Within any government, the allocation of foreign aid gets encumbered by some of the worst bureaucracy and political inanity. Despite comprising just 1% of the federal budget, politicians have expressed a passionate commitment to ensuring that it gets dispersed in accordance with their political leanings and agendas. Historically, however, it has been a large facet of US foreign policy, securing many of the country’s interests outside of development. If we look at a list of countries receiving the most aid, we can quickly discern that there is not a perfect correlation between poverty or need and a country’s position:

Table 1. Top US Foreign Aid Recipients for the 2016 Fiscal Year

Table 2. Poorest Countries by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Based on Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) per Capita

In Table 1, we can detect the underlying pattern: the US has strategic interests in all of the countries listed, especially concerning national security. The countries in Table 2 may have the greatest need, but don’t offer as much political ROI.

Given the current schism around foreign aid, politicians may find potential in a new initiative that would fall within the extant foreign policy goals and demand less direct involvement: increasing Internet penetration in developing countries. This could act as a political, economic and cultural catalyst for change and further the US’ national interest in strategically critical regions of the world.

Combatting disease, curing the sick and protecting the marginalized are of course essential—they concern life and death. However, in looking at the programs seeking to cultivate prosperous economies, foster conditions in which private exchange may occur and flourish, and combat corrupt governments and violence towards civilians, the Internet has thus far been an undervalued foreign policy tool.

Today, only one in three people have access to the Internet, what could now be considered a significant resource. The Internet is a global marketplace, an unparalleled educational platform and so much more. And though its reach is perpetually expanding, the increasing number of people with mobile and tablet devices means it isn’t moving fast enough.

Firstly, the untapped economic potential of the Internet is astounding. Considering that it is a fairly recent development for even the most industrialized economies, the long-term effects of it remain unknown. The World Bank lacks reference to any data prior to 2007. However, many studies suggest that Internet access leads to increased economic development. One study published in the American Economic Review found a direct correlation between an increase in Internet penetration and a country’s trade: for every 10% increase in connectivity, a country sees a 1.7 % increase in exports and 1.1% increase in imports. Those appear small, but they amount to millions, perhaps billions, of dollars in wealth. The return on investment could be far greater now considering the study was done back in 2002 and Internet penetration has grown exponentially.

With maturation, this access has immeasurable implications. Over the past 5 years, the Internet has accounted for 21% of the GDP growth among developed economies. Considering the baseline of these more established economies, developing countries could see far greater growth.

For these countries, this kind of growth stems from access to new information and collective knowledge about new market places and opportunities. Rural farmers receive agricultural data for the first time. People geographically isolated find access to critical resources, such as clinics, shelters and aid. Merchants expand their reach to a global network of consumers. Cyber-connectivity eradicates enormous barriers to economic development: scarcity, lack of infrastructure and marginalization become hindrances, not obstructions.

Colombia, in particular, has taken note of this emerging trend to alleviate poverty. Its government seeks to subsidize a fiber-optics network that spans 96% of its towns and cities, and provides all citizens with cloud storage space. Although ambitious, they’ve seen dramatic results.  According to Diego Molano, Colombia’s minister for information and communications technology, this initiative has helped pull 2.5 million Colombians out of the trenches of poverty. At its genesis, the country had 2.2 million broadband connections; today, it sees numbers as high as 8.8 million, which amounts to 80% of its population.

Aside from the economic development evinced in Colombia’s program, expanding connectivity serves another strategic interest for foreign policy: millions of people become connected for social and political change. One of the greatest threats to corrupt, dictatorial and failed regimes is this kind of communication network. To use a perhaps belabored example: the Arab Spring was a movement that successfully supported a national effort to overthrow a dictatorship. Indeed, the subsequent system may be a tenuous, precarious version of democracy, but people were able to mobilize on a massive scale. Even if social media didn’t catalyze the revolution, it did unequivocally empower the Libyan people in a way that hadn’t been possible ten years before.

And without the extreme example of a national coup d’état, the Internet still allows greater political participation and inevitably increases transparency. Places previously dark to the outside world could share their experiences on the ground and communicate information in real time. How may this have altered the evolution of past genocides or government brutality?

Of course, history has proven that authoritarian regimes can manipulate the Internet too. The Internet opens up greater opportunities for government spying, disseminating violent propaganda and censorship. But given its limitless nature, this kind of control is becoming increasingly more difficult. We see this with China and Russia, where anti-government groups still manage to spread their collateral to millions of people. To say that no Internet is better than a limited form would be drastic consequentialist thinking.

Moreover, this kind of self-empowerment and sustainability is exactly what foreign aid aims at in its investments. Internet provides both the economic development and innovative tools for political and social reform that create stability. And, unlike so many of the programs USAID currently facilitates on the ground, Internet connectivity is a sustainable model for growth. Thus it defies the “teach a man to fish” conundrum so many often cite in opposition. Benefits for USAID’s other largest initiatives, such as health and humanitarian assistance, will come as externalities of increased Internet penetration. One of the major challenges for non-profits operating on the ground is reaching the local population; that fundamentally changes with widespread Internet connection.

With newly developed technology and a wealth of research, now is the time to make the Internet a priority for foreign aid. Countries no longer need to install cell towers for Internet access. Facebook and other large companies are working to proliferate the number of people with access to broadband with major initiatives such as Internet.org, a program that uses high-altitude, long-endurance planes, satellites and lasers to bring Wi-Fi to rural areas. They’re eager to engage governments to implement their ideas. Google, IBM and several other large tech companies are equally dedicated to expanding global Internet access.  

While the private sector has taken the initiative on this particular endeavor, the partnership with governments expedite execution and provide financing and resources otherwise difficult to tap into. Therefore, the private sector becomes an incredibly productive resource for the government to use—their priorities are aligned. If the US becomes involved with these initiatives as part of their foreign aid programs, it would not only accelerate its foreign policy agenda, but may also lay a foundation that can have a long-lasting return on investment for its various agencies.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Though the incessant stream of Islamic State-related headlines have cemented a narrative of IS as the greatest threat to mankind, the numbers seem to belie the reality of our pervasive sense of alarm. In fact, the Assad Regime in Syria has killed more civilians than IS militants have—by a large margin. Since the Syrian Civil War began four years ago, 250,000 people have died in the Syrian conflict, of which only about 5% can be attributed to IS (though no one has exact figures). And yet, Western audiences seem to have directed its collective condemnation and attention within the Middle East almost exclusively to IS, while Assad single-handedly facilitates a massive genocide of Syria’s Sunni Muslims.

The widespread attention makes sense, however, in relation to the extensiveness of media coverage that fetishizes IS’s savagery, debates its “allegiance to Islam” and generally promotes fear to improve ratings without delving into the greater machination at play in Syria. The idea of Westerners traveling to the Middle East to train with IS fighters and returning to the US in order to commit an act of domestic terrorism garners far more views than a far-off war in which barrel bombs kill thousands of people. However, in this way, the public plays into a strategy set by Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and ignores a far greater threat.

