Announced as a “special military operation,” Russia officially invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022. Since then, the West, led by the United States and the EU, has donated billions of dollars worth of equipment, humanitarian aid and more to Ukraine in an effort to stall and hopefully fully repel Russia’s invasion. This support had been widely covered by international media, with Ukraine frequently encouraging allies to send more aid. However, many people may not know that the United States actually began donating to Ukraine following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2017, Trump’s administration continued sending weapons to Ukraine, primarily sending Javelin antitank missiles. This practice continued and increased following the Russian invasion in February of 2022, when the United States Congress passed a $13.6 billion aid package to be sent to Ukraine. 

By Feb. 27, 2022 the European Union responded swiftly and similarly with a 500 million euro, roughly $577 million,  military package composed of 90% “military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force…”  By the end of May 2022, Ukraine had received two billion euros ($2.3 billion) from the European Union, $55 billion from the United States, and over 1.3 billion pounds ($1.7 billion) from the United Kingdom. The start of this war shook the geopolitical landscape of the world. Countries were shaken, frightened at what more could come and were staunchly motivated to resist Russia’s encroachment into Ukraine’s territory. With over $59 billion in aid, Ukraine was able to launch its 2022 Kherson counteroffensive, taking back Kherson, the only regional capital that Russia was able to occupy since its initial invasion. 

This huge financial package and commitment from the West signaled the West’s support for Ukraine and its opposition to Russia’s actions. However, the war has now lasted over three years and sees no clear end in sight. Therefore, it begs the question of how long can this commitment last? 

The last U.S. aid packages sent to Ukraine came in the form of $3.4 billion in “direct budget support” on Dec. 30, 2024 and $500 million worth of military aid on Jan. 9, 2025. These packages were approved by the Biden administration, presumably to preempt changes before the Trump administration took over. 

Since the start of the second Trump administration, the United States has suspended all aid to Ukraine. In doing this, Trump seems to be applying pressure on Ukrainian President Zelensky to sue for peace, stating that Zelensky is “gambling with World War three.” The EU on the other hand, has not slowed down its aid. From January to Aug. 31, 2025, the EU has already given roughly $50 billion worth of aid to Ukraine, ranging from direct financial support and loans to military equipment.

From these donation patterns, conclusions about the United States and European Union’s differing attitudes towards Ukraine appear. Evidently, the European Union has not been experiencing Ukrainian fatigue as they continue to donate billions of dollars worth of equipment to Ukraine in an effort to fight Russia. The EU likely feels a larger threat from Russia than the United States does. If Russia were to take over part or all of Ukraine, Russia would be closer to the EU than to the U.S., essentially knocking on the EU’s doorstep. If a war were to occur, it would likely be on Russia’s Western front making it significantly closer to the EU than to the U.S. This difference suggests differing threat perceptions between the U.S. and EU with the second Trump administration stalling funding. 

Furthermore, this does not seem likely to change any time soon as the relationship between Trump and Zelensky has been shaky at best following their clash in the Oval Office. However, a “Supporting Ukraine Act of 2025” bill has been introduced to Congress on July 31, 2025, though has not been voted on by the Senate or the House of Representatives. While U.S. aid has stalled at the federal governmental level, public support echoes this attitude as well. While 46% of polled Americans say U.S. assistance to Ukraine is not enough, the other 53% of Americans polled state that American assistance to Ukraine is either the right amount or too much. 

However, it is worth noting that the sentiment of sending American support to Ukraine is on the rise. In December 2024, only 30% of Americans said not enough aid was being sent, and by March, 46% said it was not enough. The contrast between EU and U.S. relations with Ukraine highlights a shift in Western engagement: while Europe views the conflict as a more immediate security threat, the U.S. political landscape reflects growing wariness over long-term involvement.

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Ukraine

After the election, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky congratulated Trump, saying he looks forward to a strong U.S. approach to global affairs. Trump has pledged to end the war in Ukraine but has revealed little plans on how he would do so. The United States provides the most aid to Ukraine out of any other country, and Trump, alongside his Vice President JD Vance have cast doubt on whether they would continue military aid to Ukraine. This would be devastating for the hopes of beating Russia, which is steadily advancing into Ukraine’s Donbas region. President Putin has not congratulated Trump, and re-iterated U.S. hostility towards Russia making them hesitant to make any statements on the future of the two countries’ relationship. However, given Trump and Putin’s friendly-ish relationship (possible collusion between Russian officials and Trump campaign members in 2016 and Trump calling Putin a “genius” for invading Ukraine), it would not be surprising for the Trump administration to reduce aid to Ukraine. Last week, President Biden sent Ukraine official approval to use American long-range missiles to strike deep within Russian territory, a move seen as Biden hedging against Trump’s future plans.

Hungary

Moving westward, another relationship that should be watched is that between Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a right-wing autocrat. Hungary and Russia are close, despite Hungary’s membership in the European Union and NATO. Hungary relies on Russia for gas and is refusing to let aid pass through Hungary into Ukraine. Additionally, Orbán was the only EU leader to endorse Trump for the U.S. presidency and flouted their close relationship. Therefore, under the new administration, Hungary might gain an influx of foreign investment from American companies or enjoy a closer economic relationship. These circumstances suggest there will be good relations between the United States and Hungary over the next four years. 

Poland

Another conservative leader, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda, congratulated Trump on his win. Duda wants to strengthen Poland’s relationship with the United States, but Poland is against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, sending more than $3.5 billion to support Ukraine’s army. Duda’s main goal is to curry U.S. favor and keep the United States in NATO, so it’s no surprise that Duda has tried to become closer friends with Donald Trump. In April 2024, Duda and Trump met in New York City for dinner, and both shared positive sentiments, with Trump stating that he is “behind Poland all the way.” Thus, it would not be surprising to see Poland continue to schmooze up to the incoming president in the coming months. 

Czech Republic and Slovakia

The Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both populist conservatives, have welcomed Trump with open arms.

Petr Fiala, the Prime Minister of Slovakia, and President Biden have enjoyed positive relations, with the U.S. and Slovakia becoming closer over the past four years. The Czech Republic has continued sending military aid to Ukraine, but Fiala is growing weary as the war has surpassed its 1000th day. In September, he stated that Ukraine “will have to be realistic” about the growing possibility of ceding some territory to Russia, even if temporarily.

Fico has ended Slovakia’s military aid to Ukraine and opposes Ukraine’s bid to enter NATO. Slovakia is in the midst of a political crisis, with a sharp divide between Fico’s conservative government and the liberal opposition party. Fico has been consolidating power, undermining media independence, eliminating the office responsible for investigating political corruption and prohibiting protests. As such, expect to see Slovakia drifting towards an Orbán-style populist way of governing, to Trump’s delight.

