in Chile, Colombia and across Latin America have begun transitioning from public buses to electric vehicles. The agricultural sector has begun adopting regenerative agricultural practices to combat soil degradation, depletion and drought, a problem particularly afflicting Chilean farms that have suffered from a drought for more than a decade. The region is also developing plans for offshore wind farms and solar panels to create the infrastructure of sustainable energy production required to reduce carbon emissions.

Indeed, many Latin American countries have already adopted more aggressive climate policies within their national borders, but they lack the resources to undertake the large scale of climate crises. 

Like many developing countries, the primary roadblock to sustainable energy transition is insufficient financial resources. Achieving their carbon reduction goals set in the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement would require redirecting as much as 19%, or $1.3 trillion USD, of public and private spending in Latin America toward climate solutions, a figure that remains both politically and economically infeasible in developing countries. “Yes, we need to incentivise the transition to low-emission, highly resilient development, but this should not be done at the expense of existing businesses or national development,” said Ovais Sarmad, the UN Climate Change deputy executive secretary. 

Consequently, Latin America and the Caribbean hope to secure greater adaptation and mitigation investment from developed countries, especially for constructing sustainable energy infrastructure, transitioning away from fossil fuel transportation and modernizing agricultural systems to be more energy efficient and environmentally conservative. The agricultural sector, in particular, presents multiple opportunities for carbon reduction with developed countries’ investments and technological assistance. 

Implementing the necessary changes will require three distinct channels of negotiation at the upcoming COP27: “capacity building, technology transfer” and, most importantly, funding.

“Funding must be increased. Developed countries, which pledged to provide USD 100 billion a year in assistance starting in 2020, must fulfill their promise, as was highlighted at COP26 in Glasgow,” said Walter Oyhantçabal, an expert on international climate negotiations. Delegates from Mexico, Chile and Colombia are expected to continue leading the charge in COP27 deliberations, pressuring developed countries to increase their investments and follow through on their promises.

“It must be clear to our peoples and to the world that we are serious and that, even in the most difficult circumstances, we are not going to stop. We will overcome the difficulties. This is the message that Latin America and the Caribbean are taking to COP27 in Egypt,” said Puig in conclusion. 

As both a vulnerable region and a site of immense potential in the battle against climate change, Latin America will play a critical role in negotiations at this year’s COP27 summit.

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As Brazil currently finds itself in a tight economic situation, recovering from its worst-ever recession with limited economic growth, high inflation, and lots of debt, finances and economy will likely play a major factor in Sunday’s election. However, the most globally concerning issue is that of the Amazon rainforest and its fate in the hands of either candidate.

The Amazon Rainforest should ideally function as a major global carbon sink. A carbon sink is anything that absorbs more carbon from the atmosphere than it releases, and the rainforest used to be one of the most significant and important carbon sinks in the world. However, it has now converted to a carbon source, which releases more carbon into the atmosphere than it absorbs. This is due to both natural and manmade factors. In terms of the former, the eastern part of the Amazon rainforest over the last 40 years has seen a 25% reduction of rain and an increase of at least 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit during dry seasons. This causes more forest fires and even causes the trees to be able to contain less carbon than before. As these shifts are attributed to climate change, a nasty cycle is produced where such effects cause deforestation and carbon release, which contribute further to climate change. These factors, combined with human-started forest fires and clearance of trees have shifted this eastern part of the forest into a carbon source. The western part of the Amazon is largely carbon neutral, as it too suffers from fires and deforestation but not to the same degree as the eastern region. This is extremely worrisome for the Amazon and for the planet, as the conversion of carbon sinks into carbon sources might be a key shift in the progression of climate change, and not for the better. 

A win for Bolsonaro in this election could make the fate of the Amazon go from bad to worse. Already during his presidency, Bolsonaro has cut environmental regulations, taken power away from those in charge of protecting the rainforest, put military officials who want to develop the forest at the heads of environmental institutions, and incentivized the invasion of native lands. Deforestation under him reached a 15-year high, with a loss of over two billion trees over the last four years. That is the equivalent of about 13,000 miles of forest lost, an area larger than the state of Maryland. From 2021 to 2022, fires in the Amazon rose by 147%, with over 41,000 detected, 31,500 during this year’s dry season alone. Even for a dry season this is an unusually high number, and is possibly due to ranchers using fire to clear their land under the cover of the dry season. If discovered, the punishment the farmers face is a fine, one they can get away with not paying. The reason for such destruction of the forest under Bolsonaro is that he actively encourages more farming, ranching, and mining in the Amazon. He has decreased government presence in the forest, a message to illegal farmers, ranchers, and miners that a blind eye will be turned to their clearance of the forest. He is also attempting to pass bills that would grant ownership of native lands to land invaders to mine and bills that would make it easier to obtain licenses to conduct large-scale farming or mining in the Amazon. He sees the Amazon as an opportunity for jobs and economic growth. As a result, many people in Amazonas state support him: many of them are below the poverty line and do need jobs; Bolsonaro makes this a priority. In September 2022, environmental criminals cleared 1,455 square kilometers of the forest in an attempt to destroy as much as possible before the potential change of power. Even before, in August, deforestation rose by 81%. People are acting in a last ditch effort to clear as much as they can just in case Bolsonaro isn’t re-elected. Ecologists say that if this level of destruction isn’t stopped soon, the damage could become irreparable and the rainforest will no longer be able to retain enough moisture to remain a rainforest; the Amazon would become a savannah. 

Lula da Silva, on the other hand, vows to go in another direction.  He says he will implement measures to protect the Amazon, appoint experts to environmental institutions and weed out illegal gold mining. He’s also proposed a National Climate Change Authority to ensure Brazil’s procedures are up to the Paris Agreement standards. On top of this, Lula da Silva has pledged to rebuild Ibama, the environmental protection agency Bolsonaro weakened and sidelined under his administration. 

