However, the political marvel of Bukele’s success does not come without its drawbacks. Not only has his government committed a number of human rights violations under the consistently extended state of emergency/exception that has now lasted for a year and a half, but his recent push within the Salvadoran judicial system to allow his unconstitutional bid for reelection threatens the already weakened democracy in the country. 

So, who is Nayib Bukele? Why has he been able to systematically rid El Salvador’s democracy of checks and balances, and even go against the constitution with the support of his people? How does his casual dress and social media usage contribute to his success? 

Born in San Salvador in 1981, Bukele is amongst the oldest of the millennial generation, making him 42 years old as of 2023. He originally pursued a career in business but soon transitioned into politics, becoming the mayor of a small principality outside San Salvador called Nuevo Cuscatlán in 2012 on the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) ballot, the country’s main leftist party. However, during his time in this office, Bukele clashed with party leadership over policy disagreements. Despite their displeasure with his policy and conduct, the FMLN could not pass up on his popularity and put him up as their candidate for mayor of San Salvador, the country’s capital. Bukele was elected in 2015, but this position marked the end of his association with the FMLN. The party expelled him, citing their assertion that he sowed division within the party and, at some point, physically attacked another member of the party. 

This marked a change in the trajectory of his political career. Bukele soon began his campaign for president, running under the Grand Alliance of National Unity (GANA) because his new party, Nuevas Ideas, did not register in time to put up a candidate. 

His win in 2019 was historic. It was the first time in the near thirty years since the end of El Salvador’s brutal civil war that the country’s two main parties, the FMLN and Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), were not in control of the presidency. Salvadorans saw this as a much-needed relief from the stifling two-party system that failed to address issues of corruption and violence.

In his first year in office, Bukele quickly began implementing his tough-on-crime policies. His “Territorial Control Plan” lacked support in the legislature, as the GANA party controlled only 10 of the 84 National Assembly seats, the rest of which were held primarily by the FMLN and ARENA. Bukele wasted no time in using his power as president to get his way, entering the National Assembly’s chamber surrounded by armed forces members, then sitting in the chair reserved for the president of the assembly and demanding they support his policy. This stunt was immediately criticized for intimidating the legislature, and El Salvador’s highest court told President Bukele to refrain from similar actions in the future. 

While the first few years of his presidency were hindered by an opposition-controlled legislature, El Salvador’s 2021 midterm legislative elections could not have gone better for Bukele and his Nuevas Ideas party. The party won 56 out of 84 seats in the National Assembly, giving Bukele an important majority. 

Bukele immediately began to dismantle important democratic checks and balances upon gaining legislative control. His party quickly replaced all judges of the country’s Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court and replaced the Attorney General, then unconstitutionally appointed 5 new judges to the supreme court, giving Nuevas Ideas control of 10 of the 15 seats. Other laws which undermined judicial power throughout the government followed suit, and the new legislature also shelved many progressive bills related to issues such as abortion and gender affirmative care. 

Nuevas Ideas posits that its ideology is neither right or left wing, and instead challenges the entire system developed after the 1992 peace accords. However, Bukele has failed to align himself with or agree with the narratives of leftist presidents in the region, such as Brazilian President Lula or Nicaraguan President Ortega. He has instead spoken and agreed with right wing world leaders including Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and, as mentioned, pursued conservative social policies. 

As he nears the end of his five year term, Bukele is once again making the news due to his decision to run for reelection. Although the Salvadoran constitution outlaws reelection, the Bukele-controlled Supreme Court ruled that the President is allowed to run for reelection once. Soon after, Bukele announced his intent to run, and officially registered for the election in October. The decision has seen widespread disapproval amongst human rights groups, but Bukele maintains high domestic support for the decision. 

Aside from his authoritarian behavior regarding democratic institutions, the main critiques of Bukele and his government center on the anti-gang policies. As of September, over 72,000 Salvadorans have been arrested under the state of emergency, and the government continually failed to ensure protection of both civil and human rights for those arrested. Cases of foreign nationals being wrongfully arrested and the legislature’s decision to permit mass trials are concerning to human rights and pro-democracy groups. 

