The impact of Trump’s criticisms is still felt in Washington today. On the one hand, Biden has faced pressure from dozens of senators, Democrats and Republicans, who are committed to expanding upon the deal to include expanded compliance from Iran in regards to its ballistic missile program. Meanwhile, the administration has been the subject of scrutiny from diplomats from France, Japan and Germany, who manufactured a 2003 deal with Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities and have served in an intermediary role between the two countries since 2018.

Biden’s insistence that Iran must make the first move toward compromise to maintain negotiating leverage has, in the eyes of the European Union, halted potential discussions and pushed Iran to explore other avenues. The ability, or lack thereof, of Biden to orchestrate any semblance of effective diplomacy at a time when Iran may only be months away from nuclear capabilities will test his multilateral approach to the Oval Office and will potentially determine the balance of power in the Middle East for years to come.

The historically rocky relations between the two countries — characterized by the CIA-led coup of democratically elected Prime Minister Mosaddegh in 1953, the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis in 1979, and the assassination of top military commander, General Qasem Soleimani, in 2020, to name a few — were put on display when Biden ordered a series of airstrikes on Iran-backed militias in Syria in late February as his first demonstration of military force. The airstrikes were supposedly a response to rocket attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, which Iran denied involvement in. That same week, Iran rejected the European Union’s proposition to moderate informal nuclear talks between Tehran and Washington. 

While Biden’s willingness to extend a diplomatic hand through the EU and prevent the nuclearization of one of the United States’ biggest military rivals, the first such offer in four years, reflects the new administration’s intent to revive global cooperation and internationalism, Iran’s cold response has made restoring the JCPOA one of the administration’s early challenges. Evidently, it will not be as diplomatically simple as lifting sanctions and returning to the 2015 deal, though the State Department recently reported that they are ready to do so. A new round of negotiations must be conducted, whether on Pennsylvania Avenue or a neutral location, with leverage being sacrificed on both sides.

It seems this is already underway. At a meeting in Vienna between intermediaries on April 6, representatives of the United States and Iran agreed to establish a joint commission that will work to simultaneously lift U.S. sanctions and halt Iranian nuclear development, thus officially beginning the negotiation phase, however indirectly.

However, after signing a 25-year, $400 billion dollar oil agreement with China in late March, Iran seems positioned to recuperate some of its economic losses from the devastating 2018 sanctions that Trump reimposed, thereby putting pressure on the Biden administration to concede to Iranian demands. The agreement signals that Iran is moving on from stalled negotiations with the United States and looking to the East for economic relief and potential military support down the line. 

In fact, the Iran-China deal also expanded military cooperation between the two nations, including joint research, training, intelligence and weapons development, with the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stating that, “China firmly supports Iran in safeguarding its state sovereignty and national dignity.” Yet U.S. officials seem rather unconcerned with the military aspects of the agreement, citing its lack of specificity and non-binding commitments. 

Even so, the economic leverage that the United States had over Iran as a result of Trump’s 1600 reimposed sanctions will continue to slip as Iran furthers its relations with China. With Iran entertaining other opportunities for relief and perhaps turning toward a more internationalist approach to foreign policy, the JCPOA’s salvation should not be seen as an inevitable conclusion.

Yet the most effective strategy for Biden remains the consolidation of U.S. nuclear demands. While a minority in Washington have continued to criticize the 2015 deal, most Americans opposed Trump’s diplomatic departure in 2018 and still support the JCPOA on its own, which was a landmark achievement of diplomacy and nonproliferation. And, as Iran has restated numerous times, they have no interest in renegotiating or expanding upon the JCPOA, efforts that will become increasingly slim if a new Iranian president takes office in June.

The lifting of some Trump-era sanctions will allow Biden to still maintain leverage in negotiations while also giving the diplomatic discussion some much needed momentum. Even so, such momentum might not get the JCPOA restored or a new nuclear deal established before it’s too late and Iran has already developed full-scale nuclear weapons. For the foreseeable future, Biden will continue to work in a race against time, which may require first rescinding some sanctions and returning to Obama’s Iranian approach in order to get the ball rolling faster. In fact, former weapons inspector and founder of the Institute for Science and International Security David Albright believes that “Iran could explode a test device within nine months; build a basic nuclear weapon in a year; and in two years, affix a warhead to a ballistic missile”.

Ultimately, Biden’s surprising refusal to cave into Iran’s pre-negotiation demands reflects his hard-nosed centrism and the slow U.S. return to diplomatic multilateralism following the Trump presidency. While many would have expected an immediate attempt to restore the JCPOA at all costs before the Iranian national elections, the administration seems sluggish to deliver on one of its key campaign promises. As negotiations stall and Iran approaches nuclear capabilities, expect to see a more desperate and conciliatory Oval Office to Tehran, the EU, and the American public.

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When President Joe Biden took office in January, the United States’ global reputation and global partnerships were falling into disarray. The Trump administration aggravated tensions with numerous countries around the world — both allies and adversaries. But, in particular, the relationship between the U.S. and China suffered greatly, with the economic, trade, and diplomatic relations turning sour and geopolitical tensions increasing.

Biden’s leadership in the White House comes at a pivotal time for the world. When COVID-19 continues to ravage the world; and the development of competing vaccines, the creation of vaccine passports and the race to distribute them to countries in need are fueling U.S.-China tensions. Foreign policy leadership under the new administration undoubtedly has a different outlook on foreign affairs than the previous administration — with engagement, global cooperation and multilateralism at the forefront of decision making. 

The relationship between China and the United States is a nuanced one; the two countries are both rivals and partners in different sectors. And the integrated and globalized economy means that the decisions of one great power undoubtedly impact the fate of the other — and vice versa. This article will provide a brief overview of what those main issue areas are, and how the Biden administration is expected to approach each area in light of U.S.-China relations. 

Navigating Trade and the Global Economy

An increasingly confrontational relationship between the United States and China continues to test global diplomacy and international trade, as the two countries struggle for economic and political power. 

In 2016, former President Donald Trump accused China of being one of the primary reasons for losses in U.S. manufacturing jobs, igniting a complex U.S.-China trade war. In 2018, the United States imposed tariffs on more than $360 billion worth of Chinese goods, causing China to retaliate by imposing tariffs on U.S. products. As tensions grew, the January 2020 $200 billion trade deal between China and the United States failed to solve economic hardship stemming from the multi-year trade war. 

But this tension is built on complex cooperation. China is the United States’ largest supplier of imported goods. Trump’s tariffs policy encouraged U.S. consumers to buy national products, making imported goods rise in prices. This strained the U.S.-China relationship, increasing tensions and making international trade more expensive. 

And currently, large disruptions in global trade resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic has provoked executive action in an attempt to reduce U.S. dependence on internationally sourced materials. On February 24, Biden signed a new Executive Order on U.S. a supply chain, requiring his administration to review supply chains and bolster American manufacturing output, beginning long-term efforts to insulate the U.S. economy from future shortages of critical manufacturing goods. The order calls for a yearlong review of six sectors and a 100-day review of four critical manufactured imports: high-capacity batteries, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and critical minerals. Early on in the pandemic, China diverted protective equipment against COVID-19 to local hospitals and proposed bans on critical minerals, leaving international buyers, including the United States, empty handed. Biden’s new executive order began an important step for creating jobs and making the U.S. economy more resilient in the face of ever growing global threats.

On March 1, the Biden administration released the 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report. The document specifies that the United States will use “all available tools” to address “China’s unfair trade practices that continue to harm U.S. workers and businesses.” The report  reinforces statements previously by the Biden administration in their strategy towards China on trade policy. 

“Addressing the China challenge will require a comprehensive strategy and more systematic approach than the piecemeal approach of the recent past,” the report read. 

Furthermore, the report outlines that it will be a top priority of the Biden administration to work with allies to ensure China fulfills its trade obligations. Although this report does not outline specific steps for trade policy moving forward, it solidifies Biden’s trade stance with China. 

Trump’s U.S.-China trade relationship left the Biden administration with several other economic complications. A December 2020 report from the Center for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) in the United Kingdom indicates that early lockdowns and stability from the COVID-19 pandemic has tipped economic recovery in China’s favor. The report predicts that after a strong economic recovery in 2021, the U.S. economy will grow about 1.9% annually from 2022-2024, and slow to 1.6% in the following years. By contrast, China’s economy is expected to grow 5.7% annually through 2025. 

Although China was the first country hit by COVID-19, aggressive action prevented the country from being affected by the same economic hardship as many others. By contrast, the U.S. economy has been hit hard by COVID-19, as the nation struggles to recover from over 30 million cumulative cases nationwide. The national economic damage has been cushioned by fiscal stimulus, but disagreements and prolonged passage of the $900 billion Consolidated Appropriations Act left millions of Americans struggling into the new year. 

