Ukraine

After the election, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky congratulated Trump, saying he looks forward to a strong U.S. approach to global affairs. Trump has pledged to end the war in Ukraine but has revealed little plans on how he would do so. The United States provides the most aid to Ukraine out of any other country, and Trump, alongside his Vice President JD Vance have cast doubt on whether they would continue military aid to Ukraine. This would be devastating for the hopes of beating Russia, which is steadily advancing into Ukraine’s Donbas region. President Putin has not congratulated Trump, and re-iterated U.S. hostility towards Russia making them hesitant to make any statements on the future of the two countries’ relationship. However, given Trump and Putin’s friendly-ish relationship (possible collusion between Russian officials and Trump campaign members in 2016 and Trump calling Putin a “genius” for invading Ukraine), it would not be surprising for the Trump administration to reduce aid to Ukraine. Last week, President Biden sent Ukraine official approval to use American long-range missiles to strike deep within Russian territory, a move seen as Biden hedging against Trump’s future plans.

Hungary

Moving westward, another relationship that should be watched is that between Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a right-wing autocrat. Hungary and Russia are close, despite Hungary’s membership in the European Union and NATO. Hungary relies on Russia for gas and is refusing to let aid pass through Hungary into Ukraine. Additionally, Orbán was the only EU leader to endorse Trump for the U.S. presidency and flouted their close relationship. Therefore, under the new administration, Hungary might gain an influx of foreign investment from American companies or enjoy a closer economic relationship. These circumstances suggest there will be good relations between the United States and Hungary over the next four years. 

Poland

Another conservative leader, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda, congratulated Trump on his win. Duda wants to strengthen Poland’s relationship with the United States, but Poland is against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, sending more than $3.5 billion to support Ukraine’s army. Duda’s main goal is to curry U.S. favor and keep the United States in NATO, so it’s no surprise that Duda has tried to become closer friends with Donald Trump. In April 2024, Duda and Trump met in New York City for dinner, and both shared positive sentiments, with Trump stating that he is “behind Poland all the way.” Thus, it would not be surprising to see Poland continue to schmooze up to the incoming president in the coming months. 

Czech Republic and Slovakia

The Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both populist conservatives, have welcomed Trump with open arms.

Petr Fiala, the Prime Minister of Slovakia, and President Biden have enjoyed positive relations, with the U.S. and Slovakia becoming closer over the past four years. The Czech Republic has continued sending military aid to Ukraine, but Fiala is growing weary as the war has surpassed its 1000th day. In September, he stated that Ukraine “will have to be realistic” about the growing possibility of ceding some territory to Russia, even if temporarily.

Fico has ended Slovakia’s military aid to Ukraine and opposes Ukraine’s bid to enter NATO. Slovakia is in the midst of a political crisis, with a sharp divide between Fico’s conservative government and the liberal opposition party. Fico has been consolidating power, undermining media independence, eliminating the office responsible for investigating political corruption and prohibiting protests. As such, expect to see Slovakia drifting towards an Orbán-style populist way of governing, to Trump’s delight.

The fate of Ukraine lies, in large part, in the hands of Trump and Vance. 

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Since the breakup of Yugoslavia and the ensuing war, governance over Kosovo has remained a contentious topic in global affairs, with international oversight providing much of its legal infrastructure alongside local power brokers. Many of these local leaders have direct ties to the nominally dissolved Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a group designated as a terrorist organization in multiple countries. Among these leaders is Kosovo’s first elected prime minister Hashim Thaçi, one of the founders of the KLA who is currently awaiting trial for war crimes in The Hague.

Cooperation between international actors and local leaders to orchestrate a peaceful transfer of power has required carefully redefining the relationship with the KLA “from ‘terrorists’ to ‘partners.’” As of now, the UN is gingerly withdrawing from Kosovo one agency at a time while balancing international and domestic issues. Establishing Kosovo’s legitimacy will require restructuring of economic and political institutions, international cooperation and long-term conflict mitigation plans. Through sustainable, mutually beneficial and calculated policy implementation that strengthens Kosovo internally, we will see an end to, in the words of international relations professor at the University of Southern California Dr. Douglas Becker, the “international presence [in Kosovo]no one wants.” 