The fate of Ukraine lies, in large part, in the hands of Trump and Vance. 

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Macron is now the first French president in history to openly endorse Corsican autonomy, saying in his address, “Let us have the audacity to build a Corsican autonomy within the [French] Republic.” In 2022, French officials began discussing potentially granting Corsica greater autonomy after the death of a prominent nationalist figure, Yvan Colonna. Colonna had been imprisoned for killing Claude Erignac, a top French government official stationed in Corsica, in 1998. However, since then, not much has changed for the island. Macron’s words are therefore poised to open the issue up to debate once more. 

However, rather than promoting unconditional autonomy for Corsica, Macron’s speech was more nuanced in its message. The French President made it clear that the potential new rights being given to Corsica will only be granted conditionally. The island will “not be [granted]autonomy against the state, nor autonomy without the state.” Currently Corsica is classified as a “territorial collectivity,” meaning the nation has its own assembly elected by Corsican people which is able to legislate on local affairs. However, the French government still has ultimate control. Although the official status of the island may be changed with the Corsican people being more powerful over their own land, that power only extends until they attempt to separate or go against France. 

Macron’s words are a step in the right direction, but it is only one story in the long history of Corsica’s nationalist movement for greater rights from France. The island has its own unique language and culture separate from the mainland French population. In fact, much of Corsican culture, especially its language, is more closely aligned with Italian traditions. This is due to the long period of control by the Republic of Genoa from the 13th-18th centuries before the French became in control. One of the main demands of nationalists today is the equal emphasis in education to the Corsican and French languages. 

The uniqueness of Corsican culture has generated widespread nationalist sentiment throughout the nation, particularly over the last 40 years. Some argue for more autonomy for the island, such as greater control over the economy and the island’s governance, while separatists call for a complete separation from the French. 

One of Corsica’s most notable separatist groups is the Corsica National Liberation Front or FLNC, a violent, nationalist political organization formed in 1976, a year which marked the beginning of the Corsican conflict between this group and French militarints. The FLNC is a separatist organization which believes in a complete severing of their land from French control. Since the 1980s, the group has claimed responsibility for hundreds of bombings, particularly targeting buildings and homes owned by non-Corsican settlers, who the FLNC believed were representations of the continued presence of outsiders on their land. This period of armed resistance was marked by guerilla tactics, including assassinations of political figures, such as Claude Erignac. However, the group officially ended its use of violence for political means in 2014. 

This shift in ideology came after the Corsican assembly passed a few major separatist demands, including establishing Corsican as a co-official language alongside French. Also passed was a mandatory minimum five-year residency requirement in order to be able to purchase property, as well as an amendment to the French constitution which could open the door to greater administrative authority in Corsica. 

However, many Corsicans felt that these accomplishments were unlikely to become a reality. The demands which had been granted by the Corsican assembly would then have to be passed by the French government in a constitutional amendment. At the time, France was still unwilling to discuss conditions of a more autonomous Corsica. So, although armed resistance stopped, the demands of nationalists were never fulfilled. 

In response to this popular discontent, a political alliance known as Pe a Corsica (For Corsica) formed in 2015 when separatist group Corsica Libera joined with the more moderate pro-autonomy group, Femu a Corsica (Let’s Make Corsica). This alliance enjoyed electoral success immediately after its founding until it was dissolved following the 2021 elections due to dissension within the group. 

In 2015, Pe a Corsica won more than 35% of the vote, approaching a majority in the local authority council by winning 24 of 51 seats. The leader of the alliance, Gilles Simeoni, former mayor of Bastia and lawyer for Yvan Colonna, was elected the president of the executive council of Corsica. Later, in 2017, Pe a Corsica accumulated more seats, winning 56.5% of the votes in the second round. It is clear that nationalist sentiment remains strong among the Corsican people, including in the last election in 2021 with the percentage of pro-autonomy control rising to 57.7%. 

Yet despite Pe a Corsica’s control over the local assembly, not much progress was actually made in terms of Corsican rights because the assembly’s control over legislation is limited by the French government. In 2019, revision to the French Constitution fell through which would have upgraded Corsica’s status to a “Special Status Community,” granting greater rights of self-legislation to Corsicans, a fact which some French governmental officials worried would weaken the French parliament. 

Following the death of prominent separatist leader Yvan Colonna in 2022, Corsica saw large protests, as people took to the streets blaming the French government for his death. These protests were especially inspired by Colonna’s role as a major figurehead for the Corsican nationalist movement. After Colonna was arrested for the assisination of Claude Erignac, he was imprisoned on the French mainland as a political prisoner. However, many protestors believed that Colonna should be moved to a prison in Corsica. The French government only agreed to the demands after Colonna had been seriously injured from the incident, later dying from these injuries. Protests ramped up after Colonna’s death, arguing that this failure to listen to the demands earlier on led to his death. Protestors adopted the slogan “Statu Francese Assassinu” (The French State is an Assassin), and took to the streets to argue for their island’s rights. 

Despite opportunities for change, including the 2019 amendment to the French constitution, the French government has stood in the way, leading Corsicans to remain frustrated with the lack of progress. Macron may have promised to reopen the conversation over Corsica’s status; however, the island’s future remains uncertain. Corsican autonomy has been a taboo subject for the French government despite the over 50 year long history of nationalist movements on the island. Through understanding this historical context we can hope to see a change in the relationship between Corisca and France, a change that according to Macron, may be coming very soon.

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In May 2023, this acute rainfall caused severe flooding in Italy’s northern region of Emilia Romagna. What began with reports of incoming bad weather concluded with flooding that impacted 50 municipalities, displaced over 30,000 people and caused damages nearing billions of dollars in the agricultural and infrastructure sectors.

The flooding marked one of the worst environmental emergencies for the region since an earthquake in 2012. However, to understand the nature of the event and how the government is handling its aftermath, it is first important to gain a better picture of the conditions and consequences that defined Emilia Romagna’s dark summer season.  

The Flooding – Causes and Aggravating Variables

Starting May 1, Emilia Romagna saw rainfall in the provinces of Bologna, Ravenna and Forlì-Cesena. After an impending storm warning coming in from the Mediterranean, the region reported 200 millimeters of rainfall in 24 hours, equaling over two standard months of rainfall in a single day. In response, Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni declared a state of emergency.  

The situation was exacerbated further by the soil’s inability to retain water. The 2022 droughts slowed the soil’s capacity to absorb water, worsening the severity of May’s massive water inputs. Additionally, terrain in the impacted areas was unable to drain, because two weeks later, the regions saw renewed, heavier rainfall totaling 300 millimeters. These conditions made it almost impossible to counteract the rising water volumes. In many areas, it was reported that torrent water levels rose as much as 20 meters, making it extremely difficult for city officials and individuals to properly react in time. 