When the Syrian conflict began in 2011 as a reverberation of the Arab Spring, Bashar al-Assad reacted to the peaceful protests in the same way his father had in 1982, by attacking the opposition into acquiescence. Militarizing the conflict engendered greater hostility and the Free Syrian Army arose as a non-sectarian effort to oust a brutal dictatorship. Seeing the potential power vacuum, jihadist extremists travelled to join the rebels.

Yet, the greatest threat posed by the rebel groups was their diversity—the opposition came from a variety of religious affiliations, ethnicities and political agendas. In a tactful maneuver to sectarianize a unified conflict, Assad freed extremists from jails under the guise of “amnesty” (the Assad regime isn’t exactly a country keen on amnesty for amnesty sake) and then targeted the Sunni-majority in order to draw extremist Sunni support to the opposition and polarize them.  These efforts would alienate potential international allies seeking to oust him from power and augment intra-rebel conflict.

In late 2011, the crisis had become bad enough that the UN Security Council considered a resolution to condemn Assad’s crimes (which has no implication beyond a wag of the finger), yet both Russia and China vetoed it: Russia’s vote a direct defense of Assad and China’s a show of camaraderie to Russia. Both also vetoed another draft in February 2012.

At the time, there were enough Al-Qaeda affiliates and extremists in the region for al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, to become a major player in the conflict.

By January 2013, an estimated 60,000 Syrians had already been killed – often with barrel bombs and explosives amid large civilian groupings – with little to no media attention. And while Assad’s chemical attacks against his own people did incite international outrage, the US did not launch any military initiatives against his administration, as was alluded to by President Obama. No one was talking about IS at the time because they didn’t even truly exist—the largest anti-Assad factions were still al-Qaeda and al-Nusra.

Another year later IS emerged: an opposition group attracted to the hotbed of radicalism Assad had intentionally bred. Its extremism, however, inadvertently supported Assad’s agenda—it simultaneously fought rebel groups seeking to oust Assad and cast his regime as a lesser evil.

In fact, defectors of the regime have exposed the role that Assad played in enabling IS: he actually subsidized their expansionary endeavors by purchasing oil from them and militarily tiptoeing around their territory. To this day, Assad has indiscriminately bombed thousands of his own people – rebel and civilian alike – and yet never targeted IS strongholds. According to an analysis of the IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center’s (JTIC) database, of the 982 counter-terrorism operations for the year up through November 21st, only 6% directly targeted IS.

Despite these atrocities, US intervention was limited to non-lethal supplies until an entire year later when IS capturing Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city and executed two American journalists. When the media finally delegated airtime to IS inside Syria, President Obama formally avowed to “degrade and destroy ISIS.” With attention shifting to the ever-increasingly threat of IS, an opportunity arose for Assad to continue to commit atrocities without the vigilant eye and condemnation of the media.

Assad has enabled the most violent extremists to debilitate, polarize and secularize his opposition, while continuing to protect and purchase oil from IS. IS has only killed about 10,000 people across Syria and Iraq to date, whereas Assad had already killed 191,000 Syrians when the group first emerged in September 2014. The media’s focus on IS obfuscates the real source of atrocity. The fallacy of IS as the primary evil-doer in the Middle East fosters a paradox within the US’s foreign policy: while the US seeks to eradicate IS and impede the growth of the Islamic Caliphate, it empowers rebel groups that see Assad as the primary enemy and IS as a tangential conflict. The US wants to focus primarily on IS – not ousting Assad – and yet that isn’t a priority for the rebels that it empowers. These “moderate” groups look to al-Nusra Front and Hezbollah for alliances, both of which the US actually considers terrorist organizations. This is a very happy outcome from Assad’s earlier military calculations—the US has no allies or “good side” with the same priorities.

Not only is the US’s myopic obsession to destroy IS counter-intuitive, it has shifted the world’s gaze away from the Assad Regime towards a group that, while unequivocally brutal, hasn’t committed the atrocities Assad has and continues to. The latest headlines often attribute the millions of refugees fleeing into European nations to the havoc caused by IS (despite disputed claims about whether or not the group is at fault) and undermine the mastermind behind the entire diversion. Blame continues to remain with the US’s favorite enemy—IS. Most problematic about this particular narrative is that it provides an opportunity for Bashar al-Assad, who can now capitalize on the situation by calling for domestic rebel-backing in order to “combat terrorism.”

Furthermore, during the US’s categorical pursuit of IS, Putin has managed to quietly establish an agreement between Russia, Syria, Iraq and Iran under the guise of combatting IS, thus establishing himself in a greater position of influence within the Middle East and challenging the US for supremacy in the region. This comes after Putin deployed tanks into Syria to further bolster the Assad Regime without prior warning. Putin’s campaign on behalf of his ally seemed to culminate in his speech to the UN, in which he called for a united front against IS that would include Syria’s current administration—a plea that directly resisted President Obama’s condemnation of the Syrian Regime and subsequent call for international powers to preserve the international order through diplomacy in the region.

These latest developments will evidently divert more attention to the future of Syria; however, the overarching narrative centers itself around IS and obfuscates the harsher reality. This in no way implies that media outlets should downgrade the atrocities committed by IS—whether it be murder, rape, pillaging or large scale acts of terrorism. However, the narrative should not detract from the larger human rights violations and machinations by the Assad Regime.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Even with the news consumed by stories from the 2016 presidential race, President Obama continues to be upbraided by political analysts and commentators for each and every mandate, appointment and speech—especially when it comes to his foreign policy. However, with regard to Russia’s recent aggression in Crimea, casting blame upon the current administration may just be a hasty oversight of the nuanced interplay of interests in the Middle East and the intricacies of Putin’s political calculations. Many conservative politicians and pundits have attributed Putin’s audacious military exploits in Eastern Ukraine to Obama’s projection of weakness in the face of conflict in Syria, Iraq and Crimea. But it’s not at all clear whether more aggression from the US would have intimidated or aggravated Putin. In a post-Iraq world, Obama’s softer hand appears the more rational, strategic move compared to the hawkish alternative.

The Red Line on Syria
Politicians love to enumerate examples of Obama’s weakness—it has practically become a hobby on the Hill. The first thing they point to is the administration’s “red line” with Syria back in 2013. When asked if he would deploy US military forces in response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons, Obama stated, “We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is that we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.” Then, in a press conference with Swedish Prime Minister, when asked about using military action in Syria to maintain his credibility, Obama denied the use of military force and distanced himself from the military follow-through that many felt embedded in the “red line”, saying “I didn’t set a red line; the world set a red line. The world set a red line when governments representing 98 percent of the world’s population said the use of chemical weapons are abhorrent and passed a treaty forbidding their use even when countries are engaged in war.”