The KLA is a nationalist Kosovar-Albanian militia founded in 1993 as a response to Serbian state-backed violence against students protesting for Kosovar independence. Starting as a small, disorganized group of around 150 men, the KLA quickly became “one of the most successful military organizations in history,” as well as one of the most brutal. As Kosovar nationalism rose, more and more people joined the KLA in taking up arms against Serbia. 

During the following years of conflict, the KLA were not only perpetrators of war crimes—including systemic torture, rape and forced expulsion—but also an organized crime ring. Much of the KLA’s funding came from human trafficking, organ trafficking, sex slavery, money laundering, illegal weapon smuggling, counterfeit currency, migrant smuggling, fraud and drug trade, with an estimated 80% of all heroin headed into Europe passing through the hands of the KLA in 1999. 

When the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia officially ended in June 1999, the KLA filled the subsequent power vacuum. However, they were quickly replaced after the 1999 Security Council resolution 1244 gave jurisdiction of Kosovo to the UN, creating the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and establishing United Nations Administered Kosovo, a time period in which the UN was essentially the Kosovar government. The UNMIK took charge of virtually all government functions in Kosovo, facilitating elections, issuing legal identification documents, adjudicating criminal cases, policing and overseeing immigration. 

By 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, developed a constitution and elected its first prime minister, Hashim Thaçi, ultimately ending UN Administered Kosovo and creating the Republic of Kosovo. As part of their agreement to recognize Kosovo’s independence, the U.S. and EU required oversight by international presences; thus, UNMIK remains a supportive actor in ensuring peace, normalcy and community-building in collaboration with 16 other UN agencies and partners. 

Locally, most political figures are former members of the disbanded KLA, including current prime minister Albin Kurti. Some claim to have abandoned their criminal past while others have faced charges of war crimes, such as Kosovar prime ministers Hashim Thaçi, Agim Çeku and Ramush Haradinaj. An investigation conducted by the Council of Europe found that even while acting as prime minister, Thaçi still controlled much of organized transnational crime, relying upon illegal activities for government expenditures. Although the KLA is officially dissolved, its members have reassembled in one of the main political parties, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). Prime Minister Kurti has openly declared that “the Kosovo Police is a continuation of the liberation army.” KLA dominance presents a massive issue for the prospect of complete UN withdrawal due to its unsustainable nature and criminal history. While decreasing, organized crime remains intertwined in Kosovar politics, with the U.S. Department of the Treasury blacklisting multiple Kosovar politicians and security officials linked to transnational organized crime as recently as 2021.

The UN, European Union and United States are desperate to withdraw: Kosovo presents a major liability for the international actors involved due to the criminal background of the local actors with whom they are collaborating. The United States views UNMIK as having fulfilled its purpose, and states that “a peacekeeping mission [is]no longer necessary.” International involvement is unfavorable for the people of Kosovo as well, inhibiting their desire for international recognition and sovereignty. Serbia also dislikes the international presence and does not recognize the majority of the agencies in Kosovo as legitimate, instead viewing them as an imposition upon their own sovereignty. Logistically, the oversight has simply drawn on much too long and cannot be maintained in the long term. 

Thus, the UN is working to strengthen local political, legal and economic institutions to wean Kosovo off international support. Additionally, efforts are underway to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia, including promoting Serbian and Albanian language learning, assisting families of missing persons and providing free legal aid and language interpretation to allow for a smoother transition of power and a peaceful future for the region. According to the UN, a facilitated, gradual withdrawal from Kosovo is the best approach to end this deeply undesired international presence. 

However, tensions have risen within the last few months, amounting to “the worst escalation of violence in years,” with Serbia deploying tanks and artillery to the Kosovar border, prompting the U.K. to send 200 troops to support the current NATO presence. This uptick is the result of a dispute over license plates, with Kosovo demanding Serbian license plates turned over in favor of Kosovar plates to demonstrate a sovereign, united Kosovar state. Ethnic Serb mayors in northern Kosovo resigned in protest of this demand, further contributing to unrest and lawlessness and reinvigorating Serbs’ desires to establish autonomous Serb-majority municipalities within Kosovo. This move and the reaction to it proves nationalism and ethnic identity disputes remain unresolved issues.   

