China’s known across the world for its unfortunate repression of the Tibetan and Uyghur peoples’ right to self-determination. Tibet and Xinjiang (home to China’s Uyghurs, an Islamic, Turkic ethnic group) are both restive regions that capture the world’s attention from time to time, leading observers to frame the conflict as one between the Han majority, consisting of 95% of the population, and an oppressed class of minority groups.  However, many people fail to realize that China is also home to 53 other ethnic minority groups that are generally satisfied and at peace with the regime. At the heart of Chinese policies toward minorities is Youhui zhengce (优惠政策), an affirmative action-like program meant to induce economic integration, protect the equality of minority languages and cultures, and respect territorial autonomy.

To examine the success of this policy requires comparing two fundamentally similar groups that differ in response to the Chinese regime: the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the Koreans in Jilin.  The Koreans and the Uyghurs share a similar geographic and historical context. Both are located in landlocked provinces outside of the core region of China’s economic miracle and were, in principle, equal recipients of preferential treatment by government affirmative action policies to foster integration and equality of opportunity since the 1980s. In addition, both provinces have seen substantial double-digit economic growth since the 1980s. However, while the Koreans have lived in peace with the Chinese, the Uyghurs have become increasingly violent and resistant to Beijing.

Comparing the Uyghur and Korean-Chinese experiences offers a rare opportunity to analyze Beijing’s strategy of using economic growth and integration to develop a legitimate mandate of rule over minority groups.

Uyghurs and Korean-Chinese share fundamental characteristics that make a comparative study possible. First, unlike other minorities like the Bai, Uyghurs and Korean-Chinese are culturally and historically distinct from the Han. Uyghur culture is closer to the Central Asian Turkic and Islamic civilizations, while Korean-Chinese culture is part of the long, independent Korean culture and civilization founded in the namesake peninsula.

Secondly, both groups are at the periphery of China. Xinjiang has historically been at the far periphery of any Chinese empire—if included at all. Even when controlled by a Chinese government, Xinjiang was often classified as an outpost rather than a full province. The Korean Chinese live at the southern tip of Manchuria. Jilin is a former Manchurian province, and only became a part of China during the Qing dynasty. Most Koreans that live there trace their roots to migrants that left the peninsula between 1850 and 1945.

Thirdly, both groups have a similar socio-economic background. They both reside in provinces that were outside the direct Chinese economic miracle that transformed areas along the East Coast. Both Xinjiang and Jilin are removed from the central Chinese basin and predominantly rural, with the Korean-Chinese and the Uyghurs engaged almost entirely in agriculture. And both provinces have seen substantial economic growth, ever since the start of Chinese investment in the 80s and 90s: Jilin had 13.4 % GDP growth in 2012 and Xinjiang has seen 8.8% growth in 2016.

With all of these fundamental similarities, why were the Chinese able to placate Korean ethnic nationalism while stirring up Uyghur frustration and resistance over the past two decades. That reason might be found in China’s method of producing economic growth. In Xinjiang, Beijing utilized migration while Jilin grew due to internal investment. The former caused substantially higher levels of income inequality that hurt Chinese attempts at integration.

When comparing growth strategies in the two provinces, we need to understand what drives GDP growth. Growth requires increases in investment, consumption, exports and/or government spending. Exports are dependent on investment and government spending. Investment relies on a large population base with substantial human capital to implement projects and achieve returns.  Consumption also requires a growing population (i.e. consumer base) with rising incomes.

In the case of Xinjiang, China had no means of fast growth other than through migration-induced development. Xinjiang, which had a population density of less than 10 people per sq km. in the 70s and 80s, was not built for rapid growth in investment, consumption or exports. A small, spread out population also means government spending growth has a low ceiling. So, rather than wait for the local population to increase and develop higher levels of educational attainment, the CCP simply encouraged—and in many ways forced—mass migration: an economically ingenious move insofar as it took the massive labor surplus of provinces such as Sichuan to the labor scarce Xinjiang. However, it effectively overwhelmed Uyghur culture and identity; the Uyghur, once a majority, is now the provincial minority. It also reduces the benefits of affirmative action policies for Uyghurs as the mass influx of Han migrants, educated and un-educated, reduces the demand for skilled Uyghurs.

Jilin, unlike Xinjiang, is relatively well-populated and dense, with 27 million people and 149 people per square kilometer. In addition, the capital of Jilin, Changchun, was the former capital of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. Thus while the province is still very agricultural and rural, its urban areas are far more developed thanks in part to Japanese imperialism. Given this history, Jilin has a strong base of human capital, an aged but functional industrial base and a population density that can induce further urbanization. While Koreans, like the Uyghurs, are predominately agricultural and rural, they are densely concentrated in one part of Jilin: Yanbian Prefecture at the south tip of the peninsula. Thus, there was no need to force surplus Han labor from other provinces to induce growth. In Jilin, capital investment and endogenous strategies were able to kick-start the economy. Koreans who benefited from affirmative action policies were also able to climb up the ladder of prosperity without having to compete with a mass of Han migrants like the Uyghurs.

The CCP has created a generally successful strategy of using economic growth to develop a legitimate mandate of rule and bring peace to a country with 55 minority groups. We see this exemplified in Jilin, where Koreans have generally been peacefully integrated through endogenous development. However, in the case of Xinjiang growth was induced through massive migration of Han people, which brought development but reduced the efficacy of economic growth based ethnic integration. Conflict in Xinjiang is racial, and despite economic growth and an objective betterment of Xinjiang Uyghur livelihoods in the past three decades, nothing can replace the loss of identity that accompanied it.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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In describing the history of Korea’s foreign relations, there is an appropriate phrase: “Between a fight of whales, the shrimp is crushed.” While the Korean peninsula’s relative geographic isolation has protected its peoples’ ancient, independent streak, every few centuries the region gets tossed into the tumult of great power politics, leading to conflict and devastation. In the 16^th century, Japan’s quest to topple Ming China as a regional hegemon led to the Imjin War, which was fought entirely on the peninsula. The 17^th century saw the Manchus rise to challenge the Ming leading to a war involving Korea, a Ming ally. The 19^th century saw the Sino-Japanese war, which saw Qing and Japanese forces clash in Seoul and Pyongyang. In the early 20^th century, the Russo-Japanese war was a battle over who will have a sphere of influence in Korea (the Japanese won). After the end of World War II and liberation of Korea, Cold War politics between the Soviet Union and the US led to the division of Korea and the subsequent Korean War, leaving many scars still remembered on both sides of the 38^th parallel.

