In May of 2015, the UAE took another step into the space exploration arena with the establishment of the Mohammed bin Rashid Space Centre (MBRSC) in Dubai. The center, which now operates several observation satellites, is tasked with launching an unmanned space probe to Mars in the year 2020. Dubbed “Hope”, the mission is intended to spark interest in science and technology in the Arab world and represents the UAE’s latest engineering ambitions.

The UAE’s presence in space began in 2000 with the launch of Thuraya-1, the Middle East’s first telecommunications satellite. The satellite’s operator, Emirati cellular provider Thuraya, followed this with the launch of two additional satellites offering cellular services across Europe, Asia and Australia. In 2011 and 2012, AlYahsat, another UAE-based communications company, launched its own satellites for broadcasting, broadband and cellular purposes.

The expansion of Emirati companies into the telecommunications sector represents the UAE’s efforts to diversify its largely energy-driven economy. However, the satellites themselves – which were built and designed by aerospace companies such as Boeing and Astrium (now part of Airbus) – have done little to boost the country’s technological capacity. This is particularly problematic for a country facing a STEM shortage and whose world-famous projects are largely designed by western architects and engineers. As a result, the UAE has established several agencies to foster its nascent space sector, starting with the Emirates Institution for Advanced Science and Technology (EIAST) in 2006, the UAE Space Agency in 2014 and the MBRSC in May of 2015.

So far, these organizations have largely relied on foreign entities to develop their homegrown Earth observation satellites. In a partnership with Satrec, a division of South Korea’s Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), the EIAST launched DubaiSats 1 and 2 to capture high-resolution photographs of the Earth’s surface. But in a country known for its “go big or go home” attitude towards engineering projects (e.g., the world’s tallest building), UAE leaders have pressed for more advanced projects led by entirely Emirati teams.

These projects come in the form of an Earth observation satellite known as KhalifaSat and the recently announced Mars Hope mission. The former project will launch on a Japanese Mitsubishi rocket in 2018 and monitor greenhouse gas levels in the Earth’s atmosphere. The Mars mission will collect Martian climate data, and is scheduled to launch in 2020 when the planet makes its closest approach to Earth. In addition to their scientific goals, the Emirati space agency intends for these projects, particularly the Hope mission, to inspire engineers in the Arab world in the same way Kennedy’s Moon speech did half a century ago. To Hope’s project manager Omran Sharaf, this goal is especially important in an era where IS and other terrorist groups seem to dominate the region’s politics. Reaching Mars would send a strong message that the Arab world can develop economically and technologically without violence.

But the transition from low earth orbital satellites to a Martian probe in only several years is an ambitious one and something the UAE can hardly achieve alone. Consequently, the UAE has recently sought additional partnerships with space agencies and universities abroad to further develop their aerospace abilities while maintaining the Hope mission’s 100% Emirati label. Early in December 2015, the UAE Space Agency signed a Memorandum of Understanding with its Russian counterpart, the veteran agency Roscosmos, to pave the way for an exchange of information and training of Emirati engineers. Two weeks later, the UAE struck a similar deal with China, and has collaborated with American universities such as Berkley, Arizona State and the University of Colorado since the project’s inception.

However, US laws such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), designed to protect American space and military secrets, have stymied cooperation between the US and UAE. ITAR restrictions already posed challenges for the UAE’s space program: last year the regulations prevented Airbus from using US-made components to build an observation satellite for the UAE’s armed forces. Since at least March, officials from the UAE have sought to prevent similar restrictions and to take advantage of the US’s experience in space. In November, officials from the two countries formed a committee to iron out ITAR exemptions for the UAE but it remains unclear if concrete progress will be made.

With private companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin pioneering reusable launch vehicles and countries such as India and China attempting their own Mars missions, the space exploration field is evolving quickly. If the UAE wants to make its mark in that sector, it will require sustained motivation and continued cooperation with foreign entities. While its aspirations are ambitious, they are not impossible, and achieving them will be all the more important in showing the war-torn Middle East a path forward.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors or governors.

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Last week, the Air Force announced that SpaceX would be allowed to compete against United Launch Alliance (ULA) for lucrative Department of Defense (DOD) space-launch contracts. The announcement, which came after years of controversial certification proceedings, represents a major victory for SpaceX as the company seeks to expand its presence in the defense and commercial launch industries.

SpaceX’s certification means that it will now be able to launch under the Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. Established in 1995 as a way to ensure the availability of launch vehicles for national security sensitive programs such as GPS and missile defense satellites, EELV was intended to lower launch costs and increase reliability by pitting Boeing and Lockheed martin in a competition for contracts.

But the Air Force’s plans to lower prices through competition evaporated in 2006 when Boeing and Lockheed Martin formed ULA as a joint venture and united the two companies’ launch divisions. Since then, costs have steadily risen as ULA, through its expendable Delta and Atlas rocket families, maintained a status as the US’s sole provider of national security related launch vehicles.

Until last week, that status was criticized by many, including representatives at SpaceX, as a virtual monopoly. To make matters worse, since 2003 the DOD has granted ULA and its predecessors billion dollar “launch readiness” (ELC) payments and in 2012 the Air Force agreed to purchase 36 rocket cores – enough for 28 launches – from ULA over a period of five years. SpaceX has contested both actions as anticompetitive.

