Cheap Chinese imports flooding the Indian market and China’s role in the spread of COVID-19 had led to resentment from India’s populace toward China. With the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers directly attributable to Chinese forces, the incident proved to be a tipping point in the regional powers’ relations.

The clashes were caused by ambiguous demarcations in the Ladakh region, which both sides exploited through increased military presence and infrastructure. In the conflict’s immediate aftermath, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government appeared reluctant to act aggressively. Yet, Modi, unafraid to utilize populist swell, was plotting towards a different approach. 

India’s public had been growing steadily resentful towards China, blaming the pain incurred by COVID-19 on China. Therefore, on June 29, India’s government announced a sweeping ban of 59 Chinese apps, including TikTok, WeChat and Helo, citing threats to the country’s “sovereignty and security.” India’s anger, previously confined to the public, manifested itself in government policy.

But this is not the first time Sino-Indian tensions have reached a dangerous high. The relationship between China and India has experienced tumult in modern history, with conflicts erupting in 1962, 1967, and 1975. The rocky nature of their relations fits with political scientist Samuel Huntington’s “fault line” paradigm, a theory he explores in his 1993 book Clash of Civilizations. 

Huntington’s book argues that following the USSR’s collapse, conflict between nations would not be shaped by ideology, but by civilizational background. Huntington divides countries and regions into major civilizations — the West, Orthodox, Islam, Buddhism, Hindu, African, Latin American and Sinic — that would clash when respective cultures, norms and values between nations came into conflict with one another.

Within Clash of Civilizations, Huntington’s “fault line” concept has helped describe relations between countries, including India and China. Fault lines describe the possibility of conflict between two nation-states — from different civilizations — that border one another, similar to friction between tectonic plates. Fault line conflicts are also sometimes characterized by ethnic violence. 

Ethnic conflict along the Sino-Indian fault line is not pervasive primarily because both countries are core states of their civilization. A core state is the regional power at the core of its civilization. According to Huntington, China is the Sinic civilization’s core state as India is for Hinduism. Due to their size, each has a responsibility to restrict all-out conflict, which is also deterred by the principle of mutually assured destruction that nuclear weapons provide. Therefore, conflict manifests itself in other arenas, such as trade wars, immigration bans, investment boycotts and border skirmishes.

Like many fault line clashes, conflict along the Sino-Indian border has been intermittent. The first conflict can be traced back to the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. Following a decade of good relations in the 1950s, underpinned by India’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations, a diplomatic rift over India’s decision to grant refuge to the Dalai Lama in 1959 spoiled the Sino-Indian friendship.

China, aggrieved by India’s decision to house a political enemy, responded by claiming control of the Ladakh region, the territory separating India and China. The move launched a border dispute, a matter complicated by the cartographical inaccuracies along the border. The previously used McMahon line contained ambiguous demarcations, leading China to introduce the Line of Actual Control, a demarcation India did not agree with. This led India to introduce its “Forward Policy”, which sought to construct 43 military outposts beyond China’s side of the border. Both sides were walking the tightrope of territorial claimance.

Tensions reached an apex on October 10, 1962, when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army crossed into Indian territory. The Chinese, who had drawn extensive preparations, effectively executed militaristic intentions, disrupting communication outpost and seizing strategically significant bases. India,caught off-guard, lost the war within a month, after a unilateral ceasefire and retreat was declared by the Chinese. An estimated 3,000 Indian soldiers died in the conflict, signifying the fault line’s first “earthquake.”

In 1967, China lost 300 soldiers in border skirmishes with India. India emerged victorious and, in doing so, revived a deflated national spirit since their defeat in 1962. In 1975, India accused China of a pre-planned ambush following the death of four soldiers. Only in the 1980s did relations slowly improve. Recognition of the border was formalized in 1993 with the Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC. 

India and China signed another 4 treaties to consecrate the new era of relations. Additionally, Sino-Indian trade rose with the onset of the century. By 2008, China secured its status as India’s largest import partner as bilateral trade experienced exponential growth. 

Yet, beneath the surface, cracks began to show. Infrastructure encroachments across the border, concerns over India’s trade deficit with China, and anger over China’s role in COVID-19 has influenced Indian public opinion, which has grown increasingly hostile. In 2019, only 23% of Indians were polled to have favorable attitudes towards China, the 2nd least of 34 countries polled.

Now, the death of Indian soldiers has enraged a country dominated by Hindu nationalism. Fallen soldiers have become martyrs and through India’s ban of 59 Chinese apps, the government is conscious of which way the wind is blowing. Xi Jinping has also shown no reluctance in intensifying nationalist currents. The border conflict provides an opportunity to divert the Chinese public’s discontent from a slowing economy to India’s geopolitical threat. With both leaders invigorating a strong-man status, a retreat can puncture holes into an inflated national spirit.

Further sanctions, visa bans, and bombastic rhetoric may increase as economic and political triggers aggravate the Sino-Indian cultural divide, which has been poorly bandaged since 1962. Increased military presence across the border suggests the Sino-Indian fault line could be prone to another tremor — indicating the deepening of a critical geopolitical fault line.

