Regarding the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a set of 17 goals intended to provide quantitative data on each country’s development progress, Syria ranks 130th of 166 countries and territories. Syria particularly lags behind its regional counterparts in SDG 9 — “Industry, innovation and infrastructure” — and SDG 11 — “Sustainable cities and communities.” Overall, Syria’s progress is stagnant or worsening, with only 28.3% of the goals achieved or on track — however, even this figure is misleadingly positive, as the only improving indicators are misrepresentative of the country’s development as a whole.

Indicators dependent on economic prosperity inappropriately paint a success story; while decreases in import-related water consumption, fatalities and environmental hazards seem like progress, they are results of economic hardship. According to the WTO, Syria exported $12.2 billion a year before the war; in 2021, exports amounted to $739 million.

The only goals considered “achieved” or “on track” are SDGs 12 and 13, which relate to climate change. In 2021, Syria emitted carbon dioxide at a rate less than half of pre-war rates. Solid waste, sulfur dioxide emissions and nitrogen emissions have also decreased. While the UN describes SDG 13 as taking “​​urgent action to combat climate change,” this decrease is due to the war’s hindrance of industrial production rather than progressive policymaking. 

The most critical areas for Syrian development are SDG 8, “Decent work and economic growth;” SDG 9, “Industry, innovation and infrastructure;” and SDG 17, “Partnerships for the goals.” While other SDGs remain important, SDGs 8, 9 and 17 are more feasible to achieve while the war is still ongoing and develop symbiotically to achieve economic revitalization via regional reintegration – renormalizing relations with other Arab nations.  

While many indicators of SDG 8 lack data, it is noted that less than a fourth of Syrians have a bank account and unemployment has risen to 13.8%. Syria has yet to achieve any progress with SDG 9, with only 36% of the population accessing the internet and a mere 0.02% of GDP spent on research and development. Quality of transport and trade-related infrastructure is slightly better, ranking 2.51 on a scale of one to five, yet still behind the UN’s goal of 3.8. SDG 17 lacks data, with the only reported indicator being government spending on health and education which was 6.5% of GDP as of 2012, significantly lower than the UN’s goal of 15%.

Syria Today: Conflict, Weak Institutions and Economic Decline

The situation in Syria has been deteriorating, with the UN special envoy for Syria stating that the “needs of the Syrian people have reached the worst levels since the conflict began” due to sanctions, COVID-19, the Ukraine-Russia war, destroyed infrastructure, earthquakes and losing control of oil fields. 

Syria remains engrossed in a war of attrition amongst over a dozen militant groups and international actors. While violence has considerably reduced, a formal conclusion has yet to be reached and sporadic fighting remains. The government is highly fragmented as the official Syrian government only controls 70% of Syrian territory, with extremist groups commanding regions in the northwestern region of Idlib.

The war has destroyed nearly all of Syria’s infrastructure — roughly 90%. Since the beginning of the Assad regime, Syria has been dependent on oil, relying upon the state-owned Syrian Petroleum Company for much of its revenue. Because of the civil war, Syria has lost its oil fields to U.S.-backed Kurdish militants and now must import oil from Iran, imposing an extreme financial burden. 

While technically a presidential republic, the Syrian government operates as a highly authoritarian regime. The single ruling party, the Ba’ath Party, dominates Syrian politics with President Bashar al-Assad as chief of state and Prime Minister Hussein Arnous as head of government. According to Transparency International, Syria is the second most corrupt nation in the world. The civil war has presented opportunities for low-level corruption, as humanitarian aid is often misappropriated or used as leverage to manipulate recipients. 

Freedom House considers Syria “not free” and “one of the world’s most repressive regimes” due to corruption, forced disappearances, torture, arbitrary detainment and a near complete lack of civil society. There are neither fair elections nor legitimate opposition parties, and the government maintains a strong surveillance apparatus to punish dissenters. 

Syrian political institutions are weak, corrupt and secretive, neither conducive to democracy nor development and reflect a low quality of government that deploys systemic deprivation of human rights. The national legislative branch, the People’s Council, consists only of Ba’ath Party members. Legally, women hold the same political rights as men; however, they only fill 11.2% of the People’s Council seats and are excluded from actual decision-making. 

