Emerging from a shared socialist past, the coalition served to align these nations toward European Union integration, gaining accession to the organization in 2004. The four nations enjoy the free flow of capital, goods, services, and people throughout the EU. Yet, the EU also prides itself on shared democratic norms, expecting its members to uphold these values in return for membership and common economic and political cooperation. In recent years, the Visegràd group has acted in discordance with the EU, reminiscing repressive ideals from the former Soviet bloc and deviating strongly from Brussels’ action plan. 

Accession to the EU promised the V4 inclusion to the world’s largest common market. The labor market situation has improved in all four countries since the start of their EU membership. Poland for example, has received $154 billion from the EU since its accession, more than any other member country. This economic boost helped Poland make massive leaps in infrastructure. The aid, in combination with a higher standard of living, also enabled Poland to retain more of its working population within the country, counterbalancing the outflow caused by joining the EU.

The EU’s eastern members are also subject to paramount foreign direct investment (FDI) from the economic bloc. The inward FDI stock, a value of foreign investors’ equity and net loans to enterprises, accounts for over 40% of the GDP for each of the four Visegràd countries. Proportions of this order exhibit how strongly the V4’s economies rely on the close partnership with the EU and its western affiliates. 

The V4 are also the main topic of interest of the EU’s cohesion policy, an aim by the institution to reduce disparities, improve employment, and support convergence of incomes across its member states. During EU budget distribution from 2007 to 2013, the V4 received half of the total cohesion funding. Such funds unlock large scale infrastructure investments, bringing about economic growth and prosperity. In compliance with this, the Visegràd states were, collectively, Germany’s most important trading partner in 2017 due to their inclusion into European supply chains.

EU membership clearly brings economic development as well as social inclusion to the states left fragile by the demise of the former Soviet Union. Yet, all four countries continuously prove that their belonging to the European common market does not guarantee compliance with any problem-solving or political alignment. Analyzing these acts of non-compliance shows the former socialist identity is still very much embedded in the region, as the V4 are very attached to their nationalistic and authoritarian beliefs.

The most prominent example of disobedience is the migrant crisis of 2015. The European Court of Justice found that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had breached EU law by taking little to no migrants during the crisis. The EU policy called upon member states to properly manage migration flows, sharing the burden and imposing redistribution quotas. 

The three nations disagreed with key EU policy, stating that supporting migration brings more problems to the EU. This lack of burden sharing was met with heavy criticism by other European leaders, leaving countries such as Germany to take in over one million asylum seekers between 2015 and 2016 alone. The anti-immigrant stance also falls in line with the V4’s nationalistic belief in homogeneity, wanting to keep the majority of their population of the same religion, ethnicity, and race.

The Center for European Studies links this lack of burden sharing to the fact that the V4 states had little authority over their borders during the Soviet Union. The stream from East to West left these countries very fragile in the past. A reminiscence of internal and physical division is a harrowing narrative for these countries. However, the group cannot support open EU borders when it benefits from the inflow of remittances and FDI, to then decline the flow of movement when a problem arises.

If the V4 felt that the EU was solely bringing economic development to their countries, would they still nitpick what part of the membership they agree with? Hard to believe. This is why the V4’s viewpoint needs to be considered. In fact, the aforementioned emigration to Western Europe meant that many high-skilled labor forces left their countries. Moreover, the levels of FDI in the Central European countries have bought out the local market. The Visegràd nations cannot establish their own economic landscape as they are now dependent on Western capital.

By not developing their own economic sovereignty, the V4 know that they will never be considered heavyweights within the EU spectrum. As outlined by a lecturer at the Institute of European Studies, the V4 feel inferior to other member countries, essentially being handed out a second-class membership. If not valued as an economic partner, the Visegrad states are in no rush to adapt their political landscape to the rest of Europe. Instead of a successful EU integration narrative, their new narrative is that they are an underappreciated bunch. 

Despite being tied to the West, the V4 don’t want to be bullied into an adaptation of policies such as migrant intake strictly because someone much further West in Brussels says so, a view shared by a Visegrad minister. Instead, many parts of the four countries are driving forward political sovereignty from the EU, pushing further right. And while this viewpoint is not widespread throughout all four countries, it helps to explain their rebellious behavior in terms of foreign policy. 