In the face of rising costs, the Air Force announced in 2012 that it would open up the EELV program to additional launch providers that could complete an outlined certification process. That certification, which SpaceX acquired last week, was marred in controversy as SpaceX complained about bureaucratic sluggishness and an alleged cronyistic relationship between the Air Force and ULA. Last spring, SpaceX’s grievances culminated in a lawsuit that was settled in January with an Air Force agreement to expedite the certification process to the summer of 2015.

Now that that certification process is complete, several factors will impact ULA and the launch industry’s future. Though ULA is guaranteed future launches as per the 2012 block buy deal, it will need to compete with at least 9 other launches until 2018 and every launch thereafter. Appealing to a cash-strapped pentagon, SpaceX can beat ULA on pricing, offering launches for under $100 million, dwarfing ULA’s $160-350 million.

Meanwhile, ULA’s dependence on the Russian-made RD-180 engine for its Atlas V adds an additional obstacle. In December of 2014, congress banned the use of RD-180s for national security related launches. Though the edict exempted past contracts, ULA doesn’t think it will have enough to sustain it before the company rolls out its Atlas V replacement vehicle sometime around 2023. Making the situation more pressing, ULA announced plans to retire all but the heavy variants of its Delta family by 2019. ULA doesn’t believe the Delta IV, which costs on average 30% more per launch that the Atlas V, will be able to compete with SpaceX’s Falcon 9 for future EELV contracts.

As SpaceX encroaches on historically ULA territory, the Air Force has already announced intentions to phase out its ELC payments. This, coupled with the factors noted above, makes the time from now until the early 2020s, when ULA can finalize its Vulcan launch system, critical to ULA’s survival. Presently, the Air Force’s EELV launches make up the bulk of ULA’s business, making it imperative for the company to continue winning Air Force contracts or to expand into the commercial launch industry. This is not the case for SpaceX, which even in its infancy has a diverse manifest of commercial launches and NASA resupply missions to the ISS.

But the groups most shaken by SpaceX’s sudden rise may not even be ULA. Actors in the international commercial launch arena, particularly the EU-based Arianespace and the US-Russian International Launch Services (ILS), have already began to take preemptive measures against SpaceX’s rapid expansion.

Arianespace, historically owned by a consortium of European government agencies and companies, was founded in 1980 as the world’s first commercial launch provider. With a claimed 60% market share in 2014, Arianespace dominates the commercial market with its Ariane 5, Vega and Soyuz vehicles. Until recently, its main competition has been the US-Russian ILS, which fights for dozens of launch contracts each year with its Proton launch family.

Like ULA, Arianespace and ILS are threatened by SpaceX’s ability to undercut them on price. For ILS, recent launch failures have compounded that threat by eroding confidence from commercial satellite companies and restricting Proton launches to the patronage of Russian customers. Its difficulties have led to its dismissal by many commentators who increasingly treat SpaceX and Arianespace as the only relevant competitors on the market.

Between SpaceX and Arianespace, Ariane’s edge comes from its ability to launch heavy payloads SpaceX’s Falcon 9 cannot and its reputation as a nearly impeccable launch provider over the past three decades. However, Arianespace can only cling to these advantages for so long as SpaceX nears completion of its Falcon Heavy and grows its own manifest of successful launches. As of now, both the Ariane 5 and Falcon 9 are fully booked through 2017.

But what price advantage SpaceX currently has could be dwarfed by what it may have. Since at least 2011, SpaceX has been attempting to develop a reusable launch vehicle, an innovation Elon Musk says could lower launch costs by “as much as a factor of a hundred.” Though engineers at organizations such as NASA and the French space agency CNES are skeptical, if SpaceX successfully pioneers reusability it could eradicate its competition.

Arianespace has responded to SpaceX’s assaults by lowering prices for smaller satellite launches to around $90 million (still shy of SpaceX’s $60 million) while adding price hikes for its low-competition heavy payload contracts. Additionally, on June 5 the company revealed that it is now attempting to match SpaceX on the reusability issue through a new project known as Adeline: a drone that can transport a rocket’s first stage engine and electronics systems back to Earth. Though it’s unclear when either launch provider will make their respective reusable vehicles ready, Arianespace has a set a target date between 2025 and 2030.

The privately held SpaceX has also challenged Arianespace’s public and somewhat decentralized structure. Last year, a joint venture between Airbus and Safran known as Airbus Safran Launchers began to consolidate private control over the company. Now, in an attempt to reduce costs and increase efficiency, the French government is planning to sell its remaining 35% stake in Arianespace to Airbus Safran Launchers, giving the infant venture a nearly three-quarters share of the world-established launch provider.

But amid privatization efforts, Arianespace has enjoyed subsidies of more than €100 million ($112 million) from the European Space Agency (ESA) and, for a company that sells in USD, a sharp fall in the value of the euro against the dollar from 2014 to early 2015. Despite the advantages, the ESA agreed in late 2014 to provide €8.2 billion ($9.2 billion) over the next ten years the assist in the development of Arianespace’s next generation launcher.

Arianespace’s relationship with the ESA and European governments will undoubtedly draw fire from SpaceX which has already fought bitterly with ULA over what it deemed as unfair treatment. But its assistance is unlikely to end anytime soon; for Europe and the ESA, Arianespace assures European access to space, access that the EU is unwilling to let die at the hands of an American space startup.

The responses from Arianespace and the Air Force show that in just several years, SpaceX has managed to upset the status of government-sponsored legacy launch providers on both sides of the Atlantic. As it continues to benefit handsomely from NASA resupply missions to the ISS and prepares to rake in additional funds from the EELV program, the rivalries it’s forming – and the potential tensions between competing nations – will likely only intensify.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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On January 6, 2015, California officially began construction on the California High-Speed Rail system. The project is intended to link California’s major urban areas with an 800-mile rail network spanning from San Diego to Sacramento.