The President’s vague approach of non-military confrontation was reversed, however, when he sent Congress a request to authorize military strikes in Syria. An apparent political flip-flop, this policy change could have been a mere symptom of President Obama’s greatest flaw: his professorial nature. With past presidents, like George W. Bush, the country became accustomed to absolute, decisive action. When faced with an international conflict, the administration assumed a position, and pursued it vehemently—well-informed or not. Obama – on the other end of the spectrum – has consistently taken prolonged periods of time to reflect on issues, which has often been perceived as indecision and weak leadership.

Did Obama make a mistake in his Syria strategy? In the Syria Accountability Act, the treaty on chemical weapons, there is no clause that requires anything beyond sanctions in response to a country that develops chemical weapons. Military actions were never a part of the agreement. Obama’s later request for military support may have been a reaction to pressure from the public and the media. Regardless, the strategy ultimately brought Assad to the negotiating table. The resulting compromise between the US, Moscow and Syria managed to leverage much of the international community in destroying most of Assad’s chemical weapons—a tangible improvement that air strikes and collateral damage couldn’t have accomplished alone.

Though many cite the resulting plan as the epitome of Obama’s weak foreign policy, we should look at the consequences of a foreign policy decision that didn’t resort immediately to military force. As the administration’s national security agenda states, “We must recognize that a smart national security strategy does not rely solely on military power… The use of force is not the only tool at our disposal, and it is not the principal means of U.S. engagement abroad, nor always the most effective for the challenges we face.” With soft posturing and military restraint, one of the world’s most brutal dictators came to the negotiation table, and Russia offered a degree of compliance with international laws and norms. The latter was not an easy task. Though Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov came to Geneva to discuss the question of Syria’s chemical weapons, he continued to deny Assad’s actual use of weapons on the Syrian people and threatened to leave the talks before any deal was reached. It was only after UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon threatened to share the results of an investigation into Syria’s chemical weapon use with the Security Council that the Russians shifted their position. Though a permanent and often obstinate member of the UN Security Council, Russia feared becoming more of a pariah in the UN, which attests to the significant sway of the international community—something that usually finds its strength in a climate of military restraint.

The US’s military restraint accomplished several noteworthy feats: the US didn’t immediately resort to bombing Syria, nor assume the role of the world’s most unwanted policeman (again) and become accountable for the absolute mess that would have and now is ensuing in Syria. Preemptive missile strikes would have forced the US to become more involved and in turn responsible for any awry regime change. The Middle East is a foreign policy Rubik’s cube. Any and all military actions should come as a final attempt, as hastiness risks making the situation incredibly worse, and costs significant political capital.

The immediate military action and show of force that many call “American leadership and strength” wouldn’t have addressed the nuanced and complex forces at play nor attained the same results. Indeed, the end proved an imperfect reduction of conflict, not an end in itself; however, the US mitigated the levels of conflict in a way that a hawkish would have missed all together. Suggesting that Obama’s hesitancy sent Putin a signal of weakness is flawed when considering the cooperation of Russia in a campaign led by the US. Isn’t this reflective, adaptive reaction to complicated situations exactly what leadership entails?

Playing Whack-A-Mole in the Middle East
President Obama’s strategy with ISIS has also become a hallmark of the criticisms political pundits, politicians and the media use against the administration. First, it’s important to admit that the US isn’t “winning the War on Terror”, nor dealing effectively with the proliferation and spread of extremist groups throughout the Middle East. Too often however, this opinion becomes a political ploy under the guise of pseudo-analytical criticism, exploiting the public’s ignorance of the US’s capacity to incite positive change with minimal risk.

Countries like Syria actually provide a perfect example of the limitations to US policy. Fighting groups like ISIS or Al Qaeda either translates into strikes, ground support or the more ambiguous, “logistical support”. In Syria, however, this approach inevitably strengthens the Assad Regime, a brutal dictatorship killing the same innocent civilians targeted by extremists. Arming moderate rebels, however, poses issues as well. The US isn’t free to exude American strength wherever it finds contention.

The media recently inveighed against the President after he equated sending in ground troops to combat ISIS as playing whack-a-mole. The President’s current strategy is comprised of five parts, outlined in his address given on the 13th anniversary of the September 11 attacks:

1. Conducting “a systematic campaign of airstrike”
2. Increasing “support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground” with approximately 475 servicemen
3. Supporting “Iraqi and Kurdish forces with training, intelligence and equipment, ramp[ing]up military assistance to the Syrian opposition”
4. Isolating ISIS politically and economically, and expanding humanitarian support by collaborating with partners

In simple terms, the US launches airstrikes that are coupled by “support” for fighters on the ground, like the Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi forces. Any more aggressive of a strategy would entail a full-fledged war in the Middle East, and indirect conflict with allies like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Aside from a disruption of the broader, regional interests of the US, that war would find very little support from a war-fatigued public after Afghanistan and Iraq. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that Putin sees the President’s restraint as a sign of weakness. If anything, a lack of aggression by Obama might have clued Putin into just how tied Obama’s hands are in foreign military intervention. As conditions continue to evolve rapidly in the Middle East, however, it would prove unwise for Putin to take egregious actions presuming the President’s low level of the political flexibility.

Appeasement in Crimea
This leads to the latest display of “Obama’s weakness” abroad: Crimea. The day Putin officially declared Crimea a Russian commonwealth, major world powers displayed perhaps the most anticlimactic eruption of consternation. German Chancellor Angela Merkel called it an “unjustifiable and inexcusable” act that challenges “the European peace order and international laws.” David Cameron compared it to the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s. French President Francois Holland immediately denounced the illegal action of Putin and called for a “strong coordinated response.” The EU, most heavily impacted by a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty, failed to execute any sort of meaningful action until pro-separatists shot down Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, killing 298 people. Its reluctant intervention was met with parallel support by the US, which also announced new sanctions and a freezing of assets for Russian oligarchs.

The criticisms that call for more American strength offer few plausible solutions. Even Senator John McCain, who attributed the crisis to “a feckless foreign policy where nobody believes in America’s strength any more,” had to concede the fact that there was “no viable military action that [could have been]taken.” Other suggestions, like harsher sanctions, are ineffective without European support. While the US only trades about $40 billion a year with Russia, Europe relies on a lucrative trade relationship with its aggressive neighbor to the East, leaving them hesitant to aggravate Putin with more sanctions. With a third of Germany’s gas and oil coming from Russia, a disruption in the supply line would be devastating. What’s more, Russia provides an integral market for $48 billion worth of German products.