On January 20, the Biden administration announced the American Rescue Plan, which intends to provide immediate economic relief to communities struggling from the effects of COVID-19, send grants and funding to struggling businesses, and assist state and local economies. Signed March 11, this plan will bolster U.S. economic growth and send much-needed relief to Americans and their families. This bill, combined with the American Jobs Plan — which aims to create millions of jobs to rebuild U.S. infrastructure and “position the United States to out-compete China” — will serve as major steps towards repairing the U.S. economy. 

As the United States recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic and begins to determine its trade policies with China moving forward, it will continue to test and enforce trade relations with China. 

The Growing Challenge of Cyber Security

In May 2020, the Trump administration attempted to block American telecommunications firms from installing foreign made equipment that could pose a threat to national security. This included an attempt to restrict the sales of Huawei computer chips within the United States and restrict Huawei from building its 5G wireless networks for fear of global spying. 

Further, hacking concerns in May 2020 caused the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to issue warnings of an imminent threat to U.S. based healthcare, pharmaceutical and research sectors working on COVID-19 response. However, this strategy failed to dissuade further cybertheft. 

In July 2020, the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice issued charges to Chinese hackers after an attempt to gain intelligence on U.S. intellectual property, including COVID-19 research. In September 2020, the Center for Strategic and International Studies revealed that Chinese hackers had been monitoring U.S. government and private networks for over a year in search of vulnerabilities. 

Following incidents of intellectual theft from U.S.-based companies and despite U.S. efforts to prevent major companies such as Huawei from dominating the field of telecommunications, China continues to grow as a limitless threat in the cybersphere. The United States’ vulnerability to China’s international cyber reach leaves the Biden administration with several immediate online threats to combat and weaknesses to secure. 

The Trump administration challenged China’s technology industry through sanctions and executive orders. Early actions from the Biden administration indicate Biden will maintain a similar approach. 

In the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference, Biden said that “we must shape the rules that will govern the advance of technology and the norms of behavior in cyberspace, artificial intelligence, biotechnology so that they are used to lift people up, not used to pin them down.” Statements like this display the administration’s tough stance on proliferating technology concerns. 

Biden may potentially continue the Trump administration’s efforts to exclude Chinese companies from next-generation 5G mobile networks. Trump’s executive order gives the U.S. government the power to block technology transactions that pose “an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States.” 

Only time will tell what the Biden administration will do to tackle cyber security on a global scale. However, one thing is certain: the conversation of technology, global security, and cyber dominance will continue under the Biden administration. 

Emerging Technology and Media Concerns

The technology standoff between the U.S. and Chinese administrations was one item in the laundry list of tensions between the two countries that dominated headlines over the past year. As a staunch proponent of American superiority, Trump seemed determined to undercut any sort of relationship with China that was perceived as a security threat. In February 2020, officials discussed placing restrictions on export licenses of goods from American companies in order to restrict sales to China and reduce their technological advantage. 

American technology companies voiced strong concerns and opposition to any sort of embargo. They insisted that these restrictions would actually undercut American business abroad, as many foreign and American companies were locked into symbiotic business relationships. While these specific restrictions were never enacted, the threat of implementation was enough for some foreign companies to begin cutting ties with American tech corporations. In particular, the semiconductor industry was among one of the most affected industries as the Trump administration placed strict limitations on sales of sensitive microchip technologies to China in January 2020. 

The U.S.-China technology war goes beyond the trade of technological raw materials. In September 2020, as the Chinese app TikTok gained massive global traction, Trump signed an executive order that demanded Bytedance, the app’s parent company, to sell TikTok’s American operations to a U.S.-based company. Trump also banned WeChat, the popular Chinese messaging and communications app, from app stores on Android and iOS platforms. These restrictions were the culmination of U.S. suspicions regarding how these apps utilized personal user information; many in the administration believed the apps were delivering sensitive information directly to Chinese intelligence. As the Trump administration exited the White House, the New York Stock Exchange was ordered to delist the stocks of three Chinese telecommunications companies.

Many believe that the strict hardline stance against Chinese technologies will continue under the Biden administration. The U.S. continues to state that Chinese technologies pose an economic and national security threat to American interests. While many American companies attempted to block such acts from being implemented, the Biden administration is reportedly allowing a Trump-era sanction against Chinese technologies to come into effect later this year. This rule would allow the U.S. Department of Commerce to unilaterally ban any Chinese technologies that it perceives as a threat to national security, paving the way for a great deal of uncertainty among CEOs of American technology giants. However, the Biden administration has taken a step back from Trump’s bans on WeChat and TikTok, allowing the Commerce Department to review these sanctions and determine whether they are necessary. 

Looking Forward

China poses one of the largest long-term threats to U.S. national security. As a growing global influence, China will continue to shape the international sphere through free speech and censorship methods, economic trade policies, and cyber domination.

Tensions regarding trade tariffs and economic recovery will continue as the globe recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic. As China and the United States recover from economic hardship, both countries may aim to improve trade relations. However, this seems increasingly unlikely, as recently passed U.S. legislation aims to outcompete Chinese manufacturing and economic prosperity. 

Cyber security and growing concerns over censorship will continue throughout 2021. Following cases of lapses in cyber security, the U.S. will need to bolster its stability in the cybersphere. The U.S.-China technology war will likely continue under the Biden administration — as the U.S. looks to secure its position as a global hegemonic power. Over the course of the trade war with China, the U.S. administration seeks to also become less reliant on Chinese manufacturing and more self-sufficient. 

Another point of contention that gained international traction last year is the treatment of the Muslim Uighur population in China. The issue attracted massive media coverage when reports of camps filled with Uighurs in the north-western Xinjiang region of China were leaked to international media. While the Chinese government was openly criticized for its actions, President Trump supposedly voiced approval of the treatment — news that became public following the release of former National Security Advisor John Bolton’s memoir. President Trump also delayed sanctions against China’s treatment of the Uighurs in order to facilitate a trade deal. Shortly before leaving the White House, the Trump administration changed course and publicly denounced the treatment of the Uighurs. The Biden campaign was vehemently opposed to the issue but it remains to be seen whether the administration will pursue a more hardline stance against this particular humanitarian issue.

The U.S.-China relationship will continue to evolve over the next four years under the Biden administration. As tensions continue to rise, only time will tell if the United States and China will be able to resolve hegemonic conflicts and improve diplomatic relations. 

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NEW YORK — The Biden administration has expressed an interest in reinvigorating U.S.-Canada relations following a virtual meeting between President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau early February. The meeting, which was the first between the then newly-inaugurated president and a foreign head of state, focused on each country’s response to COVID-19, economic cooperation during the pandemic and moving forward, as well as other shared interests among the two close allies. As the White House begins forming its foreign policy objectives and global leadership, it is essential to consider the current state of U.S.-Canada relations and where the two countries may be headed moving forward.

“Generally in world politics, there are no permanent friends, but permanent interests. But, there is supposed to be a special exception for some countries,” said Brian Bow, director at the Center for the Study of Security and Development at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, in an exclusive interview with Glimpse from the Globe. “It is not unique to the U.S.-Canada relationship, but Canada has a special relationship with the U.S. and Canadians were happy with that in the first half of the Cold War.”

When former President Richard Nixon reformed the United States’ economic policy in 1971, which is often referred to as the “Nixon Shock,” along with leaving the Gold Standard, Nixon began putting tariffs on products leaving the United States.

“Most countries reacted with hostility, but no one was more surprised than the Canadians,” Bow said. “They assumed it was a mistake that they weren’t on the list of countries that wouldn’t need to pay these surcharges.”

Following the change invoked by Nixon in U.S. international economic foreign policy, Canada had to do some “soul-searching,” as Bow said. Canada began realizing that they needed to have other partners rather than just entirely relying on the United States. Canada tried to diversify its economic partners, but ultimately failed, as penetrating new markets, especially in Asia, can be pricey and full of uncertainty. As a result, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1989, signaling that economic relations would return to normal. This agreement; which eliminated all tariffs on trade, was a precursor to NAFTA, which was then enacted in 1994. 

“Even since then, there have been these recurring periods where Canada hasn’t liked the direction the U.S. has been going in,” Bow said. “The controversy with the Bush administration over the war in Iraq in 2003 was a big one, and the election of the Trump administration in 2016 was another one.”

Bow believes that the current administration in Ottawa is better aligned with President Biden than it was with Trump. That said, he believes there is a possibility of Trump-like rhetoric making its way into Canadian politics in the future. 

“When I was a teenager in Canada, stylish clothing would make its way about five years after it appeared in America,” Bow said. “The same thing can happen with policies and parties in Canada trying on Trump-style rhetoric.” 