Furthermore, Emilia’s geographic makeup is composed of hundreds of narrow waterways and many counties in the region of Romagna specifically do not have extended detention ponds as sources for helping barrier rainfall residue. 

Since the flooding, the regional government has been heavily criticized due to reports that it was provided national funds between 2015-2022 to invest in the development of these mechanisms, but approximately half of the projects were still in development or not operational at the time of the flooding. This discovery increased conversation over preparation protocols for environmental emergencies, particularly regarding improved canal maintenance and cleaning on the part of city officials.  

Additionally, the severity of the May rainfalls has been linked to climate change. The University of Padova released a summary study explaining that climate change has increased temperatures and changed the circulation patterns in the Mediterranean region, affecting the predominance of rainfall in Western Europe. 

As such, Emilia Romagna’s flooding demonstrates that lack of government planning and infrastructure, when brought into contact with drought and climate change concerns, amplified the floods’ severity. 

Damages, Response and Current Developments 

The flooding left many cities, such as the town of Conselice, vastly underwater for weeks. It has been estimated that infrastructure damage to houses and public buildings is near 8 billion dollars. However, causing alarm is also the floods’ effects to the region’s agricultural landscape. Emilia Romagna produces over 20% of Italy’s vegetables, but since the flood some of the region’s largest agricultural produce companies are facing years of losses and rebuilding programs. 

The regional government has estimated that 21,000 agriculture enterprises have been impacted, covering 45% of Emilia Romagna’s agricultural area. Furthermore, studies are still underway to determine the geographic effect on the soil itself. The heavy water levels have largely destroyed the soil structure, particularly the porous part of the terrain in charge of circulating air through the root systems, causing many fruit and wheat plots to die of an asphyxiated environment.

After the summer months, the situation has improved, with water levels removed. However, Italy is now faced with the challenging aftermath of dealing with clean-up efforts and public health consequences.

In many cities, the government issued health advisories and sent mandatory tetanus vaccinations due to sewage systems overflowing and contaminated waterways increasing the risk of infections and bacterial exposure. Nearing the beginning of the summer season, many of Romagna’s tourist beach areas, better known as “lidi,” have also prohibited bathability, impacting the tourism industry. 

Yet, since the flooding, the region has reported expressive displays of solidarity from citizens and the general public. Echoing back to Florence’s flooding incidents in the 1960s, Romagna saw the arrival of “angeli del fango” or “‘mud angels,” a group of volunteers that helped organize the impacted areas to shuttle out waste, as well as aiding individuals in saving residences and personal appliances. The flooding led to mass public support, with some of Italy’s biggest names in the music industry organizing a benefit concert June 24 in conjunction with the culture ministry to raise money for the region. 

Next Steps and Continuity

The more pressing question has become how the government will work at supporting citizens and mitigating the public infrastructure damages. Italy’s population at large does not own extensive insurance coverage. Citizens vastly rely on public government services in exchange for tax payments. Flooding left thousands of people displaced, most of whom do not have any insurance covering their properties in the case of environmental disasters. Worry stems over how Italy’s already largely indebted government will now meet rising pressures to distribute emergency checks to citizens who have lost everything. Italy announced the regional government of Emilia Romagna has been provided an 8 million euro fund, 5,000 per family, for urgent intervention for citizens reporting damages. Furthermore, the government announced on Sept. 25, that beginning Nov. 15 the platform “Sfinge,” used in the past to organize restoration efforts, will be made available for affected businesses and individuals to request compensation. However, criticism over past government aid has laid at the foundation of its bureaucratic steps, which delayed fund distribution and projects for years.

The flooding marked for Emilia Romangna one of the worst environmental emergencies in decades. However, it served as a powerful reminder to remember the upcoming consequences of climate change in tandem with the vitality of well-maintained government services and protocols. The true test will emerge as reconstruction begins and plans come to light over how Emilia Romagna will work to rebuild its agricultural, infrastructure and residential environment. Taking lessons from this flood will be crucial, particularly because the Higher Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA) reported Emilia Romagna stands at a much greater flood risk than the rest of the country due to its plains and lowlands, with climate change looming in the horizon. 

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The reform plan, which aimed to raise the retirement age from 62 to 64 years old, was proposed to ease the financial burden of France’s public pension system. It passed on March 16 with President Macron overriding Parliament after two failed votes of no confidence. However, the reform faced extreme backlash from unions and citizens, who took to the streets to oppose the bill and its reverberant consequences on France’s working population. Most recently, on March 7, over one million people participated in the demonstrations, which blockaded eight of France’s largest oil refineries. 

The protests have bridged political divides and presented questions of working conditions and social welfare. In this way, France’s predicament highlights a growing issue on the global sphere: rapidly aging populations. 

The World Economic Forum has recently estimated that the number of persons over 65 years old is expected to reach 1.6 billion by 2050. As such, providing care and support to seniors is projected as one of the next decades’ most pressing policies. With countries such as Japan holding the highest proportion of people over 60, at 28.7%, many countries’ demographics present a red flag to governments who will have to tackle what the International Monetary Fund has labeled the next long-term global crisis. 

So how does France’s predicament apply to pensions and understanding how the global community will tackle their impending demographic pyramids? 

The build-up to French reforms

The 20th century’s advancements in life expectancy, coupled with a decline in birth rates, has spurred an increasing number of older adults in comparison to younger populations. While people are generally living longer, healthier lives, the old-age dependency ratio, the proportion of young people working to support retirees, has steadily increased over the past 20 years. This means many countries have been left dealing with how to afford social security. Just in 2023, France was among the countries with the highest ratio, sitting at 55.8%, meaning there are less than two working-age people per aging individual. 

This has made the question of sustainability the core of the French government’s rhetoric toward its proposed pension reform. Premier Elisabeth Borne presented that there have not been enough worker contributions to sustain pension spending, leading to large government expenditures in order to bridge the gap. In 2020, France’s spending made up 13.7% of its annual GDP, making the system among the most costly in Europe. 

Yet, while France’s impending pressures are acknowledged, many labor unions claim the government has exaggerated estimations. According to a recent report by France’s Pension Guidance Council, although the pensions system will trend towards deficit in the coming years, it is currently in surplus. Therefore, citizens have proclaimed the government should find an alternative financing solution that will not have a detrimental impact on the older population.

Among the negative issues raised by protestors is that of the senior unemployment rate. France has one of the lowest employment rates among EU nations for individuals between 55-64 years, raising concerns over how the government will help support job opportunities for the elderly.

France’s system at a glance and the build up to reform

Currently, an individual in France needs at least 62 years of age to apply for a state pension. The country’s system operates along a continuum depending on when someone started working, their occupation and special circumstances accrued.

Citizens born after 1968 need approximately 41 years of working experience to obtain full pensions, which range at an estimated 1000-1200 euros. If the minimum contributions are not met, France provides old-age pensions to all citizens over 67 years old. 