Other suggestions also defy European interests. Welcoming Ukraine into NATO is complicated; it’s uncertain whether any Western nations would be willing to come to Ukraine’s aid in the case of a Russian attack. Others, like Ted Cruz, have suggested stripping Putin of authority in international regimes like the Security Council and G8, which would only further antagonize Putin and exacerbate his unwillingness to compromise. Even propositions like those of Lindsey Graham to arm Ukrainian forces would mean unilateralism that upsets our key allies. Merkel responded directly to such suggestion at the Munich Security Conference, saying, “This [crisis]cannot be won militarily. That is the bitter truth. The international community must think of something else.”

Ultimately, in line with the international community, the US must trust diplomacy and collective international pressure. Moreover, the critics of Obama’s response to Ukraine shouldn’t immediately dismiss non-military options as weak. Though the US’s sanctions aren’t crippling Russia’s economy into military restraint in Eastern Ukraine, it is acting multilaterally and allowing the European community to deal with a regional issue. While this more careful approach may not exude military prowess, it does display a more impressive awareness of global complexities—one that will likely lead to more intelligent strategic initiatives than impulsive fits of defensive aggression.

Rhetoric that blames Putin’s aggression on Obama’s feckless strategy remains just that—rhetoric. Though Obama’s overall strategy might not be as effective as many would like, it’s not an expression of weakness, but rather a calculated response in a climate of limited options. The criticisms overlook the nuanced geo-political issues of these regions and the limitations of the international system. Moreover, they don’t consider Putin’s extremely hawkish foreign policy and Russia’s political culture. He’s leading a country fueled by a heightened sense of nationalism and nostalgia for a Soviet-era prominence. Just as in Georgia, the greater the lash-back of the West, the more strongly Putin seems to defy it. The Russian people demand assertive leadership to compensate for years of what many would call condescending international relations by the West. In this way, Putin and his extremely nationalistic cabinet of advisors have come to embody the frustration of their people. Given Putin’s well-known aggressive nature and willingness to take unpopular positions, often siding with other brutal dictators like Assad, it’s wrong to presume that any actions by the US would have restrained his aggressions at the Eastern Ukrainian border. This supposition also relies on the notion that Putin’s political calculations rely exclusively on the US’s foreign policy, which is arrogant at best. It seems most his decisions have been reactions to the New World Order, in which the US’s rules dominate the system and marginalize ideas that challenge the current paradigm. The US acts hypocritically by calling Russia’s intervention in Ukraine’s civil war a breach of sovereignty when it constantly injects itself into the affairs of strategically important countries. Within the complex web of wars, religious and ethnic conflicts, and alliances, any military move by the US may begin a domino effect that transcends even the problems of Russia’s aggression. Therefore, the US flexing its muscle on the international stage becomes almost counter-intuitive.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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A sense of exceptionalism is bred in people of the United States, starting as early as preschool. From its very genesis, the US was a “City Upon A Hill,” an ideological beacon of light that Puritans sought to erect as a shining example for the rest of the world. Even in 2015, exceptionalism finds its way into the rhetoric of politicians across party lines.  It seems to imply “We are Number One.” Number one in what exactly? Prisoners? Guns? Military spending? Drone Strikes? Entitlement? You get the picture.

The patriotic sentiment does seem to stem from a deeply held belief that the US exemplifies the ideal nation-state: a Liberal democracy. However, with unsettling rates of inequality, a failing education system, Congressional gridlock and money insidiously creeping into every piece of legislation, how much of a Liberal democratic role model is it really?

Many now question whether the US has evolved into more of an oligarchy than the democratic republic that, at least theoretically, lies at the foundational doctrine of the nation. While many still use the same rhetoric found in the Constitution and Declaration of Independence, the backdrop of reality has marred it with emptiness. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups and Average Citizens,” a study conducted by Princeton and Northwestern universities, sought to determine the foundation of American sovereignty in the United States: do the citizens truly govern, or is it the elites who have appropriated control of practically every political institution? Though there’s enough empirical evidence to suggest that it’s the top 1% who dominate policy decisions, like the way in which the Koch brothers “choose” the Republican nominee for President, the study used a statistical model to analyze its data. In fact, researchers found that “economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence.” What’s more disturbing, however, is the disparity between the interests of The People and those of special interest. According to the study, “the net alignments of the most influential, business-oriented groups are negatively related to the average citizen’s wishes. So existing interest groups do not serve effectively as transmission belts for the wishes of the populace as a whole.” In a system where the majority of citizens will generally lose when pitted up against the interest of the economic elites, there’s much less of an exceptional democracy and more of an obfuscated oligarchy.

Even without the allure of democracy, the US has begun sending a message to the international community that their system is inefficient—worse, it has entered a state of political paralysis. When NPR asked Thomas Risse of the Free University in Berlin how the partisan political machine may appear to outsiders, he admitted it seemed “pretty dysfunctional,” reflecting a pervasive sentiment towards the US that a good piece of the American populace neither sees nor cares much about. A look at the Pew Research Center reports on international public opinion of the US paints an alarming picture of countries considered allies. The percent of those with a favorable view of the US in France, the United Kingdom, Germany, China and Turkey hovered around 75%, 66%, 51%, 50% and 19% respectively. For countries that the US expects to support its national interests, their public opinion poses significant obstacles. The US must consider the implications of unfavorable public opinion and the inevitable influence it will have in foreign policy—there is only so far that military power can advance a nation lacking the respect and admiration of the international community.

However, it isn’t just opinion. The United States falls short of the vision it projects to the world.  In fact, the 113th Congress of the United States has won the title of least productive Congress in history, passing a mere 234 bills; it also managed to completely shut down the government. At what point do these shortcomings become enough of a pressing issue to constitute reform measures? 

Figure 1. Selection from The Economist’s 2014 Democracy Index showing the rankings of countries with Presidential government systems.

Given a rather pervasive acknowledgement that the United States isn’t the democracy it once was, might it have failed to prove that a Presidential system isn’t conducive to populist-style sovereignty? The above chart maps countries with Presidential systems of government with their democracy ranking. The Economist’s 2014 Democracy Index, a measurement for the state of democracy in 167 countries, placed the US at a mediocre 19. Putting that into context, anything under 25 is considered a “flawed democracy”. Evidently, aside from Costa Rica and Uruguay, the United States isn’t in good company. The Democracy Index methodology relies on 60 indicators pertaining to political culture, civil liberties, political participation, functioning of government and the electoral process. Of the eighteen countries ahead of the US in the entire ranking, all but one (Uruguay) have some form of a parliamentary system. The question, therefore, becomes whether this pattern is a mere coincidence; or, is there some causal relationship between the health of a democracy and its government system? More specifically, has the US failed as a proof-of-concept for the Presidential system’s ability to foster a perfect Liberal democracy?