There is precedent for Lula da Silva’s claims: when he and his party were last in power from 2003 to 2016, deforestation fell by 72%. They accomplished this by increasing forest monitoring and addressing root problems of deforestation by implementing sustainable production and formal land ownership. However, Lula da Silva’s challenge this time around would be a little more difficult, with the precedent that Bolsonaro has set in the region. He would need to rid the Amazon of illegal miners, loggers, and ranchers, and better regulate food and gold markets. 

This election is a key turning point for the Amazon rainforest because of the drastically different approaches the two candidates would take with the forest for the next four years. Under a Bolsonaro regime, destruction would likely continue and could even become more severe if he passes his desired bills making it easier to exploit the forest. The damage incurred could be irreversible. On the other hand, if Lula da Silva were elected, he could take the country’s approach to the Amazon and the environment in a new direction and hopefully implement change before it’s too late. 

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Brazil’s first-round results put Lula ahead with 48.3% of the votes versus 43.2% for Bolsonaro, setting up a highly polarized sprint to the finish line and a test for Brazil’s democracy. With a recent poll indicating an ever-tightening race and with Lula ahead by a slim margin of 52% to 48%, many fear that Bolsonaro will refuse to accept the results if he loses and that he could attempt a January 6-style insurrection. Amid a nationwide climate of tension and division, the fate of Brazil’s 30-year-old democracy now hangs in the balance. 

The Bolsonaro administration has been rife with controversy. Since his inauguration in January 2019, Bolsonaro has been a close emulator of former U.S. President Donald Trump through his divisive rhetoric and staunchly conservative politics. Over the last four years, Bolsonaro has questioned the role and power of Brazil’s Supreme Court, repeatedly challenged the integrity of the electoral system, downplayed COVID-19 as “a little flu” and approved reckless environmental policies that have advanced the destruction of the Amazon rainforest. In terms of foreign policy, Bolsonaro has embraced anti-globalism, distanced himself from the United Nations, threatened to withdraw from the World Health Organization and the Paris Climate Agreement and feuded with U.S. President Joe Biden. While his platform appeals to big business interests and Brazil’s social conservatives, large swaths of the population see his views as dangerous to democracy and incompatible with modern Brazilian society. 

Lula is largely running on the nostalgia of the prosperous times during his previous administration and the failure of many of Bolsonaro’s policies, like his botched COVID-19 response. During his two terms, Lula helped lift millions out of poverty, making him one of Brazil’s most popular leaders. In contrast to Bolsonaro, Lula’s foreign policy would return to a more traditional role of leadership in regional affairs and closer relationships with the United States and the European Union. Yet, the Workers Party (PT) candidate is not without his own set of controversies. In September 2016, he was charged and convicted of corruption originating from a money laundering investigation known as “Operation Car Wash” and served a jail sentence while also being banned from running for reelection in 2018. But in March 2021, Brazil’s Supreme Court overturned the conviction, saying Lula’s trial had been compromised by a biased judge with political motivations, clearing him to run for president. 

Thus, many Brazilians see this election as a tough choice, as they aren’t satisfied with either candidate.

From the very beginning of his presidency, Bolsonaro has stretched the limits of presidential powers and criticized the security of Brazil’s electoral system, tugging at the seams of Brazilian democracy. Yet, investigations by Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE) and by independent organizations have disproven his electoral fraud claims, showing that the country’s electronic voting system, adopted in the 1990s, is highly accurate and secure. In fact, many believe that the system should be considered a model for elections internationally. 

Despite these assurances, it is undeniable that Bolsonaro’s rhetoric has already made a negative impact on Brazilian democracy. The country’s faith in its democratic system has taken a beating in recent years, with 44% of the population believing that Brazil is becoming less democratic, according to a recent study conducted by YouGov. “The last election was peaceful. Now we have a president who does not make it very clear whether he will obey the results of the polls and who has a close relationship with the military,” said Brazilian scholar Carlos Gustavo Poggio, a specialist in Brazil-U.S. relations and professor at Berea College in Kentucky.

In addition to his damaging claims about the condition of Brazil’s democracy, Bolsonaro’s strong connection with the Brazilian armed forces has raised concerns about a possible military intervention in the electoral process. For many in the older generation, it has reignited the memory of the 1964 military coup. In recent months, the military has also raised questions about the integrity of electronic voting and has requested to conduct an independent inspection of the ballot box codes in meetings with TSE technicians. The demands match those of President Bolsonaro, raising serious questions about possible collusion between the President and the military and how that could affect the aftermath of the runoff election results.

The United States, as a key strategic and trade partner of Brazil and the major power in the Western Hemisphere, has a significant role to play in ensuring the perpetuation of Brazilian democracy, and interest in the election has been notably high from multiple levels of the American government. The State Department has repeatedly made clear that the U.S. will back the results of the election. In an interview with BBC Brasil, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Victoria Nuland said, “what needs to happen in Brazil are free and fair elections, using the institutional structures that have served you [Brazilians] well in the past.” The Senate also unanimously approved a resolution sponsored by Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA) and Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) defending Brazilian democracy. The resolution urges the U.S. government to “immediately recognize” the results of the election. More notably, it also instructed the U.S. to “review and reconsider the relationship” with Brazil in the event of a power grab through undemocratic means. 

On Oct. 30, Brazilian democracy will face a challenge like never before in its over 30-year history. Regardless of who wins, the next government’s priority should be fostering Brazil’s economic growth and political stability. Brazilian institutions must hold firm to ensure the continuation of free and fair elections in the country. In the event of a Lula victory, local and international actors must step in to guarantee that Bolsonaro cannot attempt to overthrow the election results and enact a Brazilian insurrection.

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