The project will be the second major high-speed rail project in the country, following Amtrak’s Acela Express in the Northeastern megalopolis. Acela trains, traveling at speeds of up to 150 mph, can traverse the distance from Washington, DC to New York in less than three hours. But unlike similar high-speed rail projects in Europe and Asia, Acela shares tracks with slower vehicles, consequently reducing its average speed to around 80 mph.

With dedicated tracks and speeds of up to 220 mph, the California High-Speed Rail project marks the US’s first significant attempt to build a network comparable to those of other developed countries. Sponsored by Governor Jerry Brown and his supporters, the project is seen as instrumental to modernizing the state’s transportation system. However, it has been a source of controversy since its approval as a ballot measure in 2008. Opponents criticize the plan’s $68 billion price tag and question the necessity and viability of high-speed rail in the US.

Cost of High-Speed Rail

The projected cost of California’s rail project equals $90 million per mile, far greater than the $52 million per mile average in Europe and certainly greater than China’s $31 million per mile.

The price of high-speed rail construction can vary dramatically depending on land value, terrain, cost of labor, volume of construction and other factors, but is almost always far more expensive than traditional expressway construction. When it comes to maintenance costs however, high-speed rail is only marginally more expensive.

Environmental Impact

The case for or against rail infrastructure can usually be broken down into several major arguments. One such arguments relates to the relative eco-friendliness of each vehicle. The graphic below looks at the energy cost in CO₂ emissions for several existing rail networks and various other modes of transportation.

This information was obtained through several important assumptions: (1) each high-speed rail system, bus and passenger aircraft operates at an average occupancy of 70%; (2) based on information from the US Department of Energy, the average automobile produces 0.85 pounds of CO₂ per passenger-mile (23.08 miles per gallon) and uses gasoline; (3) the average automobile carries 1.6 passengers.

The graphic illustrates what one would imagine: high-speed rail, due to its economies of scale, is significantly more energy efficient than automobiles. High-speed rail produces around 0.16 pounds of CO₂ per passenger-mile whereas the typical car produces 0.53.

But Randal O’Toole, an analyst at the CATO Institute and possibly the US’s leading critic of public rail projects, argues that cars engaging in inter-city travel usually carry more passengers. According to O’Toole, instead of using the average vehicle occupancy of 1.6 passengers (which is standard in many comparisons), a figure of 2.4 is more reasonable. By increasing the estimate by 0.8 passengers, the average occupancy increases by 50% and reduces the average energy cost to around 0.35 pounds per passenger-mile.

Moreover, future increases in the fuel efficiency of cars could lead to that number falling further. The Toyota Prius for instance, with 1.6 passengers, produces 0.26 pounds per passenger-mile. At 2.4 passengers, the number is even smaller: 0.17 pounds per passenger-mile.

With the average of the three studied rail networks being 0.16 pounds per passenger-mile, fuel-efficient cars with several passengers are fiercely competitive with high-speed rail in terms of eco-friendliness. Of course, few Americans own a Toyota Prius or a comparable vehicle, but the information suggests that investing in fuel-efficient vehicles may be a more cost-effective option.

Another important implication is that buses, with 0.14 pounds per passenger-mile, are just as, if not more, fuel efficient than high-speed rail. Inter-city bus networks, which require only the vehicles themselves and existing road systems to run, are likely the most cost-effective form of transportation. However, buses operate at low speeds and contribute to congestion and are thus often overlooked by planners as a major solution to inter-city transportation problems.

Economic Impacts

The potential benefits are not merely confined to high-speed rail’s energy efficiency. The speed at which it travels and its ability to quickly link cities together at such efficiency is a more important topic.

High-speed rail offers the fastest form of land transportation yet developed. High-speed rail can reduce the more than six-hour drive between San Francisco to Los Angeles to less than three hours. When the time spent at the airport is factored in, high-speed rail is typically faster than air travel for distances of up to 300 miles.

With reductions in travel time, supporters argue, comes economic benefits of increased productivity and reduced congestion. (Researchers at Texas A&M estimate that traffic gridlock in the US may waste as much as $87 billion per year in lost productivity and other economic costs.) Whether those economic benefits exist is difficult to measure and even harder to predict, but many experts argue that projects like the UK’s High-Speed 1 (HS 1) increase employment, rental rates and wages in cities along rail lines.

When it comes to proposed projects in the US, opponents are typically skeptical that high-speed rail lines will have sufficient ridership to be considered economical. For European lines, this problem has been largely absent. In Spain, rail transit accounts for more than half of the transportation volume between Madrid and Seville. Moreover, the construction of high-speed lines coincided with a 60% reduction in automobile traffic. While experiencing moderate declines in the midst of economic difficulty, most European lines, such as France’s TGV, witnessed large growth in ridership in the several years following their construction.

But in the US, as is often argued, the car-dependent structure of urban areas, or even factors as intangible as American culture, may inhibit passenger volume. In Europe and Japan, better structured transit systems and higher levels of urbanization make high-speed rail convenient and easily accessible. That the opposite is true in the US could easily limit the number of passengers accessing high-speed rail. But figures indicating that Amtrak recently achieved record ridership in 2013 coupled with projected increases, casts doubts on how important the current state of US transportation is in curbing future ridership. Additionally, experts on a University of California, Berkley panel predict that high-speed rail projects would encourage improvements in urban density and transit systems and thus enhance access to high-speed lines.

