“Their world is crumbling. Ours is being built.”  The vice-president of France’s far-right, populist Front National (FN) party tweeted this message on November 9, as Donald Trump’s victory became evident. The FN’s prominence in the upcoming French presidential election poses yet another threat to the globalized, liberal world order which has recently endured two successive blows: Brexit and the election of President Trump. If the FN’s candidate, Marine Le Pen, becomes the next French president, that will be a third strike with immediate consequences for the European Union, and far-reaching effects for the world.

The French presidential race is heating up; all major political parties have selected their final candidates. Les Républicains (the conservative, center-right party) have chosen François Fillon. The FN’s unopposed candidate is Marine Le Pen. Current President Hollande’s ailing Socialistes swung left in primaries with the victory of candidate Benoît Hamon. Emmanuel Macron, former economy minister in President Hollande’s government, has launched an independent campaign promoting center-left principles. Finally, Jean-Luc Mélenchon will run as the candidate for the Communist party.

Similarities have emerged between the U.S. election cycle and the French campaigns. Marine Le Pen is the clear analogue to Donald Trump. Le Pen’s FN is a party of “France-first” isolationists and populists who feed on fears about immigration and the “islamization” of France. Though the Républicain François Fillon has many important differences from Hillary Clinton, both can be portrayed as the politically experienced “insider” candidate as well as reasonably centrist picks. Rather like Clinton, Fillon may be brought down by a scandal his campaign cannot shake – an allegation that Fillon’s wife Penelope did no real work while drawing an official salary as Fillon’s parliamentary assistant. The “Penelopegate” scandal threatens to ruin Fillon’s chances, damaging his anti-corruption reputation and challenging his small-government platform.

If Fillon’s scandal brings down his campaign, it will be up to either a candidate from the left or the independent Macron to counter Le Pen. Le Pen is widely expected to make it through the first round of elections in April, so the real challenge will occur during the runoff. The French presidential election occurs in two rounds, with the second round functioning as a runoff between the two candidates with the highest percentages of the vote from the first round.

The run-off mechanism is a useful structure. It allows voters to make their voice heard in the first round, but then cast a vote “against” one candidate rather than “for” the other in the second round to block a candidate viewed as unsuitable. The time between the two elections allows political leaders to rally their electorates to do just that. For example in 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine Le Pen’s father and former head of the FN, captured enough votes to make it to the second round of voting against conservative Jacques Chirac. Massive popular protests followed, and socialists and conservatives rallied together to defeat Le Pen in a historic landslide. Chirac was elected with over 82% of the vote.

The best initial hope was that something similar would occur this year; that whether Fillon, Macron, Hamon, or Mélenchon was left standing to counter Le Pen, all the candidates’ former supporters would rally together to elect anyone but Le Pen. However, Emmanuel Macron’s unprecedented success as an independent candidate has redefined the story of this election cycle. Macron has combined economic reformism, social liberalism, and–perhaps most importantly–personal dynamism while on the campaign trail.

In an election cycle where electing someone, anyone other than Le Pen was thought to be the best case scenario, Macron has introduced an “outsider” political movement that is not based on fear and exclusion. Practically, Macron as President could invigorate the French economy, promote tolerance for immigrants in France, and strengthen the European Union. Symbolically, Macron suggests something even more important: that a centrist political movement might inspire the public and win. If Macron succeeds, he will have proven that the popular movement is not only a tool of the far right.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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The powerhouse economy of Europe. The de facto leader of the European Union. The champion of human rights and freedom of movement. And now – perhaps the last line of defense for Western liberal democracy against populism, nationalism and isolationism.

The election of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, following on the heels of the U.K.’s vote to depart the European Union, is a threat to the U.S.-led project of peace, democracy and free trade that has united North America and Europe since 1945. If campaign promises are to be believed, the Trump presidency will bring a sea change in American leadership, trade policy, commitment to NATO, support for the European Union, and counterbalancing of Russia. Meanwhile, the U.K. has chosen to leave the E.U. and will be ensnared in domestic politics and the negotiating of new trade deals for some time. Finally, key European countries like France and the Netherlands are in jeopardy, with their own upcoming presidential elections and burgeoning right-wing populist parties freshly heartened by Trump’s victory.

The last great defender of liberal democracy may be in Germany, where Chancellor Angela Merkel has recently confirmed that she will seek a fourth term in office. Chancellor Merkel, who has already held the position for 11 years, is the anti-Trump. Merkel’s most common descriptors include ego-less, analytical and pragmatic. She is, notably, the first female Chancellor of Germany. As the steadiest and longest-serving leader in Europe today, she has steered Germany to political centrism, economic prosperity and a role as the unofficial (and sometimes reluctant) leader of the EU.