Two years later, not much has changed. The onset of COVID-19 risks exacerbating the already  delicate situation, leaving the DRC’s government with a catch-22: risk reopening or continue enduring the economic implications of a prolonged lockdown. With 72% of its population already under the poverty line, the DRC may face a greater challenge now, than in 2018, and the onslaught of disease, famine, and economic turmoil highlights the constant struggle faced by the DRC’s population. 

Prompted by the wildfire-like spread of COVID-19 in China — the DRC’s largest trading partner — the DRC was quick to close its borders with neighboring countries. Kinshasa International Airport became the first of four airports, three ports, and three strategic border crossings where screening for COVID-19 among travelers would take place. Internally, the government imposed a lockdown for all schools, restaurants and shops. In doing so, it chose medical precaution over potential economic concerns, leaving many citizens at financial risk.

The country’s economic sensitivity manifests as nation-wide food insecurity, which has historically been a problem for the DRC. Ranking 179th out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index, conflict frequently disrupts the country’s supply chains. The country is also prone to a tumultuous climate that often deprived communities that are unable to be compensated by a government marred by corruption. Now, border closures in conjunction with increased conflict have added to the disruption of supply chains, causing many vendors to lose food supplies. Consequently, prices of food and other necessities have increased across the country — the country experienced an estimated 4.8% currency depreciation in the official market and 7.8% depreciation in the parallel market.

But that’s not all. Floods in the Sud Kidu have devastated homes and agricultural output. Over 100,000 people are estimated to be directly impacted by the floods. In addition to inclement weather conditions, renewed inter-village conflict with Zambia risks an escalation of the humanitarian crisis in the Western DRC. In the East, ethnic conflict continues to be pervasive. On May 26th, 40 people were killed by ISIS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces, a militia group originally established in Uganda that has presided over brutalities in the past 20 years. The attack makes the ADF attributable to 400 deaths since the DRC’s army began an offensive on the group.

Despite domestic turmoil and conflict, the DRC has succeeded in minimizing the spread of COVID-19. As of June, Kinshasa has reported 3,878 confirmed cases with 82 deaths. In comparison, New York, a city smaller in population to Kinshasa, has had 206,969 cases with 21,844 deaths. Kinshasa’s ability to evade COVID-19 has prompted speculation.

Africa’s warm climate has been considered a factor; studies have shown that hotter climates could limit the spread of COVID-19. Another plausible explanation is the DRC’s younger population — the DRC’s median population has an age of nearly 17 years, with only 2.47% of its population 65 years old and over. When fighting a disease that leaves the elderly most vulnerable, a country’s demographics can mitigate the impact of the disease.

Another theory cites the lack of testing equipment being a reason for the DRC’s low infection rates. With the DRC’s government ranked 168th out of 180 countries on Transparency.Org’s corruption index; corruption inhibits the development of a medical infrastructure by disabling the importation or mass production of testing equipment. With the absence of a sophisticated testing system, the government has been unable to survey infection rates, rendering the current figures questionably low.

High levels of corruption and an impoverished population prevents citizens from gaining access to necessary healthcare provisions. Structurally, healthcare funding is on the backburner  in the DRC. Funds that could be used to purchase essential equipment, such as ventilators, are absent.

The government’s difficulty with establishing a comprehensive disease surveillance system has been an issue pre-dating COVID-19. The government struggled to contain the DRC’s 10th Ebola outbreak in Eastern DRC, partly due to the presence of more than one hundred armed groups in the region. Their presence, stretching back to the Second Congolese War in 1998 and facilitated by weak governance and pervasive corruption, has created 4.5 million internally displaced peoples within the DRC. Resultantly, the medical surveillance system struggles to monitor rebel-controlled territories.

Militia groups have frequently targeted health care facilities, with 424 attacks occurring between January and November 2019. The attacks, frequently happening in Ebola-affected regions, complicate an already strained health response.

Communal distrust has also led to local communities believing Ebola is a conspiracy designed by outsiders. A social climate of mistrust makes it difficult to control the spread of infectious diseases, which require community engagement to prevent its spread. Without it, vaccination efforts have been constrained while some locals consult religious authorities over medical authorities for health advice.

Now, the situation faces further danger. Having recently managed to gain control over a recent Ebola outbreak, the government is facing another outbreak in the North-West. As surveillance the surveillance system picks up more cases another front opens in a seemingly unending war on disease.

Meanwhile, the battle with COVID-19 is unfinished. Its spread threatens to strain an underfunded healthcare system already overwhelmed by other diseases such as malaria and cholera. The flipside, sadly, is not much better. The government may be forced into opening up as economic unrest could transpire into social unrest.

However, easing lockdown in a city like Kinshasa, whose population density nearly quadruples London, not only risks another outbreak, but an exponential uptick in infection rates. The medical cost could handicap an economic revival, but with the issue of food insecurity steadily growing the government may have no other choice.