Conclusion

High-speed rail is hardly the cheapest mode of transportation, nor is it necessarily the most eco-friendly. However, it does offer potentially valuable solutions to congestion and economic problems in periphery regions along rail lines. Given their immense cost and uncertainty, high-speed lines in the US should be contained to the country’s several densely populated regions and should not be viewed as a perfect solution to transportation problems.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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On December 19th, the EU, on behalf of Airbus, filed a complaint with the WTO accusing the US of providing billions of dollars in subsidies to Boeing in violation of international trade law. These allegations are the latest incident in the now decades-long rivalry between the two aerospace giants who collectively form the world’s largest duopoly.

History

Competition between the two firms began when members of the former European Economic Community established Airbus in 1969 to counteract the domination of US firms such as Boeing, Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas. By the 1990s, losses and mergers left Boeing as the sole large-scale producer of passenger aircraft in the US, tearing the bulk of the international airliner market between the American company and Airbus.

The rivalry has since largely been driven by each company’s ability to sell new manufactured aircraft to the world’s major airlines. A recent surge in international travel and the rapid growth of airlines such as Lion Air (Indonesia), Emirates (UAE) and IndiGo (India) has intensified competition. Airline expansion is particularly focused in emerging economies where growth far outpaces that of developed countries.

Products

One of the earliest incidents of competition between Boeing and Airbus is that of the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 family rivalries. Boeing’s release of the first 737 in 1968 marked the beginning of what would become the world’s most successful airliner series. The 737, along with its successors in the 737 Next Generation family (released in 1997), made use of a narrow-body twinjet model designed for flying short to medium distance routes. Airbus’s answer to the 737 came in 1988 with the A320 series, following a similar design and capable of carrying roughly the same number of passengers (approximately 210).

One of the most publicized instances of product rivalry centers around to the two company’s jumbo jets. In 2007, Airbus released the A380 to compete with what was previously the world’s largest airliner, the Boeing 747. Both four engine, double decked, wide bodied aircraft are used primarily for international long distance flights and can each carry over 400 passengers. Recently however, fuel efficiency concerns have called the viability of both aircraft into question, making their fate in the future of aviation uncertain. Forecasts predict limited profitability in upcoming years for the A380. Airbus recently hinted at the possibility of discontinuing the model altogether by 2018. The 747 has witnessed a similar trend and has recently fallen out of favor among major airlines that are opting instead for more efficient long-distance, wide-body, twin jet alternatives.

For Boeing, these alternatives come in the form of the preexisting 767 (introduced in 1982) and 777 (introduced in 1995), the latter of which recently gained minor notoriety for its involvement in two fatal Malaysia Airlines incidents in 2014. The 787 “Dreamliner” (released in 2010) and the 777x (to be released later this decade) will replace 767 and 777 respectively. Airbus’s competing long-distance twin jet airliners primarily consist of the A330 series (released in 1992) and its successors, the A350 XWB (introduced in 2013) and the A330neo (expected release in 2017).

Litigation

In addition to releasing a constant stream of new airliners, each firm has turned to international courts to stifle their competition. In multiple instances, the two have leveled accusations that its rival has been receiving illegal and anticompetitive assistance from its respective government(s).

Airbus, headquartered in Toulouse, France, consists of a manufacturing network involving France, Germany, the UK and Spain and is thus characterized by high levels of international cooperation. Since 1992, these governments have provided as much as $15 billion in “launch aid,” preferential loans (below commercial rates) granted to Airbus to be paid off with interest.

In 2004, launch aid materialized into a legal controversy upon complaints issued by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), initiating one of the longest and most complicated WTO cases to date. Boeing and the USTR argued that Airbus’s launch aid violated international free trade laws and illegally benefited Airbus at Boeing’s expense. The USTR further targeted loans from the European Investment Bank, research and technology funding, and several specific infrastructure improvements as additional forms of unlawful assistance.

Subsequently, Airbus and the EU denied that launch aid constituted an illegal subsidy and in turn leveled their own allegations against the US and Boeing. The EU also filed a parallel complaint to the WTO, arguing that tax breaks granted to Boeing by Washington state, Kansas and Illinois, and research and development programs between Boeing and NASA (among other federal programs) constituted illegal subsidies totaling over $19 billion.

The WTO treated the two complaints separately and released its decision on Airbus’s launch aid in June 2010 and its decision on Boeing’s tax breaks in March 2011. After an arduous appeals process, the organization’s appellate body ultimately reached a conclusion in March 2012 ruling that both parties had received various forms of illegal subsidies. However, technicalities in the report obscured its true meaning; both companies, each seeking to spin the outcome in their favor, claimed victory.

Since the latest ruling, neither the US nor the EU has taken considerable measures to reform their policies. Pre-existing agreements (e.g., contracts predating the WTO decision) offer each rival ample justification to carry on unfazed. Launch aid to Airbus persists while Boeing continues to benefit from generous tax breaks. The trade conflict lingers on.

On December 19^th, 2014, the EU revived the unresolved dispute going once again to the WTO. In its latest charge, the EU and Airbus accused Washington state of continuing to provide illegal subsidies to Boeing through the extension of the previously condemned tax breaks.