In the 21^st century, South Korea is now caught between a rising China and its longtime ally, the United States. In the 1950s, the Chinese and the US fought to a standstill in the Korean War leading to decades of frosty relations between China and the South Korean-American alliance. But since normalizing relations with China in 1992, South Korea has developed closer relations with the Middle Country, so much so that China is now South Korea’s largest trading partner. Millions of tourists travel between the two East Asian countries annually, which helps foster a relationship already deepened by strong cultural and historical ties.

And South Korea and America’s relationship has evolved as well, moving beyond military affairs towards a strong economic relationship. The United States has based troops in the country since the establishment of the state. It provided the military and economic aid that helped South Korea become the 9^th largest economy in the world. The United States is South Korea’s second largest trading partner, with two-way trade value reaching $60 billion. However, with growing tensions between a rising China and the United States, there are risks that South Korea can be caught in the cross fire once again. Such concerns began to manifest in the summer of 2015 as South Korea debated joining the Asian Infrastructure Bank, a Chinese creation, thoroughly opposed by the US (the ROK eventually did join). This summer, the China-or-the-US dilemma escalated because of the decision to place the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea, further challenging South Korea to balance its relations with both countries.

THAAD is an anti-ballistic missile system that has the capability to shoot down short to intermediate range missiles. It is not an offensive system, as the missiles have no warhead and rely on the kinetic energy of the projectile to destroy the oncoming missile. Consisting of six truck-mounted launchers, 49 interceptors, a fire control and communications unit, and an AN/TPY-2 radar, this system is designed to deter any potential missile attack from the North. South Korea already has the US patriot missile system that can intercept artillery missiles, meaning that the addition of THAAD should be able to stop the entire array of potential aerial projectiles, excluding conventional artillery and mortar shells. This is strategically critical given the fact that the North Koreans are rapidly developing stronger nuclear weapons as well as the requisite missile delivery systems that can hit the ROK, Japan and even parts of the US’s West Coast.

South Korea has debated deploying THAAD since 2014, and China has asserted its strong opposition to the system from the very beginning. This is not too surprising and easily mirrors the Russian response toward US anti-ballistic missile systems being placed in Eastern Europe. Any time new weapons systems are placed on the front line, there is room for misunderstanding and suspicion. To the Chinese, South Korea is part of the US’s “first island chain,” stretching from the peninsula to Taiwan and the Philippines, an arrangement they see as an effort to contain China. But beyond superficial suspicion, the Chinese also have a genuine concern that THADD will reduce their nuclear missile deterrence. THAAD cannot directly destroy long distance missiles originating from China, but its radar component offers an extension of the US’s surveillance capability well into the Asian continent. THAAD’s surveillance system has been known to also be able to coordinate with the floating anti-missile and surveillance systems on the Aegis Cruisers, some of which are based in the seas around the Korean peninsula. THAAD can offer a unique early-tracking system of missiles originating from the continent, allowing for early warning for the land-based interceptors that defend the 50 states. In addition, China cannot count out the possibility of a future upgrade or expansion of the THAAD system, which could degrade its nuclear deterrent.

China did not sit idly while South Korea made its decision to deploy THAAD. It has enacted policy to hurt South Korea’s burgeoning entertainment exports to China. South Korean pop-exports is a $5.4 billion industry and China is the main export target. To illustrate the importance of the Chinese market, this past year a single Korean drama got 2.4 billion views in China, generating millions of dollars in revenue. But ever since the deployment of THAAD, Chinese TV stations have blurred or cut out broadcasts of Korean stars like Psy and limited broadcasts of K-pop concerts. As China continues to strengthen, its leverage over the Chinese-South Korean trade relationship will only increase. And much to South Korea’s dismay, the Chinese have clearly indicated that they are willing to use South Korean dependence on the Chinese market in order to advance their political objectives. It is not out of the question that more lucrative South Korean electronics, cars and ships may also be fair game in the future.

The diplomatic and cultural battle over THAAD is a glimpse into the volatile and potentially dangerous fault line that South Korea straddles between China and the US. The decision to deploy THAAD took nearly two years, with Chinese pressure only amplified by significant protests in South Korea over its deployment. It offers a preview into what the next century may hold in store for the South Koreans. The Chinese and the US have opposing interests that will undoubtedly lead to more frequent clashes. Whether South Korea can avoid being crushed will depend on brain over brawn: in order to protect all that it has gained thus far, the prawn needs to outmaneuver the whales and slip through their clash unscathed.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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During the cold December of 1592, General Kwon Yul faced an impossible task. The Japanese had trapped Korea’s only major army in Doksan Castle and cut off water supplies. A month into the siege, as water supplies began to dwindle and the Japanese were on the verge of victory, Kwon Yul ordered his men to bathe horses on the castle wall with buckets of rice. The Japanese, thinking that these horses were being bathed with water, lost their willingness to brave the intense Korean winter and broke ranks. Kwon Yul then unleashed his forces to chase down the demoralized Japanese troops and left his mark in history as one of Korea’s greatest military heroes.

North Korea under Kim Jong-un’s reign is facing their “Doksan” moment, under siege by a whole litany of domestic and international problems that threaten the regime’s stability. Internationally, North Korea is facing the most intense round of sanctions implemented under the auspices of the UN Security Council Resolution 2270 passed in March. Even China, one of North Korea’s oldest allies, supported the passage of the resolution and implementation of sanctions, indicating that they are no longer turning a blind eye to North Korea’s provocative actions. Domestically, people are becoming increasingly aware of their economic impoverishment in contrast to the living standards in South Korea, largely due to the increasing prevalence of black market South Korean entertainment materials. Kim Jong-un, despite his increasing likeliness to his grandfather in appearance and actions, is unable to command the same amount of respect and devotion by the people.

Yet despite these weaknesses, North Korea held the first Worker’s Party Congress in 36 years at the beginning of May with significant pomp and circumstance. Rather than a sign of strength, the meeting is a sign of desperation for the Kim regime as it works to centralize support around the leadership and maintain deterrence against the South and the US.

The Workers’ Party Congress is in theory the highest and most powerful political body with the ability to appoint the politburo, leadership and party line. Established by the original party constitution at the founding of the North Korean state, the Congress was supposed to gather elected representatives from across the country every five years in Pyongyang to help determine the course of the state—hence the reason why North Korea claims it is a democracy. However, in reality, North Korea is an authoritarian state where the practice of meeting every five years was never observed, and the Congress’s political powers were made politically obsolete decades ago. The last congress, the 6th Worker’s Party Congress, was in 1980, and was convened largely just to appoint Kim Jong-Il as Kim Il-Sung’s successor. All of the powers of the body have been relegated to the top leadership and their respective groups.