The schemes, however, are centered around a mandatory pay-as-you-go structure, where the current workforce helps maintain and pay contributions to retirees. The recipient’s pension amounts are centered around a points system, where individuals accumulate points based on their career experiences and salaries to gain additional benefits. 

The most recent proposal stems from Macron’s movement to universalize the system and gradually remove the specialized pension schemes. All steps he believes will help stabilize the system and save the government over 12 billion euros. Macron claims raising the retirement age will increase the minimum pensions by an average of 800 euros and avoid worse measures such as increasing the contributions of current workers, raising payroll taxes or cutting funding from other government programs. 

Nevertheless, unionists have proposed an array of different solutions which they believe more justly treats the older populations, such as raising taxes on businesses and employers to fund retirement costs. Although Macron has stated that he wants the government to work out solutions to push corporations to share more profits with workers and ensure corporations are taxed on super-profits, in a recently translated interview with the news outlet France 24, the French president avoided further comment on this proposal. Macron held that raising the retirement age was the only solution to balance spending. 

Policy Issues

Raising the retirement age is not a new phenomenon. Since 2012, over 82% of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) member countries have undergone increases. Just in 2011, Italy passed its retirement reform, which aimed to raise the retirement age to 67 years old.

Yet what France signals is a purview of policy issues that arise along with an aging population. Starting from social security and support, France opened Pandora’s box to possibilities regarding modernizing pension systems to support retirees. 

One of the most commonly implemented measures to change the pension system, particularly in Asian and Nordic countries, is the introduction of Automatic Adjustment Mechanisms (AAMs). AAMs are a series of fixed rules to evolve pension systems to changing criterias. Popular AAMs include Notional Defined Contribution Scheme (NDCs), which alter pension benefits to life expectancy through a series of formulas in a pay-as-you-go system, and balancing mechanisms which calculate the minimum rate to finance the system for the next 75 years. 

Automatic Adjustment Mechanisms were adopted by both Japan and Germany in 2004 to help maintain balance within their pension systems. Although they have been criticized in the past for depoliticizing the system, they are held to varying degrees in multiple European countries, excluding France, who does not have any. 

There have also been proposals regarding private sector pension plans, which entails more substantial, structural changes to the system. Currently, France’s only private pension scheme is known as PER, where individuals can invest into their own retirement funds over the course of their career. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, private pension schemes are much more popular and emphasized by the government. While some have proposed this change would help lessen pressures, the private-centered model would require drastic changes, making this type of reform unlikely.

Macron’s decision marks a hard line countries face in moving towards the sustainability of social security. However, if raising the retirement age is harshly against public opinion, countries will have to invest in researching alternative solutions, structural or formulaic, to ensure the shifts will not place more weight on retirees. 

In fact, there has been a push for countries to work towards reaching what has been coined the ‘silver economy,’ an economy geared more towards the elderly, through a series of policies to emphasize and grow the involvement of individuals over 60. This would include promoting more flexible working models to encourage a longer and more sustainable work period, as well as incentivising private investment in innovations, and making it easier for individuals to enter the labor force. Scholars believe that by increasing support and incentives for the older populations, countries can transition toward later retirement periods without large public disapproval, particularly among individuals with more labor intensive careers. 

Ultimately, it remains to be seen how France’s reforms will develop. The proposal may have been pushed through parliament but protests are nowhere near ceasing. What France evidences is that it is not simply enough to propose raising the retirement age. Rather, countries need to implement more long-term investments and proposals to solve social security financing. If not, reactive measures, no matter how justified, will only fuel backlash from the public. Especially in a country where over 70% of the public opposes reform. 

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The Dutch houses line the streets everywhere, adorned with beautiful large windows that don’t ever have any curtains or any sort of cover. Not only can anyone walking on the street see the minimalist and rustic decor outside of the home, but any passerby also has an open gateway into the home and a personal look at how the inhabitants choose to decorate their home. 

As I walked down the street at night, I could see into the windows of all of the homes and apartments that line the streets, and got an intimate look at the families dining inside or the elders watching TV. When I mentioned the open windows concept and how beautiful, yet exposed, the interior of each home is, my instructors just laughed and said “Yes, they’re just displaying how normal they are.” 

Following an intense night of reading up on Dutch norms, I came to recognize that the intention behind this open exposure was to demonstrate the normalcy of the families that lived within these homes. Many believe this practice is rooted in the values of Calvinism, which insists that an honest person will not need to deceive people or hide. To many Dutch people, this display of getting breakfast or working in their home office is a demonstration of their ability to “be normal” and show that they are accepted into Dutch standards during their personal time, as well in their public lives. In a culture where demonstrating decency is so valued, leaving your windows open is a primary example of showing your possessions and the decent living standards you set for yourself.

This mindset is not only limited to the open exposure of nearly every window in the street. Slowly but surely, I started to see how this “be normal” mentality surrounded me everywhere in the Netherlands. When someone next to me was walking the wrong way on the street, an old lady told her to “do normaal.” When my friend talked a little too loud at brunch, the man next to us similarly said “nou nou,” a signal that you’re behaving outside of the norm and you need to adhere to Dutch norms. Even the bread at the grocery store labeled “normal” bread is priced much higher than cultural bread and other bread types that have more ingredients and labor costs associated with them. There seems to be constant signaling and expectation of how one can fully adhere to the Dutch norms and not ever stand out.

Coming from the United States where showing extravagance and individuality is valued and seen as desirable, the Dutch interest in behaving within a thin spectrum of what is considered “normal” is not just intriguing but unusual. Shouldn’t you desire to stand out from the crowd? How will you succeed if you don’t? 

After living here now for a month (wow, so long…) I have also learned how this acceptance and expectation of normalcy is also embedded into the governmental structures at hand. Mark Rutte, the current Prime Minister of the Netherlands, has now held the position for more than 12 years. This officially makes him the longest-serving democratically elected leader in Europe. His center-right politics and his efforts to keep things as they are, combined with his personal love of all things Dutch such as biking and waffles, keep the voters on his side year and year again. His ability to not only avoid causing conflict but also his ability to fade into the background is seen as a positive. This is not to say he is not charming or successful at swaying the public opinion, as he has held power for so long and been able to accomplish a lot during his time. 

However, his center politics are more fascinating because not only is he able to keep power, his government has maintained its position for so long and he has avoided following the path of extremism making waves through the EU right now. He has even been nicknamed “Teflon Mark” because nothing seems to stick to him and his image as his control continues. His political positions have been characterized by pragmatism, which is in line with Dutch culture that prefers practical solutions to ideological ones. His approach has helped to maintain a sense of stability in the country, which has been attractive to many Dutch voters.