The judicial system is not impartial as both judges and prosecutors are required to belong to the Ba’ath Party. There is no due process, as military officers can try citizens in field courts outside the realm of legal standards, and many men, women and children are detained arbitrarily and in secrecy. There is no enforcement of equal treatment under the law as party members and affiliates receive preferential treatment.

The government maintains a centrally-planned economy, controlling key sectors such as energy, telecommunications and transportation. The banking system consists of state-owned and private banks led by the Central Bank of Syria, currently sanctioned by the United States. In July 2023, the central bank devalued the Syrian pound from 4,522 pounds to the dollar at the beginning of the year to 9,900. On the black market, the rate is now 15,000 pounds to the dollar, an acute increase from the pre-war rate of 47 pounds to the dollar. 

Syria’s currency has completely collapsed with inflation reaching 800% since the beginning of the war, leading many regions to use the Turkish lira instead. Because there are no minting facilities in rebel-controlled regions of Syria, the bills in circulation are physically falling apart and each merchant decides their value based on how intact they are.

In 2018, the World Bank (WB) reclassified Syria as a low-income country as its GDP shrunk to only 4.4% of its pre-war figures. Before the war, extreme poverty was “virtually nonexistent.” Now, 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line. The WB attributes this decline to mass deaths, destruction of physical capital, sanctions, the dissolution of economic networks and the rise of a black market – Syria exports illegal weapons and drugs, which have reportedly become Syria’s most valuable products. 

The International Community’s Response

The UN demands the Assad regime take accountability for its war crimes, allow humanitarian aid to reach vulnerable populations and institute reforms in the criminal justice system. This includes releasing unlawfully detained individuals, implementing due process, disclosing information on forcibly disappeared persons, holding those responsible for abuses accountable, ensuring legal protections for the internally displaced and halting the use of lethal force on dissenters. The ICC recommends other nations continue suspending relations with Syria until these requirements are met, while HRW calls on the UNSC to investigate and prosecute those responsible for war crimes and to sanction high-level Syrian officials. 

Syria addressed these recommendations at the 2020 UN High-Level Political Forum with a series of demands, most significantly the lifting of all economic and diplomatic sanctions, which, according to Syria, obstruct its legal “right to choose development paths” and are “preventing Syrian institutions from fulfilling its [sic] role in providing citizens with the necessities of living.” In response to its lagging SDG progress, Syria blamed “terrorism and external military interventions.” In return, Syria promised to uphold international law and encourage private sector, academic, civil society and media freedom. However, the OHCHR’s July 2023 findings of systemic rape, torture and forced disappearances discredit Syria’s pledged commitment, with the Human Rights Council declaring there is “no end in sight” to Syria’s international law violations.

At its core, the crisis in Syria is so deeply connected to systemic corruption, international meddling and a flawed economic system that approaches such as naming and shaming, financial aid and international ostracization do not address the systemic nature of the issue at hand. While violence has drastically decreased, the situation has worsened, which substantiates the idea that the war has revealed and exacerbated pre-existing structural issues, not created them. 

Echoing the UN, “the only sustainable solution” is a regime change. However, it is unlikely the Assads’ dynastic rule will be challenged anytime soon due to financial support from powerful nations like Russia and Iran, concession-free reentry into the Arab League and a lack of any political opposition.   

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In May 2023, Turkey began a large-scale humanitarian project in the Idlib and Aleppo governorates of Syria pledging the construction of about a quarter million housing units, commercial facilities, industrial areas, farming plots, schools and hospitals, spearheaded by President Recep Erdoğan and supported by the Qatar Fund for Development. The housing project pushed refugees displaced into Turkey to begin relocating back to their motherland, specifically to the 30km swathe of land along the northern Syrian–Turkish border created by Turkey to function as a demilitarized area known as the “safe zone.” The target amount of 240,000 permanent housing units is set to be finished by 2025, with 1 million refugees expected to be repatriated into Syria. In addition to this new program, Turkey has already built 75,000 25-square-meter briquette homes in Idlib and 107,000 in Aleppo within the past two years, housing over 6 million Syrians.