The V4 has also observed how Brexit has left the EU fragile. Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister and perhaps the strongest euroskeptic of the V4, attacks the EU’s weaknesses by stating it “is unable to protect its own citizens, to protect its external borders and to keep the community together, as Britain has just left.” Following the strongest anti-EU sentiments in the region suggests the V4 has identified the instability of the EU. Thus, if it is to stay in the EU, it will not tolerate being treated as a young member within the organization.

The Visegràd group uses that knowledge to its advantage. If these countries do not feel valued as an EU partner, they will not limit the spreading of far right and repressive politics in their countries. In fact, due to the notion of lost sovereignty across their states, they are holding onto their discriminative and nationalistic beliefs even more. These beliefs never truly disappeared with the fall of the Soviet era. If anything, the migrant crisis as well as the perceived disrespect from Brussels has poured fuel on the V4’s non-political alignment with the West.

A more recent example perfectly illustrates the level the repression has reached. Poland and Hungary rejected COVID-19 stimulus funds created by the EU in 2020, explaining that the countries don’t see eye to eye with the rest of the EU on topics such as migration and gender. Allowing the stimulus funds would enable EU countries to force their interpretation on these topics on Poland and Hungary. Instead of easing the effects of the pandemic on its citizens, the two nations would rather block much needed recovery funds, due to the possible implications this could have on migration and gender rights in their nations. 

The mayors of capital cities Warsaw and Budapest were in disbelief by this action. In a joint statement, they sharply criticized their own governments, accusing them of spreading non-liberal ideologies and corrupt interests. Clearly, we can observe a strong divide between the countries’ leaders’, and their capital cities, which are exposed to a richer cultural blend. This divide in itself portrays the stubborn nature of the governments, unable to adapt to changing norms in its own country, and stuck in denial toward cultural diversity and liberalism.

While this is the strongest case of the V4 disregarding EU morals, the far right and repressive ideologies are strong and growing across all four Visegràd states. The fingers are often pointed at Poland and Hungary, and with good reason, but Slovakia and Czech Republic exhibit those same ideologies.

Slovakia has had the most successful rise of a radical far-right in politics. The opposition party to the government has gotten daunting levels of support. The People’s Party Our Slovakia (LSNS) presents itself as a respectable party, yet its extremist affiliations can be discerned very easily. From celebrating anniversaries of fascist war heroes, to putting up billboards condemning LGBT and migrant communities, repressive and undemocratic politics have clearly resurfaced in Slovakia.

An even stronger trend is noted in the Czech Republic, as it isn’t the opposition party but the governing party exhibiting undemocratic politics. Czechian Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has distributed EU funds in an incorrect and corrupt way, giving the money to his own conglomerate instead of the small to medium sized enterprises the funds were meant for. This resulted in convictions by the European Commission. If that wasn’t enough, Czech President Milos Zeman is openly racist, xenophobic, and frequently showcases much stronger alignment with Russian Ideals than European ones.

Real communist power is on the rise once again across the V4. This is not to say that the trend hasn’t occurred across other EU members, but the Visegràd states are specifically placing nationalistic anti-immigrant culture above all else. The EU does not seem to be wholly respected and previous ties with the Kremlin’s ideologies are entertained. As a result, the EU does not give the V4 as much decision making power in Brussels. 

The Visegràd coalition thrived to be part of an economically prosperous and forward-looking Europe, yet strongly disrespects the European identity. At times it seems the countries themselves don’t know what they want to belong to. The identity crisis needs to be resolved, as Europe has worked toward peace for too long to revert back.

How do you solve an identity crisis? By forming an identity. The V4 have relied heavily on EU funds and remittances to promote their economic agenda, but they haven’t identified their own niches in production since joining the EU. The EU needs to encourage this and let industries flourish without intervention. Otherwise, the European market will never truly value the V4, they will continue to treat them as second-class members and in return the V4 will act nefariously toward the organization, creating a vicious loop.

On the EU side, it should offer incentives to the V4. If they adapt their political agenda more to that of the West, they can carry more voice in Brussels. As of now the V4 do not see a reason why they shouldn’t enforce their oppressive beliefs in homogeneity, they need to see a benefit in altering the way their politics is run.

A softer solution in the meantime could be resolutions that resemble the “pact of free cities.” Particularly, the culturally diverse metropoles of the Visegràd states strongly disagree with the oppressive actions of their own governments. If corruption and repression from their own governments prevents them from aligning themselves with the rest of the EU, they should not be punished. A separate relationship should be built between the EU and the cities.

