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Announced as a “special military operation,” Russia officially invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022. Since then, the West, led by the United States and the EU, has donated billions of dollars worth of equipment, humanitarian aid and more to Ukraine in an effort to stall and hopefully fully repel Russia’s invasion. This support had been widely covered by international media, with Ukraine frequently encouraging allies to send more aid. However, many people may not know that the United States actually began donating to Ukraine following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2017, Trump’s administration continued sending weapons to Ukraine, primarily sending Javelin antitank missiles. This practice continued and increased following the Russian invasion in February of 2022, when the United States Congress passed a $13.6 billion aid package to be sent to Ukraine. 

By Feb. 27, 2022 the European Union responded swiftly and similarly with a 500 million euro, roughly $577 million,  military package composed of 90% “military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force…”  By the end of May 2022, Ukraine had received two billion euros ($2.3 billion) from the European Union, $55 billion from the United States, and over 1.3 billion pounds ($1.7 billion) from the United Kingdom. The start of this war shook the geopolitical landscape of the world. Countries were shaken, frightened at what more could come and were staunchly motivated to resist Russia’s encroachment into Ukraine’s territory. With over $59 billion in aid, Ukraine was able to launch its 2022 Kherson counteroffensive, taking back Kherson, the only regional capital that Russia was able to occupy since its initial invasion. 

This huge financial package and commitment from the West signaled the West’s support for Ukraine and its opposition to Russia’s actions. However, the war has now lasted over three years and sees no clear end in sight. Therefore, it begs the question of how long can this commitment last? 

The last U.S. aid packages sent to Ukraine came in the form of $3.4 billion in “direct budget support” on Dec. 30, 2024 and $500 million worth of military aid on Jan. 9, 2025. These packages were approved by the Biden administration, presumably to preempt changes before the Trump administration took over. 

Since the start of the second Trump administration, the United States has suspended all aid to Ukraine. In doing this, Trump seems to be applying pressure on Ukrainian President Zelensky to sue for peace, stating that Zelensky is “gambling with World War three.” The EU on the other hand, has not slowed down its aid. From January to Aug. 31, 2025, the EU has already given roughly $50 billion worth of aid to Ukraine, ranging from direct financial support and loans to military equipment.

From these donation patterns, conclusions about the United States and European Union’s differing attitudes towards Ukraine appear. Evidently, the European Union has not been experiencing Ukrainian fatigue as they continue to donate billions of dollars worth of equipment to Ukraine in an effort to fight Russia. The EU likely feels a larger threat from Russia than the United States does. If Russia were to take over part or all of Ukraine, Russia would be closer to the EU than to the U.S., essentially knocking on the EU’s doorstep. If a war were to occur, it would likely be on Russia’s Western front making it significantly closer to the EU than to the U.S. This difference suggests differing threat perceptions between the U.S. and EU with the second Trump administration stalling funding. 

Furthermore, this does not seem likely to change any time soon as the relationship between Trump and Zelensky has been shaky at best following their clash in the Oval Office. However, a “Supporting Ukraine Act of 2025” bill has been introduced to Congress on July 31, 2025, though has not been voted on by the Senate or the House of Representatives. While U.S. aid has stalled at the federal governmental level, public support echoes this attitude as well. While 46% of polled Americans say U.S. assistance to Ukraine is not enough, the other 53% of Americans polled state that American assistance to Ukraine is either the right amount or too much. 

However, it is worth noting that the sentiment of sending American support to Ukraine is on the rise. In December 2024, only 30% of Americans said not enough aid was being sent, and by March, 46% said it was not enough. The contrast between EU and U.S. relations with Ukraine highlights a shift in Western engagement: while Europe views the conflict as a more immediate security threat, the U.S. political landscape reflects growing wariness over long-term involvement.

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While the world focused on the clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces in May 2025, it is important to remember that the Kashmir conflict has not only been shaped by the two states, but also by various armed non-state actors with conflicting goals, ideologies and allegiances. This article seeks to explore the various armed non-state actors that have shaped the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, focusing on their histories, ideologies and relations to the Indian and Pakistani states and intelligence services.

Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) – Pro-Independence

The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front was founded in the late 1970s, with considerable support from the British-Pakistani diaspora, most of whom trace their origins to Mirpur in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. After carrying out attacks on Indian military personnel, diplomats and Kashmiri Hindus, JKLF shot to prominence with the execution of key leadership and the conclusion of the 1987 elections in Jammu and Kashmir, widely regarded as rigged in favor of a pro-India Kashmiri party. This prompted many Kashmiri youth to pick up arms to fight Indian rule, starting the armed Kashmir conflict. 

JKLF initially received support from the Pakistani intelligence agencies with the common goal of separating from Indian rule, but the group adopted a relatively secular, Kashmiri-nationalist ideology that sought to unite Indian-administered Kashmir and Pakistani-administered Kashmir as an independent country. 

In the mid-1990s, a diversion of funding from Pakistani intelligence services to pro-Pakistan militant groups combined with crackdowns from India and Pakistan saw JKLF renounce violent struggle in 1994. They continue to operate politically on both sides of the ceasefire line dividing the region, advocating for independence, but face restrictions from both countries. 

Currently, Pakistan restricts political activity by JKLF and other pro-independence groups in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, and India has banned JKLF since revoking Indian-administered Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status in 2019.

Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM) – Pro-Pakistan

Another non-state armed group, Hizbul-Mujahideen, emerged in 1989 after the 1987 elections. HM, like the JKLF, was predominantly composed of Kashmiri Muslims seeking to separate from Indian rule. However, unlike the JKLF, they sought to merge all of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan, and justified their struggle as a jihad against India in contrast to secular nationalism. By the early 1990s, they overtook JKLF as the foremost separatist militant organization in the Indian-administered Kashmir with Pakistani support. 