With no political power, the Workers’ Party Congress has only one purpose: to be a big, expensive show augmenting the regime’s legitimacy. South Korean experts estimate that the cost of this most recent Congress was upwards of $200 million, which is a far larger figure when considering the country’s low cost of living and North Korea’s per-capita GDP of about $1800. More than 3000 delegates elected by their local party organizations were transported to Pyongyang and given generous lodging, presents imported from China (televisions, computers and other rare consumer items) and front row seats to musical and artistic performances that were broadcasted nationally. Even the actual agenda of the Worker’s Party Congress was a show insofar as it consisted of a symbolic election of Kim Jong-un as the head of the congress and repeated calls for the maintenance of an implausible nuclear deterrence strategy.

Despite the immense expense and effort expended by the central government, the Worker’s Party Congress was not a success. Domestically it is unclear whether it has increased loyalty to the Kim regime. During the 70 days leading up to the Congress, the government had implemented forced labor, dubbed the “70-day battle,” to increase the production of food and manufactured goods used for the event. The clear human rights violation only further alienated the poor that live outside of Pyongyang. Since the event there have been minor reports of dissatisfaction among the non-elite echelons of society, demonstrated when normal citizens and workers complained about the poor quality toothpaste and toothbrushes given as gifts for their 70 day labor while party elites were given lavish items. Meanwhile, to even collect the gifts, workers had to pay a fee of 1500 Won ($1), so many chose not to bother claiming them. Yet perhaps the biggest sign of regime weakness is the defection of workers at a state-run overseas restaurant just two weeks after the Congress. These workers are chosen for their loyalty and are often the daughters of elite families residing in Pyongyang. The fact that the members of the privileged class chose to defect indicates that dissatisfaction has even spread to the upper classes of North Korea.

Internationally, no one is fooled by the Congress. There were 128 reporters from 12 countries present at the event – all of whom were shown the best sights in the country. However, to Pyongyang’s chagrin, these reporters’ commentaries were not positive. Articles focused on the signs of poverty, the authoritarianism and the cult-of-personality propaganda, brainwashing the North Korean people. Despite its best efforts, North Korea is not seen as any more powerful in the eyes of the international community. Their nuclear program, despite being touted as a responsible, defensive move to protect the state’s sovereignty, is no more legitimate.

The North Korean Worker’s Party Congress was revived after 36 years to help lift the siege of domestic and international pressure, to unite the populous and exude a strong image overseas. But North Korea has failed to project an image of plenty and strength. By wasting more than $200 million and exemplifying the excesses and problems of the party, it may have only augmented the regime’s problems. North Korea can wash their horses with water and with rice, but it will not be able fool its own people, nor the international community.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Mokusatsu. In stating the Japanese cabinet’s position on the Potsdam declaration, Premier Kantaro Suzuki uttered this notoriously vague word, which could mean either to remain in a state of “wise and masterly inactivity” or to respond with “silent contempt.” While for the Japanese it was clear that Suzuki wanted to give an ambiguous answer—the cabinet was still deliberating on English translations—the Allies interpreted the response to mean the Japanese premier and cabinet were firmly against surrender. Ten days later, Hiroshima was leveled. The translation of Mokusatsu is now permanently a part of the NSA’s lesson journal.

Language translation and interpretation in the policy realm is still an immensely arduous process handled by a studied few. (Read this to learn about the sheer complexity of translation and interpretation at the UN.) But in the 21st century, advanced cloud computing will help us overcome the challenge of foreign languages—allowing for clearer global conversation.

Cooperation inherently requires an understanding of the “other side”, which is near impossible without a reliable line of communication. Foreign languages often make it easier to characterize unfamiliar peoples as enemies, inducing elitism and racism. The term barbarian comes from the Greek root barbar, or, “person speaking a language different from one’s own.”

Throughout history we see diplomatic efforts compromised by language barriers. England’s 1793 Macartney Mission to the Qianlong emperor in China failed partly because the English delegation brought four Chinese Catholic priests to serve as interpreters and translators. They knew Latin, not English, and as Catholic priests who had studied in Italy, they had a limited understanding of the byzantine rules and politics of the Imperial Qing Court. Both sides, unable to communicate effectively, ultimately looked down on the other with suspicion and prejudice. The failure of the mission was a major step towards the Opium Wars that would ravage China.

Even in the present day international diplomacy is hampered by costs associated with language translation and interpretation. The cost to translate one page of a United Nations document into all the official languages is equal to the annual living cost of a single person in a developing country. With millions of pages of documents coming from the UN and other institutions, the price tag is prohibitive despite having only five official languages. There are simply not enough skilled professionals, even in critically important arenas like the War on Terror. During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the dearth of people fluent in Arabic resulted in a backlog of 123,000 hours of counter-terrorism-related recordings.

Prohibitive costs and a lack of language professionals also mean that there is no information consistency. International journalism in particular suffers from the lack of cheap and quick translation. News gathering organizations such as the Associated Press in the US often translate or analyze local media reports and sell them to all the major news reporting outlets, which then create their own reports or op-eds that are then used by smaller outlets. Thus, our access to foreign journalism and information is severely limited by the slow and costly speed of translation. For example, most sophisticated analyses of the recent South Korean parliamentary elections are in Korean, and are inaccessible to non-Korean speakers, who generally only have access to news reports in their own language that summarize results and basic trends. When comparing search results related to the parliamentary elections on Naver (a Korean search engine) and Google, we see that it is impossible to obtain even basic information about the candidates of the various districts, demographic details or the list of proportional representation candidates in English.

Now, cloud computing may finally be able to eliminate this historical information barrier, and revolutionize translation. Machine translations, 60 years in the making, have a reputation for horrible and even comical results (e.g. Google Translate). Bad translations can be even worse than no translation, causing aspiring interpreters and translators to make grave mistakes. However, a revolution in machine translation is right around the corner. Joining the likes of IBM’s Deep Blue and Watson, Google’s AlphaGo recently beat Lee Se-dol, the best human player, at the complex game of Go, demonstrating a path to crack the complex challenge of foreign languages.  

Because of Go’s complexity, it provides a strong comparison to language systems. Languages, like the rules of go, have uncountable variations and permutations based on perfect information and non-chance combinatorial grammar rules. Go is often characterized as Asian chess, yet it is far more complex and nuanced (for a complete explanation of how to play click here). Mathematically, there are approximately 1050 legal positions in chess, while in Go, there are approximately 2*10170 legal positions, not taking into account the order of moves played. (For reference, there are between 1078 to 1082 number of atoms in the observable universe.) The number of variations in the first 40 moves alone surpasses this astronomical figure.