Seeing as the status quo is undesired by all parties involved, any potential resolution would necessitate the complete withdrawal of international forces. However, given the recent developments in conflict, such a withdrawal must be orchestrated in a gradual and calculated manner. A sustainable, mutually beneficial plan should be executed through three main tenets: economic and institutional restructuring, international cooperation and long-term conflict management plans. 

A major hurdle to Kosovar legitimacy is government corruption. The UN must incentivize legal economic activities to dissuade organized criminal activity. Kosovo is well-endowed in natural resources including fertile farmland. The UN should provide agricultural training, subsidies and supplies to reinvigorate this sector and help establish multilateral trade agreements as well as a conducive market environment, which would allow Kosovar goods to be competitive on a global scale. Additionally, farming was a major part of Kosovo’s medieval identity and revitalizing this industry could appeal to Kosovar nationalists. Opportunities for professional development, such as job training, higher education and English lessons should also be installed. 

Politically, legal and lucrative economic opportunities should automatically lessen corruption. Through education, the general public should become more aware of their human rights and therefore more likely to elect transparent officials who better protect these rights. However, the UN should also lead crackdowns on political criminals and help restructure political institutions to eliminate opportunities for future corruption. 

International recognition could also be enhanced if Kosovo were to abandon transnational crime and join the global economy. Countries are more likely to support relationships from which they benefit economically, and if Kosovo can become an international bread basket, especially during a time when the agriculturally crucial country of Ukraine is under attack, they can establish themselves as a critical ally and trade partner. 

Additionally, the UN should advocate for Kosovar recognition within the general assembly. Although the chances of gaining Russian approval are extremely slim, other nations such as Argentina, India and Greece may be more likely to change their views. With increased recognition, Kosovo can operate as a strong de facto state or even an internationally recognized country—Taiwan, for instance, is unrecognized by UNSC member China, yet is still internationally recognized as a sovereign nation. 

A long-term conflict mitigation plan is crucial in preserving an auspicious future for Kosovo. In establishing political institutions, the UN should coordinate between Kosovar Serbs and Albanians to create a joint association to guarantee cooperation. If this matter is not addressed, Kosovo will remain vulnerable to issues like the license plate dispute, where something as seemingly mundane as license plates led to a violent conflict due to a lack of resolution regarding underlying disagreements regarding ethnic identity. The UN must work in conjunction with both ethnic communities to establish institutions and promote long-term collaboration. 

Rather than staying idle in the present, the UN must start actively pursuing a sustainable future by implementing mechanisms that will provide Kosovo strength for decades to come. By redirecting Kosovar interests towards lucrative economic pursuits, the Kosovar government can become more legitimate and capable, garner revenue to strengthen internal political institutions, secure trade partners to embed them into the global economy and establish international allies to validate their sovereignty. If the parties restructure economic and political institutions, pursue international recognition and set long-term conflict mitigation strategies in place, the international community can finally withdraw from Kosovo and put an end to an international presence no one wants.

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At the same time, the eastward expansion of NATO, which the West viewed as integral to safeguarding peace and establishing a buffer zone, is perceived by Russia as “an existential threat to national security.” Particularly, Russia is most concerned recently with NATO expansion as more and more countries are joining the organization. At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, both Georgia and Ukraine were promised to eventually join the Western defense alliance. Four months later, Georgia attacked Russia, killing at least ten Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, to which Russia responded with a full-scale offensive — marking the beginning of the Russo-Georgian war. Although the nature of this conflict is multifaceted, its predominant causes can still be analyzed. These causes can be broken down to the personal interests of Russian President Valdimir Putin, the desires of the Kremlin and NATO’s involvement. 

In the context of the Russo-Georgian war, an individual to analyze is Putin, who (despite not officially being president) still had full control over the country as Dmitry Medvedev, the leader at the time, was Putin’s protégé and aligned his policies through regular consultations with Putin. This effectively made him Putin’s proxy. For Putin, his interest was to ensure the survival of the Russian state and, within that, to maintain his own power. 