The group has historically enjoyed close ties with Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir, an Islamist political party in Kashmir. HM has engaged in attacks against Indian armed forces, Jammu and Kashmir police officers, pro-Indian politicians in Jammu and Kashmir and Kashmiri Hindus, leading to the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits in 1989-1990. They are accused of committing the 1998 massacre of Hindus in Prankote. They are also held responsible for the Wandhama massacre of Kashmiri Hindus in 1998. Furthermore, a popular HM commander was killed by Indian security forces in 2016, prompting massive protests in Kashmir. Indian forces were widely criticized for the usage of pellet guns to quell the protests which caused severe injuries, including blindness, to hundreds of Kashmiris. 

HM is designated as a terrorist organization by India, the U.S., Canada and the European Union. It is a legally operating organization in Pakistan. It remains active, but severely weakened due to Indian crackdowns and infighting.

Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen – Pro-India

The Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen was formed around 1993-1994, backed by the Indian intelligence services. Pakistan’s intelligence services initially supported multiple armed groups in the JKLF umbrella, but later concentrated support on the pro-Pakistan HM. This led many other militant organizations to lose their weapons, training, funding and bases, pressuring members to defect to HM. Many militants became disillusioned, and instead sought revenge on HM and other pro-Pakistani organizations. Indian intelligence services and their collaborators organized these groups together to form the Ikhwan. They recruited Kashmiri Muslims with pro-India leanings, those seeking revenge against HM due to loss of resources or friends and family members to militant attacks and suspected, surrendered and imprisoned militants who sought freedom and protection from both India and HM. 

While considered effective by India for counterinsurgency operations, they were widely criticized in Kashmir for egregious human rights violations, including torture, extortion and extrajudicial killings. Lack of popularity in Kashmir pressured Indian forces to disband and remove security from the organization, leading to the killing of many Ikhwanis by rivals. Others were absorbed into the Jammu and Kashmir police force (JKP) or Indian army. Many joined the Special Operations Group (SOG), a specialized counterinsurgent unit of the JKP. While the SOG is officially affiliated with the state, recruiting police officers from the various ethnic groups of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, it is also widely accused of serious human rights abuses, with particular concern that cash incentives from the Indian military for killing militants has encouraged SOG members to kill civilians and label them as militants for financial rewards.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) / The Resistance Front (TRF) – Pro-Pakistan

The LeT was established in 1990 in Afghanistan, as one of the various Mujahideen organizations, after the merger of two Islamist missionary organizations. After the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan, it shifted its focus in the mid-1990s on fighting India with the objective of merging Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan. Unlike Hizbul-Mujahideen, who were mostly made up of Kashmiris, most LeT fighters were Pakistani Punjabis. The group expanded from suicide bombings and shootings in Kashmir to attacks in major Indian cities, becoming notorious for both the 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks, where 10 LeT fighters sieged the Taj Hotel and killed more than 160 people. The group is also accused of collaborating with Indian Muslim extremist groups in coordinating attacks, and enjoys ties to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It is designated as a terrorist organization by the UN, European Union, U.S., India and Pakistan.

 In spite of its official ban, Pakistan’s intelligence services are widely accused of continued support to the organization, particularly through allowing its charity front, Jamaat ud-Dawa (JuD), to continue its activities within Pakistan, as well as taking limited action against LeT leadership. While Pakistan has cracked down on LeT and JuD since 2018 to comply with FATF regulations, seizing assets and jailing leaders, criticism remains that the organization continues to receive covert support from military and intelligence circles. Top leadership have historically lived openly in Lahore, holding political rallies and appearing on television interviews, in spite of UN sanctions and American bounties.

The Resistance Front (TRF) has emerged in resistance to the 2019 revocation of Article 370 in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. The group has become known for its attacks on Indian military personnel, Jammu and Kashmir police, migrant laborers and minorities. The group shot to prominence with the April 2025 massacre of Indian tourists in Pahalgam, prompting the military standoff between India and Pakistan. The group appears to have deliberately targeted Hindus during the attack, sparing those who could recite Islamic verses. Both India and the U.S. allege the group is a local proxy of the LeT, with considerable overlap between its leadership. Unlike the LeT, it has framed its struggle against India in more secular terms in an attempt to distance itself from the LeT’s religious rhetoric, seen as a strategic shift to win more tolerance for their cause.

Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) – Pro-Pakistan

Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM) is a newer group, founded in 2000 in Pakistan by militants released from an Indian prison in exchange for Indian hostages from a plane hijacking. The group, like LeT, seeks Jammu and Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan, and largely draws membership from Pakistani Punjabis who had experience in the Afghan Mujahideen. The group became notorious for its suicide attacks, including on both the Indian Parliament and the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly in 2001, Indian consulates in Afghanistan and the Pulwama attack on Indian paramilitary forces in 2019. They also launched attacks on Indian military personnel in 2016. It is designated as a terrorist organization by the UN, most western countries, India and Pakistan. However, Pakistan remains accused of allowing the organization to effectively function, with no serious legal action or arrests against the organization. Pakistani intelligence is suspected of supporting the group in attacks against India and shielding its leadership, as well as utilizing it as a counter to the Pakistani Taliban which wages war against the state. Both JeM and the Taliban share ideological links from the Deobandi school, leading to competition for cadre. The group remains active.

Village Defence Guards (VDG) – Pro-India

The Village Defence Guards, formerly known as Village Defence Committees, were organized in the mid-1990s as a civilian militia against militants in Jammu. Villagers were predominantly recruited from pro-India ethnic and religious groups in Jammu, such as the Hindu Dogras, Hindu and Muslim Paharis, Sikhs and Muslim Gujjar-Bakarwals. The VDG system has been criticized for arming civilians, enabling them to settle personal scores. With most VDG members being Hindu, the program has also been accused of enabling majoritarian violence against Muslim Gujjar villagers. While inactive for most of the 21st century, the VDGs were resurrected after the abrogation of Article 370, particularly as more militant attacks are shifting to Jammu from the Kashmir Valley. The VDGs are armed, trained and paid by the Indian army.