Outlets including The New York Times and The Economist have entertained the idea that Chancellor Merkel must now take on the liberal democratic leadership role the U.S. is shedding. But Merkel is a cautious, methodical leader more than a visionary or norm-shaper. Though Germany has filled a leadership void in the EU, Merkel tends to focus on Germany’s political interests, and cannot always translate German strength into European strength. Germany’s checkered historical memory also means that German politicians and the public alike prefer restrained politics and cautious national leadership. Chancellor Merkel herself called the idea that she must take over as leader of the free world, “grotesque and even absurd.”

Germany’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis is one instance in which Chancellor Merkel has pushed beyond cautious, middle-of-the-road politics. She showed herself to be a valiant defender of the principles of democracy and human rights by presideding over the most open refugee policy in Europe, admitting more than one million people seeking asylum over the last 2 years. This decision was out of character for Merkel, who tends to carefully adjust policy to match public opinion, avoiding extremes and always looking to compromise. Merkel’s refugee policy undoubtedly cost her considerable political capital: losses for her party, the Christian Democrats (CDU), in the 2016 state elections, as well as a decreasing approval rating. But in many ways the handling of the Syrian refugee crisis was Chancellor Merkel’s finest moment. She found an issue important enough to use the political capital and expertise accumulated over a decade of more cautious policies in office. Looking back, Merkel’s statements fit her doors-open policy; for example, in a 2007 speech to European Parliament, she declared, “The heart and soul of Europe is tolerance.” Perhaps the refugee crisis allowed Merkel to turn long-held beliefs into policy.

Just after Donald Trump’s election, many world leaders began to publish statements congratulating the controversial president-elect. Unlike most world leaders, Chancellor Merkel chose to carefully set ground rules for future cooperation in her statement. Merkel declared Germany and America “bound by common values” including the “dignity of each and every person,” and offered her cooperation “based on these values.” This word choice constituted a subtle warning to the president-elect, a reminder that Germany values and protects human rights, and that any policy challenging these values could have consequences for the U.S.-German alliance.

It is far from certain whether Chancellor Merkel has the interest or the ability to take a more active role as the last effective, centrist, liberal democratic leader. But her ability to take a stand against demagoguery and fear is a good sign.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Britain is gearing up for a historic referendum that will determine whether it remains a member of the European Union. Prime Minister David Cameron is in a tricky spot: he must please Eurosceptics in his party with a tough, Britain-first stance, but as a politician who campaigned on economic revitalization, he recognizes the critical economic benefits of EU membership. Cameron has worked to balance these opposing concerns by promising to “renegotiate” Britain’s membership in the European Union.

The Prime Minister outlined his points for this renegotiation in a letter sent to the EU on November 10. Cameron has four main demands: 1) maintain a single market with no favoring of the Eurozone over countries like Britain that have kept independent currencies; 2) cut excessive business regulation and “red tape”; 3) allow Britain to opt out from language in the EU charter that envisions an “ever closer union” (and has been interpreted as a threat to UK sovereignty); and 4) reform intra-EU immigration.

The first three demands can be resolved; the economic goals are in line with current EU policy, and the “ever closer union” rhetoric is largely symbolic. For Cameron, opting out from “ever closer union” just serves as a nod to right-leaning, independence-craving Britons. However, the last point, on reforming immigration between EU countries, will be deeply problematic. Although Cameron did not demand one particular policy, he suggested a four-year delay before UK social benefits could be offered to immigrants arriving from other EU countries. A policy like this is totally incompatible with European law that protects freedom of movement and guarantees equal treatment for all EU citizens in all EU countries. But without some concession from the EU on migration policy, Cameron’s renegotiation points may not be enough to appease right wing, Brexit-leaning voters.

The right-wing case for a Brexit is largely tied to immigration and the rise of the UKIP party in Britain. In particular, it is emotionally linked to the stress of large numbers of refugees flowing out of the Middle East, particularly Syria, and the perceived security risk of high migration. Britain already has an opt-out on EU asylum policy, so leaving the EU would make little practical difference—Britain already has domestic control of immigration policy for non-EU migrants including refugees. However, the EU’s freedom of movement between member countries has caused large populations of mainly Eastern European workers to move west, into the UK in some cases. Many Britons see leaving the EU as a way to secure national borders and decrease overall rates of immigration.