For programmers, go and language are both puzzles unsolvable through brute calculation. However, AlphaGo’s innovation is its use of two deep-neural networks to make decisions and choices. One neural tree, the “policy network,” predicts the next move and narrows the number of considered moves by calculating which move is likely to lead to a win, reducing the breadth of search. The other neural network, the “value network,” reduces the number of future moves that AlphaGo predicts and analyzes them by estimating the set of moves with the highest probability of winning, rather than predicting the game to the end with every permutation. The program uses the power of Google Cloud computing to access already existing global computing infrastructure, eliminating the need to build costly servers.

AlphaGo’s programming methodology is crucial for language applications. Brute calculation can only string words together without considering the complex relationship between connotation and denotation. Neural networks that have been “sensitized” to the vast majority of cases and permutations found in language will be able to overcome this impediment. AlphaGo learned by evaluating 30 million human moves in Go’s recorded history and played numerous games against itself in a form of reinforcement learning.

Following this pattern, a language version of AlphaGo would have access to the millions of human translations that exist on paper and online to train itself. Of the two neural networks, one neural network could potentially measure the statistical accuracy of the word within the sentence, while the other network looks at the sentence’s relationship to the word.  Powered by cloud computing, anyone with a computer and the internet could have access to this technology. Just like in Go, it is not hard to believe that computers will be able to offer creative, yet accurate means of translating and interpreting texts better than human beings.

In a future with computers that can translate and interpret languages, globalization will undoubtedly boom. There will be revolutions in second and third language acquisition, as students studying Vietnamese or Russian train with digital language partners. Multi-national corporations will become even more international as a South Korean corporation operating in Turkey would be able to immediately analyze and adapt to customer responses to its new product. Ironically, cold mechanical computation will pave the way towards greater mutual understanding, empathy and cooperation between cultures and countries. No longer plagued by misinterpretation and misunderstanding, diplomacy will flourish; a US negotiator will know exactly what his Japanese counterpart means when he responds mokusatsu.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.


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Not only known as the leader of the most populous country in the world, President Xi is also affectionately called “Daddy Xi”, with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sanctioned rap videos containing brilliant lyrics about his effectiveness as China’s top leader. This effusive praise, present in the CCP’s official publicity, has become commonplace across Chinese mass media. On February 18, the deputy director at China’s official Xinhua news agency wrote a stirring public poem about how President Xi Jinping has greatly inspired his creativity.

Xi has been the leader of China for nearly three years and his process of consolidating power has been expansive. He recently demanded “absolute loyalty” from all domestic and foreign media outlets, which must receive government permission before publishing online. Many had regarded President Xi as a potential reformer of China’s political system when he assumed office, but his drive to consolidate power and the rapid development of a low-scale cult of personality has prevented any positive change. Given China’s slowdown, Xi’s government is tightening control over the media and cultivating nationalism in order to offset inevitable dissatisfaction over a worsening economic climate. Rather than making critical reforms, his government is attempting to establish a Maoist-like form of ideological unity around Xi: a dangerous embrace of the past rather than a pursuit of much needed reform.

In the first decade of the 21st century many viewed China’s economic rise as unstoppable, but as of late, many significant structural issues are rapidly coming to light. Statistically, there is seemingly little to worry about as China still posted an official figure of 6.9% GDP growth. However, statistics in the country are often imprecise or have been significantly altered by the central government. A more accurate indicator is the Chinese stock market, which posted a steep decline resulting in a loss of 5 trillion dollars since last summer. The Chinese stock market is neither as large nor as developed as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), so its impacts on the total economy are not too severe. But, these losses serve as a harbinger for China’s future economic problems.

The most pressing issue is the significant dependence on investment for economic growth. Historically, China’s large investment to GDP ratio fueled development and expansion, but naturally with time, the number of investment-worthy projects has fallen. Yet with businesses fueled by government backed credit, the rate of investment is at a whopping 43% of GDP, and this has resulted in unused infrastructure, excess industrial capacity and a housing bubble. With debt-fueled investment flowing into questionable projects, there are concerns over whether this huge investment would yield appropriate returns to service high debt levels. Poorly chosen projects, such as empty cities in the middle of nowhere, cannot produce the appropriate amount of revenue to pay off the debt, meaning many individuals and companies are at risk of default.

As a result, China’s debt levels have quadrupled since 2007 and are at 282% of GDP. In addition, this past January exports fell by 11.2%, confirming the slowing industrial sector, and imports fell by 18.8%, indicating shrinking consumption. China needs to reduce its dangerously unsustainable dependence on investment and replace it with consumption if it wants to successfully transition into an economy like that of the US. However, consumption cannot increase in the short run without major reforms due to government incentives to invest combined with weakening exports, low income growth, income inequality and large numbers of impoverished people.

With these economic weaknesses becoming more apparent, it is no surprise that the CCP is engaged in policies of centralization and media control in an attempt to create ideological unity. China’s outward-projected image is that of a modern capitalist state with Shanghai as the poster-city. But in reality, China still retains a political economic system centered around a Maoist-communist, party-state hierarchy.

Mao used this centralized system to create a unified ideology and collective spirit to legitimize CCP control of China, but Deng Xiaoping, his successor, was more pragmatic, instead focusing on economic growth and welfare as a better tool to maintain party control. This turn was further entrenched with the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, which demonstrated the potential for the party to lose power.

However, the CCP is reverting away from Deng’s pragmatism. Their move toward centralization will mean continued, high levels of corruption as officials — unlike in the Maoist past — deal with wealthy businessmen and major projects. And corruption directly contributes to the explosion of unwise, debt-free investment in poor pet projects of party-state officials. Thus, embracing centralization will delay not only economic reforms but also essential reforms in governance.

While there is no perfectly clear solution to fix China’s problems, it is clear that attempting to recreate a Maoist unifying ideology is not a good option. Rather, China should not rest on its laurels of past achievements and instead face the sobering music that it must engage in a serious restructuring of the economy. A father needs to be able to do what is best, not necessarily what is most popular, and if “Daddy Xi” wants to live up to his popular reputation, it is best that he puts the state’s effort into reform and not Maoist ideological centralization.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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With a population of 600 million and a total GDP of $1.9 trillion, South East Asia is rapidly capitalizing on its potential to become a major economic power. While its economy is developing briskly and consistently – nearly 5% every year – its political development of has been rough and inconsistent. With a growing, educated middle class and greater access to information technologies, citizens are clamoring for more democratic liberties and a wider range of political rights. In 2015, several key states made important developments towards democracy.

Burma
From 1962, the military Junta has ruled Burma with an iron fist. However, in 2011, the country took unprecedented steps toward democratic reform: 1) releasing Aung San Suu Kyi, the longtime opposition leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), 2) establishing a Commission on Human Rights and 3) relaxing censorship. Furthermore, in 2012, there was a by-election in which the NLD won 40 seats in the parliament. The country has attempted democratization in the past—namely in 1990 when it held multi-party elections that simply ended with the results annulled and a crackdown on the NLD. But developments in the past few months suggest the democratic changes beginning in 2011 are here to stay.