Conclusion

Armed non-state actors have played a significant role in Kashmir for decades, complicating the conflict beyond the formal militaries of India and Pakistan. For the Kashmir conflict to reach a resolution, and for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences, the complications arising from these various organizations are an important factor to account for and keep in mind.

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Since the breakdown of inter-Korean ties and the failed Trump-era talks in 2019, North Korea has doubled down on nuclear weaponization. In 2022 alone, the regime tested over 70 ballistic and cruise missiles. It also reportedly continues to produce advanced fissile material, which experts say can fuel up to 90 nuclear warheads.

Pyongyang’s growing alignment with Moscow and Beijing has deepened the crisis. In exchange for supplying Russia with artillery shells, ballistic missiles and even troops for its war on Ukraine, North Korea has gained valuable political cover—and likely technological support—from the Kremlin. China, meanwhile, has provided an economic lifeline for the isolated nation and brushed off Western countries’ requests to pressure the regime. This emerging axis has emboldened Pyongyang, enhancing its missile and nuclear capabilities while forming a united front that threatens U.S. influence and the security of Japan, South Korea and the U.S. mainland.

Taken together, these developments cast doubt on the sincerity of Kim’s statement and the notion that talks could alter the North’s strategic calculus. Nonetheless, Washington seems intent on restoring diplomacy with Pyongyang in the hopes of resetting relations. 

Even if such a summit were to occur, it would likely yield little progress. For decades, the United States has insisted on denuclearization as the foundation for improving ties, oscillating between diplomacy and military threats as a way of bringing about the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear program. Successive administrations have tried different approaches—including the 1994 Agreed Framework, which temporarily froze the North’s plutonium production, and the 2012 Leap Day Deal, which briefly halted nuclear and missile testing—but each of these efforts ultimately unraveled as Pyongyang reneged on its commitments and pressed ahead with weaponization. Kim’s position on denuclearization continues this pattern, pouring cold water on the prospect of a negotiated settlement.

What, then, motivated Kim to make such a statement? Given Pyongyang’s upgraded weapons arsenal, he lacks the same incentive to extract concessions from Washington as during Trump’s first term. Back then, North Korea displayed a markedly different attitude toward negotiations; the historic Panmunjom Declaration with the South in April 2018 affirmed their shared goal of achieving “a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula,” and the Singapore Summit with Trump later that year fueled hope that U.S.-North Korea relations were entering a new chapter.

The talks ultimately collapsed in October 2019 due to disagreement between both sides over sanctions relief and the terms of complete denuclearization. This was because, despite the economic incentives, Kim was fundamentally unwilling to abandon the regime’s most important source of security and status—an arsenal his family had spent nearly half a century developing. Knowing that nuclear weapons were his regime’s primary source of leverage and domestic legitimacy, he concluded that maintaining this arsenal was worth the economic cost.

Nearly seven years later, Pyongyang’s upgraded nuclear and conventional weapons capabilities have strengthened Kim’s leverage. However, his demands have fundamentally changed: rather than seeking comprehensive sanctions relief or warmer ties with Washington and Seoul, he is solely focused on persuading the White House to recognize North Korea’s nuclear status.

This would confer several benefits to his regime on the domestic and international stage. Shaped by the trauma of the Korean War (1950-53) and President Harry Truman’s nuclear threats, North Korea has long viewed its nuclear arsenal as the sole means to guarantee its survival. For years, Kim has cited the examples of Libya and Iraq as cautionary tales against denuclearization. In this vein, recognition by the United States would not only strengthen his regime’s legitimacy, but also the narrative that North Korea’s nuclear status is irreversible and a key pillar of its national identity—boosting Kim’s leverage at home and abroad.

Nuclear recognition would also give North Korea more room to maneuver between Moscow and Beijing. China remains wary about Pyongyang’s rapprochement with the Kremlin, fearing it will undermine both its economic leverage and its ability to balance between the United States and its allies in the region. It has thus adopted a more cautious stance toward the nuclear issue, officially supporting denuclearization yet refusing to meaningfully pressure the regime; such caution would evaporate if Washington were to recognize Pyongyang as a nuclear power. Although this would not eliminate all sources of friction within the Russia-China-North Korea axis, it would enable Kim to effectively balance ties between Moscow and Beijing, strengthening the regime’s regional and global influence.

Given Kim’s hardened stance on the nuclear issue, the United States must develop a clear, comprehensive strategy to constrain Pyongyang. Instead of yielding to Kim’s demands, Washington should reaffirm its commitment to denuclearization as a way to blunt the axis’s destabilizing influence and avoid nuclear brinkmanship in East Asia. This includes tightening enforcement of existing sanctions on North Korea and imposing secondary sanctions on Russian and Chinese firms that enable Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Washington should also continue to deepen trilateral security cooperation with South Korea and Japan, expanding joint military exercises, facilitating allied weapons transfers and increasing high-level coordination among top security officials as a strong signal to the regime of the alliance’s continued resolve. President Trump’s Asia trip last October was a positive step in that direction, but the administration must continue to build on this momentum and pursue additional measures to counter the regime.

Additionally, Washington should craft a long-term strategy to deter the regime militarily. That includes reaffirming its extended deterrence commitments to Tokyo and Seoul, and, if necessary, maintaining the option of targeted strikes against North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities. Such action would be both unlikely and unwise, but it must remain viable to cast a shadow of power across the negotiating table.

The North Korean nuclear threat has grown dire in recent years. The regime’s rapidly advancing weapons arsenal and strategic alignment with Moscow and Beijing present an increasingly complex challenge for the United States and its allies. Although Kim’s offer to resume talks may seem like a tempting diplomatic offramp, Washington should stand firm and marshal all available resources to achieve the goal of peaceful denuclearization. This would not only bring stability to the Korean Peninsula but also strengthen Washington’s credibility among its allies in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, an outcome that would reaffirm U.S. leadership at a moment when it is being tested on multiple fronts.