The possibility of conservative politicians in Canada imitating the populist and often provocative language of Trump will certainly impact relations between the two neighbors. While this style of rhetoric is not prominent in Canada yet, Canadians, including Bow, are worried this could occur in the future. The next federal election in Canada could see a tight race between liberals and conservatives. Current polls show Prime Minister Trudeau with a narrow five-point lead, but Biden’s win may have an effect on Canadian elections. Many politically engaged Canadians are happy that the Biden administration will be holding office for the next four years; a recent poll showed that four in five Canadians hoped for a Biden win. 

Canadians are excited and hopeful about the Biden administration’s position on various issues, namely climate change. Undoubtedly, the Biden administration is taking the threat of climate change more seriously than the previous administration. Already, Biden has appointed former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry as the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, a new position within the cabinet. Additionally, the U.S., as of February 19, has rejoined the Paris Agreement with the international goal of keeping global warming below two degrees celsius, needed to avoid the most catastrophic impacts of climate change. Canada is also a signatory of this agreement and has fiercely advocated for its importance. Most recently, on February 25th, Biden and Treadau announced that they would be coming together to reach their goal of net zero emissions by 2050 with their “U.S.-Canada Partnership Roadmap.” 

The Partnership works to align the goals and climate policies of each country so that they can cooperate more efficiently. In addition to aligning policies, the plan hopes to create more policies and projects that will promote job growth, address inequality and combat the effects of climate change. Advocating for the creation of clean-energy infrastructure and ensuring that cross-border energy is renewable is at the core of this partnership. Biden and Trudeau also committed to having polluters take responsibility for their damages.

In addition to the announcement of the plan, Trudeau said that “U.S. leadership has been sorely missed over the past years… [it is]nice when the Americans are not pulling out all references to climate change and instead adding them.” 

While both countries must implement long-term goals for climate change to protect our planet, the issue of COVID-19 has taken precedent this past year as over 500,000 people have died of COVID-19 in the U.S. alone as of February 2021. 

During the initial meeting between Biden and Trudeau, COVID-19 was the primary focus. Both leaders agreed that cooperation in combating the virus was essential. Canada has struggled to vaccinate its population due to supplies being bought up by larger economies like the United States and United Kingdom. As part of his statement, Trudeau raised the idea of buying vaccines produced in the United States. Canada is currently receiving vaccines from Pfizer and Moderna plants in Europe and Biden’s team reportedly said that it was the administration’s priority to “ensure every American is vaccinated.” 

It is unlikely, however, that the United States would sell vaccines produced domestically to Canada until late summer at the earliest. As of February 20th, 2021, only 2.43% of Canadians had received at least one dose of the vaccine compared to about 14% of the U.S. population. 

Despite the challenges associated with vaccine distribution, the United States and Canada have committed to keeping trade as open as possible. The Prime Minister’s office emphasized “the importance of avoiding measures that may constrain the critical trade and supply-chain security between our countries” in a public statement. Economically, it is in the best interest of both nations to keep borders open and encourage trade to avoid unemployment and increase GDP.   

Although Canadian and U.S. interests are more aligned than in previous years, on his first day in office, Biden signed an executive order to end the expansion of the Keystone XL pipeline, a project supported by the Government of Alberta, a provincial government of Canada. The Keystone XL pipeline, which began planning and construction in 2008, travels from Canada through Texas. The pipeline, which began operating in 2010, was scheduled for an expansion to be able to carry even more oil. Despite the pipeline providing economic benefits to both countries, Biden canceled the project in order to protect the environment and indigenous communities. A January statement from the White House said that “the President acknowledged Prime Minister Trudeau’s disappointment regarding the decision to rescind the permit for the Keystone XL pipeline.” 

Bow said that the pipeline will hurt domestic relations between the local governments and the federal government in Canada, rather than hurting diplomatic relations between Ottawa and Washington. Given that Trudeau is substantially worried about political support in his country, this may be why he showed disdain for the cancellation of the project. 

“The prairie provinces who are the major oil exporters in Canada are the ones who really desperately wanted Keystone to go through, and people in other parts of Canada don’t really care that much about it,” Bow said. “There are real differences between Canadians on those issues.” 

While the Trudeau administration did not express as much distress about the cancellation of the project, in a statement released by the Government of Alberta, Premier Jason Kenney expressed his disturbance with Biden’s actions to cancel the Presidential permit for the Keystone XL pipeline. He highlighted the 2,000 jobs that would be lost due to the cancellation of the project. The statement also said, “That’s not how you treat a friend and ally.”

Even though some of the provincial governments may not support President Biden, there is no reason to believe that the Trudeau administration, which will be in office for at least the majority of Biden’s stay in the White House, will become hostile with the U.S. over this issue, especially as, since the cancellation of the project, Trudeau and Biden have already begun working on several projects together. 

The future of U.S.-Canada relations looks hopeful as the two countries are already working together to tackle global issues such as climate change and COVID-19. However, the  relationship between the two countries can change depending on the issues at hand and the administration holding office. 

With the popularity of Trumpism in the United States and growing support of populism in Canada, both countries could experience major political shifts once the two leaders are up for re-election. However, until then, the neighbors will most likely continue to work cooperatively together and advance the two countries’ unique historical, cultural and geographical relationship.

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LOS ANGELES — The Cuban Missile Crisis. The Bay of Pigs. Guantanamo Bay. All of these infamous events seem to encapsulate a common sentiment around the topic of U.S.- Cuba relations over the years, one marked by tense relations and cautious diplomacy. 

In 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama overcame decades of tension and became the first president to visit Cuba since Calvin Coolidge in 1928. In Obama’s second term, he made it a priority to change the contentious relationship between the two countries. While Obama understood the human rights differences, he believed that the best way to deal with the dispute and promote freedom was through dialogue and positive actions. 

He then set out a plan to develop trade, humanitarian and scientific opportunities. The Obama administration promoted joint medical research, the selling of Cuban medicine in the U.S. and banking for Americans in Cuba. They also wanted to create scholarships for research and build more infrastructure in Cuba. 

The administration hoped that easing restrictions and creating new programs would help facilitate a better economic and diplomatic relationship. Though Obama’s actions were not widely applauded by Cuban Americans like Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ), his arrival in Havana marked a historic beginning to a detente period and the first step to normalizing relations between the two countries. 

That, too, however, quickly deteriorated. The past four years under Trump saw rollbacks in Obama’s policy. Former British Ambassador to Cuba Paul Hare told Glimpse from the Globe in an exclusive interview that, “Trump for largely electoral reasons, thought it would be advantageous, so he could win Florida, to say he would reverse Obama’s policies, which he did pretty quickly, despite the main one of keeping full diplomatic relations.” 

Notably, Trump also re-designated Cuba as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” continuing to choke Cuba’s economy with economic sanctions. Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reported the new classifcation of Cuba, and justified the decision by saying that Cuba continually, “[provided]support for the acts of international terrorism in granting state harbor to terrorists.” When this decision was made, the United States only had listed Syria, Iran and North Korea under this categorization. Being classfied as a “state sponsor of terrorism” allows the United States to apply more sanctions, deny foreign aid and restrict the exports of defense materials to the country. 

In a tweet, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez condemned the act, and said that “the political opportunism of this action is recognized by anyone with an honest regard for the scourage of terrorism and its victims.” Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy expressed his frustrations with the decision and recognized in a statement that this action will make the relationship between the United States and Cuba even more strained for the Biden administration. As Biden now takes office, there has been talk of continuing Obama’s legacy to normalize relations between the two countries. 

U.S. President Joe Biden, who served as Obama’s vice president, heavily endorsed previous efforts to seek improved relations with Cuba. Biden’s presidential campaign vowed to reverse Trump’s policy that has “inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights.” Already, eighty Democrats in the U.S. House of Representative have encouraged Biden to roll back sanctions on Cuba and allow travel between the two countries to create “a constructive, productive and civil approach toward Cuba and its people,” according to Peter Kornbluh, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive.  

Calls for lifting U.S. sanctions on Cuba mainly stem from concern for the Cuban economy. Many describe Cuba as a country lost in time, with its infrastructure and economy unmoving from decades ago. The struggling economy saw its first awakening in 2014 after U.S.-Cuba relations were restored and travel restarted to enliven the tourism market. However, these changes were quickly undermined by rollbacks of the Trump presidency and the COVID-19 pandemic. 

In 2020, Cuba’s economy shrank by 11%, setting a three-decade record of decline. Broadly speaking, the Cuban economy last peaked in 1984 and plummeted in the 1990s, erasing almost a third of its entire economy. After that, there were meager economic improvements in 2000 when Venezuela supplied oil at discounted prices, but since the 2008 financial crisis, Cuba never truly recovered. 

Now, the dire state of its economy is taking a toll on the entire demographic, with its population of 11.2 million shrinking and quickly aging. With Biden’s arrival, many are optimistic about Cuba’s recovery with U.S. aid — but it may still be too early for that. At this stage, Cubans are looking towards strides in opening up travel.