Amending the constitution has become nearly impossible, and yet, couldn’t a parliamentary system save the health of a once-flourishing democratic system? Perhaps the financial corruption, ubiquity of interest groups, inefficiency and cost of elections are not only causes, but also symptoms of an inefficient and exclusive political structure. Could some of these issues be mitigated by shifting away from a presidential system? In terms of efficiency, parliamentary systems appear to reign supreme (within the context of democracy, at least). Since the majority party garners enough legislative authority to pass most of its priority bills, they can mitigate the effects of gridlock. And, since the prime minister or chancellor is elected by the parliament, there is ideological cohesion. Imagine how much more legislation could have been passed had a majority party won sufficient control of Congress—no matter the ideological tendencies, there would, at least, be a faster period of trial and error for policies that don’t work. When asked if other democracies have similar structural issues, Jane Mansbridge, a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, retorted, “Do other democracies have this problem [of gridlock]? The answer is no. Not many.”

In the past few years we’ve seen ugly partisan politics on the Hill and a marginalization of those who aren’t aligned with the two party systems. The US would undoubtedly benefit from a more variegated political system – like in many European countries – where even the Green Party, a political niche, holds several parliamentary seats. Not only would it add diversity to Congressional debate, but it might also attenuate the extremism of politicians. There might be less pressure from the Republican Party, for example, were the Tea Party truly a different entity—not one mangled into the more moderate Republican caucus. Moreover, politicians would have more liberty to vote against the Party when they don’t fear the looming threat of competition in later elections. Nevertheless, that comes with other threats as well: could the US see the rise in radical rightists now taking hold across Europe? What would it mean to have those voices entering the debate on the Congressional floor? While some politicians might see plurality as an opportunity to become more moderate, new parties with extreme ideas may also amass quite a following.

The United States doesn’t like to take advice from other countries on account of it being “exceptional”. However, when 18 political systems surpass its own democracy rating, it could be time to re-evaluate and learn from the success of more efficient governments like Finland, Germany and the UK. What does the US stand to lose if the image it once projected for the world, and the values it fights for abroad in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, cannot be upheld at home?

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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We look back upon World War II with a furrowed brow and incredulous gaze, wondering how millions of people could be led to espouse such hateful ideas, based exclusively on unsubstantiated leaps in logic, pseudo-scientific assertions, and politically-engineered ‘truisms’.  How could so many educated people subscribe to such ridiculous ideas? And yet, over 75 years later, here we are in Germany, one of the world’s most tolerant societies, watching the same campaign of agnotology enfold the Pegida movement.

Comparisons between Pegida and the Nazi Party have already been made, and perhaps even belabored since its parallels are, unfortunately, rather apparent. However, most interesting may be not the two groups’ similarities, but rather their differences. The Nazis galvanized the masses by scapegoating Jews for poor economic conditions. Pegida is responding to a German national identity crisis and a systemic fear of radical Islam. Nazis originally intended to marginalize the Jewish communities of Europe. (Hitler’s inner circle devised the policy of mass extermination at the Wannsee Conference in January 1942.) Pegida, however, seeks to prevent extremism and conserve a liberal and secular German state. However, its policy of refusing immigrants and refugees entry into Germany doesn’t align with those goals.

Pegida, or Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, began as many political movements now do: on the Internet, which remains its primary vehicle of propagandizing. The group has rallied as many as 25,000 people in Dresden and boasts nearly 160,000 Facebook followers. According to its official page, Pegida seeks to ensure that all children may grow up in a cosmopolitan Germany, free from the violence of radical Islamic groups such as the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda, etc. Supporters also advocate for a separation of church and state, citing the philosophy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, known for establishing a modern, secular Turkish state in 1923. On the surface, Pegida’s mission welcomes secular Muslims. However, many Germans including Chancellor Angela Merkel recognize its true intentions. In the chancellor’s 2015 New Year’s address, she warned her constituents of Pegida’s true rhetoric, saying:

“Today many people are again shouting: ‘We are the people’. But what they really mean is: you are not one of us, because of your skin color or your religion…I say to all those who go to such demonstrations: do not follow those who have called the rallies because all too often they have prejudice, coldness, even hatred in their hearts.”

The organization has denied all allegations of racism and xenophobia and remained adamant that it only seeks to combat extremism and challenge Germany’s immigration and asylum policies. Yet, the inconsistencies between its actions and intended goals either indicate abhorrent prejudice or naïveté.

If Pegida primarily sought to eradicate extremism, it wouldn’t target refugees or asylum seekers. Millions of people have been displaced by terrorist organizations like IS, which has invaded, slaughtered, raped and destroyed much of Iraq and Syria. Refugees come from these war-torn regions and look to Germany, Europe’s strongest economy, for safety and economic opportunity. They view these terrorist organizations as enemies, not as sources of inspiration. Therefore, to assume that the influx of refugees is inviting domestic extremism is simply ignorant.

Pegida’s skewed view of asylum seekers reveals another inconsistency in its philosophy. Germany has welcomed more asylum seekers than the rest of Europe, Australia and Canada combined. Its thriving economy, generally tolerant culture and willingness to accommodate those in need has made it the most attractive place for those seeking security and stability. Many countries antagonize and marginalize peaceful, non-radical Muslims, causing frustration and anger to fester until certain at-risk individuals erupt in some act of violence.

However, Germany is in a unique position within the international system: its tolerance puts it in a less likely position to experience a domestic attack. Pegida and other such anti-immigrant movements threaten that harmony. Its policies should aim to welcome and integrate the incoming Muslim population, not engender tensions and divisions—the exact conditions that lead to frustrated individuals manifesting their anger in senseless violence.

While Pegida’s rhetoric against violent extremism might be effective during a period heightened terrorist activity, it’s an unconvincing mission statement for a group whose founder, Lutz Bachmann, recently posted a selfie of himself styled with the notorious Hitler hair part and mustache. Moreover, two weeks prior to Pegida’s first march, Bachmann sent private messages referring to asylum seekers as trash and scumbags. Though these revelations have led to his resignation, they’re indicative of the group’s social agenda: to use the pervasive fear of radical Islamic terrorism to drive out Germany’s non-white, non-Christian population.

As millions witnessed during the Charlie Hebdo solidarity movement, many Muslims have demonstrated a profound allegiance to their nation’s ideals. Millions, whether online or on the streets of Paris, defended the magazine’s right to freedom of speech before they criticized its offensive depictions of Islam. Supporters of Pegida should take greater note of these trends rather than pigeonholing Muslims into a category of people who want to ‘Islamize’ Germany. If the organization seeks to preserve German culture, it should shift its strategy to increasing patriotism among immigrants and refugees. They might even discover that there’s less of a desire to ‘Islamize’ Germany than to embrace its freedoms and customs.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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At age 12, a visit to the hairdresser marked a rare occasion for Umm Mohammad. “We were all very excited, as each girl had just been given a new, white dress.” And yet, the day didn’t proceed as expected. “Suddenly this man, who was really a stranger to us, started to undress us,” she told the German news organization Deutsche Welle. “Then he got out his razor blade.” Under no anesthesia and unhygienic conditions, Mohammad underwent an experience that would skew her perception of womanhood and traumatize her for the rest of her life. Her “circumcision” left literal and figurative scars that transcend the pain she experiences every day living in Cairo’s slums. Mohammad’s experience is but one narrative of the oppressed female experience in Egypt.