The views expressed in opinion pieces do not represent the views of Glimpse from the Globe.

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The leader who has emerged in the months since the fall has been Ahmed al-Sharaa, a military commander who led the rebellion against Assad and former al-Qaeda member. His role in al-Qaeda is something that has raised concern on a global stage, though Sharaa cut ties with the group in 2016. The United States has designated Sharaa, previously known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani, as a terrorist when, in 2011, he established a new Syrian branch of al-Qaeda called the Nusra Front. Sharaa refused to bring the Nusra Front into ISIS in 2013 and, in 2016, the group was renamed to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and broke off from al-Qaeda. Sharaa’s newest insurgent front is named Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and is ultimately the group that toppled the Assad regime.

In 2013, while still maintaining ties with al-Qaeda, Sharaa named his intent for Syria to exist as a fundamentalist Islamic state, stating that religious minorities would have no room in the country. Since then, however, Sharaa has appeared to pull back from this intent, announcing in 2015 that he does not wish to target religious minorities or to create conflict with Europe or the United States. In 2023 and 2024, Sharaa showed little understanding for dissenters and was not known to show mercy. Although this may bear similarity to the Assad regime, HTS has shown far less suppression of those with differing beliefs and Sharaa has since maintained his commitment to a freer Syria. With the signing of a new transitional Constitution, Sharaa remains committed to the freedoms of expression and media and remains steadfast in his commitment to a unified Syria.

In a 2021 interview with PBS, Sharaa spoke with a U.S. news outlet for the first time. Here, he re-emphasized that he does not wish to infringe upon the security of Europe and America and criticized his designation as a terrorist, asking, “Terrorism, how do you define it? Today, every country has a terrorism list. Any person or party that the country claims is opposing it is automatically added to the terrorism list.” Sharaa also urged people to ask the question of why people join al-Qaeda and to understand how U.S. policy has driven many to join al-Qaeda. Despite al-Qaeda’s attacks on civilians, such as those on 9/11, Sharaa claims that he does not, and never has, supported external attacks on civilians and that he has never killed an innocent person in one of his operations.

Regarding Sharaa’s plans for Syria’s future, he has highlighted the need for unity and democracy within the country. Sharaa has been named as Syria’s transitional president and HTS has also declared that the Constitution will be repealed and the army and parliament will both be terminated. HTS seems to be planning a complete upheaval of the existing Syrian government and Sharaa has announced his intention to create a constitution for this transition period and to hold a national dialogue conference to discuss the future of Syria. 

As a result of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, parts of Syria have been controlled by various militia groups. This civil war began with Assad’s crackdown on pro-democracy protests and did not end until the regime was overthrown. Sharaa has announced that all rebel militia groups will be absorbed into the government and that, to promote unity, all guns held by non-state actors should be surrendered to the new government. Regardless of whether Sharaa’s intentions are in earnest, this will likely be a difficult endeavor and possibly one that will never occur. After 53 years under the iron fist of the Assad regime, Syrians are their militia groups have faced constant terror and threat from their government and can be expected to be distrustful of a future government, especially one led by a former al-Qaeda member and a man who advocated for a fundamentalist Islamic rule. 

Due to the 14-year civil war, it has been incredibly difficult to obtain accurate data about Syria’s population statistics. The numbers vary by source, but it is estimated that Syria’s population is 70% Sunni Muslim, 10% Alawite and 3% Shi’a with a variety of other religious minorities, primarily Christian denominations.Sharaa is a Sunni Muslim, something that has worried many Syrians and even caused some Shi’a Muslims to flee the country for fear that Sharaa will lead religious persecution efforts. Conflicts between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims have defined much of the recent history of the Middle East and it remains to be seen how tensions between the two will play a role in Syria’s future.

Throughout early March 2025, the Alawites, a religious minority in Syria, have experienced a surge in violence against them. This has been a fear among Alawites since the overthrow of Assad as the Alawites have been politically dominant throughout the entirety of the Assad regime. Bashar al-Assad, along with his father, was an Alawate and installed Alawite leaders in his regime, suppressing other religious groups. Because of this, Alawites are often viewed as more sympathetic to the Assad regime. On Mar. 6, 2025, on the coast of Syria, a group of Assad loyalists attacked, killing hundreds of civilians and security forces. Security forces then provided a defense against these pro-Assad fighters. A number of unknown fighters then came in, killing Alawites in, presumably, a retaliatory action. As of Mar. 17, 2025, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) has reported at least 639 deaths as a result of the fighting on the Syrian coast. Following these events, Sharaa has called for peace amongst Syrians and promises that those responsible for targeting civilians will be held responsible.

With the changing landscape of Syria and the chaos within the country, the future of Syria remains unclear. Many have hope for the rule of Sharaa and many others worry that this will only continue division within the country and that this new rule will be no better than that of Assad. Sharaa holds firm in his hope for a united Syria, however, and the future of Syria remains hopeful, though unknown.

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The involvement of North Korean troops fighting on Russia’s side of the war in Ukraine is perplexing. Throughout its entire history, North Korea has never launched a foreign military intervention, so their presence in the Russian-Ukraine war is unprecedented. 

Russia is at a turning point in its history. With the war in Ukraine waging on for nearly three years, its ultimate status remains unclear; however, the war has undoubtedly questioned the U.S.-led global order. After the start of the invasion, Western nations immediately imposed trade and economic sanctions on Russia, effectively isolating it and reducing it to a pariah state similar to North Korea. 

As the war in Ukraine has gone on far longer than Russia anticipated, Russia has begun to run low on ammunition and manpower. Unwilling to back down on Ukraine, Moscow’s options for wartime trade have become largely restricted to the handful of other countries who have similarly been isolated from the Western financial world, such as Iran and North Korea. Russia has already been turning to Iran for thousands of cheap yet deadly drones throughout the war. As for North Korea, the country has spent decades preparing for a war with South Korea and the United States. As a result, outside of Russia itself, North Korea possesses the largest arsenal of artillery munitions of any country in the world. Realizing this and sharing a land border with North Korea, Putin saw a golden opportunity to restock on munitions by shipping artillery shells from Russia’s far east to the far west into Ukraine. 