In January of 2015, the government opened formal talks with student representatives regarding an education bill after major (illegal) demonstrations. In a country that usually cracks down on protests, this is a positive sign of government accountability and toleration of freedom of assembly and association. Protests continued throughout the year by students, citizens and the press alike with little obstruction. The biggest development was the announcement of an election promising wide opposition party participation; held on November 8, the NLD achieved a landslide victory with 77% of the seats in parliament.  

Burma is not a full-fledged democracy and the military still wields substantial power (25% of the seats of parliament are military appointments). However, they have promised to respect the decision of the election, and the NLD will choose the next president. The military’s motto is “disciplined democracy”, and while it seems like a contradiction, it is leading to unprecedented liberalization within the country.

Cambodia
Cambodia has been ruled since 1979 by the semi-authoritarian Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), led currently by President Hun Sen. A formerly Marxist-Leninist party, the CPP dropped its leftist affiliations in the early 1990s and adopted market economic reforms and supposed democratic restructuring. While the CPP has had regular elections since 1993, through intimidation, corruption and stringent regulation they have denied any opposition party a genuine chance at winning. However, in order to maintain legitimacy amidst rising unpopularity, the regime has recently embraced real democratic reform. The government held a 2013 election in which the opposing Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), a democratic liberal reform party, came within four percentage points of winning. The CNRP gained 55 out of 123 seats in the National Assembly despite allegations of voter fraud.

On November 12, 2015, the government issued an arrest warrant for the CNRP leader, Sam Rainsy, for public defamation, and expelled him from the National Assembly. Largely seen as a political move, it came at a turbulent time; two opposition party politicians were assaulted in November outside the National Assembly. With the opposition facing greater persecution by the government, Rainsy in self-imposed exile abroad and negotiations stalled, it seems that Cambodia’s path forward is rocky—two steps forward, one step back.

Thailand
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy historically ruled by a military Junta. The country has repeatedly attempted democratization but has failed to make meaningful progress. The most recent military government, which came to power through a coup in 2014, has promised to put Thailand back on the path of democratization, mainly pressured by large-scale citizen activism and protests. But 2015 saw very little change; the constitutional drafting process failed, resulting in the inevitable prolonging of the military government. Thailand has had 19 constitutions in less than 100 hundred years, and while there is currently a project to get another constitution written by April 2016, the junta’s commitment to writing a lasting document is questionable.

Additionally, the military government has created a climate of fear, as major political figures near the King and dissenting officers in the army were arrested for dubious corruption charges. It suggests that the government’s commitment to the rule of law is secondary to maintaining political control. Perhaps the most important development was news that the 2016 elections would be delayed. Thailand technically became a democratic state in 1932, and despite this legacy, the military junta seems to be deliberately delaying democratization for its own aggrandizement.

Vietnam
Vietnam is a one-party-rule communist state and is also one of the fastest developing countries in South East Asia. Vietnam embraces the Chinese model, using economic growth to maintain their political grip on the country. While the government does have a strong hand in media, internet censorship largely exists in name only and outside information is widely available.

Dissidents recently received a higher profile in the country. Citizen journalists wielding smartphones are trying to break the government’s monopoly on the media by circulating reports regarding human rights violations on the internet. While the government is cracking down, criticism from NGOs and other governments is limiting their ability to respond and is allowing citizen journalism to proliferate. There is an active online community of dissidents, some of whom send their grievances to the government directly.

An NGO known as Bloc 8406, a coalition of many regional and local pro-democracy parties, serves as the main organization pushing for greater political freedom. Its very existence indicates that the roots of democratization are being laid in the country. The government has been harsh in its suppression of dissidents and independent journalists, but is unable to silence all the voices or prevent more from joining the movement. It is important to note that with relatively high levels of economic growth and relative satisfaction, dissidents and active opposition against one party rule are still a minority, making any major changes beyond a relaxing of laws on freedom of speech and press unlikely in the near future.

The Regional Outlook
Democracy and basic political freedoms have become globalized norms that states and their citizens in South East Asia cannot ignore. South East Asia has a long history of military and one-party rule, but the region’s governments face an increasing demand for fair representation and political rights from their citizenry. Greater economic prosperity and the accompanying access to the internet and global media are fueling an increasingly fervent domestic discourse, which will result in a demand for government accountability and protection of human rights. Burma is the surprising leader in this move, and could serve as an inspiring development for similar movements in Thailand and Cambodia as well as activists in Vietnam.

With this in mind, it is unlikely that there will be violent and explosive revolution; citizens are unlikely to sacrifice economic growth and stability, and current governments have a strong grip over their respective states. However, we will see continued and escalating non-violent citizen pressure in 2016, led by students and members of the middle-class, reminding governments of their political and human rights.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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As late as the 1870s only 10% of the African Continent was colonized. Less than 30 years later, the “Scramble for Africa” had rendered 90% of the continent under the control of European powers. This race to conquer the continent was not simply motivated by European politics; it was also motivated by genuine economic interests to find new markets and resources as a result of the 2nd Industrial Revolution. In the 21st century, land-conquering colonization is over, but we see that globalization and an increased appetite for resources is driving a second “Scramble for Africa”—accomplished not by the power of the colonizer’s gun but by the power of the land contract. As African states see freer trade and greater integration with the world economy, they are also opening up to economic exploitation and dependence: a story of modern colonization.

In 2008, record high commodity prices sent shockwaves through the global economy. Between 2006 and 2008 the price of rice rose by 217%, wheat by 136% and maize by 125%. While prices have since subsided, many countries in the developed world have made it a national objective to improve food security in order to prevent a Malthusian crisis of high population and an unmet demand for food. This includes European countries, the wealthy gulf states of the Middle East (such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE) and East Asian states like China and South Korea. Africa – with 60% of the world’s uncultivated arable land – is a prime area to hedge against future commodity crises.

The most representative and notorious example of the “land grab” phenomenon involves the South Korean company Daewoo in Madagascar. The 2008 commodity crisis was a particularly acute warning sign for South Korea, which has a population of around 50 million people in an area one-fifth the size of California. Madagascar, on the other hand, has 2.5 million acres of arable land, and in 2008 Daewoo attempted to acquire 1.3 million acres to grow corn and other foodstuffs in return for a $6 billion investment in infrastructure and new jobs. With a 99-year lease, Daewoo was practically getting free land. The infrastructure would have been centered on farm and export operations (meaning it would generate a return on investment) and local jobs would easily be created in the process. However, many citizens felt that this deal handed over their country and livelihoods to an unaccountable foreign company. The project was cancelled when it incited anger and mass protests that led to an attempted coup (where the army sided with the president’s rival).