Other Controversies

Aside from the subsidy dispute, the two aerospace companies have long been subject to controversy regarding illicit or otherwise morally questionable activities, including bribery. This may be particularly true for Airbus, which has been caught in countless scandals involving the use of bribery to win contracts with foreign governments at Boeing’s expense. These activities have been all but condoned by the French government, which treated the bribery of foreign officials as a tax-deductible expense until 1997. In contrast, the US made bribing foreign officials a federal offense in 1977. France continues to receive criticism from organizations like the OECD for its lax attitude towards bribery.

This isn’t to say that Boeing is guiltless when it comes to surreptitious business practices. Boeing has been involved in several of its own high profile bribery cases, including a scandal surrounding a $23.5 billion Airtanker deal with the Air Force in 2003 in which Airbus was a competitor. Even more damaging is Boeing’s relationship with US security agencies, which has lead to allegations of economic espionage. Though agencies like the NSA make no secret of spying to advance US economic interests, the true extent to which they do so to benefit specific US companies is unclear. It is clear, however, that NSA intelligence through the ECHELON program cost Airbus a $6 billion deal with Saudi Arabia, which was later picked up by Boeing instead.

Future

Based on previous outcomes, it seems unlikely that the EU’s latest complaints with the WTO will be conducive to any meaningful policy changes on either side of the Atlantic. As the WTO lacks serious mechanisms to enforce international trade law, the US and EU would need the willpower to initiate a trade war or reach an out of court settlement if the conflict were to finally be resolved. As the US and EU subsist on high levels of mutual dependence in both a political and economic sense, the former option is exceedingly unlikely.

Both Boeing and Airbus represent massive shares of the US and EU economies, with each employing hundreds of thousands of workers and bringing in billions in export revenue. These factors, coupled with immaterial and emotional elements of the rivalry (e.g., the national pride associated with manufacturing extraordinary aircraft), have the effect of making private sector aircraft production inevitably tied to government involvement.

It therefore seems out of the question to expect either company to completely remove itself from the hand of public assistance. In order to reach a resolution, the US and EU must come to an agreement which minimizes the role of subsidies in the rivalry and balances the effects of whichever subsidies persist. Such an agreement should ultimately allow the products themselves to set the stage for airliner competition rather than government aid.

Additional causes for animosity, such as bribery or the use of industrial espionage, will be more complicated to resolve. With each firm offering similar and reliable products, contract negotiations inevitably involve political and economic favors. But one can hope that efforts by the OECD to curtail the use of bribes as a bargaining chip and trends indicating global poverty reductions will reduce the significance of illicit negotiations as a competitive tactic. And in light of Snowden’s NSA revelations, which cost Boeing a $4.5 billion contract with Brazil, it may be beneficial for US companies if industrial espionage efforts were restrained.

With Boeing and Airbus each continuing to churn out advanced and competitive aircraft, it seems that the airline industry will continue to be dominated by the American and European companies for the foreseeable future. But any major misstep in the production process, a severe loss litigation front or a crippling scandal could lead to either side gaining total control of the market or could potentially make way for a new competitor. With countries such as Japan, Russia and China each seeking to increase their foothold in the airline market, the latter possibility is not implausible. But as is the case with most matters of this nature, the future cannot easily be forecasted.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

Correction: The previous version of this article mistakenly identified Lion Air as “Air Lion.” The article has been corrected. 

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On a periodic basis, several organizations administer international exams for the purpose of comparing primary and secondary students to their international counterparts. Most notable of these exams are the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), organized by the OECD, and the Trends in Mathematics and Sciences Study (TIMSS), managed by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). These exams offer policy makers the opportunity to assess the effectiveness of national education systems with respect to international competition.

International assessments of this nature are a relatively new development beginning with the creation of TIMSS in 1995 and PISA in 1997. Since then, each exam has been administered cyclically: PISA every three years and TIMSS every four. Both exams test subjects such as mathematics, science and reading comprehension. However, the two exams vary in the countries, age groups and types of questions used in their surveys.

Despite differences between the two tests, the latest exam data, drawn from 2011 and 2012, offer generally consistent results. PISA 2012 placed Shanghai, which participated in the survey independent of China as a whole, as the world leader in education. Other top achievers consisted primarily of several East Asian and Western European nations such as Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Finland. The United States scored only marginally above the international average, while countries with lower levels of economic development expectedly attained the worst results. TIMSS 2011 generally corroborated these findings, with most countries obtaining similar positions.

These international exams have a noticeable influence on the education policies of participating nations. The information put forth by exam data serves as an indicator of how well a nation’s students may perform relative to their international counterparts. To countries looking to increase or maintain their current levels of international prestige, the possession of a highly skilled student base is imperative. As domestic benchmarks alone fail to place the performance of students in an international context, international exam results are essential for any standardized international comparison.

The impact of these tests and the fear of “falling behind” can be exemplified by Germany’s reaction to the 2000 PISA exam. Results placed Germany well below the OECD average, exposing major weaknesses in what Germans had long regarded as one of the world’s premier education systems. The exam results and the resultant jolt to public opinion precipitated education reforms centered on increasing opportunities for minorities, lengthening school days and strengthening teaching requirements. On subsequent exams, Germany demonstrated significant improvement; in 2012, German scores far surpassed the OECD average. Though improvements may have been the product of other factors (e.g., continued East German assimilation), these reforms have been hailed as largely successful.