The color revolutions, particularly the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in the subsequent year, collapsed pro-Kremlin leaders in neighboring countries, which increased Western influence by Russia’s borders. Preservation of the Kremlin became Putin’s priority during that period, which might have been a contributing factor to the war. Indeed, Putin sought constitutional changes as a means to reclaim power and pursue a more aggressive role in the region which could explain the asymmetrical escalation in 2008 — launching a full scale invasion after just a few casualties. This revisionist sentiment remains even today, where Putin continues to abide by incrementalism in his foreign policy rather than drastic actions — resorting to cyberattacks to undermine NATO solidarity, exploiting international institutions (i.e. UNSC, IMF, APEC) to stifle liberal internationalism, and propagating misinformation to disrupt free elections. All of these efforts are to destabilize Western institutions and democratic systems around the world. 

For the short-term leading up to the invasion, Putin was faced with a triple-challenge: low oil prices from the Great Recession, a stalled constitutional process and socio-economic hardships. The war in Georgia was a diversionary tactic employed to distract from these domestic failures. By ‘rallying around the flag’ against NATO, which over 88% of Russians held unfavourable views towards, Putin increased his approval rating by eight percentage points directly after the intervention and re-consolidated his regime’s legitimacy. This parallels the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, where Putin’s approval rating jumped by 22 percentage points from a historic low post-invasion. 

More broadly, the Kremlin sought to revise the status quo and bring back Soviet glory. The disintegration of the USSR was seen as a humiliating defeat because Russia/USSR lost a third of its territory and half of its population and GDP. The Kremlin has long desired to rebuild the once-great Soviet Union (also known as revisionism) and feels it has the right to “take something back” such as reuniting the ethnic Russians in South Ossetia and Abkhazia with their motherland. Yet, revisionism also can only be a secondary component because it does not explain why Russia chose Georgia to go to war with instead of other ex-Soviet states, which all possess ethnic Russians in varying quantities. Specifically, Kazakhstan and Moldova both have comparatively larger populations of ethnic Russians compared to Georgia. This means that while revision can be a contributing factor to the war, it is not a leading factor because there is no justification for Georgia specifically compared to every other ex-Soviet state. The only difference is Western involvement in the country, which suggests that to be a decisive factor. 

NATO’s involvement in Georgia impacted both Russia’s and Georgia’s decision-making calculus when it promised that Georgia would one day join the alliance. Instead of disbanding after the collapse of the USSR, NATO extended membership to 15 additional countries in Eastern Europe as a means to ‘deter Russian aggression’ through the creation of a buffer zone. Russia on the other hand, has vehemently opposed NATO expansion, perceiving its only goal to be villainizing and containing Russia. 

Furthermore, “NATO expansion broke a promise that various American officials [including Bush and Clinton]had given to various Russian and Soviet officials [such as Gorbachev and Yeltsinthat]that NATO would not expand.” NATO’s hubristic expansion tipped the balance of power in Eastern Europe and was considered an existential threat by the Kremlin, which compelled it to retaliate to seek survival. In this case, Russia felt forced to destabilize the region in an effort to block NATO membership for Georgia, which was promised at the Bucharest summit. Indeed, the war effectively vetoed membership for Georgia because NATO would not accept new members with open territorial disputes. Overall, it’s arguable that Putin has been “protecting legitimate security interests” by destabilizing the region to veto NATO membership. 

By contrast, NATO involvement also emboldened Georgia to become overconfident through moral hazard  — the concept that Georgia engaged in risky behavior (behavior which they wouldn’t otherwise engage in) because they believed they had the full support of NATO. NATO’s open-door policy emboldened Georgia to act arrogantly after verbally pledging membership in 2008. Soon after, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili launched an offensive against pro-Russian separatists and Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia as he believed the “West had his back, but he miscalculated and overreached,” confirming that the pledge made by NATO was misinterpreted by Georgia as a blank cheque. In Georgia, sporadic fighting against separatists has been ongoing for years, but it was not until after the Bucharest summit that President Saakashvili decided to strike. In this paradigmatic plight of moral hazard, NATO involvement encouraged Georgia to provoke Russia, confident that NATO would save them in the end. Critically, this was not the case with the invasion of Ukraine, as there were no indications that Ukraine would be part of NATO anytime soon. 