The large-scale Madagascan project failed due to a “Deus-ex-Machina” turn of events: a well-timed political storm that ended a seemingly inevitable project. However, we see that many projects by national agricultural companies are in fact going as planned all across the African continent. In North Sudan, South Korea and the UAE alone purchased 1.4 million hectares of land for wheat cultivation. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, China acquired 1 million hectares of land for biofuel and palm oil production, paid through investments in infrastructure and business. One estimate posits that the total area of reported land transactions stands at 50.1 million hectares.

Global population is expected to approach 9.6 billion by 2050, which would inevitably result in upward pressure on food prices. Developing unused arable land is significantly cheaper than developing new technology to increase yields on already tilled land. Countries are hoping to take advantage of rising food prices, and are buying in advance.

For poor African countries, the investment opportunity that a land acquisition contract provides is immensely lucrative. Often these countries are too willing to rush into deals, giving up massive tracts of land for remarkably low sums of money. Government officials, thinking in the short term and often with personal gain in mind, see the selling of undeveloped, “worthless” land for any price as a good deal. This is unfortunately acutely similar to Native Americans selling Manhattan Island for purportedly 60 guilders worth of trade items ($24 in the present day).

In these land deals, the food product and investments are designed for the long-term purpose of export, with the resultant income largely going to a foreign entity. Some projects start right away, although many other investors are waiting for prices to rise before breaking ground. One that has already begun is the massive 10,000 hectare Saudi Arabian rice plantation in Gambella, Ethiopia. It produces thousands of tons of rice sent straight to Saudi Arabia, contributing nothing to the local Ethiopian diet. Given Africa’s dire food insecurity, this is unfortunately ironic. Furthermore, the two dominant ethnic groups in the area (the Anuaks and the Nuers, who have long depended on a pastoralism) have been forced to relocate and change their traditional lifestyle with minimal compensation from the government. Additionally, the lack of environmental regulation and oversight along with relaxed land-use conditions assure that companies have free reign over how they use the land. For example, in countries like Liberia, companies have clear-cut vast acres of trees to grow palm oil.

In principle, African countries should have the upper hand when it comes to contractual land deals. Africa’s arable land is a jewel that can be leveraged so that investors have a greater stake in developing the local area beyond simply exploiting the land for agricultural export. This could include stipulating that companies dedicate a portion of the land leased to them for local agriculture and the domestic market, with consideration for traditional practices and the agricultural patterns of local farmers. Completely industrialized farming would displace multitudes of farmers and destroy local knowledge of sustainable farming practices, making this a crucial stipulation. Finally, environmental concerns could be met by clauses that at the very least require a company’s responsibility for environmental cleanup or replanting of trees. With high demand for African land, governments are well positioned to impose such conditions.

Beyond simply domestic action, the African continent needs a united front. One country simply developing stronger regulation and scrutiny of land contracts would be meaningless its neighbors can be exploited. By utilizing organizations such as the African Union in tandem with the World Bank, which specializes in development, countries should create a framework setting norms and customs for countries and corporations to avoid one-sided contracts and land deals that disenfranchise the inhabitants. The UN’s 1962 Resolution 1803 recognizes the importance of protecting the sovereignty of local inhabitants and their resources (including land), but the world still needs to make significant improvement in recognizing the rights of indigenous and local farmers who live and till on land that is not clearly defined by property rights.

For Africa, the 21st century will be a story of development. Whether that development will be able to bring about improvement in the average citizens’ livelihood is directly related to the use of and investment in land. Desires to achieve quick development and to satisfy short term economic desires will lead to inequality and disenfranchisement. With a long-term vision and the local population in mind, African governments have the ability to channel foreign demand for land and food production in ways that benefit the country, potentially making the second scramble for Africa a positive story in economic development.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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In the final days of 2015, the governments of South Korea and Japan surprised the world with a deal addressing the issue of Korean “comfort women”. This term describes the thousands of women and girls from Japan’s Pacific-Asian colonies during World War II who served as sexual slaves to Japanese soldiers stationed in the front lines. Foreign Minister Kishida of Japan conveyed Prime Minister Abe’s apology for the women’s treatment and announced that Japan would provide official government funds totaling ¥1 billion ($8.3 million) for a victim’s foundation. Foreign Minister Yun of South Korea announced that both sides would refrain from accusing and criticizing each other internationally regarding an issue that “is resolved finally and irreversibly.” With 2015 being the 50th anniversary of the normalization of Japanese and Korean relations, this was a major breakthrough that analysts predict would change the geopolitics of East Asia by strengthening the anemic Korean-Japanese alliance at the expense of China’s attempts to isolate Japan and increase influence in Korea. However, this decades-old issue is unlikely to be solved heading into 2016.

The issue of comfort women represents the lack of closure regarding Japanese war crimes and grievances during World War II. More than 200,000 teenage Korean girls were taken from their homes and served at front line military bases, where they became victims of institutionalized rape. Each girl had to serve dozens of men per day and according to one testimony, a girl that resisted was “[t]aken to the courtyard and in front of all of us, her head was cut off with a sword and her body was cut into small pieces.” While Korea was the main country where the military recruited girls, women from China, the Pacific islands and South East Asia were also victims.

The crime committed against comfort women is horrific, and the attention surrounding the issue only amplifies the lack of justice regarding Japan’s conquests. Unlike the German war crime tribunals, there was little participation of victim countries in the Japanese ones, as these tribunals largely focused on grievances against the West. Many neighboring countries believe that Japan has not properly accepted and acknowledged its wartime guilt. This is only strengthened by some Japanese politicians arguing that comfort women were necessary (in order to maintain troop morale and discipline during the war) and continuing to visit the Shinto Yakesuni shrine, which many see as a symbol of Japanese militarism. With Japan led by nationalist Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who is intent on strengthening Japan’s military and endorsing textbooks that reduce the extent of Japanese war crimes, tensions between Korea and Japan have increased in the past few years—and comfort women have become the crucial point of tension.

The recent deal between both sides is the most progress made in recent history. The last time the Japanese government made an apology was in the 1993 Kono Statement, which was issued by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono. However, Japanese conservatives rejected the statement, making the move seem insincere. Since then, conservatives have made further affronts regarding the issue; for example, Shinzo Abe has long attempted to reduce the significance of the victims’ claims and even to pass a resolution in 2007 suggesting that there was no proof of coercion (playing into the far-right narrative that comfort women were prostitutes). However, after both sides made the recent deal public, Prime Minister Abe called President Park and offered Japan’s “sincere apologies and remorse from the bottom of his heart.” (It is important to note that Japan only apologized to Korea despite the fact that the women originated from all across Asia.) Both sides clearly want to improve economic and security relations, especially concerning North Korea and the rise of China.