Among a myriad of other human rights violations, Egypt subjects 91% of its female population to genital mutilation, a procedure defined by a clitoridectomy, the cutting of the clitoris and external genitals, or infibulation, the sewing closed of the vaginal opening. Although the cultural practice is male-engineered, it’s most often propagated by mothers, who believe it to curb their daughters’ sexual desires and preserve their chastity. Above all, it maintains family honor and ensures marital prospects. However, these mothers are merely vehicles through which men establish a patriarchal dominance over women and deny them agency over their bodies and behavior.

Because many men spurn marriage to women who haven’t undergone some form of female genital mutilation (FGM), perceiving them to be “unclean”, mothers subject their daughters to the procedure in order to maximize marriage prospects. In this way, FGM has become a cultural practice for young girls as a critical right of passage into womanhood. However, it is men who have calculated this narrow definition of womanhood as a system of self-oppression. Men aren’t oppressing women; women are oppressing women. This ingenious and twisted system works in two ways: girls avoid pre-marital sex because they both fear the pain of breaking their stitching and the dishonor that comes with subverting a system that values honor above all else.

The practice, however, plays but one part in the female narrative around sexuality and honor. Every aspect of it caters to a man’s desires. Let’s consider infibulation, the sewing shut of the vaginal opening, which leaves only a small portion open for urination and menstruation. Many men physically prefer penetrating a woman who’s undergone the procedure; her first sexual encounter, and even subsequent times, will require him to literally rip her open. On a psychological level, the surgery allows men to claim women as property, which feeds into the cultural pressure for women to ‘save their chastity’ for their husbands. But, men are really stealing a woman’s agency over her own body; once that has been claimed, the woman often feels powerless. Yet, the practice doesn’t merely increase a man’s pleasure; it simultaneously decreases the woman’s by removing what many would argue is the epicenter of female sexual pleasure. Many women will never feel any pleasure, insinuating that female sexuality is of both shameful and secondary importance—even within the confines of marriage.

While many North African countries have yet to ban FGM as a practice, Egypt already has, which might indicate a turning of the tide. According to the UN, legislative steps towards punishing perpetrators are critical. Following the death of an 11-year-old during an FGM procedure in 2008, Egyptian legislators passed the Child Rights Law No. 126 to punish perpetrators with three months to two years of imprisonment—or a meager $700 fine. However, November 2014 marked the first time an incident reached trial. And, more discouraging, the rates of FGM haven’t changed significantly since 2008. This indicates a discrepancy between law and reality, which could be explained by Egypt’s political instability.

The Mubarak Regime prevented many medical professionals from conducting the procedure since they feared the repercussions of Suzanne’s Law, which outlawed FGM and liberalized divorce laws. No one had been prosecuted under his rule; however, in an attempt to obscure the realities of authoritarianism to the West, the Mubarak Regime gave women more opportunities to secure new freedoms. However, under ambiguous political authority, doctors now express a flagrant disregard for the law, willing to accommodate any family willing to pay the price. In fact, there’s been a drastic shift in those who actually facilitate FGM procedures. Egyptians are increasingly turning to medical professionals instead of local community members. Unlike many other MENA countries with ubiquitous female circumcision practices in which local village circumcisers or barbers perform the procedure, Egyptian doctors now conduct most operations—77% of them, in fact. Though this is a safer method than that which Umm Mohammad endured, it is concerning that doctors are willing to conduct a procedure with no medical benefits and a slew of physical and psychological risks. While engaging and educating local communities remains an important facet of combatting this savagery against women, it appears that directing law enforcement towards doctors might be more effective.

Within a convoluted system of authority and a burgeoning democracy, human rights need to be at the forefront of the public dialogue in Egypt. Women are especially vulnerable to abuse, especially under a cultural backdrop that perpetuates sexual violence. With a growing population of dissenters to the practice, it’s up to the government to enforce its codified laws against FGM, starting with prosecution and education of doctors. However, Egyptian women might have to wait a while to see their rights actualized, since it is unlikely that these changes will arrive under President al-Sisi, widely known for defending the “virginity tests” conducted on female protesters in 2011.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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President Obama’s announcement to normalize diplomatic relations with Cuba elicited a plethora of political commentary, particularly from the right and prospective presidential candidates. Though many lauded the president for his leadership in addressing a policy that has, for over 50 years, failed, politicians including Marco Rubio, John Boehner, Jeb Bush and Ted Cruz wasted no time condemning the White House. Senator Marco Rubio, a Cuban-American himself, however, led the charge. While his protestations and impassioned avowal to thwart the president’s initiative seem legitimate, both a political and Orwellian-style literary critique will expose the hypocrisy of his commentary. He obfuscated a complex relationship, culture and regime with sensationalistic rhetoric. And, though certainly not insincere, his claims are entrenched in an outdated Cold War-era disposition that neither align with US nor Cuban interests. His public outrage also happens to conflict with many other aspects of the Senator’s foreign policy.

Following the president’s announcement, Marco Rubio immediately held a press conference and made numerous television appearances in which he vehemently condemned Obama’s foreign policy as one that’s “not just naive, but willfully ignorant of the way the world truly works.” As the son of Cuban immigrants, his perspective on US-Cuba foreign policy seems more an outdated expression of filial obligation than a testament to his politics. As he details his book, American Son, his grandfather, a fervent Castro adversary, became his political inspiration, indoctrinating him with his generation’s Cold War ideology. Growing up among Cuban exiles only solidified this enmity towards the Castro regime. However, with the majority of Cubans under 65 opposing the embargo, his commitment to politics of the past have isolated him from popular opinion. As he caters to a very small population of older, conservative Cubans in South Florida, he alienates not only the younger Cuban generation, but also the majority of Americans who support lifting the embargo. His outrage is therefore a “Washington anomaly”— an emotional rather than reelection-driven political response.

Despite being the Cuba expert in Washington, his family background might have completely disconnected him from pulse of the Cuban people. According to the Senator, the deal between the US and Cuba was predicated upon the “false notion that engagement alone automatically leads to freedom.” However, the White House has repeatedly emphasized that cultivating a relationship with Cuba will enable the US to “renew our leadership in the Americas, end our outdated approach on Cuba, and promote more effective change that supports the Cuban people and our national security interests.” There is no sudden call for a “Cuban Spring,” but rather small, incremental change that comes with greater exposure. President Obama isn’t deluded to believe he’ll single-handedly bring democracy to Cuba, or that the 80 year-old Castro brothers might suddenly eschew communism and come running into the arms of the US to feel the warm embrace of a constitutional republic.