Today, Russo-Georgian relations are in shambles despite the war only lasting five days. After Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, Georgia completely severed all diplomatic relations with Russia. Russia eventually withdrew their troops from Georgia after a month. In its entirety, the war displaced nearly 200,000 people, many of whom were unable to return even today. 

Importantly, many of the issues and patterns in the Russo-Georgian war can still be seen today: the unresolved ethnic tensions in the Donbas and Luhansk regions, the revisionist sentiments of the Kremlin and the antagonistic stance of NATO. Moving forward, it is vital to consider pre-existing conditions within regions, the intention of each state and the impact of the involvement of international institutions.

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In 2020, Eastern Europe’s response to the pandemic was a loosening of monetary policies to support citizens and protect against short-term economic loss, which ultimately led to higher inflation and an increased cost of living. Out of the whole continent, Eastern Europe has been impacted the most; while it used to be known for countries with lower living costs compared to the rest of Europe, the cost of living in Eastern Europe is now almost comparable to Western European countries. 

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Eastern Europe saw a sharp decrease in retail sales, skyrocketing food and energy prices and higher rent, all of which have cut significantly into families’ incomes. Hungary, a small, landlocked country bordering Ukraine and the EU country with the highest rate of inflation, saw the most severe inflation rates it has seen in decades following the invasion, rising more than 20% year after year from January 2021 to December 2022. 

How is this crisis impacting the average Eastern European citizen?

Low-income families are paying around double for groceries, electricity and gas compared to upper-middle and wealthy families in Eastern Europe. This results in worse economic gaps between low and high-earning families. Food prices have also risen faster in Hungary than any other country in the EU, rising over 45% from 2022 to 2023, with Slovakia in second place at 29%. 

Meat products, once considered a staple in the Eastern European diet, are now a luxury for many. Bottled water, milk, eggs and bread now cost 72-80% more than they did in 2021– a staggering difference when compared to the average monthly income of Hungarians, which is 554,540 forints (about $1,631 USD). A dozen eggs can now cost as much as 858 forints (about $2.34 USD); this is not currently a sustainable price point for the average Hungarian. In Hungary, many families like to vacation in Lake Balaton, a world-famous vacation destination that European citizens flock to every summer for its warm temperatures and beautiful landscapes. 

When I visited Hungary this July, I was shocked by the cost of food. Cheese was somehow more expensive in Hungary than in the United States and what I would have considered affordable in Hungary the last time I was there was no longer affordable. According to my Hungarian family members, as well as other Hungarians I met during my time there, fewer and fewer people are able to travel for vacation to other countries or even within Hungary.

The risks of inflation rates remaining this high are many, including consumers buying fewer things, having to find a second or third job, finding alternatives to using gas and having less disposable income, which in turn negatively impacts Eastern Europe’s economies. According to the European Commission, Hungary’s GDP growth fell from 4.6% in 2022 to a mere 0.5% in 2023, and unemployment rose from 3.6% in 2022 to 4.2% in 2023. Experts predict that Hungary will be able to recover in 2024 with forecasted disinflation and a tightening of monetary policy. Hungarians should expect a decrease in inflation to 7-8% by December of this year, according to Hungary’s Finance Minister Vargás. The IMF predicts a low 0.3% GDP growth in Poland for 2023, 2.4% in Romania and -0.3% in Lithuania. 

The Israel-Palestine war will affect not only the Middle East’s economy but Eastern Europe’s as well; the cost of oil has already risen but will expect to recover unless Iran is sanctioned by the West for its support of Hamas. With no end in sight for the Russia-Ukraine war, rippling global conflict, lower consumption and economic activity and climate disasters such as wildfires and heat waves, the next couple of years will be difficult for Eastern Europeans. 

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