“They will be hoping now that Biden does open travel, which will bring a lot of money into Cuba,” said Paul Hare, former ambassador to Cuba. “It will bring tourism, but also Cuban American travel, which is being reduced from the new restrictions.”

As seen by Cuba’s recent governmental action, better relations seem to be desired by Cuba. Cuba’s inner workings have seen significant changes over the years. After decades of isolationist authoritarian policy under Fidel Castro, in 2009, Fidel’s successor, Raul Castro completely reformed his cabinet. He removed several of Cuba’s highest-ranking officials from their posts and dismounted many loyalists of his brother. The political significance of the removal signaled a notable pivoting point for Cuba, signifying an internal political power and Cuba’s divergence from a long period of isolationist policy. 

For the first time in decades, Raul expressed openness to improving relations with the United States. Cuba’s reform has not only been limited to its government but has also been making economic changes to accommodate for the pandemic. The spread of the Coronavirus in Cuba has caused over 65,000 infections and resulted in 387 deaths. While the country was able to keep the mortality rate considerably low, it struggled to keep its economy going and protect its citizens. And the already dwindling economy became even more damaged by a food crisis. 

Since 2010, Cubans have only been allowed to work in businesses in 127 private sector categories specified by the government, mostly encapsulating service jobs in the restaurant or transportation industry. In February, the former policy was abolished, legalizing all private sector businesses except for a list of 124 specifically prohibited jobs. 

This is a fundamental, historic change that we’ve been asking for for a long time,” said Oniel Diaz Castellnos, an owner of a business Cuban consultancy agency. “There are a lot of businesses that were illegal and now can be legalized, and there’s going to be a lot of innovative ideas that will be unleashed. It’s an economic opportunity not just for entrepreneurs but for the country.”

Biden’s entry into office has increased optimism on the U.S.-Cuba relationship. He has openly voiced intentions to roll back President Trump’s harsh foreign policy and continue engagement with Cuba. “Yes, I would. In large part, I would go back,” Biden said. “I’d still insist they keep the commitments they said they would make when we, in fact, set the policy in place.” The Biden administration’s first priority in Cuba would be to support democracy and human rights in the country. White House Spokeswoman Jen Psaki said at a press briefing “[we are committed]to making human rights a core pillar of our U.S. policy,” and “to carefully [review]policy decisions made in the prior administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.”

However, this is not necessarily a guarantee of close diplomacy. Biden’s arrival may mean improved relations between the United States and Cuba, but as the United States battles with COVID-19, diplomacy with Cuba may not be of the utmost importance. The Biden administration is not in a rush to change Cuba policy, which is currently under review, the White House said. 

“The Biden administration clearly has to decide what it’s for and what its policy priorities are,” Hare said. “They’ve got many more pressing issues, and perhaps Venezuela, which is linked with Cuba, is more pressing than actually reformulating a new policy towards Cuba.”

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In 2018, Mexico elected President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a left-wing populist member of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA). Although he had long been a divisive figure in Mexican politics, López Obrador entered office with an astounding 53% of the popular vote and a promise to prioritize Mexico’s sovereignty. After multiple failed presidential elections, AMLO (the popular abbreviation for López Obrador) finally achieved the highest office in Mexico on the rising tide of Mexican nationalism, which had dominated Mexican politics for a majority of its relations with the U.S. and had only subsided in the late 80s.

Americans observed Mexico’s return to nationalist tendencies with anxiety, heralding AMLO as “Mexico’s answer to Donald Trump” and anticipating exacerbated tension between the United States and its southern neighbor. However, AMLO and Donald Trump maintained a surprisingly functional, occasionally even congenial, working relationship.

In many ways, Trump and López Obrador were diametrically opposed, but one crucial shared opinion allowed the two leaders to collaborate. Trump was uniquely uninterested in intervening in Mexico’s domestic politics, and AMLO appreciated the absence of American oversight and intervention.

Donald Trump’s platform toward Mexico focused almost exclusively on issues of migration and renegotiating regional trade agreements. Trump’s approach to foreign policy, toward Mexico and many others, was unprecedentedly one-dimensional, relying on his personal business dealings rather than a multifaceted, coordinated agenda. Trump’s narrow focus allowed AMLO to pursue his own domestic agenda with less American influence.

In a recent call with newly elected President Joe Biden, AMLO said “I must mention that we do have a very good relationship with the now president of your country… Regardless of all other considerations, he respects [Mexico’s] sovereignty.”

Joe Biden’s approach to relations with Mexico is a far cry from his predecessor’s. Where Trump relied on his own personal relationships, Biden will rely on a fully appointed cabinet to manage a wide range of issues. One of the many ways in which Trump’s presidency marked a divergence from the status quo was his resistance to assemble a cabinet that could navigate the complexities of a relationship between two countries whose economies, cultures and politics are so inextricably interconnected. Biden intends to reconstruct this infrastructure of diplomacy that will allow him to tackle multiple campaign promises.

AMLO anticipates the increase in American oversight that will come with Biden’s more holistic foreign policy platform. He has already begun sending signals to the incoming American president that he will not tolerate the same amount of American influence as his predecessors. Not only was López Obrador among the last global leaders to congratulate Biden on his victory, but he has also exonerated a former Mexican defense secretary from prosecution for drug trafficking in America and granted asylum to Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks who has been evading U.S. extradition since releasing thousands of Hillary Clinton’s emails in 2016. Many Americans received these actions as slights to the incoming administration, but the sum of these minor affronts is a broader message: Mexico’s president intends to continue pursuing his robust domestic agenda with minimal American interference.

AMLO has championed the charge for Mexican energy independence, a goal which he has ardently pursued since he took office in 2018. An outspoken critic of his predecessor’s energy sector redesign that opened the industry to extensive privatization, López Obrador has repeatedly vowed to restore the dominance of Mexico’s state-owned electricity company.

Recent storms across Texas, a major source of Mexico’s natural gas, resulted in widespread blackouts across the northern half of Mexico. Pointing to these blackouts as evidence, AMLO argued for fortifying Mexico’s own domestic energy supply and in late February put forth a bill that would strengthen the state-owned energy program and limit the involvement of private companies in the energy industry. Ultimately, López Obrador aims to buttress Mexico’s economy from America’s political and economic influence through the centralization and nationalization of the energy industry.

AMLO’s fear that Biden’s election will spell out more roadblocks to his dream of energy independence is not unfounded. Hordes of legislators, environmental advocates and industry experts have criticized his proposed bill for violating carbon emission regulations and trade agreements. These infractions will likely attract opposition not just from his domestic opponents but also from the Biden administration.

Lourdes Melgar, a top energy official under former President Enrique Peña Nieto, said AMLO “has a nationalistic view of how to utilize resources.” Melgar and many other energy experts argue that this policy sacrifices environmental sustainability for an ideological power play. Although the bill is expected to become law within the coming days, Mexico will continue grappling to find a balance between nationalistic impulses, international cooperation, and environmental sustainability.

Unlike his predecessor, President Biden will not look the other way when it comes to violations of environmental agreements. Throughout his campaign and into the first month of his presidency, Biden has remained adamant about the need to uphold environmental protection agreements and expressed a willingness to reassert America’s role as a leader of international environmental cooperation.

According to Pamela Starr, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network at the University of Southern California, Biden should expect to ruffle some feathers when addressing Mexico’s disregard for carbon emission limits and other sustainability regulations. The new president may not necessarily care that Mexico is striving for energy independence, only considering the repercussions of the tactics employed to achieve self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, increased oversight could set off alarm bells for AMLO and others who remain skeptical of American involvement.

Starr points to Jeffrey Davidow’s metaphor for the complex relationship between the United States and Mexico, “the bear and the porcupine,” which captured the difficulties of navigating a relationship between two closely connected countries when one was overtly interventionist and the other hypersensitive to perceived intervention. This dance between American brashness and Mexican defensiveness defined their relationship until the election of Ernesto Cedillo in 1988.

AMLO has openly asserted his disapproval for his predecessors’ approach to dealing with the United States, accusing Mexico of kowtowing to American interests over the past few decades. His approach to diplomacy marks a return to the era of the porcupine, defined by Mexican nationalism and apprehension of U.S. involvement. In order to avoid returning to the role of “the bear,” the United States must carefully navigate the rising sentiment of Mexican nationalism, an endeavor further complicated by rising nationalism within its own borders. Competing threads of nationalism could cause friction not just within the realm of environmental policy, but also within negotiations of labor, trade, corruption and migration.

According to Starr, Biden’s policy toward Latin America rests on three pillars: corruption, climate change and democracy. Although the ongoing migration crisis will likely monopolize much of Biden’s first year in office, the early months of his presidency could define the timber of their relationship and define the trajectory of negotiations of the other items on his agenda in the subsequent years of his presidency.