The new project is operating under the slogan “safe, voluntary and [honorable]returns,” and is most likely a result of the “temporary protected” status for Syrians which grants refuge that is temporary and thus volatile. According to Turkish Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu, “there is a serious demand for a voluntary and dignified return to this safe area.”

While Soylu has labeled this repatriation scheme “the most honorable project the human history will talk about” and “an exemplary step for the whole world, showing how humanitarian aid transforms into development in a region,” many have been skeptical of Turkey’s true intentions. 

The validity of this “serious demand” expressed by Soylu has been contested by a myriad of international sources including the UNHCR, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW). The UNHCR reported in 2023 that although over half of Syrian refugees hope to return one day, a mere 1.1% planned to do so within the next year. 

In 2019, the Turkish government began forcibly deporting refugees back to Idlib, an area marred with violence. Police scoured public areas and raided apartments, searching for Syrians with and without temporary protection cards. While Turkey insisted its actions were legal, Turkish and international law — under the principle of non-refoulement — prohibit forced deportation to active war zones under any circumstances “irrespective of migration status.” 

While in custody, Turkish officials coerced detained Syrian refugees to sign statements expressing their desire to repatriate, under the threat of imprisonment. If able to re-enter Turkey, deported refugees who did have Turkish identification documents found their validity had been canceled. Whether or not the zone is actually safe is also a matter of contention, with major international organizations including HRW condemning the Turkish safe zone as “anything but,” describing it as “woefully misguided,” “dangerous” and “bound to fail.”

Many are concerned that the safe zone simply is not safe, as it is rife with violence. With 12,000 ISIS fighters imprisoned in the safe zone’s easternmost governorate of Al-Hasakah, the area is a prime target for rebel groups and armed uprisings — such as the 2022 ISIS prison break, the “most significant” assault since its inception. 

Additionally, safe zones as a concept have been notoriously counterintuitive. According to HRW, militants are known to take advantage of safe zones, intermingling with civilians to attempt to avoid retaliation, turning the area into a “valid military target.” Additionally, safe zones are lucrative sources of humanitarian aid, which combatants can easily steal. They also serve as ripe recruiting grounds for extremist organizations.  

President Erdoğan is managing a two-level political game, juggling both domestic and international concerns. Regardless of these criticisms, free housing and resources are not entirely negative endeavors. Erdoğan is incentivizing Syrians to act in a way beneficial to their long-term development — taking advantage of resources that will ultimately lead to a sense of stability and safety —– and furthering his domestic and international agendas. 

Regarding Turkish domestic politics, Erdoğan established this plan in the midst of the country’s 2023 presidential elections. His opponent Kemal Kilicdaroglu campaigned on a platform of sending “all the refugees home,” reflecting popular anti-refugee sentiment, so a similar message was necessary on Erdoğan’s behalf if he wanted to compete with Kilicdaroglu. Instead of publicly forcing refugees to return home, he attempted to bolster both his domestic image as a stern advocate for Turkish nationalism and international image as a humanitarian by proposing the free housing solution instead. 

In addition to improving his international reputation, his building schemes solidified the establishment of the “safe zone,” as Turkish building projects bolster Turkish influence in the region. This move also supports Turkish imperial interests and the rise in pan-Turkism, a growing nationalist ideology that “emphasizes the common ethnic, cultural, and linguistic roots of Turkic peoples living across Eurasia,” regardless of Turkish nationality. 

Before the inception of the new project, the Syrian government issued a statement in 2022 “[rejecting]these plans” and labeling them as “criminal projects.” Although the Syrian government is viewed as highly corrupt and not necessarily concerned with the best interests of the Syrian people, it is worth noting their stern opposition to the plan. Echoing concerns from the international community, Syria declared, in relation to the housing project, that “the main objective is colonialism.” Considering that Turkey has maintained a violent occupation of northern Syria since 2016, fears of continued land-grabs are not unfounded.  

Whether or not Syrians would repatriate into Syria without the force of the Turkish government or the incentive of free housing is unclear, but it is safe to say that the temporary safe place provides respite for the refugees, especially since the Syrian war persists, with rebel group strongholds as prevalent as ever. Thus, while the housing project is a potential positive step in Syrian repatriation, it is not unreasonable to scrutinize Turkey’s questionable underlying motives and reexamine the actual benefits of safe zones. 