In exchange, Russia agreed to give North Korea some of its significantly more advanced military technology compared to North Korea’s frozen in time Soviet military armaments. Previously, nearly the entire world including Russia was united in restricting trade with North Korea because of its nuclear weapons program. This restricted North Korea’s military from advancing into the modern day, especially compared to their South Korean counterpart. However, now that Russia has been ostracized by the Western world, its previous cooperation with Western powers has been abandoned, prompting Russia to seek new trading partners to counter its isolation.

The Russian Defence Minister visited Pyongyang in July 2023. Afterwards, Kim Jong Un traveled across the border to meet personally with Putin in September 2023. In summer 2024 Putin personally visited Kim on his own turf in Pyongyang for the first time in 24 years, pledging to support one another in the event of an attack on either country.

This marks a significant departure from North Korea’s previous attempts to normalize relations with the United States during the Trump administration, and realign its relations with Russia similarly as they were during the Cold War era. 

The details of Putin and Kim’s meetings are unknown, but the U.S. state department suggests that, since mid 2022, roughly 11,000 shipping containers have entered Russia from North Korea presumably carrying primarily munitions. Western estimates suggest that roughly 1.6 million to 6 million artillery shells have entered Russia from North Korea worth several billions of dollars. These shells are of debatable quality and reliability but have undoubtedly given Russia the edge in munitions while Russia restocks from their own factories. In October 2024, Western intelligence sources reported that roughly half of the Russian artillery shells used in Ukraine came from North Korea.

North Korea is arguably the most militarized country in the world. North Korea spends 36% of its GDP on military spending, which is nearly the same as Ukraine (37%) with an ongoing invasion across its territory. However, since North Korea is so impoverished, this is only a fraction of the spending the United States and South Korea spend on their militaries. 

Pyongyang knows that once Russia restores itself on munitions, its need for North Korea will diminish. As a result, in order to maintain the relationship and gain further military advances from Russia, North Korea is left offering Russia the only other thing they have that Russia is in need of: its massive reserves of soldiers. Approximately 30% of the entire North Korea population is either actively serving or in the reserves. All North Korean men are required to serve ten year terms while women are required to serve eight year terms. The country has more than 1.3 million personnel in their active duty army. This is almost as much as the 1.4 million U.S. personnel and more than Russia’s 1.1 million personnel.  

The New York Times estimated in October 2024 that approximately 115,000 Russian soldiers have been killed fighting in Ukraine, in addition to another 500,000 that have been wounded. Russia likely considered doing a larger mandate draft as Ukraine has done but it knows it would presumably make the war deeply unpopular. As a result, Moscow calculated the better option for itself is to give North Korea more technology in exchange for manpower. The Ukrainian military suspects that Moscow will use these North Korean troops to deploy in the Russian Kursk Oblast which Ukraine acquired in their counter offensive in August 2024. The presence of North Korean troops in Russian territory leads to frightening implications for the war and the rest of the world. 

Currently, the Ukraine-Russia war is at its worst point for Ukraine since the start of the war, with Russia slowly advancing further into Ukraine’s territory as Ukraine faces extreme artillery and manpower shortages. North Korean forces entering the Kursk Oblast would allow Russian troops to redeploy to the Russian offensive helping to increase their advances. The current North Korean troops are still untested with significant language barrier and operational differences to overcome. However, if North Korean soldiers prove effective it could suggest that these 10,000 troops are only the start of a much larger share of forces entering Russia to help the war effort. 

As for what this means outside of the Russian-Ukraine war, the Korean peninsula has become extremely precarious. In January 2024, Kim Jong Un formally called for an alteration to the North Korean constitution to remove all commitments to a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, he had the constitution changed to label South Korea as the nation’s “primary foe and invariable principle enemy.” In addition, he ordered the arch of reunification, a monument constructed in 2001 symbolizing Korea’s eventual reunification, to be destroyed. These moves effectively eliminate the long standing peaceful reunification of Korea from North Korea’s official policy. This has led several North Korea analysts to suggest that Kim Jong Un plans to go to war with South Korea. The publication does not suggest a specific when or how, only that Kim has made it in his mind to do so eventually. 

That being said, the South Korea military still far outclasses the North’s in almost every way. The rationale for North Korea to invade the South can be seen as extremely irrational. However, with the aid of advanced Russian technology in the form of advanced missiles, submarines, and more, South Korea is on high alert.

The involvement of North Korean troops in Russia’s war against Ukraine marks an unprecedented shift with significant implications for global security. For Russia, North Korea’s vast munitions and manpower alleviate critical shortages, enabling its prolonged offensive. For North Korea, the partnership offers advanced military technology, currently desperately needed by the Kim regime to bolster its aggressive ambitions. This alliance not only complicates Ukraine’s defense but also destabilizes the Korean peninsula, as Kim Jong Un dismantles the long standing peaceful reunification efforts and escalates hostile rhetoric toward South Korea. With authoritarian regimes deepening ties and defying international norms, the ripple effects of this partnership extend far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine, threatening to reshape regional dynamics and global power balances.

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Originally, the heart of this article centered around a nascent policy strategy by the Biden administration in regards to its lesser known allies and trade partners on the African continent. That policy, in my opinion, was likely to be continued under his chosen successor, Kamala Harris. However, due to a recent shift in the political agenda of the White House from Liberalism to Trumpism, the future relationship of the United States with the global south is now in question. Joseph Biden, despite his expansion of Trump-Era tariffs to protect domestic industry, was the furthest thing from an isolationist — in fact, it could be said that he is part of a fading generation of Democrat politicians who placed international cooperation and trade at the forefront of their political agenda, rather than focusing strictly on domestic politics. Still, both the African Union (AU) and Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have agency in regards to their trade and development strategies, and so despite a shift in U.S. interest in these projects, they may continue regardless.