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Ituri is a northeastern province in the DRC that has seen extensive ethnic conflict occur since 1972. Violence peaked between 1999 and 2003, with an estimated 50,000 deaths. The main root of the altercations is that the Hema community, who are historically herders, were treated much more favorably during the Belgian colonization of the DRC (ending in 1960), placing them higher up on the social hierarchy. Meanwhile, the Lendu community, which is traditionally agricultural, is often the aggressor due to feeling unjustly stripped of land, natural resources and local political power. 

The conflict diminished after 2003 due to European Union peacekeeping missions, but has been reignited since 2017. Part of the reason for this is the continuous nature of the issues, with the disputes never fully ending and with groups holding onto their weapons from previous altercations. More importantly, the reason a complete cessation is so challenging is due to it being far more than a bilateral ethnic conflict. A deeper analysis of the crisis reveals that other military and ethnic groups are involved, including heavy political meddling from exterior actors due to the province’s wealth in resources — especially oil.

Since reigniting in 2017, 360,000 people have been displaced to neighboring provinces and countries, with over 1,000 casualties. Unlike the war from 1999 to 2003, there has not been a structured ethnic militia engaging in the conflict. The violence is mostly carried out by Lendu youths, not necessarily backed by their entire ethnic community, with some Hema youths carrying out reprisals. It is clear that there is no overarching command as assailants claim to be part of different groups, making intervention all the more challenging. 

The DRC’s military, FARDC, is perceived to be a very unstable force due to the levels of corruption and underfunding. FARDC frequently attempts to strike back at Lendu communities to limit their exertion of aggression, but this has just dispersed the youth groups. The dispersion enables them to spread terror in internally displaced camps, and take back some of their lost areas. Lendu youths do not fear the DRC’s armed forces, as they see the army as the natural ally of the Hema’s. Attacking army positions both helps them get rid of their enemy and enables them to take their firearm weapons. 

Aside from the military, other actors involved reveal why attaining peace in the region is such a challenge. These include other ethnic and rebel groups involved on the ground, as well as opposing political entities meddling to reach favorable outcomes. Due to past altercations in Ituri and in the Eastern DRC in general, the bordering countries of Rwanda and Uganda have historical ties to armed groups and rebellions in the region. A Congolese government official claims that migrants from the Hutu community from Rwanda fuel the violence. He asserts that they are involved both as military trainers for the Lendu’s, and as protectors of the Hema’s herds. 

Representatives of Congolese security also outline that the M23 movement, a rebel group responsible for violence just south of Ituri in 2012, is attempting to profit from the altercations from the Ugandan side. Former members of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-K), a political party and former rebel group, also own territory in the region, it is historically supported by Rwanda and is currently supported by the Ugandan government. One of the main issues of this crisis has been the continual involvement of foreign ‘invisible hands’ that help organize attacks and provide equipment, a complaint shared by several archbishops in the region. 

Due to the fragile relationship between the two ethnicities, external actors are pitting them against each other in order to rid the areas of inhabitants and exploit the benefits of the land, chiefly natural resources such as gold and oil. The greed for the district’s resources explains the heavy involvement by Uganda and Rwanda. Illegal resource exploitation has long been a pillar of the continuation in violence. The United Nations mission in the DRC explained in 2004 that inter-militia conflict will not cease in the region until the government takes care of extracting the natural resources in a credible fashion. 

However, while natural resources have always played a key aspect of violence in Ituri, oil is a particular resource that was not as prominent in the 1999 to 2003 conflict as now. Ituri is incredibly rich in oil, Lake Albert makes up much of its eastern border and is the main oil source of the region. There has been a substantial increase in oil discovery over the past decade. Therefore, despite the aforementioned history and regional factions of the area contributing to the crisis, oil is now an undoubtable key driver. Lake Albert’s oil exploration is divided into five blocks, with two being on the Congolese side of the lake, and three being on the Ugandan side. The majority of the lake and its basin are located on the Ugandan side, the country has therefore been able to control a favorable majority of the oil. 

The oil deposits at Lake Albert have often taken the center stage of the relationship between the DRC and Uganda. During the previous Ituri conflict, the Ugandan government altered its alliances with local armed groups frequently to attain its highest possible influence. Its main priorities in choosing alliances were to keep Uganda’s influence in the region high while limiting the DRC’s influence, and most importantly securing the extraction operations of their oil partners, Heritage and Tullow Oil, two foreign companies attempting to maximise profits in the region. Considering the uptake in oil discoveries on the Congolese blocks since the last Ituri conflict, it isn’t hard to imagine why Uganda might still support rebel militias on the Congolese side.