However, his approval ratings have recently taken a dip in recent years. In 2021, his government resigned after a scandal involving the child welfare benefit system. Essentially, due to negligence and a lack of oversight, many were wrongly accused of tax fraud. Rutte’s involvement in this situation and many people’s impression that he tried to hide these incidents affected his political strength. But, despite this major incident, he was still subsequently re-elected and still holds the position. For many across the globe who know the impact that one major scandal has had on a politician’s past, this situation seems unfathomable. The ongoing approval of such a center politician for so long in a government signals the uniqueness of the Netherlands in maintaining a status quo and pursuing the ideals of normalcy.

And when we look at the decisions of the Netherlands internationally this past decade, this expectation of normalcy is also prevalent. The demonstrated resistance to incoming EU members and against the widening process of the EU is also attributed by many to be a result of Dutch complacency. As the European Union is in the process of deciding how to stop the influx of international immigrants, whether it be through greater border control or increased security measures within, there is still a demonstration that being outside of normal within the Netherlands carries greater weight. Dutch citizens are coming to believe that as the demographics of the Netherlands change, holding onto that same feeling of normalcy will also be a different experience. 

So, from the amount of houses exposed to the public or the type of bread bought, social customs show the stagnant growth for the Netherlands in terms of pioneering social acceptance. When the lines between expecting normalcy and expecting sameness begins to blur, it becomes clear that the Netherlands might not be as socially liberal as it might initially seem. 

These ideas of adhering to a status quo can often skirt the line of desirable and discriminatory.  It will be interesting to see how the government changes in the future and in a post-Brexit world, and how the role the Netherlands plays in European politics might shift with new developing powers.

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While some comments express skepticism, claiming that dairy and gluten tolerance exist all the same in Europe, the majority of commenters jump to support Taylor’s claims. Some users recount their own experiences traveling all over Europe eating gluten and dairy only to return to the United States unable to eat a piece of toast with butter and jam. 

Input the search terms “food intolerance Europe,” and you’ll be met with several dozen videos echoing the same narrative: an American with food intolerances travels to Europe and enjoys bread, tiramisu and smelly cheeses. Said American returns to the United States to discover the fun is over. 

Gluten and dairy make their stomach churn, prompting them to opt for a gluten- or dairy-free diet once again. If they’re adept at social media, the American may then post a TikTok reminiscing about their glory days filled with baguettes and gelato.

The driving message behind these videos seems to be that something is wrong with American food — so wrong, in fact, that these intolerances can be cured simply by eating food in Europe. While the main question is whether there is any scientific merit for this bizarre relief, there’s one significant issue that must be addressed first. 

As of now, the bulk of videos portray American food as bad — causing intolerances — and European food as good — “curing” intolerances. Of course, this apparent phenomenon is an absurdly oversimplified take on food. It excludes all other cuisines from the conversation. What about Korean food, Ethiopian food or Peruvian food? By no coincidence, food and travel influencers, most of whom are white due in part to racial inequities in influencer pay and discrimination sewn into the algorithm, have conveniently forgotten to include any non-Western countries in their comparisons. 

By deeming European food — which is quite diverse on its own — as the “good” or “healthy” option, influencers are also inherently implying that other cuisines are not healthy. This furthers a dangerous perspective that Europe is sophisticated, clean and healthy, and other cultures are the opposite.

Now that we’ve addressed the eurocentrism featured in these videos, we can take a closer look at whether the phenomenon these influencers are promoting is actually credible.

The commonly-proposed theory for gluten intolerance in the United States is that food, wheat in particular, is different in two ways. Firstly, people suggest that wheat grown in the United States has a higher gluten content. Secondly, U.S. wheat is thought to be produced with more herbicides.

It is true that the majority — about 60% — of wheat grown in the United States is hard red wheat, which has a higher protein, typically gluten, content. On the other hand, the majority of wheat grown in Europe is soft wheat, which has a lower gluten content. In essence, if someone with gluten intolerance were to eat a piece of bread made from hard red wheat, they might experience more severe symptoms than if they were to eat bread produced from soft wheat.

It makes sense, then, that someone with a mild gluten intolerance might report more gluten freedom in Europe. However, the issue is not so straightforward. Unless a customer conducts an extensive investigation, there is really no way to know that they are consuming a Parisian baguette made with flour from soft wheat or hard wheat. While soft wheat is more common in Europe, in 2021, 17.5% of U.S. wheat exports went to Europe. This means that U.S. hard wheat is, in fact, present in at least some European goods. 

The second theory, that it is the production mechanisms of wheat that contributes to this phenomenon, seems more probable. It is well known that Europe tends to have stricter standards when it comes to herbicides, pesticides and chemical additives in food. The European Food Safety Authority has banned chemicals such as rGBH growth hormone, yellow dyes no. 5 and 6, rBST growth hormone and potassium bromate while they continue to be used in the United States. 

Another herbicide, glyphosate, is widely used in U.S. wheat production but seldom in Europe. An early study on glyphosate performed on fish suggests that it may contribute to digestive issues “reminiscent of celiac disease.” The less frequent use of additives, as well as differences in lactose content in milk products in Europe, is similarly theorized to contribute to the dairy intolerance phenomenon.

While the second theory offers more scientific evidence, it also implies that there’s a chance the people who claim to experience gluten and dairy intolerance in the United States, but not in Europe, have the wrong idea. It is possible that it is not actually gluten or dairy that is causing them stomach discomfort in the United States, but rather the added chemicals and preservatives. Because these are less common in European countries, travelers may feel a sense of temporary relief.

Of course, none of the influencers who are posting aesthetic travel food videos claim to be scientists or experts in nutrition, but there is a level of caution that should be employed when posting about food and food intolerances. 

First, in a diet culture-obsessed society, the last thing needed from people with social influence is narratives that promote fear around certain foods. And second, it could be dangerous to advertise supposed food tolerance, when this may not actually be the case for some people. 

Just imagine how upset a traveler would be to find out after a full day of baguettes, croissants and pizza that, shockingly, they still can’t handle their gluten and dairy.

The post Do Food Intolerances Just Disappear in Europe? appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

However, it is important to address the difference between a migrant and a refugee. The term “migrant” refers to a person who moves to a new place, either to work or to have a better quality of life. A refugee is a person fleeing imminent danger in their homeland and who must escape to avoid persecution, whether political, ideological, religious, etc. Migrants and refugees are both subjects of analysis of migration crises, as the migration systems and policies put in place by nations and regions are often used for the migration of migrants and refugees. 

Since the two types of systems that apply to different types of migrants sometimes intertwine, many people blame the system put in place by the EU for any fault or problem related to the citizenship of new migrants or the acceptance of refugees. Although this may be true in a small number of circumstances, it is clear that new cases of migrants in the European Union are caused by a migration crisis, rather than a European crisis, due to the increase in conflicts resulting in displacement and a lack of infrastructure in specific regions of the world.