It is difficult to envision a solution on the immigration question that accomplishes these goals and is simultaneously permissible under EU law. This is where David Cameron’s challenge lies: to convince hesitant Conservative voters to remain in the EU, despite the reality that EU freedom of movement does not have much room for renegotiation.

So why is Cameron even fighting to remain in the European Union? The economic reality for Britain is that EU membership is critical. Britain exports about 45% of its goods to the EU, enjoying open market access (no tariffs) in doing so. Furthermore, Britain has developed a significant current account deficit—meaning it imports more goods than it exports. Such a deficit is paid for by foreign capital investment, which is incentivized by the strength of the British pound. This precarious position could be shaken by a Brexit, which would cause economic turmoil in Britain, specifically a loss of confidence in the British currency and a downturn or recession as the economy transitions. As foreign investors move their investments elsewhere, Britain could face a substantial monetary crisis in tandem with an economic downturn.

Brexit and free market supporters have argued that an independent Britain could separately negotiate its own trade deals with the EU, the US and other major global players such as China. However, it is unlikely that the much smaller British economy would be able to negotiate as well as the EU powerhouse. The result would be far greater barriers to trade (particularly with the EU, which would not give Britain the best terms following an unceremonious British flight) and further economic downturn. In other words, the costs of Brexit would be high – economically and monetarily. Because Cameron is a Prime Minister who ran on the platform of sound economic management – and thus is looking for solid economic growth – such a result is unacceptable.

Impassioned debates over economic policy and immigration will tie up Cameron and Britain until the referendum at the very least. But as Britons spend their time debating the merits of EU membership, other European countries are leaning in. As Cameron seeks to limit social benefits for European migrants, Germany’s Angela Merkel has yet to set a cap on the number of refugees and migrants flowing in from the Middle East to her country. Germany has been a key player in EU politics without losing out as Europe’s economic powerhouse. Its continued leadership in the EU, including an impressive moral leadership on the migrant crisis, stands in stark contrast to Britain’s isolationism.

The European Union is not a competition among member states, but Prime Minister Cameron should recognize that Britain’s isolationist bent has costs. Britain’s domestic disputes reduce British leadership in the EU and on the world stage—a weaker position from which to make foreign policy. For his country’s sake, Cameron should have the referendum sooner rather than later and campaign hard to secure the “no” vote. Reticence and isolation from Europe in a globalized world is impractical both economically and politically. It is time for Cameron to switch tactics and become a leader rather than an appeaser.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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On Monday, September 28, Russian President Putin spoke before the UN General Assembly in New York for the first time in a decade. Putin outlined Russia’s plan for reintegration into the global community. In one word: Syria. By taking a much more interventionist role in the Middle East, Putin hopes to usurp the United States as the key world power in the region, prove Russia’s might and foreign policy prowess, and stage a rapprochement with the Western powers that have isolated the country in response to the conflict in Crimea. But Putin’s speech is best understood when compared to his previous statements on the international stage—particularly his famously bellicose speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007. Putin’s worldview, as expressed in these two speeches, is one in which power is a zero-sum game between the US and Russia. Additionally, Putin demonstrates a self-contradicting respect for international rule of law principles. Finally, Putin has long expressed and is now prepared to act on plans to redefine Russia as an effective and involved power on the world stage. The rest of the world will need to respond to this interventionist Russia, and understanding Putin’s worldview is the first step to formulating effective policy and engaging in sensible dialogue with Russia.

At the Munich security conference, Putin openly criticized the United States and its superpower status, saying, “What is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it…is (a) world in which there is one master, one sovereign.” Putin continued, directly calling out the US, “One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way.” Putin’s recent speech at the UN contained similar, though slightly more veiled lines, such as, “After the end of the Cold War…a single center of domination emerged in the world…those who found themselves at the top of the pyramid were tempted to think that if they were strong and exceptional, they knew better.” Both speeches end with Putin offering up Russia as a partner to the international community and an alternative to US hegemony.

These lines clearly reveal a mentality of conflict between Russia and the US, but they also show that Putin considers world power as a zero-sum game between the US and everyone else. In Putin’s world, the US must give up its domineering exceptionalism and others – particularly Russia – must take back their influence. Other countries cannot grow in a unipolar world; the United States must step back for others to move forward. Putin presents this as a path to a better, more just world order.