Rubio’s secondary objections are less valid, less ideological arguments than hypocritical inflammatory rhetoric. These changes to US foreign policy to Cuba, he claimed, “will tighten this regime’s grip on power for decades to come and significantly set back the hopes for freedom and democracy for the Cuban people.” That doesn’t sound good. But, one: is that really true? And, two: does this align with Rubio’s foreign policy towards countries with equally questionable human rights violations?

First, Americans should question the validity of his statement. “Decades” is already an exaggeration—the Castro brothers will not celebrate their 103rd birthday with a tight grip on power. Moreover, the US has sustained their reign through isolation. The Castros have deflected from their own ineptitude by blaming Cuba’s financial woes on the US embargo. Although it won’t dissolve completely until Congress decides to legislate, Fidel and Raul Castro’s infamous excuses will inevitably receive more criticism as the US assumes a larger role on the peninsula. Rubio’s accusations are not only less accurate than Americans might assume from a “Cuba expert,” but they also don’t align with many of his other ideas.

As the White House pointed out, Rubio supported the nomination of Senator Max Baucus as the US ambassador to Beijing in order to for Americans to better espouse ideas of democracy and freedom in China. At the confirmation hearing he stated, “I think you’ll find broad consensus on this committee and I hope in the administration, that our embassy should be viewed as an ally of those within Chinese society that are looking to express their fundamental rights to speak out and to worship freely.” He endorsed engaging a state equally criticized for its flagrant human rights violations in a dialogue that he won’t even entertain with Cuba. Moral righteousness is of utmost importance—unless of course we’re talking about an economic super power. Rubio admitted this fact in a recent interview with CBS, when he insisted engagement alone doesn’t lead to freedom, citing the Chinese who are “no more politically free today than they were when that engagement started.” However, when asked if he himself would eradicate ties with China, he claimed “comparing China to Cuba is not a comparable analogy because China is the second largest economy in the world, they have the third largest nuclear arsenal on the planet, and they are the most populous state on the planet.” National interests often hinder the US’s ability to advocate for human rights reform. Given the current landscape of affairs, Americans appear to place far greater value on economic opportunity than the plight of human suffering or oppressive institutions and states, a trend for which Rubio is no exception.

The question also remains: how should the US orchestrate serious political change and human rights reforms without fostering some form of a relationship? The previous policy hasn’t dismantled its dictatorship or improved the conditions for the average Cuban. To expect change with the same policies that have failed for 50 years is not only naive but also obstinate.

Throughout his press conference, Rubio belabored the “brutal dictatorship” point as if it substantiated all his objections. However, it doesn’t quite align with his past statements either. When Americans debate the brutalization of human beings in the hemisphere must they not at least acknowledge Guantanamo—the epicenter of inhumanity? Despite the fact that Rubio condemns Cuba for its human rights abuses, he also demanded Ahmen Abu Khattala, captured suspect for the Benghazi attach, be interrogated and detained in Guantanamo back in June. Then, when Americans learned of the US’s own abuses in the Senate’s report on the CIA torture program, Rubio decided to disregard the US’s own offenses once more. He responded to reports of rectal rehydration and water boarding by tweeting, “Those who served us in [the]aftermath of 9/11 deserve our thanks not one sided partisan Senate report that now places American lives in danger.”

Rubio also expressed concern that normalizing relations with Cuba would not only embolden brutal dictators, but also send a message of US weakness to the international community, saying, “appeasing the Castro brothers will only cause other tyrants from Caracas to Tehran to Pyongyang to see that they can take advantage of President Obama’s naiveté during his final two years in office.” Firstly, the US is one of the last remaining countries to recognize Cuba. In fact, for the 23rd time in history, the majority of the UN General Assembly voted to end the US embargo against Cuba (Yea: 188 member states, Nay: the US and Israel). If Obama’s sending a signal of naiveté, then at least he is in good company. Secondly, the word “appeasement” sends a terrible chill down the spines of all those who have studied World War II, yet, behind the sensationalistic rhetoric lies the implication that diplomatic relations with tyrants denotes appeasement and invites countries to exploit the US’s willingness to work with non-democratic regimes. I suppose that means Americans appease every single dictatorship and tyranny except North Korea, Iran, Bhutan, and Cuba. In fact, by this logic, the US “appeases” some of the most flagrant abusers of human rights and authoritarian governments, such as China, Russia, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe. Yet, cultivating a relationship with Cuba would somehow send a different message? Yes, Cuba may “scheme with our enemies,” Senator Rubio, but that hasn’t stopped the US from speaking with Russia (who supports Iran and the Assad Regime) or many other countries who aid and abet the US’s adversaries.

Why does Rubio’s fiery opposition to Obama’s policy change matter? Aside from asserting himself as a foreign policy leader in the Senate and winning conservative approval by berating the president, he isn’t exactly seeking constituent approval. Come 2016, his speeches might boast his consistent disapproval of Obama’s “naive foreign policy”; however, raising his head above the political parapet might not be advantageous with such a distant foreign policy issue. However, his role in the Senate has serious implications for the US’s new stage of foreign policy. Marco Rubio plans to not only derail Obama’s plan to lift the embargo, but also threaten to impede the funding of the new embassy and the appointment of an ambassador. With a Republican majority in Congress, it’s certainly possible Americans won’t see any move to lift the embargo, but Rubio might also galvanize enough support to challenge the president’s orders. As a rumored 2016 presidential candidate, his foreign policy matters and augurs badly for the future of US-Cuba relations. How might a Rubio presidency set back this diplomatic milestone? For now, however, Americans must hope that with US support, new infrastructure, technology and exposure will incrementally change Cuba’s social and political dynamic.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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A former communications technician for the Islamic State (IS) has written an op-ed lamenting his participation in IS and, more importantly, claiming Turkey to be an ally to the terrorist organization. Sherko Omar (his pseudonym for Newsweek) said he became disillusioned, eager to abscond from the group after experiencing their unchecked brutality in the battlefield—a sharp contrast to the kindness they showed him when he arrived at their border camp on the way to fight the tyrannical Assad Regime.

“At the start, we thought that to leave would be a betrayal because the IS men at the camp gave us food, clothes and whatever else we needed. We also thought that if they were fighting against the regime of Syria then we should just join them to save the Syrians.”