President Bukele has dramatically changed not only El Salvador, but the state of politics throughout Latin America. As other politicians aim to recreate Bukele’s security “success,” the entire region faces threats of democratic backsliding and humanitarian crises. Some leaders in the region have even begun to mimic Bukele’s style of dress and social media strategy, attempting to rile up the same levels of support.

All eyes are on El Salvador as it approaches the 2024 election. What the future is for Salvadorans if they cross this unconstitutional line is yet to be determined, and its ripple effect on the region as a whole may determine the future of democracy in the region.

The post Who is Nayib Bukele? The Millennial Authoritarian of El Salvador appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Chile and Colombia joined Bolivia in condemning what they called a disproportionate military offensive on the part of Israel, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Palestinian citizens, and recalled their ambassadors. Other countries, including Mexico and Brazil, have called for a ceasefire in the region. Most recently, Belize suspended relations with Israel.

Israel has critiqued these decisions, with Lior Haiat, Israel’s Foreign Minister, asking countries such as Chile and Colombia to “support the right of a democratic country to protect its citizens, and to call for the immediate release of all the abductees, and not align themselves with Venezuela and Iran in support of Hamas terrorism.” 

The prevalence of Latin American policies taking a stand against Israel’s actions in Gaza is counter to the positions of many western countries, including the United States. It is also a stark change in regional policy. Prior to the current humanitarian crisis, Latin America, and the Western Hemisphere as a whole, had close ties to Israel, spanning from economic agreements to technological cooperation.

Why is Israel’s war so unpopular in Latin America? Why have Latin American leaders swarmed to support Palestinians? 

The answer is complicated, but some understanding can be garnered by looking back to historical experiences with imperialism throughout the region and addressing the so-called “pink tide” of leftist leaders rising to power in countries such as Brazil and Columbia. 

Latin America, as a region, has time and again experienced imperialist and colonialist powers meddling in domestic affairs and infringing on their sovereignty. Sensitivity to these issues dates back to Spanish colonization in the region and has continued due to U.S. imperialistic and paternalistic behavior toward Latin America during the 20th century, especially throughout the Cold War. In many cases, these historical experiences led to institutional deficiencies and instabilities in these countries, allowing authoritarian rule to propagate. From colonization to independence to U.S. intervention, Latin American countries were often left with systems that benefited the wealthy elite, concentrating power and increasing inequality. 

Colonization left Latin America scarred, as Latin America expert and prior Literary Director of the Library of Congress Marie Arana says, “Absolute power still beguiled. New republics became as oppressive, insular, and isolated as Spain had encouraged its colonies to be. Latin America’s culture of violence . . . seemed to morph, almost overnight, into a culture of intimidation, with the landed gentry acquiring an ever sharper aptitude for cruelty, and a pumped-up military that never seemed to stand down.” Latin Americans have been fighting to change these inheritances ever since. Still, U.S. imperialism efforts often took advantage of systemic weaknesses, pursuing regime changes that removed leftist, non-capitalist leaders, often replacing them with right-wing extremists. Both colonization and U.S. imperialism left Latin America with an intimate familiarity with the perils associated with the rule of political radicals, from Augusto Pinochet to Porfirio Díaz. 

It is likely that these historical wounds are part of the explanation for Latin America’s sympathy for the Palestinian cause and anger towards human rights violations conducted by Israel. Violent revolutions freed many Latin American countries first from colonialism, and then from dictatorships. As a result, it follows that this region would be sensitive to a potentially imperialistic relationship between Israel and Palestine, especially once the situation turned to state-sanctioned violence against civilians.

The other potential explanation is the new rise of leftism within Latin America. The region is currently seeing a swell in the election of leftist leaders, who often lean towards supporting Palestine rather than Israel. The newly developed leftist bloc in Latin America includes Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, Peru and Chile, with some autocratic leftists in Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba.