One of the most surprising elements in Putin’s speeches is his self-contradicting respect for the United Nation’s rule of law, particularly his regard for the concept of state sovereignty. Putin sees the UN as a rules-based forum that upholds the rights of nation-states and stabilizes the international system. In 2007, Putin lamented that, “We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law,” and emphasized, “The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN.” He specifically defined state sovereignty in 2015 as, “freedom and the right to choose freely one’s own future for every person, nation and state.” He has continuously condemned the US’s invasion of Iraq as an illegal circumvention of the UN, an unjustifiable violation of state sovereignty and an affront to international law and order. Putin also contends that breaching state sovereignty in the Middle East, from Iraq to Syria to Libya, has created a power vacuum in which terrorism has grown unchecked; he therefore supports the Assad regime as the only legal partner in combating the Islamic State in Syria.

However, Putin’s discussion of the importance of legitimate states stands in stark contrast to Russia’s incursion into Ukraine. Putin gets around this hypocrisy by claiming that the overthrow of the Yanukovych government was sponsored by the US, and that the current Ukrainian government is not “legitimate.” This argument, if Putin truly believes it, may explain how he hails sovereignty while (in Western eyes) outright violating it in eastern Ukraine. It is clear is that the US and NATO definition of sovereignty may not match Putin’s concept of legitimate states. In Ukraine, Putin favors the right to self-determination, while the US supports the central state regime. In Syria, the roles are flipped. These disparities will not be easily bridged, which is why Putin has taken on a new project in the Middle East.

Putin’s recent speech focused on Syria and the threat of Middle Eastern terrorism, positioning Russia as an interventionist global player. This is a complete departure from Munich, where most of his lecture focused on nuclear disarmament. Putin called for a “genuinely broad international coalition against terrorism,” and offered Russia as an alternative leader for a better Middle East. He has matched his words with controversial action—commissioning air strikes in Syria and selling a missile defense system to Iran. Russia is finally wading into the quagmire that Putin claims has been created by poor US policy and unilateral military action.

By taking on Syria, Putin has seized upon an issue that will garner attention and reverse Russia’s increasing isolation from the West. He has cunningly referenced the refugee crisis that has hit Western Europe hard, contending that with peace and security in the Middle East, “there would be no need for new refugee camps.” Russian involvement in the Middle East both counters US influence in the region and gets Russia global attention—perhaps even cooperation from Western European leaders that have iced the country out. However, Putin is taking a grave risk; as the US has learned, extracting your county from the Middle East is easier said than done. Russia should also not overlook Assad’s atrocities against his own people and must be reminded of the realities of the regime that they support.

Putin’s speeches at Munich and in New York reaffirmed that he has a distinct vision of the international system as unjustly unipolar, in addition to a complex but genuine respect for the rule of law and state sovereignty. Putin frequently offers Russia as an alternative global leader to the US, and his speech in New York outlined his plan to exercise Russian influence in the Middle East. Putin hopes to gain international approval for Russia’s plans for Syria, and at the very least, prove that Russia is undeniably relevant and cannot be isolated or ignored. Whether Putin’s plans will self-destruct in Syria remains to be seen, but the US and their Western European allies need to consider how they will respond to Russian power in the Middle East—while maintaining a firm stance on Ukraine.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Years of legal and regulatory battles, protests pitting environmentalists against “Big Oil” and over $7 billion spent – and just a month and a half after receiving final drilling permits – Shell announced its intention to pack up its Arctic oil exploration project and go home. Shell’s controversial Arctic project exemplified the American debate between environmental protection and economic development in the Arctic for years. This ending, a dry well and a hasty withdrawal, is an anticlimax. But the conclusion of Shell’s Arctic adventure is also indicative of the ways in which the economic and geopolitical significance of the Arctic has been overhyped and misunderstood.

Shell’s departure from the northern coast of Alaska leaves just two operational Arctic oil projects: BP’s longstanding Prudhoe Bay field and Gazprom’s Prirazlomnoye rig. Prudhoe Bay produces around 84 million barrels of oil per year (about 240,000 barrels each day), while Gazprom’s rig is projected to reach peak production levels of 126,000 barrels per day. Compare these figures to the world’s gargantuan demand for oil, which clocks in at 93 million barrels per day, and it becomes evident that Arctic oil is less than pivotal in the global energy market.