While the governments have settled this issue, it does not mean that it is buried in the dustbin of history. In order to be resolved, the people of both countries must also agree to the compromise. Unfortunately, that does not seem to be the case; a day after the announcement of the deal, protests began in front of the Japanese embassy. Some of the surviving Korean victims are voicing fierce objections to the deal, which they say is insincere (since the Japanese government has not admitted legal responsibility) and invalid (because they were not aware of the negotiation proceedings). Furthermore, the opposition party leader Moon Jae-in stated “the deal amounts to a treaty in which the people’s rights are surrendered.”

Complicating the issue further, the Japanese government conditioned their funding on the removal of a bronze statue of a comfort woman sitting in front of their embassy in Seoul. With 7 in 10 Koreans against the removal of the statue and a civic group pledging to erect additional statues, this condition is becoming a major point of contention. President Park came on national television to ask for the country to understand the need for compromise, but it seems that the issue has only been inflamed.

The significance of this deal goes beyond the South Korea-Japan bilateral relationship. It sets a precedent for other countries such as the Philippines and China to levy similar requests. It may also signal a serious attempt by the Abe government to finally resolve war grievances at the inter-governmental level. Geopolitically, it demonstrates Japan’s attempt to repair its image in East Asia amidst plans of militarization and a more assertive foreign policy. For South Korea, it is an attempt to mend a crucial relationship and deflect concerns in Tokyo and Washington, DC that Seoul is drifting into the arms of China. Seoul’s interests lie with developing a closer relationship with Beijing; China is their largest trading partner and wields the most influence in North Korea, the South’s greatest security challenge. Yet through the US alliance system, South Korea’s security partner in the local region is Japan, and DC is most likely pressuring both governments to cooperate in light of China’s rise.

The next few months will be a crucial test to determine if Seoul and Tokyo can use this deal as a vehicle to repair a strained relationship. The number of living victims is decreasing rapidly, and intensifying protests and a tug-of-war relationship between China, South Korea and Japan make 2016 a crucial year to see if compromise will be sustained.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin once remarked, “Sometimes it is necessary to be lonely in order to prove that you are right.” Putin has not shied away from unilateral action and is proving to be a calculating realist leader who is readily attempting to increase Russia’s power. The most notable example was his successful annexation of Crimea and destabilization of an anti-Russian, pro-West Ukrainian government to the benefit of his domestic popularity and Russian strategic posture. Russia did lose global popularity, but the incident confirms Putin’s preference for realist considerations of relative power over neo-liberal concerns of interconnectedness and positive foreign relations, which he unabashedly sacrifices. He is at it again by intervening in Syria, currently in its fourth year of a bloody civil war.

After Russia’s parliament unanimously approved of further military action in Syria, Moscow has dramatically increased its military presence in the Mediterranean base of Tartus, which they lease from Syria, and began airstrikes against ISIS as well as US-friendly rebel groups. Russia is laying the groundwork for a major Russian intervention despite the vehement opposition of the US and Europe. Their strategic move in the area maintains Moscow’s regional relevance and tilts the Middle East back in their favor geopolitically. Putin recognizes that winning the Syrian Civil War means winning the region.

Firstly, in order to establish Russia’s interest in the region, we need to look at the historic and long valued Russian-Syrian strategic relationship going back to the 1950s. Syria was ruled by a socialist (and nationalist) Ba’ath party that required assistance in governing a state in a volatile region. The Soviet Union was more than willing to step in, and the strategic relationship has been a match made in heaven since then, eventually including cultural exchanges and international marriages. When it comes to direct national security interests, Russia’s only base in the Mediterranean is in Syria, making it the lynchpin of Russia’s regional military and economic power projection, and of achieving Putin’s ambitions to increase Russia’s global clout. Additionally, amidst the political instability and many powerful non-state actors in the Middle East, the Assad regime provides critical regional intelligence to Moscow. This partnership has historically been the counterweight to the US and Israeli Mossad’s relationship.

Secondly, Russia’s involvement in the region is an extension of their national security interests; namely, ISIS and similar extremist organizations (e.g. Al-Nusra Front) are seen as a major threat to Russian stability. More than 2000 Russians have joined ISIS thus far and on October 31, a Russian airliner flying from the Sinai Peninsula was brought down by an ISIS bomb. Unlike the US, which is insulated by distance and two oceans, Russia’s southern border is relatively close to the region and the risk of an ISIS attack on their territory is higher. ISIS has exemplified their ability to launch terrorist attacks in the recent Paris attacks, there are videos threatening more impending attacks in Russia and there is a homegrown Islamic separatist movement in Chechnya, where many terrorist plots trace their roots. With these strategic interests in mind, Russia has wielded its veto power in the United Nations Security Council to prevent any UN-sponsored intervention or condemnation of the Assad regime—a crucial ally and partner in the fight against Islamic extremism. They have also continued their decades-long practice of supplying weapons to Damascus in order to equip Assad’s Army to effectively fight extremists and rebels, despite criticism that the arms are also being used to commit human rights violations. Now with the situation on the ground becoming more perilous and tense, direct military involvement is a natural escalation of Russia’s involvement in the region.

In addition to simply maintaining historical interests and security, Putin likely sees intervention in Syria as an open door to extend Russia’s reach and influence. There is a hegemonic vacuum in Syria: no major power is doing anything particularly meaningful to change the situation on the ground. The US is engaging in airstrikes, dropping ammunition relatively haphazardly (amid reports of not properly vetting the recipient organizations) and training rebels with very limited results. On the other hand, Russia’s air strikes, missile launches and artillery barrages are coordinated with a ground offensive composed of the actions of the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF), Hezbollah and Iran, which has reportedly led to initial success. There is no doubt that ISIS and the various rebel groups are powerful, but it is hard to imagine them winning a direct confrontation against a Russian-backed, three-pronged attack by the SAF, Hamas and Iran. What makes Russian operations easier is that they have a clear strategic goal: defend Assad and defeat both rebel groups and the Islamic State. On the other hand, the United States is in the strategic quandary of balancing opposition to Assad and opposition to ISIS. Since defeating one necessarily strengthens the position of the other, a substantial US intervention is unlikely.

Given the lack of meaningful opposition to Russian-backed forces in Syria (excluding rebel groups and ISIS), it is critical to consider the scenario of a pro-Assad victory and what it means for the region. Islamic State administers the area east of Damascus all the way to central Iraq as an internationally unrecognized country.