Despite AMLO’s initial posturing, he has recently demonstrated his commitment to maintaining a productive relationship with the United States. The two leaders convened virtually to discuss issues of immigration, the pandemic and climate change, and both seemed intent on redirecting the nature of their nations’ exchange away from the blatant antagonism that defined the Trump administration. López Obrador, like many Mexicans, is relieved to work with an American president who does not openly degrade their country.

However, this relief at a return to amiability will not dissuade AMLO from fiercely protecting his plan for energy independence. The past four years have exacerbated a relationship that had been fraught with mistrust for decades. This history of unwelcome intervention and competing nationalist sentiments will guide the next four years of U.S.-Mexico relations.

Biden has already begun to dismantle Trump’s hardline anti-immigration policies, ending the “Remain in Mexico” program and working with Mexican officials to reinstate mechanisms for granting asylum to the thousands of migrants waiting at the US-Mexico border. Biden has already encountered numerous roadblocks: an SUV crash in California left 13 migrants dead and a bottleneck of migrants in encampments at the border. Recent reports predict thousands more migrants from Central America are marching toward this chokepoint, hopeful that the new administration will open more doors for their arrival.

Tensions of migration at the border continue to reverberate throughout the region. With the support of Mexican police and leadership, Guatemalan police confronted a caravan of Honduran migrants in late January in an effort to stem the flow of northbound Central Americans. As the entire region reels from the effects of widespread migration and the ongoing public health crisis, Biden will need to rely on coordination with Mexico to stabilize their shared border and eventually the region.

Constructing a productive relationship after four years of Trump’s nationalism and centuries of prior American interventionism will be no small feat, especially with a Mexican president with his own political agenda that runs counterproductive to American interests in certain sectors.

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The past four years resulted in weak and volatile U.S.-North Korea relations; but, Biden’s outward-oriented posture starkly contrasts with that of Trump. As North Korea proliferated their nuclear weapons program, Trump responded to every nuclear threat staunchly, signaling a potential war if need be. 

With a new administration in the White House, the United States now has a chance to ease tensions with North Korea and encourage dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. 

Under President Obama’s administration, the approach towards Pyongyang focused on incremental change. In 2008 and 2009, Obama emphasized the need to interact and engage with North Korea “without preconditions.” He affirmed that while difficult, working with communist governments, like those in Cuba and North Korea, would be beneficial for the entire international community. Obama’s willingness to meet with strongman Kim Jong-Un was met with harsh criticism, particularly from conservatives and human rights groups. Some viewed his efforts as weak. Conservatives expressed that meeting with enemies would “lower the prestige of the office of the president.” After Obama, Trump reversed course and deeply strained the progress Obama had made with Kim Jong-Un, resulting in several instances of nuclear threats toward the United States. 

In contrast, conservatives applauded Trump as he met with Kim Jong-un during his presidency, praising his efforts to aggressively denuclearize North Korea. Unlike Obama’s “strategic patience,” Trump demanded a top-down approach to North Korea’s complete denuclearization, offering the incremental removal of financial sanctions. To Trump’s dismay, the Hanoi Summit in 2019 ended in Kim’s refusal to accept any form of denuclearization. Still, Trump garnered conservative support as the false potential for North Korean disarmament led to the expression: “If North Korea disarms, President Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize would be well deserved.” 

Even Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) said a full-fledged war would be “worth it in terms of long-term stability and national security.” Many argue that Trump’s business mindset might have aided in dismantling Kim’s nuclear weapons program. However, soft power and traditionally diplomatic skills from the Biden administration will likely prove to advance U.S.-North Korea relations. 

Biden’s plans to reverse many of Trump’s foreign policies suggest that relations with North Korea will progress. The Obama administration did not have a weak approach toward Kim, despite partisan criticism, and emphasized that military involvement may be necessary if North Korea does not cooperate. Obama’s plan of North Korean denuclearization before easing restrictions should be followed through during Biden’s presidency, but with a bottom-up approach. Before any high-level summit is held, Washington must establish high-level methods of private communication with Pyongyang. 

Already, however, a challenge is clear. In early January 2021,North Korea labeled the United States as its primary enemy. The Biden administration should not plan to host a large summit in an official manner, but in private discussions. In the past, the United States has made deals with North Korea which were misconstrued as simply improving America’s reputation. 

In addition to dealing with North Korean denuclearization, the United States must repair relations with South Korea. Coordination with South Korea will further pressure Kim to accept incremental disarmament. Pursuing peace on the Korean peninsula can incentivize North Korea to change its alignment towards cooperation in exchange for sanction removal, economic advancement and an enhanced reputation. As detailed in the 2018 Singapore Declaration, the United States should work towards normalizing relations on the Korean peninsula. To do so, Biden must eradicate the hostile atmosphere that Trump exacerbated during his presidency. Building military preparedness along the Demilitarized Zone, dividing the north and south, is vital to protecting their citizens. Peace on the peninsula will never be achieved with an aggressive attitude. 

Amid Biden’s new presidency, North Korea plans to hone its military power in an effort to hinder American power. Kim’s attempts to modernize its weapons system include a 15,000 km range missile. North Korea’s military development can serve as bait to convince the United States to slowly lift sanctions in exchange for minuscule denuclearization. To avoid military aggression, the Biden administration must arrange working-level negotiations to effectively mitigate tensions and the destruction of an entire population. Trump’s staunch approach towards denuclearization can be implemented, but with cautious language and private negotiations. Trump’s style of riling up allies to attack the enemy is not the approach Biden can continue. By amassing the collective hatred of many allies, North Korea has even more reason to pursue nuclear aggression and refuse any negotiation. 

Incremental denuclearization in exchange for sanction relief is the most effective route for the Biden administration. Conducting these negotiations in a private setting will allow both parties to not put on a “show” and instead discuss what they truly need in order to repair relations. 

Biden must not accept Pyongyang as a nuclear power, but grant concessions and offer greater market access to North Korea. However, these concessions may only be offered if Kim feels inclined to denuclearize in any capacity. 

Ultimately, Biden’s presidency will likely improve U.S.-North Korean relations exponentially — but it will take some time. Regardless, there is hope for a more peaceful international community. 

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Just a few hours prior to this much anticipated action, Biden pledged to “repair our alliances and engage with the world once again.” Considering almost every other country in the world has pledged onto the Paris Climate Agreement and remained loyal to that pledge, the United States’ reentry into this international accord is a crucial step toward repairing U.S. diplomatic relations and restoring American leadership amid the climate crisis.

Many global leaders joined Biden’s American supporters in applauding his commitment to the Paris Agreement, hoping it signals not only a shift in climate policy but also thawing diplomatic relations with the United States. Surely, this is a step in the right direction, but rejoining the Paris Climate Agreements, despite its hefty symbolism, is not compensation for U.S.’ abysmal approach toward environmental policies over the past four years. Climate change ‒ the very existence of it ‒ has become embroiled in heated partisan debate, and consequently, the United States’ commitment to the Paris Climate Agreement and to the broader fight against climate change drastically fluctuates with each change in administration. While the United States is embroiled in a partisan debate over climate change, Latin America, one of the regions most affected by climate disaster, is already confronting the consequences of U.S.’ inaction.

Three thousand miles south of the Oval Office, thousands of Guatemalans are struggling to keep their head above water. In late 2020, two massive hurricanes, Eta and Iota, struck Central America within a few miles of each other, devastating large swaths of Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala. These cataclysmic storms uprooted an estimated 5.2 million residents, and thousands still remain in shelters while they struggle to piece their lives back together.

Prior to this unprecedentedly volatile storm season, five straight years of drought had plagued Central America, pushing thousands of migrants northward in search of food and work. Coffee-growing economies throughout the region suffered unprecedented crop failures and drought, leading to a declaration of emergency in Honduras in 2019. The limited water supply was often polluted due to exposure to toxic waste, biological agents and oil spills. 

After half a decade of drought and remarkably uneventful storm seasons, hurricanes Eta and Iota pulverized the region. The storms completely ravaged a region that was already uniquely vulnerable to the COVID-19 crisis, exacerbating conditions in nearly every aspect of life from the prospects of economic recovery to their already weak sanitation system. Displaced citizens are even more vulnerable to gender-based violence and the safety consequences of inadequate reproductive healthcare. More than a singularly horrific tropical storm season, the effects of climate change are already manifesting in every facet of life in Latin America.

In the wake of Hurricanes Eta and Iota, the U.S.Agency for International Development (USAID) estimates damages and losses in Nicaragua alone to total $738 million.