On Sept. 7, 2024, Dr. Carla Bennett, chairman of the Caribbean Community, made a speech before Barbadian leaders and the press  in the capitol, Bridgetown. Dr. Bennett’s words, espousing the “vibrant pan-Africanism” and warm feelings between the Caribbean and African continent, at first seemed to be fairly standard pandering by an international leader. Amid the group of government officials and reporters, however, was an outlier — Okechukwu Ihejirika, chief operating officer of the African Export-Import Bank’s (Afreximbank) Caribbean office. 

Dr. Bennett’s words and Ihejirika’s attendance reflects a noteworthy trend of increasing political, economic, and social integration between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the African Union (AU). The year prior to Dr. Bennett’s speech, Afreximbank constructed a representative office in Barbados with the purpose of helping facilitate Africa-Caribbean trade. African and Caribbean leaders have met consistently since 2020 with the goal of Caribbean nations diversifying their export portfolio and to becoming closer with their neighbors across the Atlantic Ocean. That being said,  CARICOM is primarily an insular organization, akin to the European Union. The primary goal is to coordinate foreign and economic policies among member states, as well as economic integration and relative freedom of movement. To that end, much of CARICOM trade is with other members, and the majority of external trade still goes to larger powers such as the United States and China. Though Caribbean trade with Africa is minimal at the moment, it is clear that this is a developing relationship that may take years or decades to fully coalesce.

While the Caribbean may be best known for its idyllic beaches, rich culture and luxury crops such as nutmeg and indigo, it should start to be considered as a hotspot for a changing global economic order. Although some may overlook its assets, CARICOM has 15 votes at the UN and sits on a vital trade route between the United States, Mexico, South America and West Africa. CARICOM also rests quite comfortably within the U.S. sphere of economic and political influence, with a number of military bases and multilateral trade agreements made between the two actors. The United States wishes to keep CARICOM friendly towards it, as a trade and security partner to bolster the economy, combat the illicit drug trade from South America and project naval power into the southern oceans. How then, does this new strategy of economic development through trade diversification fit into the American agenda?

Under the Biden administration, Democratic leaders were committed to continued trade liberalization in line with neoliberal values. However,  it was abundantly clear that the United States had competition, primarily from an ascendant China who reached out to the global south through a flood of public and private investments, trade agreements and land purchases for the purpose of trade and security. 

This strategy, known as the Belt and Road initiative, sought to tie nations of the global south to China through a mix of debt trap diplomacy and circular trade relationships, blocking the United States out of the region economically. The old trade order, in which U.S. economic dominance relied on open markets, is now in danger of fracturing under the pressure of increased regional integration, potentially shutting the United States out of a Chinese-led trade order. 

Fearing this, the United States has ramped up its own investments, particularly in the African continent. Biden’s cabinet directly named Kenya as a potential trade partner and a major non-NATO ally, a country that has recently become disillusioned with the Belt and Road after a disastrous railway project halted last year. On the Southern cone of the continent, U.S. and European governments have elected to help fund a railway that connects the coast of Angola with the African interior, rich in minerals integral to electric vehicle battery manufacturing. The potential for this project is enormous: Joe Biden already wants to bolster the U.S. EV industry, and diminish Chinese influence in a hotly contested region, rich in UN votes as much as minerals and luxury items, effectively killing two birds with one stone.

The Caribbean could serve as an excellent proxy for this continued United States-Africa partnership. Already kindred in identity (with founding visions based on the ideals of pan-Africanism and decolonization), CARICOM could become the source of a linkage for U.S. foreign policy toward Africa – increased cooperation with one region could coincide with increased cooperation in the other. Rather than being directly managed by the United States, this trilateral relationship grows under tacit approval from Washington, justified as part of an existing history of trade liberalization. Given proper attention and encouragement, a pro-United States trade bloc could have formed among Caribbean and African states, trading with each other as much as they traded with the United States. However, just this last month a bomb was thrown into these plans. Newly elected 47th President Donald J. Trump, a vehement isolationist and staunch anti-China politician, is ambiguous as to his policy regarding trade and investment to either region. For starters, these developments are marginal in the minds of the American people, with domestic matters and the wars in Ukraine and Gaza being the primary foreign issues of interest. Trump’s strategy may be unshackled by commitments to his constituency and may continue under different leadership, in the same way that Trump-era tariffs toward China were maintained under Biden. However, that may also mean a U.S. withdrawal of direct involvement in the growing Caribbean-Africa relationship. The Lobito corridor may lose funding, and the HOPE and HELP acts (which give preferential textile trading rights toward Haiti) may disappear in a tide of protectionism, a policy that seeks to protect domestic industries by shutting out competition via tariffs. However, the CARICOM-AU partnership is not necessarily dead in the water. 

Ignoring the economic incentives to continue working together, there are a number of security and political benefits for the Caribbean and Africa to reap from a continued partnership. A renewed Trump presidency brings the future of trade with the United States as a whole into question – shaking a dependency on American goods and services may lessen the blow should tariffs be implemented. Similarly, African exports are primarily oriented towards advanced industrialized countries such as China, the EU and the United States, often not focusing on developing nations overseas or even other African states. Afreximbank is already focused on developing inter-African trade, and developing a more diverse portfolio only helps to achieve further independence from the northern capital. In addition to these benefits toward sovereignty, unifying policy agendas in international institutions makes a CARICOM-AU bloc a formidable force to reckon with. Leaders have already cooperated on social issues such as petitioning for a formal program to institute reparations for African slavery, a feat that could potentially be replicated on other issues, ranging from civil conflict to economic development. 