Indigenous Latin Americans, who are often supportive of leftist governments, understandably empathize with the plight of displacement facing the Palestinians, having been continually displaced themselves. This has led to progressive movements in the region seeing Israel and Palestine as an issue of decolonization. 

Leftists in Latin America also have little reason to support U.S. policy in any regard. During the first pink tide in the 1970s, the CIA was undeniably responsible for removing leftist governments that did not fall in line with U.S. Cold War goals. In some cases, this led to the installation of right-wing authoritarians who agreed to stifle the spread of communism and subscribe to U.S. capitalist beliefs. Overall, this left a number of Latin American countries facing “significant declines in freedom of expression, civil liberty, and rule of law.”

Despite these experiences, there are some countries in Latin America that support Israel. Specifically, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Costa Rica and Peru, all countries with right-wing governments, immediately expressed their strong support for Israel. President Nayib Bukele of El Salvador, infamous for his extreme crackdown on gangs and gang violence which has drawn wide criticism for humanitarian violations, likened Israel’s fight against Hamas to El Salvador’s fight against gangs. 

Latin America is not a monolith, and differing domestic contexts have clearly affected the overall perspective held by each nation. It is also pertinent to note that some of these policies may be affected by international contexts, as those who rely on countries such as the United States economically or otherwise may be less likely to come out against Israel, meaning countries with larger, more independent economies have more freedom in policy. 

While a divide exists within the region on this issue, the high levels of support for Palestine are altogether unsurprising when one considers the historical scars of colonialism and imperialism that continue to mar Latin American communities, institutions and governments.

The post Latin American Reactions to the Israel-Hamas War appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Before one can assess success, however, it is necessary to understand the conflict’s origins and how it eventually became a chiefly humanitarian crisis. 

The initial intervention was, by and large, not motivated by any humanitarian reasoning. Instead, it was a military reaction to the 9/11 attacks, ordered as a means of “self-defense” by then-President George W. Bush. This marked the beginning of the infamous and lengthy War on Terror in Afghanistan. 

Considering the initially shallow and less than altruistic motivations, the sheer length of the conflict meant there needed to be some other reasoning to continue having a U.S. presence in Afghanistan. This became more obvious as another attack like 9/11 failed to occur and the self-defense argument grew weaker. 

As the United States continued to push against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda with varying levels of success throughout the early 2000s, the Bush administration began to more heavily promote a humanitarian rationale for the continued fight. The conflict evolved, extending from the counterterrorism efforts to promoting democratization, nation-building, and women’s rights. 

To further justify the ever-lengthening invasion to the American public, Bush invoked humanitarian rhetoric to garner popular support. He rallied the media toward the narrative that Afghan women were being oppressed and needed to be liberated by the West. The State Department pushed out reports on the Taliban’s abusive treatment of women, which were then reported on en-masse by news outlets nationwide. 

The shift in the portrayal of the invasion led many Americans to believe U.S. soldiers were in Afghanistan to protect, or save, women, on top of defending the United States from terrorism, rather than simply the latter. This revamp can be marked by Bush’s speech on April 17, 2002, in which he stated that the United States would assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 

“We know that true peace will only be achieved when we give the Afghan people the means to achieve their own aspirations,” he said, outlining those aspirations as developing a stable government, training an army, educating children, and improving infrastructure, all in the name of recovering from the rule of the Taliban. 

Throughout this speech, and much of his rhetoric regarding the War on Terror, Bush referred to the Marshall Plan, the U.S. policy of providing economic and humanitarian aid to European countries post-WWII, citing it as proof that the United States goes beyond winning wars, and that the country is dedicated to providing assistance. However, the humanitarian effort in Afghanistan during the War on Terror should not be compared to the Marshall Plan. 

Where the Marshall Plan was a carefully planned, extremely strategic method of aid dissemination that helped rebuild Europe after it was devastated by war, humanitarian aid in Afghanistan and the greater region during the War on Terror was more haphazard. This was due to the prolonged nature of a conflict that was not expected to last as long as it has. What was thought to be a quick counter to the 9/11 attacks was nowhere near quick, and, according to the Red Cross, the humanitarian ramifications of prolonged war are much more prominent than they would be after a short conflict. 