The above chart how longitudinal data can be used to evaluate a country’s ability to improve its education systems. Turkey, whose scores have improved at a rate exceeding that of nearly every other country surveyed, is an example of this application. Despite consistently garnering among the poorest scores on PISA, Turkey succeeded in narrowing the gap between itself and its European neighbors. Complementing the country’s progress is the fact that its scores now exceed the OECD average when adjusted for per capita GDP. Improvements may be attributed to a combination of deliberate changes in education policy such as a near three-fold increase in education spending or Turkey’s significant strides in poverty reduction.

Public attention to scores is perhaps most apparent in the United States, where each release of exam data is typically followed by popular outcry regarding the US’s usually low rankings and statements from officials promising reform. Unsurprisingly, exam results have thus served as a major justification for new nationwide education initiatives. The Common Core Curriculum, a recent and major education reform effort sponsored by the National Governor’s Association and the White House, is advocated for on the basis of improving the US’s international standing. In fact, much of the Common Core Curriculum has been designed specifically to improve the US’s PISA scores.

But to an extent, exam results have the potential to become problematic if they gain undue influence over education programs. Martin Carnoy and Richard Rothstein of the Economic Policy Institute argue that international exams such as TIMSS and PISA fail to account for high levels of poverty and wealth inequality in the US relative to other economically advanced countries, making the US’s poor results misleading. The two contend that the US’s education system, adjusted for inequality, is sufficiently functional and they caution against radical reform efforts. Other observers have linked exam “hysteria” to formerly failed policies that emphasized standardized testing, most notably the No Child Left Behind Act of the Bush administration.

Additionally, for many Americans, test results placing Shanghai and Hong Kong in top spots on the global education spectrum have had the effect of a second Sputnik, spurring a sense of alarming decline at the hands of an international rival. Excessive attention to Chinese results exacerbate an unnecessary but persistent sense of rivalry between the US and China. This hostile mentality may not only be harmful to cooperation, but is severely misguided. To use the results of two highly advanced cities as representative of the entirety of China is analogous to applying the results of Manhattan alone (which would undoubtedly far exceed the US average) to declare the United States the world’s leader in education.

The significance of exam results is further diminished when different exams offer conflicting pieces information. Though studies have demonstrated a correlation between results on the PISA and TIMSS exams, significant differences still persist. For instance, Malaysia, which scored far below the United States on the 2012 PISA, had a slightly better performance on the 2011 TIMSS. The opposite observation is true for New Zealand, which outperformed the US on PISA but underperformed on TIMSS. A likely explanation for these occurrences is that discrepancies in relative score between the two exams may be a reflection of a nation’s education philosophy and curricula. This puts education analysts in a dilemma where they lack the ability to determine which exam results or school curricula are objectively better.

Though these several underlying issues may undermine the usefulness of exam results, it’s undeniable that in many cases the PISA and TIMSS exams offer meaningful insight into the performance of national education systems, which is why it’s no surprise that an increasing number of countries opt to take them. With 40 countries surveyed in the 1999 TIMSS report to over 60 in 2015, and 32 countries surveyed in the 2000 PISA to nearly 70 in 2015, the importance of international exams seems likely to only amplify. But, as with many pieces of data, exam scores lack the ability to provide a fully comprehensive portrayal of an education system, and must therefore be applied to policy decisions with discretion.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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Since the late 19th century, skyscrapers have been built out of necessity; growing populations and rising real estate values have coerced engineers to build up rather than out. The inception of steel framed buildings allowed for just that as the first skyscrapers formed in agglomeration in US cities like New York and Chicago. In the 21st century, current technological innovations and renewed economic pressures have led to an international surge in skyscraper construction.

According to the Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat (CTBUH), there are currently 3,206 skyscrapers (defined as buildings over 150 m in height). Most of these are located in countries including China, the United States, Japan, the UAE, Australia and Canada. Of these, 2,103 have been built since 2000 and 2,595 have been built since 1990. That is to say that 80% of all skyscrapers in the 130-year history of tall buildings have been built in the last 25 years.

So where are these new buildings being built? We should first compare the year 1990 to the present. That year, the world leader in tall buildings was the United States, which had 438 of the world’s 611 skyscrapers. Next was China, with 37 (most of which were located in British-controlled Hong Kong), followed by Canada and Australia, which each had 20, and Japan with 19.

Today, the data is incontrovertibly different. China has taken the lead with 1,111 skyscrapers to the US’s 676. Australia, Canada and Japan have all more than quadrupled their skyscraper output while South Korea and the UAE, which barely made the map in 1990, are now major players. The UAE has 187, including the world’s tallest, while South Korea has erected 175. India, Indonesia and other emerging economies have followed similar, though less dramatic, trends. In the midst of these developments, European countries, which have long avoided heights, are also now constructing skyscrapers. For instance, the UK has gone from a single skyscraper in 1990 to 15 in 2014. France, Germany, Spain, Turkey and Russia have followed suit.

So why are these buildings being built? The answer is a mirror image of what occurred in the United States through the 19th and 20th centuries. China has seen its GDP rise from $3.6 billion in 1990 to over $10 trillion in 2014 with parallel increases in property values and urban population. The resultant economic pressure in urban areas coupled with the same ambition that built the Empire State Building has driven engineers in less developed countries upwards.

Meanwhile, in European cities such as London and Paris, places long subject to height restrictions for safety or aesthetic purposes, regulators are changing their attitudes. Development in London’s Square Mile and Canary Wharf districts has been fueled by record property values and population growth. France’s La Défense, located on the fringe of Paris’s city limits, has propped up ten new skyscrapers since the 1980s in an attempt to be business friendly. Moscow’s International Business Center, which hosts nearly a dozen new skyscrapers as well, was conceived for similar reasons. Throughout Europe, the construction of skyscrapers seems increasingly seen as a useful economic tool.