Increased Conflicts

The news seems to constantly reveal a new conflict occurring in some part of the world. Not only are these conflicts occurring more regularly, but they are continually displacing people; many displaced communities try to migrate to the EU to escape the conflict and enjoy a better quality of life. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the total number of people worldwide who were forced to flee their homes at the end of 2021 was 89.3 million. This is more than double the 42.7 million people who were still forcibly displaced ten years ago and the most since World War II. 

The United Nations took the initiative to research the exact reasons for this increase in wars and conflicts and found that the main reasons were “unresolved regional tensions, a collapse of rule of law, absent or co-opted state institutions, illicit economic gains and resource scarcity exacerbated by climate change.” Of course, many people from these conflict zones can afford to enter the EU through the ‘normal’ immigration system to obtain full citizenship, but this is not the case for the majority of people fleeing these conflicts.

As more and more people are forced to flee their homes, growing numbers of people are arriving at EU borders, contributing to the migrant crisis. So, in cases where there are fewer jobs or resources available in a European country, this is usually simply due to the state’s sudden increase in population rather than a “failed” migration system set up by the EU. It would be difficult for any nation to organize, let alone an entire region of the world, the accommodation of millions more civilians without running into some conflicts, and therefore being viewed as having a system failure by the rest of the world.

It is also important to take into account the previously mentioned factors for the increase in conflicts and wars. If we want to prevent migration crises from happening, it is essential to look at these factors and address them from their root causes, rather than trying to make a system work around them. This highlights the fact that any migrant-related crisis is mainly caused by the increase in the number of migrants, rather than an absolute failure of the EU to welcome everyone.

Lack of infrastructure

Another cause for the increase in migration to the EU is the lack of infrastructure in many parts of the world. For this reason, many people leave their home country for better education, careers and opportunities (which is also known as brain drain) as their own nations do not have the proper infrastructure for multiple schools, hospitals, or work buildings. The World Population Review found that some typical brain drain countries include countries in Africa, Central America and the Caribbean. One reason why many of these mentioned regions and countries experience this phenomenon is usually due to the lack of well-established schools and universities, low incomes and lack of common infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, etc. 

Likewise, these countries are currently undergoing an increase in population. According to the Pew Research Center, the countries currently contributing the most to global population growth are India, China, Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan and D.R. Congo. It is clear that if the main countries that produce migrants to other parts of the world, in particular the EU, due to brain drain are the same countries that are experiencing the highest growth in birth rate, then there are no signs of the migration crisis abating. 

There are many reasons behind this increase in population in these countries, such as an agriculture-based economy that relies on large families, reduced access to education, gender inequality, child marriages, children, etc. If we want to solve the migration crisis, it is necessary to start at the root of the problem, including the lack of infrastructure in many developing countries. 

Whether people migrate from Africa to the EU or from one EU country to another, there will always be a migration crisis. Not primarily because of the system put in place by the EU, but simply because the world’s population is growing at an exponential rate and our reserves and resources cannot keep up, which is a phenomena known as carrying capacity. It makes no difference to attack the EU and the migration system currently in place when the situation will only get worse if no funding or infrastructure is put in place.

Ukraine Crisis vs. Syrian Refugee Crisis

One comparison that many scholars make to promote their position that this is a European crisis rather than a migration crisis is how the EU has handled the Syrian refugee crisis versus the Ukrainian crisis. Before continuing, it is important to take note of the Dublin-II Regulation, which stipulates that an asylum seeker’s request must be analyzed by a single Member State, this State being the first EU State in which the applicant enters. This regulation has created a lot of hostility within the EU, which these academics are also using to prove that this is a European crisis, since EU border states are forced to deal with the demands of the majority of candidates and are very overwhelmed, especially during periods of conflict resulting in travel abroad. 

Additionally, the country that receives the most applicants changes for each unique crisis as there is a certain bias depending on the member state and people displaced from their own states are aware of this. For example, 92.8% of Syrian refugees were accepted in Italy for asylum, while 0% were accepted in Czech, which led to the majority of asylum seekers to arrive in Italy as the first Member State. During the 2015 refugee crisis, Angela Merkel said the Dublin principle for Syrian refugees would be temporarily suspended in Germany to avoid a backlog of asylum applications. 

The EU as a whole (with the exception of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland for sovereignty reasons) introduced the “Emergency Relocation Programme” which relocated 160,000 refugees from areas of war in Greece and Italy to other Member States. They further improved relations with Turkey to reach better cooperation and an agreement to place some of the refugees in the country so that the EU does not have to accept all the refugees itself. 

Meanwhile, the “situation” of Ukrainian refugees has been treated quite differently, ruling out how the EU calls it a situation rather than a crisis. During this situation, the EU introduced the Temporary Protection Directive of 2001 for the first time. Temporary protection is a tool which the EU introduced in 2001 and which can be used to respond to a large influx of displaced persons from non-EU countries who cannot return to their country of origin due to a current threat of danger. 

Similarly, almost everyone who showed up at EU borders declaring they were Ukrainians was immediately granted asylum and did not have to go through the typical process as Syrian refugees did. In addition, those granted asylum received one-year residence permits, which included access to employment, medical services, education, social protection and housing. There are many reasons and opinions as to why the EU treated the two different situations differently, such as race, historical connection, and the under-lying nature of the conflicts. However, one of the main reasons is primarily due to the proximity of the conflicts. Syria is much further from the EU, while Ukraine is right next door, which may have given the EU the feeling of having a bigger stake in the Ukraine/Russia conflict. 

Even though the EU and its asylum systems that it had/has put in place have their flaws and weaknesses, they still cannot be singled out as the main cause or contributor to the expansion of migration. These crises have been caused by conflicts in other parts of the world and the EU has accepted as many migrants as possible with the resources at its disposal, proving, once again, that it is more about migration crisis than a European crisis.

To conclude, the majority of migration problems in the EU are caused by a migration crisis and not by a European crisis; this is mainly due to an increase in migrants more than ever before, both due to an increase in conflict and a lack of infrastructure in other states. It is impossible to completely solve migration problems without first understanding the causes of migration crises and what states need to solve them. Whether migration crises are due to migrant or refugee issues, no one should ever fear that they will not be able to move to have a better quality of life, and the EU has done a relatively good job considering the resources at its disposal. to guarantee this possibility. To solve migration issues, it is important to start at the root of the problem, such as lack of infrastructure systems and unstable governments, and improve the quality of life of countries around the world in order to avoid this mass migration to a single region of the world that we are currently experiencing. This is not to say it will be easy, given that many states are struggling with internal and external conflict, but it is much easier to tackle the problem now, knowing that the focus should not be on the EU, but rather on the states from which the migrants come.