However, the Arctic has been heralded as a critical new region in geopolitics—combining large resource endowments with security and intelligence buildup and a dash of Cold War-esque rivalry between the United States and Russia. There is data indicating the Arctic’s huge economic potential: the United States Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic holds about 22% of the world’s undiscovered oil and natural gas resources, or about 412 billion barrels of oil equivalent. These resources could be worth up to $17 trillion, a figure about equal to the entire US economy. The hypothesis has been that Arctic countries (Norway, the US and Russia especially) will embark on large oil and natural gas extraction projects—especially as climate change has melted once-impenetrable layers of ice, making vast new oil and natural gas reserves more accessible.

The theory continues that competition for valuable Arctic offshore resources and demand for more infrastructure within the region will induce a military and security buildup. Political rivalries will cause international military presence to explode into an Arctic arms race as countries try to match and then outmatch each other’s forces. There has been increased Arctic military and intelligence investment, pushed most aggressively by Russian buildup. The most striking example of Arctic militarism so far was Russia’s massive 40,000-man, 5-day military exercise in their Arctic territories in March 2015. Security upgrades should occur predominately because of the economic potential of the Arctic; however, the economic consequence of the Arctic has so far been slight. Any activity in the region, where it is not simply correcting a previous lack of attention and investment, may be mostly a matter of competition between countries. For example, Russia’s recent Arctic military exercises were partly in response to Norway-led Arctic Challenge exercises that included several NATO countries alongside nonaligned Finland and Sweden. Russia’s fear of an expansionist NATO thus probably led to its show of strength in the Arctic more than any practical, economic rationale. Projects like Gazprom’s Arctic rig underscore the politicking that influences Arctic projects—the rig has been hyper-nationalized and advertised as a national achievement in a way that vastly over exaggerates its actual economic and technologic value.

The Arctic’s final identity is its vulnerability as one of the most ecologically sensitive regions in the world. It has been significantly affected by substantial glacial melt caused by climate change, and could face serious environmental damage from oil exploration and increased military presence. Drilling in the Arctic Ocean is a point of particular concern for environmentalists because of the bleak prospects for containing and cleaning up any oil spills. Countries like the US lack the physical capabilities and technological know-how needed to effectively patrol the Arctic and respond to accidents. Furthermore, the oil and natural gas reserves that the Arctic contains will of course release carbon emissions as they are used for energy. The Arctic thus contains the seeds of its own further ecological destruction.

The debate around future prospects for the American Arctic has been environmental protection versus economic interest.  President Obama was harshly criticized by environmental groups as hypocritical for approving Shell’s drilling licenses while preaching climate protectionism. Whether fossil fuel resources in Alaska should be developed at all has been hotly disputed, pitting US, and especially Alaskan, economic interests against environmental concerns.

The Shell case may be a turning point for more realistically defining the future role of the Arctic because it demonstrates that its economic potential is not as simple as promising geological surveys have made it seem. The recent steep decline of oil prices makes investing in large exploratory missions more difficult and less attractive for oil companies. Arctic projects are long-range, requiring at least ten years from exploration to oil production for the market, and tend to be very expensive, demanding large up-front investments in technology and equipment. Profitability hinges on the unpredictable future price of oil and the size of any finds. A strict regulatory environment, extreme technological and safety challenges, and widespread environmentalist opposition further dissuades projects that might be undertaken, especially those from the US. (Sanctions against Russia, imposed because of the conflict in Ukraine, have similarly stalled Russian projects.) In a very real way, all eyes have been on Shell; their success or failure would help determine the economic future of the Arctic. Their project has ended as a failure with a significant financial and public-relations price tag.

The emerging role of the Arctic in geopolitics should be evaluated more carefully in light of Shell’s departure from Arctic oil exploration. The Arctic’s purportedly vast natural resources have proven less profitable and more politically risky to retrieve than international relations analysts have predicted—to the extent that oil companies are staying out of the Arctic oil game. Without real economic incentives, the political importance of the Arctic becomes more uncertain. Predictions that Arctic shipping routes would become more widely used and economically critical also fell short, with shipping traffic declining in 2014. The same problems with lack of capability and technology affect these shipping routes as well. Although a security buildup will likely continue, without a pressing need to protect valuable economic interests, these investments are more related to rivalries between nations, especially those fueled by Russian nationalism. It may in fact be that the key identity of the Arctic is its environmental insecurity in the face of climate change—a proven issue that needs attention and practicable solutions from the entire world’s carbon emitters.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Venezuela’s recent downward spiral illustrates the profound economic and political effects oil price fluctuations have on the world’s oil-producing countries. Venezuela’s economic crisis continues to go from bad to worse. The Venezuelan Bolivarian socialist economy has collapsed from a fatal collision of low oil prices and poor economic policy. The result is economic chaos, from rampant inflation to import fraud to shortages of basic consumer necessities. As the economy plummets, political unrest builds in Venezuela.