In the Middle East however, skyscrapers serve as elaborate displays of wealth. Grandiose hotels and office buildings, such as the Abraj Al Bait in Mecca or the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, serve to exemplify this point. Saudi Arabia is now moving forward with what will become the world’s new tallest building, the kilometer-high Kingdom Tower in Jeddah. These major projects, typically designed by western architecture and engineering firms such as Adrian Smith, SOM, or Thornton Tomasetti, not only serve their symbolic purposes, but are also intended to transform oil dependent economies into centers of finance and tourism. These efforts, however, can reach the point where they defy economic principle. In Dubai, vacancy rates loom over many of the cities newest skyscrapers.

It’s easy to wonder why the United States, which leads the world in skyscraper construction through the 1990s, hasn’t been keeping up with many of its international counterparts. But in the US, the demand for new skyscrapers simply isn’t there. Countless cities throughout the United States already posses sufficient quantities of office space for their employment levels and many companies have turned to more efficient space usage as an alternative to new construction projects. Another factor lies in the location of US companies, which are relatively rural or suburban. About a third of the US’s largest companies are found in suburban or rural areas and an international comparison (see headquarter locations here) would surely reveal that US companies are less urban than firms abroad. 70% of current construction projects in the United States are underway in technology hubs such as the New York, San Francisco and Dallas metropolitan areas and in only New York is there really a skyscraper construction boom. Aside from these areas, you can expect little change in the skylines of most American cities.

While the construction of supertall structures may be limited domestically, by 2020 over 900 new skyscrapers will be built internationally. Though more than half of these will be found in China, countless other nations will see dramatic changes in their own urban heights. Countries like Russia will witness their skylines double in size while formerly docile countries like Azerbaijan plan their own megatall buildings and European cities adapt their historic reputations. These factors are all indicative of the globalization-fueled trend of building upwards, which will certainly continue for at least the next two decades.

The views expressed by these authors do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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If you’ve stayed up to date with our leading popular calumnies, you’ve probably heard of the so-called twilight of the American space program. As the narrative has it, the end of the Space Shuttle program and budgetary constraints has forced the nation that once reached the moon to hitch rides on Russian Soyuz rockets, relegating the US to a position of near subservience to our former Cold War rival. To make matters worse, that rival’s been slapping us with counter-sanctions and limitations, paralyzing our already crippled space program. As Neil Cavuto of Fox News put it: “What a fall from grace.”

Well that’s how the narrative goes anyway, a narrative that’s entirely the result of misinformation and media hype. The reality is, Russia’s counter-sanctions will be little more than a nuisance to the American space program, a program that has been, and will continue to be, successful.

In 1973, the Saturn V rocket, the launch vehicle of the Apollo program that took 12 Americans to the moon, was decommissioned, effectively leaving the United States without manned space mission capabilities for eight years. This period of dormancy, similar to the current one, was simply a transitioning phase between two generations of space launch technology: Saturn rockets and the Space Shuttle program. Subsequently, the Space Shuttle program was instrumental in the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS), the Hubble Space Telescope, the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite and countless other projects and experiments.

The program officially ended in 2011, as was intended by NASA and Congress, after nearly 30 years of operation and 135 launches. Its termination however, should not be considered representative of some fictitious demise of the US space program. It is merely, as the termination of the Saturn program before it, a signal that NASA is transitioning to a new generation of space technology. And, though the US may temporarily need rides to the ISS via Russian Soyuz rockets until that technology is achieved, Russia has been using the same rockets since the 1960s. These rockets, which were incapable of transporting humans beyond low Earth orbit at the height of the Space Race, pale in comparison to the Space Shuttles.

So, what is the new generation of space technology? Well in addition to innovations by the private sector, which should allow for independent manned launches by 2017, NASA is gearing up for the Space Launch System (SLS). This program, set to replace the canceled Constellation project, will not only once again provide the US with manned space launch capabilities, but will also return astronauts to the moon and eventually land the first humans on Mars.

Aspects of the SLS project will be developed in conjunction with the European Space Agency to create the first truly reusable launch system. The system will consist of five configurations (called “Blocks”), each designed for different purposes and payloads. Moreover, at least one of these rockets will have the ability to carry the Orion (a manned spacecraft analogous to the Apollo module), into deep space to perform manned operations on asteroids, the moon and Mars. A rough timeline for the program is as follows: In December of this year, the Orion craft will be launched unmanned via a Delta IV rocket for operational testing. In 2017, Orion will use a fully operational SLS rocket for a second unmanned mission, this time to the moon’s orbit. In 2021, Orion, with a manned crew, will land atop a robotically captured asteroid. And though no official date has yet been scheduled, SLS will implement manned missions to the moon sometime in the 2020s and a manned mission to Mars as early as 2033.

So that should clear up any major misconceptions regarding America’s space impotence, but the world of cable and click-hungry news agencies have a few other fables to purport. The two main fallacies pertain to either Russia kicking NASA astronauts out of the ISS or Russia’s halting of the shipment of RD-180s to the United States.