Experts compare this devastation to Hurricane Mitch, which struck the same region in 1998 during the Clinton administration. Roughly 7.2 million people were affected by this storm. Former Honduran President Carlos Flores Facussé recognized that his country could not survive without significant international support and anticipated the global repercussions that could follow an unaddressed humanitarian crisis such as Hurricane Mitch.

Facussé warned international leaders, especially former President Bill Clinton, that without foreign aid migrants would go “walking, swimming and running up north.”

Consequently, Clinton allotted roughly $200 million  in today’s dollars toward disaster relief in Honduras. Many countries joined the United States in donating to Honduras to fund reconstruction of infrastructure and restart the economy. Nevertheless, the region never completely restabilized. If residents didn’t flee from their home country due to lack of housing or infrastructure, they later fled from rising crime rates or an economy in shambles, unable to recover from the storm’s destruction.

Echoing the pleas of President Facussé in 1998, current Guatemalan President Alejandro Giammattei made desperate requests for foreign aid.

“Hunger, poverty and destruction do not have years to wait,” he said.

Climate disaster has already begun to wreak havoc on international migration patterns. Two more groups of migrants, called the Caravan of the Damned, are fleeing north from Honduras to America, escaping the wreckage wrought by the hurricanes, which has been compounded by COVID-19 and a weak economy. Thousands of refugees are headed toward the U.S. border, electing to face the unsure policies of asylum, detention and deportation rather than stay in their home country, which remains torn apart by a slew of catastrophes.

The similarities between these two cases are numerous: millions of Central Americans ravaged by natural disaster, regional leaders requesting immense international support and a Democratic president staring down the barrel of a split congress and polarized political climate (Hurricane Mitch struck a few weeks before Clinton’s impeachment proceedings).

U.S. immigration policy and foreign aid to natural disasters in Latin America remain inextricably linked. We knew it in 1998 and we know it now: if the U.S.  hopes to limit immigration from its southern neighbors, it must be willing to lend a hand in their recovery.

However, insights from the failure of aid to stabilize the region following Mitch and the current international political landscape demand a different approach from American leadership.

We now have a term for the influx of Honduran migrants after Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and the renewed caravans currently departing from the region: climate change refugees.

Climate change disaster will continue to magnify global disparities in wealth and security, permitting wealthier countries to contribute more to impending devastation, while less developed countries pay a higher price.

“Central America is not the producer of this climate change situation,” the president of Honduras, Juan Orlando Hernández, reminded international onlookers. “Instead, we are the most affected.”

Biden has prioritized immigration and climate change ‒ rightfully so. But he must make sure to avoid the mistakes of his predecessors, not just Donald Trump, whose relationship with Latin America could be described as apathetic at best. American presidents have long ignored systemic issues plaguing Latin America, rushing  to slap a Band-Aids on a bullet-hole-riddled states when staring down the barrel of an influx of immigrants.

Biden has made many promises regarding both climate change and immigration, and on his first day issued two executive orders regarding the former and five regarding the latter.

The Paris Climate Agreement is about accountability and solidarity and commitment, fostering cooperation between countries around the world to prevent impending tragedy, but climate catastrophe is already wreaking havoc in some regions of the world.

Experts in Latin and South America fear their issues, with the exception of the U.S.-Mexican border, will remain on the backburner of America’s diplomatic agenda. Without a doubt, Biden’s approach to climate change and immigration are far superior to that of his predecessor, but we cannot let Trump’s climate change denial and blatant xenophobia be the yardstick to measure Biden’s policies moving forward.

Ongoing crises in Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras demand that President Biden not only sign on to the Paris Climate Agreement and implement stricter regulations within his own borders, but also address the issues that have already landed on the shores of unstable regions.

Climate disasters such as this require a holistic response as well as preventative action. The thousands of refugees will require aid funding to return to their homes, and then they may need assistance restabilizing their economies and long-term investment into infrastructure built to withstand exacerbated storm conditions. Those that have no choice to emigrate from their home country will require extended Temporary Protection Status (TPS), allowing them to take the first step toward a green card and hopefully, eventually, citizenship.

In an increasingly interconnected global environment with rising sea levels and intensifying natural disasters, climate change and migration go hand in hand. The United States makes disproportionate contributions to the climate change predicament and accepts considerably fewer migrants and refugees. Biden is making strides to correct these grave errors, but we cannot afford to continue to treat climate change and immigration as two separate issues.

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“America is back!”

This declaration, made by President Joe Biden, was announced at the Munich Security Conference. After just two months in office, Biden has already been taking on the daunting task of restoring and cementing relationships in Europe. 

In late February, Biden appeared virtually at the Munich Security Conference, an annual international security conference held in Germany. Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Boris Johnson came out of the meeting similarly declaring “As you’ve seen and heard earlier, America is unreservedly back as the leader of the free world and that is a fantastic thing.” 

But while things might appear rosy at first glance, the path to restoring American leadership in the European sphere and reestablishing transatlantic diplomacy is not going to be smooth sailing. There are several key issues that will be sure to dominate the future of transatlantic relations in the coming months — and the next four years. 

Up first on the agenda is reestablishing a positive working relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The multilateral security organization, founded in 1942 and headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, was always a sore point for Donald Trump. The former U.S. President was vocal about his dislike of the alliance and questioned its continued use and whether or not other NATO members were pulling their weight. Conversely, Biden sees the recommital of the United States to its NATO allies as one of the most important points on his policy agenda. He made a point of calling NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in the very first week of his presidency. This singular phone call ensured the public, and the world, that America was re-committing itself to the organization — signaling a critical shift away from the previous outlook of the Trump administration. 

He also sought to correct one of the most damaging military decisions that the Trump administration brought onto NATO. During his presidency, Trump started the process of withdrawing nearly 12,000 troops from Germany, a key NATO ally. The move surprised the Germans and even some members of American military leadership. The United States views Germany as a critical strategic partner, which is evident with its 43 different American military bases. 

In the past few decades, the United States has had positive military relations with the Germans, and there has been no reason to change course on the country’s policy. The U.S. Department of Defense faced bipartisan condemnation from this decision because it made NATO look fragmented and weak. 

However, with each change in presidential administrations, the Defense Department carries out a “global force posture review,” which places all military decisions on pause. The Biden Administration has initiated a freeze on pending military action, such as pulling the U.S. forces out of Germany, and the administration will be reevaluating the decision. 

Already with the freeze in place, and no concrete determination to keep American troops in Germany, the German government is pleased and ready to work with Washington. German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer said that, “this signal will be noticed and well understood. It is now up to us to take the hand that Washington has reached out with.” 

Germany has a lot to lose if the United States withdraws its presence. Over 100,000 Americans are currently living in Germany — the largest American community outside the United States. Should the government lose the trust of the Biden administration, the loss of 100,000 people in their communities would be incredibly hurtful to their economy. They also lose prestige and abilities to train their German military forces alongside the United States should the Defense Department continue to pull out from the region. 

On the American side, the United States would lose the country’s only hospital capable of treating trauma patients in the region. Landstuhl Regional Medical Center has served as the trauma center for all military personnel wounded in the Middle East, Europe and Africa, since its opening in 1953. It is beneficial for both sides to work out a favorable negotiation that can carry them through the future. The United States’ maintenance of positive relations with Germany is key to its stable presence in the region.

Across the English Channel lies another set of problems for Biden. For Boris Johnson, a solid working relationship with the Biden administration will ensure Britain can resume its “special relationship” with the United States — a historical and cultural relationship that started in Winston Churchill’s era. 

This relationship exists because the heads of state have emphasized the closeness of American and British values culturally, politically, and economically. Both Biden and former President Barack Obama were against the Brexit decision, but now that it has been fully implemented, Biden remains committed to helping America’s ally across the pond. In fact, Johnson was the very first European head of state to receive a call from Biden after his inauguration. 

Going forward, Johnson will be looking to negotiate a free trade agreement for the United Kingdom in a post-Brexit world. Biden has made it clear that he will not be negotiating a large free trade agreement anytime soon, since the U.S. needs to make major investments at home. But, it’s possible that a smaller agreement could be worked out before the U.S. Trade Protection Authority Act expires in April 2021. Any deal made before that point could be easily slipped through Congress, since the Democrats control the U.S. House of Representatives and are tied with Republicans in the Senate, with Vice President Kamala Harris as the tie vote. But after April, it will be more challenging. 

Another hot topic for the United States and the European Union, in particular, is the China debacle. The EU struck an important investment deal with China less than a month before Biden came into office. Biden’s transition team privately lobbied the EU to wait, and China capitalized on this brief window of opportunity and signed the deal before Biden could be sworn in; even though they conceded some positions to the EU to make it happen. Amid growing economic competition, an ongoing trade war and a increased tension between the United States and China, Europe has a precarious role to play — a delicate balance between economic opportunity and historical allyship.