This gives the Russian-backed forces the ability to operate freely in the northern Middle East without the headaches of breaking international law regarding the infringement of state sovereignty. To add, Russia has token legitimacy—they even have the approval of the Iraqi government to intervene in what used to be their northern territories. A victorious Assad and Hamas backed by Russia would only have Kurdish and Iraqi forces as competitors in the area. While the Kurds are formidable, they do not have a recognized state, no regional allies and only the distant US to provide them with inconsistent aid. The Iraqi military has proven impotent and their government, headed by Prime Minister al-Abadi, has drifted away from US influence and is increasingly prone to co-option by Iran.

An Assad victory and the defeat of ISIS in conjunction with stronger Iranian influence in Baghdad would mean a potential Shia corridor in the central Middle East region. Russia would benefit at the very least by seeing the region swing further away from the US, which historically sides with Sunnis. Given a more generous victory, the Russian Federation has the potential and the ability to extensively shape the region in any post-war settlement through proxies – similar to their influence in central Asia and Eastern European states like Belarus – and in turn benefit from the northern corridor of Middle Eastern oil. Russian conglomerates like Gazprom and Lukoil already have operations in Iraq and Iran. With their alliance with Iran and Syria, along with a teetering and vulnerable Iraq, Russia can create a strong connected bloc of friendly nations. This is assuming, of course, that they win the Syrian Civil war and that the United States continues to maintain a relatively aloof strategic posture.

Russian involvement in the Syrian war marks the first overt Russian military campaign outside of the former USSR in 36 years. It is not a haphazard move, but rather a bold and calculated gamble with potentially large, long-term rewards. Putin is not simply interested in maintaining the status quo; he wants to expand Russian influence and strength by capitalizing on the relative apathy of the US and NATO. If successful, Putin may prove to the world that strong and calculated unilateral moves can serve an effective foreign policy strategy, even if they make Russia lonely.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Though we are well into the 21st century, the infrastructure and design of most of the world’s cities still reflect the zeitgeist of 20th century modernist urban planning. Urban planning is struggling to keep up with the new, progressive values of sustainability, livability and inner-city revival. But in South Korea, the Island of Palm Trees, Songdo, has hopes of becoming the 21st century model of a hyper-modern city, and the major economic center of North East Asia. Located on reclaimed land from the Yellow Sea – about 2 hours from Seoul proper – Songdo is a planned city less than 10 years old. If successful, it may be the first of many new 21st century cities that can achieve economic development, sustainability and livability for its residents.

Songdo is the physical embodiment of the tenants of globalization, free market capitalism and privatization that frame the global economic ideology. At 13,100 acres, it is the largest private real estate project in the world ($35 billion), with the majority stake owned by Gale International, a major New York-based real estate firm. Private interests, namely Gale International and POSCO Construction and Engineering (a domestic conglomerate), enjoy unprecedented power over Songdo’s design, with the government playing only a small role. Following the reasoning of free market efficiency, the Korean government entrusted the private sector to accomplish the project with cost-effective design and construction; it is this neoliberal feature that sets Songdo apart from a project like the world-renowned Palm Islands in the United Arab Emirates, which were constructed and operated by a government-owned conglomerate and are now on stall (and purportedly sinking into the ocean) due to financial mismanagement.

After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis – which was blamed on excessive government involvement in tandem with overleveraged conglomerates (Chaebol) – the South Korean government looked toward Songdo to help reclaim lost national prestige by augmenting the country’s role as a major trade hub. While constructing a city from no pre-existing foundation (save a few fishing villages) came with major risks, many factors made this project attractive for private development. With North East Asia’s total combined population of 1.5 billion, one of the world’s best airports, Incheon International Airport, merely 15 minutes away and the fifth best container port, the Port of Pusan, a 30 minute flight away on the southern coast, Songdo is strategically located for an international economic hub. Some even dub it an “aerotropolis” given its proximity to other major centers of trade.

To cultivate a truly free market environment, the government has applied the lessons learned from the successful free trade zone projects across East Asia (eg. Pusan, Shenzhen) and put into place incredibly generous tax exemptions and very light regulations on land use and labor. In line with neoliberal thought, the government’s day-to-day role is limited to providing public goods, which the private market has limited incentive to offer. The government has partnered with private entities and subsidized the creation of new schools and hospitals, and has built government service buildings (e.g. immigration offices) that cater to foreigners.

With a state-of-the-art Songdo School District, top companies like POSCO and Cisco, and several university campuses (e.g. Yonsei and New York State University), the city is poised for rapid growth by attracting a broad range of people: families, young employees and college students. Due to cognizant planning, Songdo was built with the anticipation for growth and expansion. It has multiple layers of smart and sustainable infrastructure that meet the demands of the present and the future. The whole city is LEED certified thanks to its environmentally friendly construction and efficient design features, including a central pneumatic waste disposal system that can accommodate sudden spikes in demand and eliminates the need for garbage pickup. The area uses 20% less water and 14% less electricity than a typical city of a similar size. To manage traffic and growth, the city has 6 major subway stations, an extensive bus system and bike lanes that connect to the rest of South Korea.

But the city is not just a machine of efficiency; civil engineers have also ensured that the city is livable by boosting aesthetic beauty and amenities. These features are critical in preventing the urban decay and flight from city centers that characterize many mature cities such as New Delhi and Pittsburgh that are purely concerned with economic growth at the expense of livability and provision of public amenities. Parks and green areas take up 40% of the ground space, masking Songdo’s density. This is possible because the city is populated exclusively by high-rise and apartment towers, achieving vertical density while limiting the horizontal area. Right in the center of the city is Central Park (inspired by New York) with a long canal (inspired by Venice), where residents can bike, canoe and hike among other activities. Deer and rabbits graze while classical music plays in the background, creating a tranquil oasis surrounded by metropolis. Architecturally the city center is inspired. The crown jewel of Songdo is the 68 story Northeast Trade Tower, the tallest building in South Korea (1001 feet). It is composed of triangular glass planes and symbolizes the modernity of Songdo and Korea.

Songdo is an unprecedented neo-liberal economic experiment that has already become a success. As a smart, compact city, it has strong economic growth potential, well-planned infrastructure and innovative architectural designs. The city reconciles the need for economic growth with the need for city livability and sustainability, ultimately proving that private urban planning can strike a balance. This is particularly crucial given the expansion of cities and construction of new urban spaces all across the developing world, especially in China and India. Songdo’s free market atmosphere and investments in city livability and sustainability attract businesses and people, inadvertently competing against neighboring cities such as Shanghai and Tianjin. Could it be that Songdo is ushering in an era of city competition, where governments and companies strive to build international hubs that attract human capital, investment, and trade? If so, Songdo is blessed with a very advantageous location, as well as a significant head start.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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