So, the U.S. humanitarian effort in Afghanistan was not part of the initial plan. Even so, there was an effort. The reconstruction endeavor in Afghanistan was backed by Congress sending $38 billion toward humanitarian aid in the country from 2001 to 2009, and by 2021 the total amount of humanitarian aid funding has reached about $57 billion (around 40% of the total $143 sent to the country). After the news of the troop withdrawal, a further $300 million is slotted for disbursement to Afghanistan in an attempt to prevent the government from collapsing. 

The need for this boost in aid in response to the withdrawal after the twenty-year conflict is somewhat concerning. It brings into question just how dependent Afghanistan is on U.S. humanitarian aid. If ending the occupation causes the Afghan government to fall apart and humanitarian concerns to skyrocket, has the United States actually succeeded in building a strong government and combating humanitarian issues? 

If not, what has the United States been doing all these years if there is so much concern for the state of Afghanistan when the occupation ends?

There is the obvious answer, the United States has been fighting terrorist groups such as the Taliban, Islamic State, and Al-Qaeda. However, when so much of the rhetoric surrounding the War on Terror does relate to humanitarian concerns, especially human rights violations by the terrorist groups themselves, then it is worth considering if the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan actually improved humanitarian conditions. 

While the United States has provided aid to the Afghan government, hoping to help legitimize it and weaken the Taliban, military operations have had negative humanitarian costs. U.S. airstrikes in the country have caused thousands of civilian deaths. In 2019, the number of civilian deaths caused by U.S. and Afghan military activity was, for the first time, greater than the number caused by the Taliban, largely due to an increase in airstrikes. In total, as many as 43,000 Afghan civilians have died throughout the war from a multitude of causes, including military operations and humanitarian issues such as lack of healthcare access. According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW), all of the groups involved in the conflict in Afghanistan, including the United States, are guilty of laws-of-war violations. 

Some feel as though the human costs of the war in Afghanistan, and others like it, are much too high. The Watson Institute at Brown University, which has produced many studies on the conflicts in the Middle East and surrounding region involving the United States, argues that the initial response to 9/11 and the effort to hold those responsible accountable should have been non-military. The Institute rationalizes this by stating also that prolonged involvement in Iraq only led to the further proliferation of Jihadi groups in the area. These are not unpopular stances, as the war in Afghanistan has continued to take both American and Afghan lives throughout its twenty-year history. 

As U.S. troops begin to leave Afghanistan, it is crucial to consider steps that would prevent the humanitarian situation from devolving. The HRW recently stated that legal reform in Afghanistan has been largely dependent on U.S. support, and this reform has led to an expansion in rights for women and girls in the country. The organization further urged that, following the removal of troops, the United States commits to supporting human rights efforts in Afghanistan. This will be absolutely vital if the United States hopes to leave Afghanistan with a chance at attaining stability without the ever-present assistance of U.S. troops. 

While the United States’ human rights record is murky in Afghanistan, an end to the conflict may be the best choice for the citizens of Afghanistan. If the United States ensures it maintains support for Afghanistan, even if not directly with boots on the ground, there are positives for the humanitarian concerns regarding the conflict. In general, an end to the twenty-year occupation will also put an end to civilian casualties caused by U.S. military operations. This is a positive. However, there is still the concern that, by leaving, the United States may be opening Afghanistan up for the Taliban to take over once more.

The worst-case scenario would be if the United States pulls the troops out of Afghanistan and immediately proceeds to leave the country to fend for itself in fighting the Taliban and dealing with ongoing critical humanitarian concerns. Currently, the United States sends more aid to Afghanistan than almost any other country. According to Forbes, Afghanistan is incredibly dependent on foreign aid for basic government function and services, with 75% of its spending in 2019 coming from grants from the United States and other countries. In 2019, the World Bank estimated that the country would require anywhere between $6 billion and $8 billion in international grants per year from 2020 to 2024 in order to provide these services and deal with the Taliban. 