He soon felt trapped and afraid to escape. It wasn’t until he surrendered himself to the National Army of Syrian Kurdistan and proved himself unaffiliated with the violence that he was freed from prison and disassociated with IS. Now, his testimony might prove useful for uncovering Turkish policy towards IS. Kobane, the territory of a decisive battle between IS and its international opposition, might just be a microcosm of a large strategy at play. Omar reflected on his experience accompanying members of the organization along the Turkish border:

“IS commanders told us to fear nothing at all because there was full cooperation with the Turks…while we tried to cross the Ceylanpinar border post, the Turkish soldiers’ watchtower light spotted us. The commander quickly told us to stay calm, stay in position and not to look at the light. He talked on the radio in Turkish again and we stayed in our positions. Watchtower light then moved about ten minutes later and the commander ordered us to move because the watchtower light moving away from us was the signal that we could safely cross the border into Serekaniye.”

If the account is true, then it adds to the increasing pile of evidence that suggests President Recep Tayyip Erdogan might just be a master of political chicanery. The US has publicly dubbed Turkey a friend and ally in the fight against IS. However, the recent evidence seems only to buttress allegations that Erdogan actively supports IS militants. This might seem far-reaching, as it would mean Erdogan is explicitly undermining the US, a great power whose friendship adds legitimacy to an administration that many claim to be corrupt. However, even without these new revelations, there remains probable cause for the collaboration’s validity, especially considering IS and Turkey share a common enemy: the Kurds.

Kurdistan’s Workers Party (PKK) has been a force of insurrection against the Turkish government for three decades. In fact, both the US and Turkey consider the PKK an official terrorist organization. Abdullah Ocalan, the group’s imprisoned founder, issued a letter back in March 2013 declaring an end to the insurgency war—a milestone for stability after decades of strife. It signaled the start of a cease-fire, peace talks and hope that their demands for cultural rights, release of political prisoners and representation in government might be met. After the 40,000 deaths that ensued from years of conflict between the PKK and Turkish security officials, many Turks actually see the PKK as a greater threat than IS—a clear indication that, despite the peace talks, political tensions still pervade in the country. With upcoming elections, Erdogan can’t afford to alienate the Turkish majority who don’t favor aiding a terrorist group. However, peace negotiations have been derailed by oppressive legislation targeting the Kurds, government scandal, subversive claims for autonomy and most recently, the power struggle in Kobane.

During the power vacuum of the Syrian Civil War, the Kurds seized the opportunity to establish three autonomous cantons. Erdogan sees them as a direct threat since these claims to autonomy could act as a beacon of light, igniting the inherent nationalism among Turkish Kurds, who constitute the country’s largest ethnic minority, and encourage them to emulate their brothers in officially breaking apart. If they, too, carve out territory and secede from Turkey, then it would create inevitable internal conflict and challenge Erdogan’s already questionable regime.

Kobane is one of those three “autonomous cantons” and the location of a decisive battle between IS and its international adversaries. While Kobane could have been used as leverage for compromise or a vehicle for unity between the Turkish government and the PKK, the military spent the first weeks securing the border and impeding the flow of any military support or supplies into Kobane. International pressure only escalated as Turkish policy in Kobane became increasingly suspect. In fact, the US called on Turkey to not only open its borders, but also send in ground support. Their position along the border puts them in a strategic position to push back opposition with tanks and ground troops. While missile strikes impede IS from making military advancements, Turkish ground troops will be essential for driving them out. However, Prime Minister Davutoğlu publicly declined: “We don’t want our citizens to fight in Syria and we are trying to stop those who illegally cross the border.”

The US turned to airdropping supplies in order to reach the Kurdish regional authorities since Erdogan remained obstinate. For the government, the PKK is a mere extension of the PYD (Democratic Unity Party), which governs Kobane. Erdogan sensationalized the issue claiming his role in the international coalition would directly aid and abet terrorist organizations. While this does hold a degree of truth – many radical groups have indeed joined the anti-IS coalition – Erdogan’s rhetoric conflates the PKK and PYD for political convenience. Although Turkey is officially a part of the coalition, it seems to have its own agenda.

In fact, Turkish bombing of PKK forces in the city of Hakkari diametrically contrasts with the US’s military support for the Kurds. And, despite parliament having authorized counter-terrorist military action in both Syria and Iraq, Turkey didn’t open its borders to allow the passage of Kurdish Peshmerga forces into Kobane. Erdogan didn’t concede until 34 people were killed in violent riots protesting inaction in Kobane that erupted across Istanbul. While this might signal a slight willingness to fight IS, Turkey used this political unrest to justify increasing police power against “protestors.” However, under the political rhetoric lie new policies that allow the authorities to oppress the Kurds and Western media. Erdogan thereby strengthens his domestic grip while showing the bear minimum cooperation with international demands. Despite increasing international outcry, Erdogan, in charge of NATO’s second largest military (after the US), has yet to send in ground troops.

The Turkish President argues that Kobane is just a small part of a far greater problem—
the Assad Regime with which the PKK is allied. Therefore, not only do the autonomous Kurdish enclaves challenge Turkish control, but their foreign alliances also threaten foreign interests. Conversely, IS’s continual brutality undermines the Kurdish power. After fierce confrontation, the Kurds are less disposed to fight for autonomy and support the Syrian government. That’s a win-win for Ankara.

The real question is why would Turkey send military support?

Aiding the PKK is politically an unpopular move that might compromise Erdogan’s chances in the next election cycle. His administration is already facing scrutiny as many fear it has tyrannical dispositions. Just this past September, Turkish parliament passed amendments that strengthened Internet censorship and surveillance. Several journalists, including many Kurds, have been arrested under charges of terrorism, signaling a push against government criticism in the media. Turks have also seen a proliferation in police brutality and anti-protest legislation. In fact, the conditions have become so oppressive that Human Rights Watch published an entire report condemning Erdogan’s administration.

Thanks to IS, the Kurds are less of a threat to Turkey. Kobane, if captured, would strengthen IS’s territorial gains, only further enabling them to fight the common enemy: the Assad Regime.

These benefits, in addition to Ankara’s lack of transparency, make a clandestine relationship with IS appear entirely plausible. In September, Ankara provided no explanation for IS’s release of 49 Turkish hostages taken from the Consulate in Mosul. The situation was merely described as “a diplomatic bargain.” Does that not elevate an international terrorist organization to a legitimate political entity and interlocutor? Has Turkey exchanged inaction in Kobane for the return of hostages? Recently, an inundation of claims that Turkey supplies weapons to IS have surfaced, which could either attest to the existence of an alliance, or indicate the price Turkey paid for the return of its diplomats.

Turkey’s motivations to support IS seem politically sound and strategically beneficial. Historically, the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” tactic has effectively preserved foreign interests while maintaining domestic stability. However, if these claims and testimonials are found true, then it would provoke unimaginable international backlash. Though diplomatic relations between Turkey and the US have weakened over Ankara’s inaction in Kobane, Turkey is still a part of the anti-IS coalition and an ally. One thing is certain: if Erdogan’s ambitions for Turkey, like growing its economy to the 10th largest in the world, remain, he shouldn’t undermine the strongest Western powers leading the charge on IS.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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