The post The EU and Migrants: A Migration Crisis or A European Crisis? appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

In the 2016 competition held in Stockholm, Ukrainian singer Jamala won the contest with her song “1944.” The song was written and performed in the Crimean Tatar language, a tongue spoken by Crimean Tatars — a Muslim and Turkic ethnicity indigenous to the Crimean Peninsula. 

Since Crimea entered center stage following its annexation by Russia in 2014, Crimean Tatars now face a new struggle for survival under the thumb of oppression once more. Russia’s growing encroachment upon Ukraine brought detrimental effects on the Crimean Tatar people, where Russia aims to wipe out the Crimean Tatar culture and put the Tatar people under threat of conflict.

The history of the Crimean Tatar people extends back to the 13th century, when the descendants of Genghis Khan entered the Eastern European plains and into the Crimean Peninsula. Crimean Tatars ruled the peninsula for centuries under the Crimean Khanate until the Russian Empire conquered Crimea. Although once the masters of Crimea, Tatars were relegated to second-class citizens under Tsarist rule, resulting in several waves of mass migration into Turkey. 

Following the establishment of the USSR, Crimean Tatars found themselves subject to a new, more oppressive hegemon. Through collectivization and subsequent famines under Stalinist rule, the Crimean Tatar population took a significant hit, with about 50% leaving their ancestral home. The worst, however, was yet to come, as the USSR entered World War II in 1941. 

Crimean Tatars were suddenly subject to suspicion by the Soviet government as collaborationists and Nazi sympathisers, along with other ethnicities like Chechens and Volga Germans. As the USSR had planned to take over the Dardanelles and, in turn, territories in Turkey, Crimean Tatars were seen as a threat as they shared a cultural bond with the Turks.

May 18, 1944, was a harrowing day in the collective memory of the Crimean Tatar people. Joseph Stalin ordered the exile of the entire Crimean Tatar population to Central Asia. 240,000 Tatars were rushed onto trains that would take them to unfamiliar lands, with tens of thousands dying along the way. This painful event was named Sürgünlik in the Crimean Tatar language, as the Tatar people were disenfranchised and victimized by imperialist tyranny.

The popular Crimean folk song “Ey Güzel Kırım” features the lyrics, “men bu yerde yaşalmadım, yaşlığıma toyalmadım” (meaning “I could not live in this land, I could not enjoy my youth”), describing the pain of being in exile and losing one’s homeland.  

As the once-mighty Soviet Empire began collapsing in 1989, Crimean Tatars were eventually allowed to repatriate to their homeland in Crimea. Thousands of Crimean Tatars managed to return to Crimea, but their land was entirely different. Although originally under Ukrainian jurisdiction, Russians had since taken up the vast majority of Crimea, as historically Tatar settlements were wholly populated by Russians. 

Yet, the Crimean Tatars persisted in reclaiming their homes and re-establishing their cultural presence on the peninsula. The Mejlis, a political body representing the Crimean Tatar people, was founded in 1991 to protect Crimean Tatar culture and rights. Since the Ukrainian government had been most sympathetic to the Crimean Tatar struggle, the Mejlis was allowed to operate within the scope of Ukrainian and Crimean politics.

However, things took a sharp turn for the worse when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in February 2014. Crimean Tatars once again found themselves under a familiar overlord as the Tatar community overwhelmingly stood against the Russian annexation. Subsequently, Crimean Tatar voices were silenced following a peninsula-wide ban on Tatar news publications and radio stations. Tatar journalist Reshat Amatov was abducted and later murdered by pro-Russian groups, while Russian authorities made no effort to bring justice to Amatov’s case. 

In April 2016, the Mejlis was banned by Russia for promoting separatism and extremism. The head of the Mejlis, Mustafa Dzhemilev, was barred from entering Crimea two years before the ban on the organization. Tatars linked to the Mejlis were also arrested on charges of collaborating with terrorist groups.

Following the annexation of Crimea, Russia continues its attempts to wipe out the Crimean Tatar culture. For example, many mosques and religious institutions were shut down by Russian authorities. Russia also banned Tatar-language classes as Russian became the only teaching language in Crimean schools. In 2016, human rights activist Teimur Abdullaev was arrested and sent to an isolation ward in Simferopol because he had written a letter in Crimean Tatar.

The brutal nature of Moscow’s governance over the Crimean Tatars is due to its own political structure and culture. Despite Russia being a multiethnic federation on paper, Russia is very much dominated by its largest ethnic group. The various titular nationalities of Russian republics, like Volga Tatars, Ossetians and Yakuts, have little to no power over how their respective polities are run (with Chechnya being an exception). 

As a result, ethnic minorities in Russia are expected to live a fully Russified lifestyle, where their identities are blurred out and replaced with an overarching Russian identity. For an authoritarian state like Russia, keeping the homogeneity of the country’s culture is vital for the regime’s survival to maintain control over non-Russians and prevent secession. 

For Crimean Tatars, their disobedience towards Russian rule and the presence of a unique and lasting culture pose an active threat to the Russian Federation. For Russia to create stable control over Crimea, the presence of a non-Russian and indigenous culture is enough for Russia to engage in suppressive policies. 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has undoubtedly brought renewed tensions amongst Crimean Tatar communities, as they are being dragged into a war against their will. Many Crimean Tatars chose to fight against Russia as they joined the Ukrainian Army or served in independent battalions. 

One of the most prominent Tatar battalions is led by Isa Akayev, whose troops mainly comprise Crimean Tatars but also from other ethnic groups like Chechens and Circassians. Bonded by Islam and a common goal of liberation, nationalities from the North Caucasus often fight alongside Crimean Tatars to repel Russian encroachment. North Caucasians like Chechens, Ingush and Avars also share a similar past as victims of forced deportations during the USSR. 

The recent wave of mobilization in Russia gravely impacted Crimean Tatar communities, as the order also extended into occupied Crimea. Crimean Tatars are reportedly being disproportionately targeted in military drafts in Crimea, where the vast majority of the draft is being carried out in Crimean Tatar villages. 

During an evening address, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that “this is a deliberate attempt by Russia to destroy the Crimean Tatar people, this is a deliberate attempt by the aggressor state to take the lives of as many residents of the territory the Russian troops invaded as possible.”

As a result of the mobilization, Tatar families had already started to leave their homes en masse since the start of the war, paving the way to further disenfranchisement of the Crimean Tatar people and an even more significant exodus. 

Surely, one can interpret Moscow’s draft policies in Crimea as a deliberate attempt to completely rid Crimea of its indigenous inhabitants. By disproportionately drafting Crimean Tatars and forcing families to abandon their homeland, Russia can thereby replace them with Russian settlers, ensuring loyalty from Crimea to Moscow and completely Russifying the peninsula. 