The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is concerning even ignoring the violence, and the question of aid only adds more worry. According to ReliefWeb, the humanitarian information site for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the percentage of Afghans experiencing food insecurity doubled between September 2015 and November 2020, increasing from 37% to 76%. In the same period of time, the percentage of those experiencing emergency food insecurity increased from 8% to 42%. This is in addition to the human rights violations committed by various terrorist cells in the country, and the discrimination against women and ethnic minority groups, such as attacks against the Hazaras. Thousands of Hazara have been killed or injured in different attacks since 2015, but the group has faced persecution since the late 1800s. This history of slavery, ethnic cleansing, land confiscation, and other forms of discrimination was thought to have finally ended with the fall of the Taliban in 2001. However, the Hazaras are still targeted by many terrorist cells in Afghanistan with little to no protection from the government, driving many from the small population, the poorest of Afghanistan’s many different ethnic groups, to leave the country if they have the means to, take up arms against their persecutors, or live in fear. 

As the withdrawal approaches it’s conclusion, well ahead of the original September 11 deadline and set to meet a new deadline of August 31, we are starting to see the results of taking soldiers out of a country that has been dependent upon them for nearing two decades. These results do not bode well for the future of Afghanistan. Biden addressed those who questioned whether the Afghans who assisted the United States and are awaiting their visa approval would be able to come to the country, “Our message to those men and women is clear: There is a home for you in the United States, if you so choose and we will stand with you, as you stood with us.” 

The administration did not offer a number for how many people would be allowed, only that the relocation would be complete by the end of the withdrawal. However, this does not address the millions of Afghan citizens still suffering in horrible humanitarian conditions or ending up as civilian casualties of war. Biden’s response to criticism of the withdrawal was to all-together deny any humanitarian intentions for the invasion. 

The President stated that “we did not go to Afghanistan to nation-build, and it’s the right and responsibility of the Afghan people alone to decide their future and how they want to run their country.” 

This is not only contradictory to what Bush, the man who started the war, pushed during his time in office, it is a complete dismissal of what U.S. policy about the war has been for years. Although many may agree with the sentiments of self-determination Biden invoked, here it is simply being used to avoid taking responsibility for what has started to happen in Afghanistan due to the power vacuum caused by the absence of the United States. 

So what has happened in the past few months? In early July, the Taliban displayed containers of weapons seized from the Afghan military while U.S. troops were withdrawing. Since May 1, the terrorist group has taken over 100 districts in Afghanistan, essentially doubling the previous number of districts they controlled. There has been an increase in violence, particularly against women, journalists, and the educated. The United Nations raised the alarm about the high level of violence, particularly against women, and called for a reduction in violence to save lives. 

As the direct connection between the United States and Afghanistan is severed, the United States must commit to providing aid to the Afghan government. Otherwise, the situation will continue to devolve and any previous humanitarian or military efforts in the country will be reversed.

The post Looking at Afghanistan Through a Humanitarian Lens, the Future is Unclear appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

But what has often been overlooked in the crisis is the acknowledgment of how different groups of Yemeni citizens are experiencing the conflict differently. In particular, the extreme circumstances of the country’s seven-year-long instability have led many to ignore how Yemeni women often bear the brunt of the issues caused by the crisis, on top of the gender-based challenges they face due to the discriminatory legal system and the crisis’s effect on the level of gender-based violence.

Data about the Yemen crisis’s death toll varies depending on if one focuses on those affected directly by the conflict or if it is extended to deaths caused indirectly. According to the Yemen Data Project, the country has incurred over 18,000 attacks, of which around half were deaths and half were injuries, as a direct result of the conflict from 2016 to now. This, however, does not include casualties caused by other pressing humanitarian issues the crisis in Yemen has created. The United Nations estimates that over 131,000 have died as a result of the indirect effects of the war in Yemen, including factors such as hunger and lack of access to adequate health services. 