Current president Nicolas Maduro, Hugo Chavez’s handpicked successor, has sought to continue the Chavez socialist dream and align himself squarely with the revolutionary leader’s popularity and charisma. However, as falling oil prices have made government spending (especially spending on major social programs) unsustainable and destroyed the economy, Maduro has been confronted with the failure of his political vision. He has turned to attacks on political opposition to appear strong and United States-bashing and conspiracy theories to distract his people—for example, claiming that, “there’s a world campaign against Venezuela.” Recovery for Venezuela will not come easily or at all as long as sound economic policy comes second to rhetoric, and the nation’s economic and political instability will have implications for both South America and the United States’ interests in the region.

The drop in oil prices dented the economies of many oil-producing countries around the world and had an especially significant effect on highly oil-dependent economies like Venezuela. Oil is Venezuela’s economy—Venezuela’s petroleum revenues account for about 50% of the country’s GDP and contribute more than 95% of the country’s hard currency income. It has been estimated that President Maduro’s government will require oil prices of about $117 a barrel in 2015 just to break even with government spending. As oil prices hover around $60, the economy faces a fiscal chasm.

The revenue-budget gap has been made much, much worse by historically poor economic policy. For example, strict currency controls (including an overvalued, three-tiered dollar-to-bolivar exchange rate) along with a heavily import-reliant economy have fueled a raging currency black market, incentivized fraudulent imports and created shortages of essential consumer goods like food and medicine. These extreme shortages have been created by several factors including a lack of diversified domestic production, price controls and scarce funds with which to pay for imports. The scarceness of consumer goods has truly brought the economic crisis home for ordinary Venezuelans who frequently must do without or wait in extremely long shopping lines. In February, Venezuelan officials at last announced and began to implement a plan to tackle one major political roadblock and retool currency controls—but this change may well be too little, too late.

Meanwhile, the economic crash has evolved into political instability, with massive street protests rocking Caracas since February 2014. Protestors, mainly students, have focused on social and economic problems like the collapsing economy and shortages of basic necessities. Although protest-associated violence seems to have peaked in early 2014, the causes of Venezuelan instability have not been addressed; Venezuela’s economy remains dire, Maduro’s approval ratings are around 25%, and the fairly recent imprisonment of well-known opposition leaders such as the mayor of Caracas has amplified public outrage. Smaller protests and demonstrations continue to occur and the country teeters on the brink of fresh unrest, while political opposition groups and leaders remain highly visible and vocal. Maduro does not fully control the media or public political debate, and will likely continue to face noisy opposition and low approval ratings.

Distract, deny and blame has been Maduro’s chosen response to political upheaval—Maduro has become a bit of a conspiracy theorist, claiming that the imperialist US government is plotting a coup against him, creating artificial instability and threatening Venezuela’s statehood. The Obama administration’s first major response was a March Executive Order that declared Venezuela a national security threat and placed sanctions on seven Venezuelan officials accused of corruption and violating human rights. Maduro sought to make political hay out of this move via noisily aggrieved measures such as starting a 10-million signature petition drive (to be presented to President Obama at April’s Summit of the Americas) and banning several US diplomats from the country, saying, “They can’t come to Venezuela because they are terrorists”. Such scapegoating techniques have neither significantly improved his domestic approval ratings nor done anything at all to address the real economic, political and social problems Venezuela faces. Meanwhile, Maduro has sought to enhance his personal power, winning expanded decree powers in the name of “anti-imperialism” in the face of supposed US aggression.

Venezuela is in the midst of a storm of economic disaster and political turmoil, made much worse by falling oil prices but inseparable from corruption, deceit and mismanagement in politics. As President Maduro fails to implement substantive political and social reforms or practical solutions to the country’s economic problems, Venezuela will remain a domestically unsteady and destabilizing force in South America. The United States will also remain closely involved as Maduro works to dodge blame and incriminate US “imperialism”, and as the US tries to achieve policy objectives in proximate countries, such as attempting to normalize relations with Cuba. Of all of the world’s petro economies dented by the oil price dive, Venezuela has fallen fastest, loudest and hardest because, in Venezuela, instability runs deeper than oil. President Maduro’s Chavez-socialist policies and interest in building personal power have historically trumped realistic economic policy. Venezuela today combines this problem of governance with collapsed oil prices—economic chaos and political unrest has been and will continue to be the result.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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