A closer look at these big oil corporations shows how rapidly the link to conflict can be made. 

They are heavily involved in the political climate of the region, oftentimes even directing it, implementing everything but a laissez-faire attitude to their surroundings. In Angola, one of the DRC’s neighboring countries, Heritage Oil hired Executive Outcomes, a private military company from South Africa, in order to drive UNITA (Angola’s second largest political party) rebels away from Heritage’s oil extraction sites. The Executive Outcomes attacked areas under UNITA’s control in accordance with Heritage and the Angolan military. As conflict near an extraction zone tampers an oil company’s ability to do business, it is highly probable that oil firms are taking sides in the Ituri conflicts, in order to ensure continuous profits. 

This assertion is strengthened when considering that Heritage Oil cooperated with Ugandan groups in the 1999 to 2003 Ituri crisis, as well as admitting to the DRC government that it had been striking deals with the leaders of rebel groups occupying Ituri. Heritage is not alone though, the Congolese government accused both Heritage and Tullow Oil of working with the Ugandan army to illegally cross the DRC border for oil exploration purposes, resulting in Congolese fatalities. Seeing as the Congolese government is the one supporting the Hema’s in the Ituri conflict and the two companies along with the Ugandan government seek to act nefariously toward the Congolese government, the aforementioned ‘invisible hands’ supporting Lendu attacks might not be as invisible as they seem. 

Both companies, Heritage and Tullow, still controlled the majority of Lake Albert’s projects until this year, despite there being a handful of smaller shareholders involved. A third company, Total SE, has recently acquired all of Tullow Oil’s stakes on the Ugandan Lake Albert projects, as well as the rights to build an East African pipeline whose source is at Lake Albert. Tullow’s motivation to sell to Total concerned itself with improving its financial situation, although fleeing the conflict-ridden area might well be a secondary factor.

Total has also been one of two major firms involved in exploring the Eastern DRC for more oil deposits. The French company outlined the risks associated with oil exploration in Ituri in a 2013 report, which specifically says that inter-community tensions and conflict dynamics may be affected by the search for oil. It had already identified at this point that certain communities will feel excluded by the benefits that oil brings, creating greater tension. Land ownership has always been a root of violence in Ituri due to competition over resources such as gold, therefore any hope of benefiting from further oil deposits only amplifies the violent meddling by corporations, bordering countries, and the DRC government itself.

The Hemu communities, many of which are now in internally displaced camps, are convinced that the attacks are fueled by the greater political interest toward oil exploration, rather than continued hatred between them and the Lendu community. An Ituri politician and businessman explains that their areas are full of oil deposits, and that chasing out communities with violence is considerably easier than incurring the costs for relocating them to use the areas for oil exploration. It is obviously challenging to uncover which government and oil companies are supporting rebel groups, as they are trying to keep their activities secret. However, the past suggests much greater forces are at war in Ituri than two ethnicities.

The communities of Ituri seem to be much more concerned with agricultural land ownership, the Hema’s want to retain their land and Lendu’s want to expand their influence. However, external actors are blinded by Ituri’s gold studs and particularly the oil deposits surrounding Lake Albert, using previous conflict in the region as an excuse to have no regard for humanitarian decency, pouring fuel on a flame that was slowly fizzling out.

The most infuriating part of the current Ituri conflicts is that much like the rest of the DRC, the region is incredibly rich in natural resources, but this wealth actually inhibits its development rather than benefiting it. Total SE outlined in their 2013 report how oil exploitation could lift up entire communities and the DRC’s economy in general, sadly this assessment strays far from reality. Military and rebel groups are clearly being strengthened by nefarious actors, the economy is being distorted as the agriculturally-intensive sector is getting eclipsed by the greed for oil, and border tensions and internal corruption is bound to worsen.

The international community can attempt to halt conflict with peace delegations as it did in 2003, but this does not solve for the invisible hands manipulating it. Local humanitarian groups offer significant help in relieving the ample health problems in internally displaced camps. However, until there is greater credibility and transparency from the governments of the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda, as well as by the oil corporations, local aid is all that can be done for the moment.

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