According to the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), a humanitarian non-governmental organization focused on the fight against poverty, an average of six women are killed every day in Yemen due to the conflict. Women and children are also frequently displaced, comprising 75% of displaced individuals. The majority of displacement in Yemen is internal, with Yemenis moving from place to place within the country to avoid fighting, famine, and disease. Some of the displaced are met with humanitarian aid when they arrive at new locations, such as in Marib where the UNHCR, UN, and International Organization for Migration have attempted to provide food and shelter to those fleeing the city of Al Suwayda. 

Women are often disproportionately affected by humanitarian crises in times of civil unrest or war. In the case of Yemen, this inequality is exacerbated as women’s access to work is heavily limited by socio-cultural norms.

For 14 years, Yemen was ranked last in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap index, and only in 2021 did it manage to be ranked second to last — ahead of newly-added Afghanistan. According to the 2021 index, Yemen is one of the countries with the largest economic gender gap, at 28.2% of the gap closed so far, and income gap, with women’s income being around 7% that of men. It also has one of the lowest percentages of women in the labor force, at 6.3%, and the lowest number of women in managerial positions, at 4.1%. On top of this, Yemen was ranked 154/156 in female economic participation and opportunity, 152/156 in educational attainment, 95/156 in health and survival, and 154/156 in political empowerment.

This is likely the result of an extremely patriarchal culture in Yemen, rooted in persistent and extreme gender roles. Yemeni women and girls experience forced niqab (a veil that covers the whole face excluding the eyes), divorce shame, child marriage, domestic violence, and honor killings — all of which are aggravated by the extended and ongoing crisis in the country. 

According to Amnesty International, the crisis has forced Yemeni women to take on greater roles and responsibilities than traditionally expected of them and, as a result, the levels of violence they experience have increased. Women and girls not only face extreme danger due to the crisis and fighting in the region between the Houthis and Yemeni Forces (supported by UAE and Saudi Arabia backed anti-Houthi forces), but also security and economic risks due to a discriminatory legal system. Left with a damaged system of services and infrastructure that is unable to properly support them or allow them to seek legal remedy, and further faced with things like arbitrary detentions and the disappearance of male family members, women in Yemen are stepping up and suffering as a result. 

In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325, known as the Women, Peace and Security resolution. The resolution was enacted in an effort to address the fact that women and girls suffer disproportionately from negative effects during and after times of war. This unfair burden is due to the proliferation of social networks and the magnification of inequality, both of which expose women and girls to things like sexual violence and exploitation in greater capacities than in peacetime. In the nearly two decades since its adoption, the resolution has aimed to help affected women by making them participants in peacemaking efforts and politics. 

The resolution has been somewhat successful in some regions, playing a large part in helping women participate in peace processes in their countries. This has meant enabling women to act as signatories on peace agreements, participate in peace talks and negotiation, assist with humanitarian responses and post-conflict reconstruction, or partake in other peace-driven actions.

Nonetheless, women in Yemen are consistently underrepresented in peace talks, even in the face of concerted effort from the UN and other humanitarian organizations to address this gap. So, despite women taking on the roles vacated by their loved ones who may have been lost in the crisis or forcibly taken and held, they are not able to advocate for their own safety. 

This, however, is not the full extent of challenges that Yemeni women face. According to the World Food Program (WFP), in times of crisis, women and girls are put at greater risk for humanitarian issues, on top of the gender-based issues they already experience. One of the most common problems is that girls are often pulled out of school or forced to marry early in order for families to survive, as many are unable to afford food alongside paying for school or an additional child. The WFP also reports that, for women, one of the main dangers is malnutrition. This can be caused by the burden of pregnancy — more than one million pregnant and lactating Yemeni women required malnutrition treatment or prevention intervention in 2019 — or the burden of childcare. These women have to become self-sacrificing to a dangerous extent, often giving up their own food to feed their children.