It is helpful for transatlantic relations, however, that both the Trump and Biden administrations have declared the offenses against the Uyghur Muslim minority in China a genocide, especially since the EU and UK have made similar declarations. Going forward, Biden and his team will be looking to sort out their positions on China and will eventually need to converse with the EU to see where they overlap on policy. A strong policy on China will most likely need to be accepted by the United States’ allies in order for meaningful change to happen.

Yet another complicating issue for Biden and the Europeans is the Nord Stream 2 pipeline set to deliver Russian gas to Germany. Germany has built this pipeline with hopes of diversifying their energy resources, but it leaves the EU vulnerable to more Russian influence within the energy and economic sectors. The deal has been highly controversial in Brussels, and within Washington D.C. EU member states are unable to agree on a common position on the pipeline. Most notably, some countries are worried about Russia’s growing involvement in Europe. The public criticism of Russia has been intensified since the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny by the Kremlin in September 2020. France has publicly said they are against the pipeline, but will let the Germans make the final decision on its outcome. The United States is expected to release sanctions on the Russians soon, but the Germans are expected to remain unscathed for the time being. 

Biden certainly has his work cut out for him across the Atlantic. Biden is entering a pivotal era of transatlantic relations, especially after the last four years, and his decisions over the next few months will dictate how the rest of his presidency transpires. Recommitment to NATO, dealing with a post-Brexit UK, relations with China, and the Nord Stream 2 will all pose tough challenges for the administration to conquer. 

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Since his inauguration in January 2019, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has been a close emulator of former U.S. President Donald Trump through both his divisive rhetoric and staunchly conservative politics. In return, the Trump administration consistently praised Bolsonaro, despite his harmful environmental policies in the Amazon and overall anti-democratic attitudes. Under the new administration of President Joe Biden, this is all likely to change. 

Bolsonaro may prove to be a difficult nut to crack for Biden and his cabinet. With the 2022 Brazilian presidential election looming, Bolsonaro wants to appear strong to voters, actively fighting against what he feels is foreign interference in domestic policies. A concern of interference emerged in 2019, when, after two decades of on-and-off negotiations, Brazil and other members of South America’s Mercosur trade bloc reached a free trade agreement with the European Union. While the Amazon was engulfed in flames, French President Emmanuel Macron demanded more robust conservation policies from Brazil as a condition for ratifying the deal. To the despair of South American and European exporters, Bolsonaro doubled down on his climate denial rhetoric, and the deal has yet to be ratified.

Biden’s inauguration comes as the United States faces a multitude of foreign policy challenges, such as repairing their relationship with NATO and competing with China. Nonetheless, dealing with Bolsonaro, diplomatically or otherwise, will be crucial as Biden seeks to return the United States to the forefront of the fight against climate change, one of his signature campaign promises. Early on the campaign trail, Biden took aim at the Brazilian leader. In the September 2020 presidential debate, Biden said: “The rainforests of Brazil are being torn down, are being ripped down. More carbon is absorbed in that rainforest than every bit of carbon that’s emitted in the United States. Instead of doing something about that, I would be gathering up and making sure we had the countries of the world coming up with 20 billion dollars… stop tearing down the forest, and if you don’t, then you’re going to have significant economic consequences.” This jab at the Brazilian president drew outrage from Bolsonaro, who labeled Biden’s comments as “regrettable,” as well as “disastrous and gratuitous.”

Biden will have two distinct routes in maneuvering an already rocky relationship with Brazil: take the path of direct repudiation of Bolsonaro or work to establish pragmatic collaborative ties with his government. 

Significant steps have already been taken towards repudiation. Most foreign policy aides in the administration regard Bolsonaro as a dangerous figure — a “Trump of the Tropics” with no regard for democratic norms, human rights or environmental protection. Their desire is to put forward policies that push back against Bolsonaro’s populist agenda, not just because it goes against what they believe in, but also because it will be more popular among many liberal American voters. It will also satisfy the wishes of activists within the Democratic Party, some of whom have called Bolsonaro a “pseudo dictator” and agreements between the Brazilian leader and Trump Administration trade representatives a “slap in the face of Congress.” Thus, the Biden Administration sees naming and shaming Brazil as a “climate outlaw” or denouncing it for democratic backsliding as good politics. 

In the first weeks of his presidency, Biden and top aides received a long dossier that requested a freeze of all agreements and negotiations with Brazil while Bolsonaro remains in office. The dossier, which was prompted by the U.S. Network for Democracy in Brazil, has the support of many American and Brazilian organizations, including Friends of the Earth and Articulação dos Povos Indígenas do Brasil (APIB) in Brazil, an organization that advocates for indigenous rights.

It condemns the improved relations between the countries during the Trump Administration, under the rationale that the alliance has tarnished America’s role as the fighter for the expansion of democracy. The document recommends that the Biden administration restrict lumber, soy and meat imports from Brazil, unless confirmation is given that these products are not linked to deforestation or human rights abuses, and that the U.S. government reverts the Technology Safeguards Agreement signed under the Trump administration in 2019. 

Despite Bolsonaro’s wishes expressed in a recent letter to the American president, the dossier emphasizes that the Biden-Harris government should not seek a free-trade agreement with Brazil in any form. This conscious effort to distance the United States from Bolsonaro was echoed by Juan Gonzales, a Special Assistant to the President and National Security Council Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere. “Anybody, in Brazil or elsewhere, who thinks they can advance an ambitious relationship with the United States while ignoring important issues like climate change, democracy, and human rights clearly hasn’t been listening to Joe Biden on the campaign trail,” Gonzales said. 

The dossier adamantly warns Biden against engaging in any negotiations with Bolsonaro, as financing joint conservation projects with the Brazilian government could mean throwing money at the problem rather than addressing the root of the issue, which would delay concrete action. The remedy, according to the document, is to attach any financial investment to the demands made by the representatives of Brazilian civil society, indigenous tribes, and other marginalized groups within the country. 

But essentially cutting all ties with a traditional ally and strong trading partner could allow Bolsonaro to further isolate himself from the international community, possibly opening the door for him to continue pushing his undemocratic agenda and reckless environmental policies unchecked. Thus, in order to most effectively fight for democratic values and a progressive environmental policy in Brazil, should Biden work with the Brazilian government or repudiate it?   

To get to the heart of this question, it’s important to analyze U.S. involvement in the region generally. American involvement with Latin America is much more complex than the relationship between these two leaders when viewed through a global lens. Given U.S. concerns regarding Chinese influence in the region, the Biden-Bolsonaro relationship could prove to be pragmatic, instead of one based on repudiation and finger pointing.

After trading criticism for the last months, working with Brazil’s far-right president may not even be possible for Biden. The strategic approach could be to work with the many actors within the country who have a genuine interest in improving the two nations’ relationship. Within Brazilian society, the Biden administration will find out that it not only has willing allies among activists, legislators, academics and civil society groups who have been opposing Bolsonaro’s policies for the last two years, but also among those who seek a middle ground. The Biden administration could listen and learn from these actors, as the dossier instructs, as well as empower local opposition groups to connect with international pro-democracy and environmental movements. If the fight for responsible environmental policies and a stronger democracy in Brazil is to succeed, it will be led by local players.

As it has become clear, Bolsonaro does not take kindly to international criticism over his environmental policies. Thus, Biden must find other means through which to advance his policy ideas for conservation in the Amazon, like his plan to raise $20 billion from the international community to curb the deforestation and devastating forest fires in the region. One possible course of action is working with the Brazilian ambassador to the United States, Nestor Forster. In an October interview with BBC News Brasil, Forster said that any international initiative that brings resources for the sustainable development of the Amazon and helps to finance those who preserve the forest is welcome, as long as Brazil maintains leadership on discussions. 

Yet, would increased U.S. pressure cause Bolsonaro to cave in? Brazilian congressman Alessandro Molon sure thinks so. “I have no doubt that the change in administration in the U.S. will have an impact on Brazil’s environmental policy,” says Molon, who leads the opposition Brazilian Socialist Party in the lower house. “Until now, Donald Trump served as a support for the Brazilian president to act irresponsibly. Now with the U.S. adding to Europe’s pressure, Brazil is more isolated and the government will find it harder to stay on this foolish path.” 

In case pressure alone is unsuccessful at swaying the Brazilian leader, Biden could use America’s economic leverage to force Bolsonaro’s hand. Biden’s climate plan promises to “impose carbon adjustment fees or quotas on carbon-intensive goods from countries that are failing to meet their climate and environmental obligations.” While it’s unknown if the administration will actually apply those kinds of deterrents to Brazil, there are a scope of trade levers the U.S. could pull, says Lisa Viscidi, director of the Energy, Climate Change and Extractive Industries Program at the Inter-American Dialogue, a think tank focused on relations between Washington and Latin America. 