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine does not simply present a binary selection, as many groups, like the Crimean Tatar, are caught in the middle. The resistance against Russian imperialism is not a struggle defined by the West. Instead, it is the various traumatic experiences and acts of defiance towards tyranny. It is the struggles of peoples like the Crimean Tatars, the Chechens, the Circassians and many more that complete the story.

In reality, Crimean Tatars do not wish to be puppets under Russia or Ukraine. They deserve a homeland with no masters above them. Yet, the hard truth is that Crimean Tatars have fought and suffered too much, where at least Ukraine has allowed them to rebuild themselves. 

The Crimean Tatar experience is one scarred by blood and oppression, but it’s also one empowered by an undying will to fight and survive. As the Crimean Tatar people once again face the possibility of further disenfranchisement, one could certainly expect them to resist their oppressors and protect their beloved homeland.

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Although the election was dogged by reports of manipulation and low turnout, with less than 50% of the region’s population voting, it showed the palpable desire for full independence in Catalonia beyond symbolic demands for autonomy. The Spanish government was furious at the attempt of its second wealthiest region, home to the major economic and tourism center of Barcelona and contributing to about 20% of the Spanish GDP, to separate, swiftly dismissing the decision as unconstitutional and punishing the movement’s leaders. 

The region’s fraught relationship with Spain dates back hundreds of years. Catalonia has a distinct language, Catalan, related to but distinct from fellow Romance languages like French, Spanish and Italian and spoken by about 9 million people, according to Ethnologue. The region was an independent kingdom for a time during the medieval period but in 1469 the Crown of Aragon, which ruled Catalonia, united with the Crown of Castile to form the Kingdom of Spain. 

In the centuries since, Spanish regimes have often suppressed the Catalan language and culture in favor of a vision of Castilian Spanish unity, leading to discontentment and anger that has driven Catalonian separation efforts. However, many argue that the basis for Catalan separatism in recent decades has been much less driven by cultural factors and more by economic factors and the desire to not be beholden to pay taxes to the central government that would benefit Spain’s less economically productive regions. 

Recent polls taken in Catalonia by the Center for Opinion Studies for the Catalan government regarding the possibility of independence indicate that support for secession from Spain is actually receding. The latest poll, taken in July 2022, showed that support for independence had dropped to 41% compared to 48% in 2017.

Surprisingly, events that many observers predicted to galvanize the movement have not materialized in further efforts towards independence nor increases in the percentages of people who would prefer it. In February 2021, Catalan rapper Pablo Hasel was arrested and imprisoned for lyrics courts found to be insulting to the Spanish monarchy and supportive of far-left groups labeled terrorist groups by the Spanish government. His imprisonment caused a mass uproar in Catalonia and condemnation from several human rights groups such as Amnesty International, but even high profile incidents like Hasel’s have not reignited the independence movement. 

The Spanish government’s approach toward the usage of the Catalan language in public life, which has historically triggered intense fervor, also failed to elicit increased support for independence in recent years. In December 2021, the Spanish Supreme Court issued a mandate requiring the Catalonian government to increase the use of Spanish to 25% of academic subjects in public schools. This increase roughly doubled the number of hours Catalonian students would be taught in Castilian Spanish rather than in Catalan and was intended by the central Spanish government to align the region closer to the constitutional ideal of national unity under the Spanish language. Thousands of Catalonians protested the decision, and many compared it to the harsh linguistic suppression inflicted on the region during the rule of General Francisco Franco (1939-1975). Although some analysts anticipated that this incident would increase independence sentiments, the aforementioned polls suggest otherwise. 

Yet, despite this series of outrages and seeming transgressions against Catalonian regional identity, the fervor that existed in October 2017 has simply dissipated. This may be in large part to the debates occurring within the separatist parties. On Oct. 8, 2022, the staunchly pro-independence JxCat party voted to abandon the regional government and split with the comparatively more moderate Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), citing a lack of consensus and inaction on independence. Disagreements between the two parties regarding the best ways to organize potential independence efforts—whether through confronting the central Spanish government directly as advocated by JxCat or dialogues with the central government and investment in social projects that will strengthen Catalonian resolve as suggested by ERC—have led to fractures. 

Additionally, several politicians who were once adamant about independence have softened their positions in the face of potential punitive consequences. Nine separatist leaders were given several years-long sentences in October 2019. After being pardoned and released in October 2021, these politicians have suggested increased dialogue with Madrid rather than their former hardline stances in regards to independence. 

It may also be likely that Catalonian voters do not feel the same resentment towards the central government as they did five years ago. The most pressing challenges facing the region have come out of external factors that have nothing to do with Madrid, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and economic threats stemming from the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Because independence from Spain would do little to resolve these issues that transcend national and regional boundaries, many voters likely see independence as less pressing. Experts like Pablo Simon, a political analyst from the Carlos III University in Madrid, suggest that Catalonian voters are simply more concerned with maintaining their survival amidst a challenging job market and rising food prices. 

A cultural leaning towards unity with Spanish and wider Latin culture may also be an indication that the younger generation is less interested in independence than older generations. For example, Rosalía is a globally successful pop star hailing from Barcelona, Catalonia’s cultural and financial center. She sings solely in Spanish and draws from the wide range of musical tradition within the great Spanish speaking world in her music. Although Rosalía is but one example of a Catalonian celebrity with global popularity, she is by far the most widely recognized. 

Her continual avoidance of speaking on the independence issue may be symbolic of the younger generation’s role in the Catalan culture, in which they take pride in Catalonian identity, but doesn’t feel a necessity for independence to maintain it in the same way older generations might. Polls taken in 2021 show that the support for independence among youth aged 18-24 stands at only 39%. Additional polls indicate that a growing number of young Catalonians identify themselves as ‘equally Spanish and Catalan’ in their cultural identity, reflecting Rosalía’s public image. 

Could the Catalonian independence movement’s fire respark? That remains to be seen. Recent stagnation of independence efforts and diminished separatist opinions in the polls, despite economic challenges in Spain and perceived incursions on Catalonian linguistic autonomy, would suggest Catalonian separatism has fizzled out. 

However, amidst continued post-Brexit challenges and disorganized leadership, Scotland’s upcoming potential 2023 independence referendum could signal a new era in regionalist autonomy in Europe. If Scotland does leave London behind, it could reignite and legitimize the conversation around Catalonian independence. 

Ultimately, the movement’s future is highly dependent on the separatist political parties’ ability to reach a  consensus on efforts going forward. With the regional government in turmoil, the legitimacy of the movement is challenged, which is only likely to fuel the population’s disillusionment with the notion of independence. Regardless of these recent political developments, after hundreds of years of conflict with the central Spanish government, independence will likely continue to loom in Catalonia’s politics for years to come. 

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