Right now in Yemen, around 50,000 people are facing famine-like conditions, and 11 million more are experiencing food insecurity. Young children are particularly vulnerable to hunger, with around half of Yemeni children under five expected to experience acute malnutrition, according to the WFP. 

As the Yemen crisis fades from news headlines, due to the nature of it being such an extended conflict, it’s important to stay up-to-date on the current situation. This is particularly true when considering how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the war-torn country and its most vulnerable populations.

COVID-19 is not the first public health crisis to affect Yemen, as cholera, diphtheria, measles, and dengue fever were all reported in the country prior, with cholera affecting a suspected two million Yemenis since 2016. However, Yemen was, and is not, prepared to handle the pandemic. According to the World Health Organization, medical facilities and personnel have not been left alone during the conflict. More than half of the 5,000 or so health centers have closed and many health professionals have been forced to flee. On top of this, health aid has been obstructed by the Houthi and other authorities.

Considering the heavy use of starvation as a weapon of war in Yemen, primarily by the Houthis, the impact of hunger and starvation on an individual’s health and the disproportionate way women experience hunger has escalated the pandemic. In April 2020, the UN humanitarian coordinator in Yemen warned that, based on epidemiological projections, nearly 16 million people in Yemen could be infected by COVID-19 under the current conditions. 

The actual number of cases in Yemen is difficult to know as data on COVID-19 in the country is difficult to collect. The government has only reported deaths in the hundreds, but considering the disastrous nature of the healthcare system and the fact that war makes health crises worse, the number is likely much higher. Still, There is evidence that the country is currently experiencing a second wave of the disease. On top of the expected rise in cholera cases with the rainy season in May, this could be devastating for the population, and it will further complicate and inflame the suffering and discrimination that women in Yemen already face.

There is hope, however, as at the end of March 2021, Yemen received its first batch of COVID-19 vaccines, which included 360,000 doses, 13,000 safety boxes and 1.3 million syringes, through COVAX. This was the first step in the plan to vaccinate the country, with an estimated 1.9 million doses expected to be delivered to the country throughout the rest of the year. Those leading the vaccine effort will be forced to navigate the crumbling healthcare system and figure out how to equitably distribute vaccinations. 

Women are suffering in Yemen as a result of the humanitarian crisis, and the COVID-19 health crisis has only made things worse. It is important to understand and acknowledge the nuanced convergence of humanitarian, security and public health crises in Yemen. Otherwise, it is easy to get lost in the severity and horror often broadcasted and covered through global media. 

The post The Yemen Crisis is Disproportionately Affecting Women and Girls appeared first on Glimpse from the Globe.

Some notable ones as of late are a woman’s right to drive, granted after the law stripping this right was abolished in June 2018, a woman’s right to obtain a passport and travel abroad without consent from a male guardian if she is at least twenty-one, granted through an amendment in August 2019, and most recently, a woman’s right to join the armed forces, passed in February 2021.

These laws are responded to with global media frenzies, reported on by the largest news outlets in every major region and country. As a result, it is not uncommon for people to think that Saudi Arabia has generally improved in women’s rights. However, according to the Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) 2020 World Report on Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian women are still required to have male guardian approval for many things such as getting married, leaving prison, or obtaining healthcare. Women also face discrimination in regards to family, divorce, children and child custody matters. On top of this, men are still able to file for guardianship of women based on perceived “disobedience,” which can lead to women being forcibly imprisoned or kept in the male guardian’s home. 

This report shows little change in Saudi Arabia’s position in both the HRW 2019 World Report and the HRW 2018 World Report. So, despite chipping away at the guardianship system with small legislative changes, the overall treatment of women, in regards to legislation, has remained fairly consistent. 