Despite a potential setback in what could have been a geopolitical boon for the United States, CARICOM and the AU have no real incentives to end their burgeoning alliance. From trade to development to security to social issues, the two blocs have more similarities than differences, and it is in their best interests to continue cooperation through bilateral agreements and negotiations. Perhaps, this new dynamic may represent a shift toward coordination among developing nations rather than clamoring toward the world hegemons, as it becomes evident that the free trade order is more threatened than ever by protectionists in both Europe and the United States. What remains to be seen is how the new Trump administration wishes to engage with the winds of change.

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Lebanese citizens’ opinions on Hezbollah are varied and many are quite critical of the organization. Throughout Lebanon, Shia Muslims look at the group relatively favorably while Sunni Muslims and Christians have a much more negative opinion of Hezbollah. However, despite disagreements on the stances and actions of the group, 99% of Arabs agree that all Arab countries must cease contact with Israel in response to Israeli military action in Gaza. Hezbollah as an ideological entity is not necessarily well-loved, but it is also one of few groups committed to resisting the Israeli occupation. This then becomes a difficult issue for many Lebanese civilians as Israel continues its attempt to expand into southern Lebanon, in addition to Gaza and the West Bank. It seems that the only solution is the creation of an organization that will both have higher approval from Lebanese citizens and protect the country from Israeli occupation.

In this conversation of Lebanese support for Hezbollah, it is important to understand the religious makeup of Lebanon. While Lebanon recognizes 18 religious sects, there are three major factions, with 31.9% of Lebanese citizens identifying as Sunni Muslims, 31.2% as Shia Muslims and 32.4% as Christians. While all three groups are very close in size, it is interesting to note that Hezbollah is a Shiite group despite Shia Muslims being the smallest of the three largest religious groups. Shia Muslims are the largest group in Iran, however, which is the country responsible for the funding of Hezbollah.

Conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims has been a cause of division throughout the Middle East, with major clashes in both Syria and Iraq. Despite 85% of Muslims identifying as Sunni and 15% as Shia, Sunnis have not dominated militarily and there remains a great sectarian divide in countries like Lebanon. Fear of conflict is not limited to one group, though, with 67% of Lebanese Muslims believing that Shia-Sunni tensions are a big issue. The emergence of Hezbollah has certainly not aided this and, despite having governmental representation, Sunnis and Christians alike feel as though Hezbollah as a governing entity does not represent them.

Notably, in September 2024, an Israeli airstrike killed Hassan Nasrallah, a Hezbollah founder who led the group for over 30 years. Despite disagreements over Hezbollah’s existence, Nasrallah was relatively well-liked due to his resistance to Israel, including overseeing the end of Israel’s 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon.

During an interview in September 1992, Nasrallah asserted that Hezbollah is a resistance party that opposes the creation of an Islamic Republic in Lebanon. Additionally, in their 1998 Statement of Purpose, Hezbollah says, “It should be clear that the kind of Islam we want is a civilized endeavor that rejects injustice, humiliation, slavery, subjugation, colonialism and blackmail while we stretch out our arms for communication among nations on the basis of mutual respect.” 

In the U.S. Counterterrorism Guide, Hezbollah has been classified as a terrorist group since 1997, a designation shared by the Arab League and the EU, among others. Since the group’s inception, it has been responsible for several terrorist attacks around the world. Hezbollah has bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut both in 1983 and 1984, with a total of 101 killed and at least 120 injured.

While Hezbollah was created to force Israel to cede its occupied Lebanese territory, the group has now morphed into a different sort of entity. Now, Hezbollah has transitioned from a military wing to a group with heavy influence in both Lebanese military action and politics. In addition, Hezbollah no longer solely targets the Israeli occupation. A prime example of this is the 1994 operation targeting a Jewish community center and killing 94 people in Buenos Aires. 
Since its inception, the United States has given Israel a total of $310 billion in aid, a vast majority of such being military. While the United States views the Hezbollah attacks as unprecedented, Hezbollah sees the United States as a proxy for Israel, funding the occupation of Palestine as well as southern Lebanon. As the United States continues to fund Israel’s attacks on Gazan civilians, a direct opposition to the goals of Hezbollah, it is difficult to see a future where Hezbollah’s terrorist designation is removed.

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Ukraine

After the election, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky congratulated Trump, saying he looks forward to a strong U.S. approach to global affairs. Trump has pledged to end the war in Ukraine but has revealed little plans on how he would do so. The United States provides the most aid to Ukraine out of any other country, and Trump, alongside his Vice President JD Vance have cast doubt on whether they would continue military aid to Ukraine. This would be devastating for the hopes of beating Russia, which is steadily advancing into Ukraine’s Donbas region. President Putin has not congratulated Trump, and re-iterated U.S. hostility towards Russia making them hesitant to make any statements on the future of the two countries’ relationship. However, given Trump and Putin’s friendly-ish relationship (possible collusion between Russian officials and Trump campaign members in 2016 and Trump calling Putin a “genius” for invading Ukraine), it would not be surprising for the Trump administration to reduce aid to Ukraine. Last week, President Biden sent Ukraine official approval to use American long-range missiles to strike deep within Russian territory, a move seen as Biden hedging against Trump’s future plans.

Hungary

Moving westward, another relationship that should be watched is that between Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a right-wing autocrat. Hungary and Russia are close, despite Hungary’s membership in the European Union and NATO. Hungary relies on Russia for gas and is refusing to let aid pass through Hungary into Ukraine. Additionally, Orbán was the only EU leader to endorse Trump for the U.S. presidency and flouted their close relationship. Therefore, under the new administration, Hungary might gain an influx of foreign investment from American companies or enjoy a closer economic relationship. These circumstances suggest there will be good relations between the United States and Hungary over the next four years. 

Poland

Another conservative leader, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda, congratulated Trump on his win. Duda wants to strengthen Poland’s relationship with the United States, but Poland is against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, sending more than $3.5 billion to support Ukraine’s army. Duda’s main goal is to curry U.S. favor and keep the United States in NATO, so it’s no surprise that Duda has tried to become closer friends with Donald Trump. In April 2024, Duda and Trump met in New York City for dinner, and both shared positive sentiments, with Trump stating that he is “behind Poland all the way.” Thus, it would not be surprising to see Poland continue to schmooze up to the incoming president in the coming months. 