In response to US sanctions placed on Russia earlier in the year, Putin’s government in May issued a statement that Russia’s space agency, Roscomos, would not support the continuation of the ISS program until 2024. Until January of 2014, when Congress voted to extend the project, the ISS was scheduled to end in 2020. However, recent reports forecast that components of the ISS will last beyond previous estimates, which have obliged the project’s continuation. Russia’s announcement in May was merely a statement that in the midst of the current political climate, it would not support the ISS beyond 2020. The announcement however has no real immediate bearing on the current status of the ISS. Headlines and popular discourse represented the news as America’s banishment, but Russia never indicated that it would cease providing Soyuz lift offs for astronauts anytime soon. And, given that Roscosmos is presently incapable of operating the ISS without Americans on the American wing of the station, it’s unlikely Russia ever will take action so long as it’s involved in the project. In the meantime, NASA, in conjunction with private companies including Boeing and SpaceX, will continue to develop its ability to launch crews and will likely be ready to take over the station with or without Russian cooperation by 2020.

The second major issue is that of the RD-180 engine. On the same announcement on May 13, 2014, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin vowed to fight back against US sanctions through the suspension of RD-180 engine sales to the United States for military purposes. These engines are used by the otherwise US manufactured Atlas V rockets, mostly for transporting commercial and military satellites to orbit. But suspension isn’t quite the detriment to national security it’s made out to be. The suspension has yet to be made concrete by Russian officials while the USAF maintains a two year stockpile in the case of supply breaks. Spokesmen from the United Launch Alliance, the Atlas V’s manufacturer, contend this period offers enough time to make a transition to the domestically produced Delta IV rocket family. (For information on the separate but relevant SpaceX court injunction please read: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2512/1)

So although recent political scuffles with Putin could have numerous negative consequences for the United States, the dissolution of the American space program isn’t one of them. The program’s inadequacies, expressed through popular media and conversations around the country, are mostly overblown and needlessly pessimistic. But, as the past as shown, it’s usually advantageous for the despondent public to become overly concerned about matters pertaining to space. The cynicism might be something to welcome.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff, editors, or governors.

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This week there will likely be a terrorist attack in Afghanistan – an attack that, like the recent one that left 15 dead, will target civilians, Afghan police, and/or NATO peacekeepers. In the same time period, the number of US soldiers killed in action will likely rise from 2,170 to 2,180. These events will occur as US officials assess Afghanistan’s ability to fend off insurgencies amid seemingly unending bombings, kidnappings, and wavering support for the war both at home and abroad. If, after 12 of years fighting, these are the meager results of thousands of lives lost and trillions of dollars spent, one may wonder: “was it worth it?”

Typically, the answer is an assessment of the War in Afghanistan through a security perspective – how safe is the US from terrorist threats or how stable is the Afghan government from Taliban insurgents? But this approach ignores a critical angle I’d like to address: the Afghani people.

13 years ago, Afghanistan was in the midst of conflict – a conflict that began with a communist coup in 1978, was precipitated by the Soviet invasion in 1979, and was furthered by a decade of civil conflict starting in 1992. America’s intervention in 2001, if even for questionable reasons, reduced unending violence and allowed for the first serious reconstruction efforts since 1978.

Since 2001, life expectancy in Afghanistan has risen by as much as 18 years per person while GDP has increased tenfold and billions of dollars of foreign aid have been unlocked. Similar improvements can be observed through other metrics such as infant mortality, which despite seeing little improvement during the 1990s, dropped by 50% after the Taliban’s fall.

Additionally, it is difficult to ignore the swell of liberties and political rights acquired by the average Afghan since America’s invasion. In the Taliban’s Afghanistan just 13 years ago, women were oppressed on historically unprecedented levels while everything from parakeets to public laughter was outright banned. Public beatings, shamings, and executions were not uncommon and though enforcement of laws was often uneven and arbitrary, these laws suffocated economic activity. Discriminatory policies and mismanagement of public facilities resulted in the ineffectiveness of many accommodations, most notably medical services.

Moreover, when in power, the Pakistan-funded Taliban showed no regard for Afghan culture or history as it deemed countless invaluable cultural artefacts sacrilegious. Just several months before Operation Enduring Freedom began in October of 2001, the Taliban demolished a pair of Buddhist statues known as the Bamiyan Buddhas despite fierce international objection. The two statues, built 1500 years ago, were registered UNESCO World Heritage Sites.

America’s war in Afghanistan has also made way for a new democratic system. The elections in 2004 were the first Afghanistan had seen in decades and the 2014 elections have marked the first time that power was transferred democratically in Afghanistan. And though Afghanistan’s first two elections were marred by controversy (something not uncommon in countries so poor) this year’s election has seen few issues aside from the threat of Taliban violence. Record turnouts rates have shocked the world.

America’s war itself has not wrought the destruction many seem to think it has. In the period between 1978 and the present, over 2 million people were killed in Afghanistan. However, nearly all of these deaths occurred before the 2001 invasion. Of those deaths since 2001, three-quarters were attributed to the Taliban. Meanwhile increased access to aid and medical services has saved countless lives among Afghanistan’s poorest residents.

So in addition to deposing a sacerdotal tyranny, allied forces in Afghanistan have offered the country an end to decades of conflict, have established a representative government, and have given Afghanistan a chance for reconstruction. The Taliban is gone and, given new data suggesting that only 35% of Afghans have any sympathy for armed resistance groups like the Taliban, it seems unlikely to return. Three-quarters of Afghans claim to be better off now than during Taliban rule and the same number feel satisfied with the current government’s performance. So as American military officials plan the troop withdrawal later this year, Americans may argue over whether the war was worth it for the United States, but there’s no debate that it was for Afghanistan.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the Glimpse from the Globe staff and editorial board.

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