Perhaps even more egregious than the persistence of the guardianship system is the Saudi government’s treatment of those who have spoken out against it. While the government is praised in the press for somewhat minor changes in the system, the women’s rights activists calling for change are arbitrarily imprisoned. Ahead of the lifting of the ban on women driving in 2018, over a dozen women’s rights activists in Saudi Arabia were arrested. After being held for a year, many faced trials throughout 2019. These trials were closed, barring journalists and diplomats from attending. One of the activists, Loujain al-Hathloul, was only released this February after spending over one thousand days in detention. Even after her release, she faces travel bans and a suspended three-year sentence under Saudi terrorism laws.

Other women’s rights activists arrested alongside al-Hathloul were said to have been released as well, but it is likely they are under similar restrictions, diminishing their ability to speak up. This was not an isolated incident. According to Amnesty International, in April of 2019 fourteen women’s rights activists were arrested for peacefully supporting women’s rights movements. The individuals were kept in detention through the end of the year without charge or trial. 

Many believe that the Saudi government’s decisions to make changes to their policies regarding women’s rights come from international pressure over anything else. This is a particularly popular stance when considering the most recent reforms, as President Biden has put pressure on the Saudi government through his cabinet’s commitment to protecting human rights abroad. This is thought by many to be the main reason behind the release of al-Hathloul, but it does not reflect a real change in the will of the Saudi government to protect and help their female citizens. 

Aside from the issue of stifling women’s rights activists, the Saudi government’s actual reforms seem to be largely cosmetic. Despite passing a domestic abuse ban in 2013, the Saudi government still, in many cases, mistreats the women who decide to report such abuse. In 2020, a large social media movement started in Saudi Arabia where women used the hashtag “Why I Didn’t Report It” to discuss their experiences with domestic abuse and the legislation surrounding it. Women who participated spoke of smear campaigns and victim-blaming if they reported, and many were arrested after being reported by their male guardians for disobedience. As long as the male guardianship system exists, many women in Saudi Arabia do not feel safe going to the police and are unable to escape abusive situations. 

There has also been a large resistance to the changes in the law from those that want the guardianship system to remain intact. Many women face backlash from their families for invoking their recently granted rights. So, although women may have the legal right to join the military, get a job, drive a car or get a passport, all without the consent of a male guardian, many still feel obligated to get permission from their father, brother, or husband depending on how accepting the family is of the new laws.  

Considering that women have been beaten, arrested, and, in extreme cases, killed for disobedience under the male guardianship system, its continued existence does not set a promising precedent for the future of women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. Until major action is taken to dismantle the discriminatory guardianship system and women’s rights activists are no longer silenced, it is difficult to say that the Saudi government has made any serious headway in promoting women’s rights.

It seems many recent reforms came from a place of economic strategizing rather than a serious commitment to change. For example, the expansion of jobs women are now allowed to work expands the Saudi workforce, boosting the economy. It’s very possible that this is the main goal for the Saudi government when taking into account the fact that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has repeatedly dedicated himself to diversifying the Saudi economy in preparation for a post-oil future. Allowing women to participate in the economy in a greater capacity would be a large part of that. 

It is worth questioning why the governments and news organizations of the world praise Saudi Arabia for these small changes without demanding the real changes necessary for achieving gender equality. For countries like the United States, which has a vested interest in maintaining good relations with the world’s largest oil producer, it has become common practice to turn a blind eye to the questionable practices of the Saudis. 

This was affirmed just recently with the Biden Administration’s decision not to penalize the Saudi Crown Prince over the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi despite their aforementioned commitment to human rights. Khashoggi’s murder on October 2, 2018, inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, caused international outrage due to the suspected involvement of the Saudi government. In February 2021, a U.S. intelligence report on the murder was released directly implicating the Saudi crown prince. Biden decided that the relationship was too important to risk direct punishment, citing counter-terrorism and facing Iran as his reasoning.

Without a greater commitment to abolishing the male guardianship system and with a continued history of suppressing the voices of women’s rights activists, it is hard to believe that the Saudi government wants to bring about real change. In combination with inaction on an international level, it is likely that this pattern of making minimal revisions to legislation preceded or followed by sweeping crackdowns on activism will continue to act as the only way the Saudi government addresses women’s rights.

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