Czech Republic and Slovakia

The Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both populist conservatives, have welcomed Trump with open arms.

Petr Fiala, the Prime Minister of Slovakia, and President Biden have enjoyed positive relations, with the U.S. and Slovakia becoming closer over the past four years. The Czech Republic has continued sending military aid to Ukraine, but Fiala is growing weary as the war has surpassed its 1000th day. In September, he stated that Ukraine “will have to be realistic” about the growing possibility of ceding some territory to Russia, even if temporarily.

Fico has ended Slovakia’s military aid to Ukraine and opposes Ukraine’s bid to enter NATO. Slovakia is in the midst of a political crisis, with a sharp divide between Fico’s conservative government and the liberal opposition party. Fico has been consolidating power, undermining media independence, eliminating the office responsible for investigating political corruption and prohibiting protests. As such, expect to see Slovakia drifting towards an Orbán-style populist way of governing, to Trump’s delight.

The fate of Ukraine lies, in large part, in the hands of Trump and Vance. 

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Despite diligent efforts to contain the radiation, around 5.5 metric tons of radioactive water leaked from the area in February 2024. Although the water was successfully contained before escaping the premises, preventing the surrounding environment from being contaminated, TEPCO was unable to prevent the damage done to its reputation. 

While the initial reactions to the 2011 meltdown in the international sphere were mainly those of sympathy and a growing general weariness of nuclear power, the tone changed after Japan’s announcement that it would release the treated wastewater into the ocean beginning Aug. 24, 2023. The international community, specifically Japan’s neighbors, was furious about the decision as they believe the wastewater is still toxic; however, their outcries did not deter the Japanese government’s decision. The recent wastewater spillage of 5.5 metric tons occurred around half a year after the initial release of wastewater and only contributes more to the anti-dumping rhetoric present, fighting for a reversal of Japan and TEPCO’s initiative.

South Korea, arguably one of Japan’s most valuable neighbors due to the two nations’ respective alliances with the United States, has been one of the first and most vocal in calling out Japan’s actions. The relationship between the two countries has historically been incredibly tense and volatile, largely due to Japan’s colonization of Korea during World War II. To this day, both Japan and South Korea continue to harbor resentment towards one another, making cooperation between the two difficult. However, Japan’s decision to dump the wastewater was originally viewed as a unique opening for the South Korean government to better its relationship with Japan. Under Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, the South Korean government endorsed Japan and TEPCO’s dumping but was instantly met with outrage from the majority of the South Korean citizenry, who took to the streets to protest the endorsement. South Korea quickly switched its position to one of condemnation for Japan, increasing its number of trade restrictions on the regions around Fukushima.

Although the new South Korean trade restrictions harmed Japanese exports, specifically in the aquatic sector, China’s reaction to the wastewater dumpage was far worse. Unlike South Korea, the Chinese Communist Party did not waver in its response, instantly putting pressure on Japan to stop its wastewater disposal and banning aquatic goods from Fukushima and other surrounding prefectures. Ignoring the Chinese warning, Japan continued to carry out its plans, causing China to retaliate still further with a universal ban on all Japanese aquatic-based products. The import bans from South Korea and China, as well as several other countries, severely harmed Japan’s fishing sector, however, Japan’s overall economy remains strong.

Accusations about the immorality of wastewater dumping are constantly being thrown at Japan by its neighbors, but are the criticisms even valid? In terms of hazard levels, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has consistently reported that TEPCO’s wastewater dumps have all been significantly below legal radiation limits. Likewise, the entire site is compliant with IAEA guidelines, even having an IAEA office on-site for constant feedback and monitoring. The recent radioactive water spillage was one of the only notable incidents during the entire decommissioning process of Fukushima Daiichi, meaning that such mistakes are a rare occurrence. This can be attributed to TEPCO’s commitment to prevent any accidents from happening twice, being aware of the dangerous nature of the hazards they handle. While it has not necessarily done a perfect job, TEPCO has made a large effort to keep Japan compliant with the rules of the IAEA, preventing further backlash from occurring.

In addition to verifying the levels of radiation in wastewater, the IAEA is also responsible for ensuring that radiation in fisheries and other aquatic resources remains at a safe level. As such, the fish and other products produced in Fukushima prefecture have been declared legally safe for consumption, contrary to public concerns.

In terms of the international community, the case against Japan becomes far weaker when considering that some of the dissenting countries, namely China, also have a history of releasing radioactive wastewater into the ocean. China’s wastewater has actually been shown to have higher traces of tritium, a radioactive isotope created from nuclear power plants, compared to Fukushima Daiichi.

International tensions surrounding Japan’s release of radioactive wastewater most likely do not, in actuality, stem from the perceived dangers of TEPCO’s operations, but rather from Japan’s difficult history with its neighbors. Due to the precarious relationship between Japan, South Korea and China, experts theorize that it is Japan’s colonial World War II background that created a lack of trust between it and the larger international community. Becoming a major colonial power, Japan managed to colonize parts of China, all of Korea and a large section of Southeast Asia. Aside from the colonization of the respective countries, Japan also enacted the policy of comfort women in the places they conquered, forcing women into sexual slavery in brothels. The horrors of colonization, pleasure women and other terrible acts still hang heavy in the minds of many South Korean and Chinese citizens, making cooperation between the three countries difficult—the situation of Fukushima Daiichi is but another part of this pattern.

While the Fukushima Daiichi meltdown was purely domestic, its consequences had an expansive international reach. With increasing pressures from rival nations, Japan’s attitudes towards Fukushima Daiichi need to shift or else their already strained relationships might reach a breaking point. Despite this, through cooperation with protesting countries, a common ground towards the disposal of toxic wastewater could be reached, ultimately resolving this decade-long issue.

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