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Since the breakup of Yugoslavia and the ensuing war, governance over Kosovo has remained a contentious topic in global affairs, with international oversight providing much of its legal infrastructure alongside local power brokers. Many of these local leaders have direct ties to the nominally dissolved Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a group designated as a terrorist organization in multiple countries. Among these leaders is Kosovo’s first elected prime minister Hashim Thaçi, one of the founders of the KLA who is currently awaiting trial for war crimes in The Hague.

Cooperation between international actors and local leaders to orchestrate a peaceful transfer of power has required carefully redefining the relationship with the KLA “from ‘terrorists’ to ‘partners.’” As of now, the UN is gingerly withdrawing from Kosovo one agency at a time while balancing international and domestic issues. Establishing Kosovo’s legitimacy will require restructuring of economic and political institutions, international cooperation and long-term conflict mitigation plans. Through sustainable, mutually beneficial and calculated policy implementation that strengthens Kosovo internally, we will see an end to, in the words of international relations professor at the University of Southern California Dr. Douglas Becker, the “international presence [in Kosovo]no one wants.” 

The KLA is a nationalist Kosovar-Albanian militia founded in 1993 as a response to Serbian state-backed violence against students protesting for Kosovar independence. Starting as a small, disorganized group of around 150 men, the KLA quickly became “one of the most successful military organizations in history,” as well as one of the most brutal. As Kosovar nationalism rose, more and more people joined the KLA in taking up arms against Serbia. 

During the following years of conflict, the KLA were not only perpetrators of war crimes—including systemic torture, rape and forced expulsion—but also an organized crime ring. Much of the KLA’s funding came from human trafficking, organ trafficking, sex slavery, money laundering, illegal weapon smuggling, counterfeit currency, migrant smuggling, fraud and drug trade, with an estimated 80% of all heroin headed into Europe passing through the hands of the KLA in 1999. 

When the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia officially ended in June 1999, the KLA filled the subsequent power vacuum. However, they were quickly replaced after the 1999 Security Council resolution 1244 gave jurisdiction of Kosovo to the UN, creating the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and establishing United Nations Administered Kosovo, a time period in which the UN was essentially the Kosovar government. The UNMIK took charge of virtually all government functions in Kosovo, facilitating elections, issuing legal identification documents, adjudicating criminal cases, policing and overseeing immigration. 

By 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, developed a constitution and elected its first prime minister, Hashim Thaçi, ultimately ending UN Administered Kosovo and creating the Republic of Kosovo. As part of their agreement to recognize Kosovo’s independence, the U.S. and EU required oversight by international presences; thus, UNMIK remains a supportive actor in ensuring peace, normalcy and community-building in collaboration with 16 other UN agencies and partners. 

Locally, most political figures are former members of the disbanded KLA, including current prime minister Albin Kurti. Some claim to have abandoned their criminal past while others have faced charges of war crimes, such as Kosovar prime ministers Hashim Thaçi, Agim Çeku and Ramush Haradinaj. An investigation conducted by the Council of Europe found that even while acting as prime minister, Thaçi still controlled much of organized transnational crime, relying upon illegal activities for government expenditures. Although the KLA is officially dissolved, its members have reassembled in one of the main political parties, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). Prime Minister Kurti has openly declared that “the Kosovo Police is a continuation of the liberation army.” KLA dominance presents a massive issue for the prospect of complete UN withdrawal due to its unsustainable nature and criminal history. While decreasing, organized crime remains intertwined in Kosovar politics, with the U.S. Department of the Treasury blacklisting multiple Kosovar politicians and security officials linked to transnational organized crime as recently as 2021.

The UN, European Union and United States are desperate to withdraw: Kosovo presents a major liability for the international actors involved due to the criminal background of the local actors with whom they are collaborating. The United States views UNMIK as having fulfilled its purpose, and states that “a peacekeeping mission [is]no longer necessary.” International involvement is unfavorable for the people of Kosovo as well, inhibiting their desire for international recognition and sovereignty. Serbia also dislikes the international presence and does not recognize the majority of the agencies in Kosovo as legitimate, instead viewing them as an imposition upon their own sovereignty. Logistically, the oversight has simply drawn on much too long and cannot be maintained in the long term. 