Although it seems like a ready-to-use solution, American trade pressure may also fail to have a significant impact on the industries that drive deforestation as trade between the two countries has steadily decreased over the last few years. Between January and September of 2020, accumulated trade between the U.S and Brazil totaled $33.4 billion, a 25% drop from the same period in 2019. Regardless, the United States remains Brazil’s second-largest trading partner, accounting for 9.7% of Brazilian exports and 12.3% of revenue. Only China retains a larger slice, buying more than one-third of Brazil’s exports. The United States is not a major buyer of Brazilian beef and soy, the primary goods associated with deforestation, which are exported primarily to China. As a result, André Nassar, president of oilseeds industry group Aboive, which represents the soy industry, says he does not expect the U.S. to try imposing pressure on Brazil through trade as directly as Europe has. “What I do think will change [with the Biden administration]is that there will be a push within Brazil to get control of illegal deforestation,” he says ‒ differentiating between deforestation for agricultural purposes, which is sometimes allowed under Brazilian law, and irregular land grabbing. “If Biden’s rhetoric says, ‘Brazil, you need to get control of illegal deforestation’, we as the private sector would back that.” 

As Brazilian business goes, so goes Bolsonaro. In 2018, then President-elect Bolsonaro expressed his desire to follow Trump and pull Brazil out of the Paris Climate Agreement. Brazilian agribusiness loudly voiced their concerns in Brazilian media about what that could do to Brazil’s image in global commerce, and the country stayed in. “When it becomes clear that there’s a threat to investment, or Brazilian products, the government is going to listen to businesses,” Nassar says.

Beyond direct economic pressure, Biden does have further options on the table in order to achieve his goals with Brazil, if necessary. In January 2020, the Trump Administration announced it was recommitting to supporting Brazil’s bid for OECD membership. In a reversal of his predecessor’s policy, Biden could withdraw U.S. support for the bid if Bolsonaro does not take concrete action in the Amazon. If the Biden administration uses its weight in the OECD to make Brazilian accession contingent on Amazon protections, that would sharply increase pressure from the country’s business community on Bolsonaro, according to Marcio Astrini, executive director of the Sao Paulo-based Climate Observatory.

Although Biden and Bolsonaro have a multitude of clashing policies, they also share some common interests, especially dealing with the situation in Venezuela. The Venezuelan humanitarian crisis and mass migration into bordering Latin American countries, including Brazil, has become a destabilizing force in the region and Brazil has aligned itself with the current U.S. pressure campaign to oust Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. During the Trump administration, the U.S. opposed Maduro through a “maximum pressure” campaign largely rested on progressively tighter sanctions against the regime, with the goal of forcing him out in favor of opposition leader Juan Guaido, the former head of the National Assembly whom the U.S. and more than 50 other countries recognized as the country’s valid interim president.

This hardline policy toward Venezuela was a rare show of support for democracy by the Trump administration. Yet, it was deeply undermined by Trump’s own autocratic tendencies. Under Biden, the U.S. can renew its full commitment to supporting democracy and bring in Brazil as a potential regional partner to deal with the crisis and improve relations simultaneously. 

The future of U.S.-Brazil relations, while rocky, will likely be productive over the next two years as the U.S. reverts to more traditional diplomatic channels. Under Trump, “Twitter diplomacy” reigned, largely overshadowing the usual process. The traditional approach to diplomacy, where issues are negotiated beforehand by mid-level diplomats, will make a comeback and may ultimately be positive for both Biden and Bolsonaro.

The importance of careful but fruitful diplomacy with Latin America’s largest country is especially important currently for the United States. The U.S. is clearly aware that the neglect of Latin America has provided an opening for Chinese influence in the region. The Biden administration will have to be mindful of not pushing Brazil away and straight into China’s outstretched arms. 

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The past four years of an “America First” agenda have hurt the United States’ credibility and capacity to accomplish overseas policy goals. An American grand strategy focused on nationalism — as opposed to multilateralism — has severely hampered U.S. engagement on humanitarian issues. Namely, federal foreign policy and foreign aid bureaus such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have been severely impacted. 

On January 13, then President-elect Joe Biden nominated Samantha Power, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, to the role of Administrator of the USAID. Though her nomination is currently awaiting Senate confirmation, it’s important to know what type of organization she is inheriting in the post-Trump era, and the deep problems that need to be addressed.

In contrast with other federal agencies under Trump political appointees, USAID remained somewhat unscathed until mid-2020. For the first three years of the Trump presidency, USAID was directed by former Republican Congressman Mark Green. His leadership was met with respect from both sides of the aisle and was one of the very few Trump political appointees with broad bipartisan support. However, when Green left USAID in April 2020, things started to go downhill. 

Bonnie Glick, Green’s deputy, was expected to take the helm after his departure. Glick was a Republican appointee who received Senate confirmation for her role in USAID in 2019. She had experience in the organization and her fellow USAID employees were confident in her ability to lead. Her progression to the head of the agency seemed like a natural choice. But President Trump had other ideas. In came John Barsa, a political appointee that served at USAID’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean for only nine months prior to his promotion to Acting Administrator. And before that, he served on Trump’s 2016 campaign team. This was the start to what an anonymous senior-level USAID official branded a “dumpster fire” of Trump’s legacy at USAID.  

Barsa wasted no time making his mark on the organization and sent a letter, without proper clearances or vetting, to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres claiming that “the U.N.’s global humanitarian response for the COVID-19 pandemic was being used to advance a pro-abortion agenda around the world.” 

In June 2020, in wake of the Black Lives Matter movement, he refused to acknowledge requests from 2,400 employees to address racial equality and discrimination in the organization. He also greenlighted appointees with prejudice against the LGBTQ community, women, and Muslims and defended their discriminatory comments. Additionally, since Barsa was an interim director, he could only serve for 210 days unless confirmed by the Senate — which he wasn’t. Instead, Bonnie Glick was forced out. This created another vacancy and restarted Barsa’s 210-day clock. Multiple anonymous USAID officials told newspapers that Barsa’s agenda and coziness with the White House was an attempt for him to get a better position at the Department of Homeland Security during President Trump’s second term. Which proved to be a political gamble. But with a new administration now in office, a new chapter for USAID has begun. 

Samantha Power, a former war correspondent in Yugoslavia, Pulitzer Prize-winning author and former U.S. Ambassador to the UN was nominated by President-elect Biden to salvage the reputation of USAID. Biden acknowledged the shortcomings of the previous administration in his speech to nominate Power. He said: “I know firsthand the unparalleled knowledge and tireless commitment to principled American engagement [Samantha Power] brings to the table, and her expertise and perspective will be essential as our country reasserts its role as a leader on the world stage.” 

Along with his nomination of Power, Biden has elevated the standing of Director of USAID to be a Cabinet-level position. Samantha Power has been a reputable force in the past and she is expected to be no different with her role in USAID. She defined her time as UN Ambassador by championing genocide prevention and the expansion of human rights for women and LGBTQ-identifying people. She also had the unique challenge of building an international coalition to fight the Ebola outbreak in 2013 and 2014, which makes her extremely well-suited for overseeing foreign aid during the coronavirus pandemic. 

But Power is not without her faults. She was involved in orchestrating the American intervention in Libya in 2011 — a decision that former President Obama views as the worst of his presidency. The UN Security Council supported the intervention in order to “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” and our European Allies were for it as well. 

But the main issues and controversies are what came after the invasion. When NATO and the Western coalition came rushing into Libya, they toppled Muammar Qaddafi’s regime and promptly left. The decision to leave without creating democratic reform or any semblance of help for the post-Qaddafi era left Libya unstable and vulnerable to ISIS.  

Regardless, Power’s new role within the organization creates a new opportunity for a fresh start following the Trump era. There is no doubt that the first few months of her role as USAID director will be focused on helping disadvantaged countries with vaccine distribution and pandemic management. Power has said that pandemic management is her “top-line concern.” 

One challenge Power will face in her new role is returning USAID to its international commitments. Many policies and programs of the previous administration cut funding to women’s health — specifically reproductive health. Every Republican president since Ronald Reagan has instituted what is known as the Mexico City Policy. This policy cuts off funding to any NGO that funds abortions or advocates for the practice. Under the Trump Administration, it was expanded even further to limit funding for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), maternal and child health, malaria, nutrition, and other programs. These cuts rendered $7.3 billion in funding gone just in FY 2020. Because of the stoppage of U.S. funds to these programs, USAID expects that four years without funding for family planning and women’s health measures will have created a domino effect for other family and health issues. 

Not only will Power need to make sure these programs start back up and are funded, but she will also have to be prepared for the incredible influx of problems that have arisen as a result of these programs not having been functioning in recent years. 

Power has a daunting future ahead of her. Taking over an organization with a credibility problem during a pandemic and with dozens of policies to reverse is an incredible task, but she seems up for the challenge. 

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