Thus, the UN is working to strengthen local political, legal and economic institutions to wean Kosovo off international support. Additionally, efforts are underway to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia, including promoting Serbian and Albanian language learning, assisting families of missing persons and providing free legal aid and language interpretation to allow for a smoother transition of power and a peaceful future for the region. According to the UN, a facilitated, gradual withdrawal from Kosovo is the best approach to end this deeply undesired international presence. 

However, tensions have risen within the last few months, amounting to “the worst escalation of violence in years,” with Serbia deploying tanks and artillery to the Kosovar border, prompting the U.K. to send 200 troops to support the current NATO presence. This uptick is the result of a dispute over license plates, with Kosovo demanding Serbian license plates turned over in favor of Kosovar plates to demonstrate a sovereign, united Kosovar state. Ethnic Serb mayors in northern Kosovo resigned in protest of this demand, further contributing to unrest and lawlessness and reinvigorating Serbs’ desires to establish autonomous Serb-majority municipalities within Kosovo. This move and the reaction to it proves nationalism and ethnic identity disputes remain unresolved issues.   

Seeing as the status quo is undesired by all parties involved, any potential resolution would necessitate the complete withdrawal of international forces. However, given the recent developments in conflict, such a withdrawal must be orchestrated in a gradual and calculated manner. A sustainable, mutually beneficial plan should be executed through three main tenets: economic and institutional restructuring, international cooperation and long-term conflict management plans. 

A major hurdle to Kosovar legitimacy is government corruption. The UN must incentivize legal economic activities to dissuade organized criminal activity. Kosovo is well-endowed in natural resources including fertile farmland. The UN should provide agricultural training, subsidies and supplies to reinvigorate this sector and help establish multilateral trade agreements as well as a conducive market environment, which would allow Kosovar goods to be competitive on a global scale. Additionally, farming was a major part of Kosovo’s medieval identity and revitalizing this industry could appeal to Kosovar nationalists. Opportunities for professional development, such as job training, higher education and English lessons should also be installed. 

Politically, legal and lucrative economic opportunities should automatically lessen corruption. Through education, the general public should become more aware of their human rights and therefore more likely to elect transparent officials who better protect these rights. However, the UN should also lead crackdowns on political criminals and help restructure political institutions to eliminate opportunities for future corruption. 

International recognition could also be enhanced if Kosovo were to abandon transnational crime and join the global economy. Countries are more likely to support relationships from which they benefit economically, and if Kosovo can become an international bread basket, especially during a time when the agriculturally crucial country of Ukraine is under attack, they can establish themselves as a critical ally and trade partner. 

Additionally, the UN should advocate for Kosovar recognition within the general assembly. Although the chances of gaining Russian approval are extremely slim, other nations such as Argentina, India and Greece may be more likely to change their views. With increased recognition, Kosovo can operate as a strong de facto state or even an internationally recognized country—Taiwan, for instance, is unrecognized by UNSC member China, yet is still internationally recognized as a sovereign nation. 

A long-term conflict mitigation plan is crucial in preserving an auspicious future for Kosovo. In establishing political institutions, the UN should coordinate between Kosovar Serbs and Albanians to create a joint association to guarantee cooperation. If this matter is not addressed, Kosovo will remain vulnerable to issues like the license plate dispute, where something as seemingly mundane as license plates led to a violent conflict due to a lack of resolution regarding underlying disagreements regarding ethnic identity. The UN must work in conjunction with both ethnic communities to establish institutions and promote long-term collaboration. 

Rather than staying idle in the present, the UN must start actively pursuing a sustainable future by implementing mechanisms that will provide Kosovo strength for decades to come. By redirecting Kosovar interests towards lucrative economic pursuits, the Kosovar government can become more legitimate and capable, garner revenue to strengthen internal political institutions, secure trade partners to embed them into the global economy and establish international allies to validate their sovereignty. If the parties restructure economic and political institutions, pursue international recognition and set long-term conflict mitigation strategies in place, the international community can finally withdraw from Kosovo and put an end to an international presence no one wants.

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